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
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
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
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
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[Part 1

RĀJAŚEKHARA

By S. K. DE

RĀJAŚEKHARA, son of Darduka (or Duhika) and Śilavatī, is never too modest to speak of himself; and from his works we know a great deal about him, his family, his patrons and his career as a poet and dramatist.¹ He belonged to the Yāyāvara family, in which were born poets and scholars like Surānanda, Tarala, Kavirāja and Akāla Ja'ada, the last named person, famed in Anthologies, being his great-grandfather. His ancestors lived in Mahārāṣṭra², but he himself must have spent much of his life in the midland as the preceptor (Upādhyāya) of the pratihāra king Mahendrapāla and his son Mahipāla of Mahodaya (Kanauj)

¹ For a detailed account of Rājaśekhara's life and times, see V.S. Apte, *Rājaśekhara: his Life and Writings*, Poona 1886; F. Kielhorn in *EI*, i.162-79 and J.F. Fleet in *I.A.*, xvi.175-8; Sten Konow's ed. of *Karpūramāñjarī*, pp. 177-86 and Manomohan Ghosh's ed. of the same play, pp.lxv-lxii; S.K.De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i. 122-8. Also Hultzsch in *I.A.*, xxxiv. 177 f.

² Manomohan Ghosh, chiefly on linguistic grounds, doubts whether Mahārāṣṭra was Rājaśekhara's place of origin, but he allows that the poet's ancestors might have come to Madhyadeśa from some place in Mahārāṣṭra. Sten Konow's presumption of his connexion with the Cedi court is also doubted, because the name of the Cedi country does not occur in the geography of India given in Rājaśekhara's *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*.

and later on as a protégé of Yuvarāja, who has been identified with Yuvarāja I Keyūravarṣa, the Kalacuri, ruler of Tri-purī. The poet's wife, Avantisundarī, was an accomplished Kṣatriya lady of Cahuān family, whom he quotes with respect in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* and for whose pleasure his *Karpūramañ-jarī* was composed. But since marriage beneath one's own caste is not forbidden for a Brāhmaṇa, the fact need not imply that Rājasekhara himself was a Kṣatriya; on the other hand, his Kṣatriya descent is not negated by his quite compatible position as an Upādhyāya, or by that of his father as the Mahāmantrin of some unnamed king. That Rājasekhara was a man of wide learning admits of little doubt; and he appears to have composed a large number of works. In his *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa* (1.2) he describes himself as Bāla-kavi and author already of six works, while in his *Karpūramañ-jarī* the style of Bāla-kavi is repeated with the addition of the proud title Kavirāja, which he himself considers to be higher than that of a Mahākavi. If he began his career as a Bāla-kavi, apparently given to him from the word Bāla occurring in the names of his two epic plays, then these were presumably his early productions; but the question whether his *Karpūramañ-jarī* or his *Viddha-sālabhaṇṇikā* was the last is difficult to determine.³ Of his six earlier works mentioned in the *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa*, the lost *Hara-vilāsa*, a Kāvya, mentioned and quoted by Hemacandra⁴ and Ujjvaladatta⁵, may have been one. Besides his four plays, he also wrote a general work on poets and poetry, named *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*⁶, in which there is a reference to another work of his, called *Bhuvana-*

³ The chronological order of Rājasekhara's work is uncertain. See besides Sten Konow and Ghosh cited above, V.V.Mirashi in *Pathak Commemoration Volume*, Poona 1934, p. 359 f.

⁴ *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, ed. NSP 1901, Commentary p.335.

⁵ *Uṇādi-vṛtti*, ed. Th. Aufrecht, Bonn 1859, on ii.28.

⁶ Ed.C.D. Dalal, GOS, Baroda 1916. On this work see S.K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i.125 f; ii. 366 f; French Trs. with notes etc. by Nadine Stchoupak and Louis Renou, Paris 1946.

kośa, for information on general geography. From his explicit references to Mahendrapāla, Mahīpāla and Yuvarāja, his date has been fixed with some certainty at the last quarter of the 9th and the 1st quarter of the 10th century. This date is supported by the fact that the latest writers quoted by Rājasekhara are the Kashmirian Ratnākara and Ānandavardhana, both of whom belong to the middle of the 9th century, while the earliest writer to mention Rājasekhara appears to be the Jaina Somadeva, whose *Yasastilaka* is dated in 960 A.D.⁷

In his *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa*⁸ which loosely dramatises in ten Acts the entire story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* up to Rāma's coronation, Rājasekhara perpetrates, both by its bulk and execution, and appalling monstrosity of a so-called drama. Like Murāri, who was probably one of his predecessors, he makes the mistake not only of choosing, with little dramatic adaptation and less poetic power, a bannal epic theme, but also of attempting to outdo his predecessors⁹ in scattering, through its entire length, the debris of a too fertile talent, which, in the shape of unending quantities of descriptive and sentimental verses, come up to a total of more than seven hundred and forty! Even the Prologue

⁷ Rājasekhara's plays are also cited anonymously in the *Daśa-rūpaka*, and Rājasekhara is mentioned in the *Udayasundarī-kathā* of Soddhala composed about the same time (990 A.D.). Some of the Anthology verses (Thomas, *Kavīndra-vacana-samuccaya*, pp. 81-92) are traceable in his four plays, but a large number remains untraced. The untraced memorial verses on Sanskrit poets in Jahlaṇa's *Sūkti-mukta-valī* may or may not belong to him.

⁸ Ed. Govindadev Śāstri, Benares 1869 (reprinted from the *Pandit*, Old Series, iii, 1868-9); ed. Jivānanda Vidyasagar, Calcutta 1884; ed. with comm. of Lakṣmaṇa sūri, Tanjore 1899. But a good critical edition is still desirable.

⁹ Indebtedness to Bhavabhūti is expressly acknowledged, and unmistakable evidence of imitation has been shown by Apte, *op. cit.* p. 37 f.; but there can be little doubt that Murāri's poetically extravagant and prolix play, the *Anargha-rāghava*, also served as Rājasekhara's model.

itself, which contains, with its twenty stanzas,¹⁰ a voluble account of himself and his indiscernible merits, reaches almost to the dimension of an Act, while each of the ten Acts, averaging more than seventy verses and once running up to one hundred, has almost the bulk of a small drama in itself. It has been calculated that more than two hundred stanzas are in the long Śārdūlavikrīḍita metre and about ninety in the still longer Sragdharā. It is a wonder how such a huge play could have been brought on the stage; but the author takes an evident pride in its bulk (I.12), and recommends it for *reading* for whatever merit may be found in its diction. In the construction of plot, some variation is shown by making Rāvaṇa's misdirected passion for Sitā the prime cause of his feud, the feud itself being conceived, not originally but after Bhavabhūti, as the central motif. This substitution, however, of love and longing for mock-heroic ferocity is hardly an improvement. Rāvaṇa, with his amorousness and his disappointed hope, becomes more ludicrous than impressive, and it is not surprising that Paraśurāma, instead of lending him assistance, insults him openly. The duplicacy of Mālyavat is also repeated from Bhavabhūti's *Mahāvīra-carita* with some slight variation, such as the device of bringing about the banishment of Rāma by Mantharā and a demon in the disguise of Kaikāyī and Daśaratha¹¹. The contrivance of a play within a play is also borrowed in Act iii from Harṣa and Bhava-

¹⁰ The prolixity of some of the later decadent dramatists is seen in the length of their boastful Prologues, in which they appear to vie with one another. Murāri is moderate in having only 13 stanzas, but Rājaśekhara has (in his *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa*) 20, and Jayadeva 23. The total number of verses in the *Uttara-rāma-carita* is reckoned to be two hundred and fiftyfive and that of *Anargha-rāghava* to be nearly five hundred and forty.

¹¹ The device of tricking by disguise is found also in Bhavabhūti; but the ludicrous extreme to which it can be carried is seen in the *Jānakī-pariṇaya* of Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita (17th century), where

bhūti. Rāvaṇa pines away with hopeless *crève-cœur*; and for his amusement a troupe of actors which visits his palace enacts, by happy or unhappy chance, a miniature play on the betrothal of Sītā to Rāma; the realism of the scene infuriates Rāvaṇa, and the play is interrupted. The scene is not ineffectively conceived; but the motif is farcically repeated by a second cruder effort, in Act V, to amuse Rāvaṇa by means of marionettes dressed up as Sītā, with speaking parrots inside! The idea, however, seems to have pleased the author, for he again utilis s the head of a similar speaking marionette, representing the severed head of Sītā, as a part of Mālyavat's stratagem to frighten the enemies. Rāvaṇa's Viraha, in which he demands tidings of his beloved in *furor poeticus* from nature, the seasons, streams and birds, is obviously a faint imitation of Purūrava's madness in the *Vikramorvaśīya*; but it is as unnecessary as it is tedious. The delineation of prolonged pathos of a spectacular sensibility, which Bhavabhūti set in vogue in his *Uttara-rāma-carita*, is evident here; but Rājasekhara has all the exaggeration but none of the tearful sadness of Bhavabhūti. The narrative thereafter drags on with a profusion of description, and there is little action throughout, most of the incidents being (after Murāri) reported or described rather than directly represented. The longest and most actionless Act is the last, in which the aerial journey of Rāma and his party to Ayodhyā is, no doubt, suggested by *Raghu-vamśa* xiii and the last Act of the Vulgate text of the *Mahāvīra-carita*; but it is directly modelled on the last Act of Murāri's *Anargha-rāghava*. The route is spread not only over a large number of terrestrial places, but also considerably diversified, deliberately for the purpose of

Rāvaṇa, Śaraṇa, Vidyujjihva and Tātakā appear in disguise as Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Viśwāmītra and Sītā, so that a confusion arises when they meet, and results in a cheap comedy of errors!

inserting descriptive stanzas, by transporting it to the celestial regions and the world of the moon, the poet surpassing himself in this enormous Act by composing nearly a hundred stanzas.

Rājasekhara's second epic play, the *Bāla-bhārata*¹², which is also called *Pracaṇḍa-pāṇḍava* (I.8), was probably projected, on the same scale and plan, to be a companion play on the Mahābhārata story; but, mercifully, it is left incomplete. Of the two Acts which remain, the first describes the Syayamvara of Draupadī; the second deals with the gambling scene, ill-treatment of Draupadī and departure of the Pāṇḍavas to the forest; but, with the exception of a few well turned verses, there is nothing remarkable in the fragment.

The two remaining plays are smaller works in four Acts and resemble each other in form and substance. The first, *Karpūramāñjarī*¹³, is called a Saṭṭ ka (i.6), and the second, *Viddha-sālabhāṇjikā*¹⁴, is a regular Nāṭikā; but the distinction does not appear to be substantial between the two types, except that the former is written entirely in Prakrit¹⁵. The theme in both the plays is the

¹² Ed. C. Cappeller, Strassburg 1885; ed. Durgaprasad and K.P. Parab, NSP, Bombay 1887 (included in their ed. of *Karpūramāñjarī*, see below).

¹³ Ed. Durgaprasad and K.P. Parab, with comm. (incomplete) of Vāsudeva, NSP, Bombay 1887 (also contains the *Bāla-bhārata*); ed. Sten Konow, with Eng. trs. and notes by C.R. Lanman, Harvard Orient. Series, Cambridge Mass. 1901; ed. Manomohan Ghosh, Calcutta Univ. 1939. Also ed. in the *Pandit*, Old series, vii (1872-73).

¹⁴ Ed. Vāmanācārya in the *Pandit*, Old Series, vi-vii (1871-73); ed. B.R. Arte, with comm. of Nārāyaṇa Dikṣita (18th century), Poona 1886; ed. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta 1873 and 1883; Eng. trs. by L.H. Gray in *J.AOS.* xxvii, 1906, pp. 1-71. A critical edition of this work is also desirable.

¹⁵ The author himself states that the only difference is that the connecting scenes (Praveśaka and Viṣkambhaka) are wanting in the Saṭṭaka. The definition of the *Sābitya-darpaṇa* is merely a generalisation of the characteristics of the present play. It is suggested that a distinct kind of dancing was used in it. This play is practically the only old example of the type we have.

traditional one of amorous intrigue of court-life, standardised by Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra* and popularised by Harṣa's two pretty playlets. The somewhat flat handling of the theme by Rājasekhara would have made his plays insignificant had there not been song, dance, poetry and sentiment, even if the poetry is mediocre and the sentiment puny. There is an attempt at novelty in some scattered scenes and incidents, but the influence of Harṣa's *Ratnāvalī* is unmistakable. The influence, however, has not proved advantageous; for, being weakly imitative, the treatment lacks vividness and coherence, the plot is poorly managed, and the characterisation is distinctly feeble. In the *Karpūramāñjarī* we have the banal story of king Caṇḍapāla's light-hearted, but extremely sentimental, amour with a lovely maiden of unknown status, the machinations of the Vidūṣaka and the maiden's girl-friend to bring about the meeting of the lovers who pine helplessly for each other, the jealousy of the queen and imprisonment of the heroine by her, the final union and the queen's acceptance of the situation with the discovery that the heroine is a Kuntala princess and her cousin and that marriage with her would lead to her husband's attainment of paramount sovereignty. The important variations are that there is no plotting minister behind the scheme, that the heroine is brought on the scene and into the palace by the Tāntric powers of the queen's spiritual guide, Bhairavānanda, that the king's access to the imprisoned girl is secured by a subterranean passage, that another such passage enables the prisoner to play an amusing but silly game of hide-and-seek with the queen, and that queen is made to consent to the union by a hardly worthy trick played upon her by her own preceptor Bhairavānanda.

We have the same general scheme of courtly comedy in the *Viddha-sālabhañjikā*; but the intrigue is perhaps more

varied between the two plays of Rājasekhara than between the two similar plays of Harṣa. The unknown maiden, of course, turns out in the end to be a cousin becoming co-wife; but a better device is adopted in making her a hostage sent by her royal father Candravarman of Lāṭa to the palace of king Vidyādharamalla in the disguise of a boy, with the change of her name from Mṛgāṅkāvalī to Mṛgāṅkavarman. We have the old ruse of the minister Bhāgurāyaṇa (an obvious copy of Yaugandharāyaṇa) in arranging matters in such a way that the king falls headlong in love with the beautiful maiden. This is achieved through the motif of a dream-vision, which, however, turns out to be an actual fact brought about by the minister's contrivance. The statue-device, from which the play takes its name, is in the same way not original, nor is it effectively employed as a central incident or motive. The entrance of the heroine is too long delayed, as she does not make her appearance till the middle of the third act and does not actually meet the king till a quarter of the fourth Act is over. The usual complications and luxuriant description of love, longing and secret meeting follow; and there is nothing remarkable in them, except the trick which the king's friend, the Vidūṣaka, plays on the queen's foster-sister Mekhalā and the queen's consequent design to avenge it by marrying the king to the boy of unsuspected sex, thereby outwitting herself by letting the king have what he desired. The last idea has points in its favour, but it is too much to make the dénouement follow from a puerile subsidiary incident concerning the Vidūṣaka alone, while the king is kept strangely in ignorance about the true import of the pretended marriage. As in his other plays, so also here, Rājasekhara's power of characterisation is not of a high order; as mouthpieces chiefly of descriptive or sentimental verse, the characters are well known and of fixed types. The pale and fragile heroines are charming indeed, but possess no individuality; while the king and the queen


are not as impressive and interesting as their prototypes, the gay and gallant Udayana and the dignified Vāsavadattā.

In spite of a certain individuality and distinction, it must be said that Rājasekhara's plays are essentially imitative ; the footmarks of Harṣa, Bhavabhūti and even Murāri improved upon what he has freely borrowed. It must be admitted that in his epic play Rājasekhara has more inventiveness than Murāri, if not more than Bhavabhūti; but like those of Murāri his style and treatment are chaotically poetic rather than sensibly dramatic: Rājasekhara claims the title of Bāla-kavi, as Murāri arrogates to himself the title of Bāla-Vālmiki, but he goes further in styling himself as Kavirāja and tracing his poetic descent from the Ādi-kavi through Bhartṛmenṭha and Bhavabhūti ! This is only a mournful example of a bad poet and still worse dramatist not hesitating to put his own price on himself. Rājasekhara's Rāma-drama, which mistakes quantity for quality, is an enormity in every sense. There is incredibly little action in a work which calls itself a drama; what we have is more or less, an epic succession of incidents panoramically reproduced without the consistency and compactness of dramatic presentation. It would perhaps be unjust to criticise his two comedies of court-intrigue equally severely for lack of dramatic quality and interest. Allowance should be made for the suggestion that they are conceived more as spectacular sentimental entertainments having a slight plot, than as well constructed plays, and that the main stress should be laid rather on beauty of diction and versification than on action and characterisation. But, apart from the fact that Rājasekhara's poetry is facile and shallow, his diction conventional and his ideas mostly borrowed or full of far-fetched conceits, his two small plays of court-life lack the main interest of a comedy of intrigue, which should depend on a succession of lively incidents and lightly sketched pictures. The elaborate anatomy of theatrical passion, set

forth in an equally elaborate mass of reflective and sentimental stanzas, is not only monotonous but also hampers and disorganises the little action which the plays possess. The majority of these verses are out of place from the dramatic point of view, but the illegitimate attraction of rhetorical poetry and tumid sentiment makes the author introduce them, chiefly for the purpose of unnecessary display of his vaunted skill and learning.

Rājaśekhara is conscious of this blemish of unnecessarily prolonged elaboration, which reaches its impossible limit in his *Bāla-rāmāyaṇa*, but he thinks (i.12) that the main question is excellence of expression. In actual practice, however, this excellence degenerates into a varied and ingenious stylistic exercise and an entire disregard of all sense of proportion and propriety. His *forte* is not dramatic construction, nor is his hand fully competent to create living characters, but it is his inordinate love of stylistic display that kills whatever reality and vividness there is in his attempts in these directions. The pallid heroes and faint heroines fail to be impressive by their sentimental effusiveness; Rāvaṇa, with his amorous and pseudo-heroic rant, is no better; Bhāgurāyaṇa is an insipid edition of Yaugandharāyaṇa; while his typical Vidūṣakas are tedious with their pointless jokes and still more tasteless antics. The aggravated form of pathos and sentiment becomes a muddle of the lachrymose and the rhetorical. In fairness, however, it must be said that Rājaśekhara can write elegant and swinging verses, and the introduction of song and dance diversifies the banality of his themes and metrical outpourings. He has a considerable vocabulary of fine words and a fund of conceits both in Sanskrit and Prakrit, which bear out his boast that he is a master of languages. His decided ability to handle elaborate metres in Sanskrit and Prakrit, especially his favourite Śārdūlavikrīḍita (to which must be added Sragdharā and Vasantatilaka), justly deserves Kṣemendra's

praise. Although his much lauded pictures of sunset, dawn and midday, or of the heroine's beauty of limbs and hero's love-lorn condition, or of battles and mythical places, lose their interest on account of their artificial character, yet his weakness for elaborate description gives us some heightened, but vivid, accounts of the various aspects of court-life, its pleasures and its luxury. But Rājasekhara, though posing as a critic, does not seem to possess much critical sense at least where his own works are concerned, nor even the grace to be ashamed of faults which he has not the virtue to avoid. His verses are often pleasant and always readable, but they are seldom touching. There is, as in most decadent Sanskrit poets, a vast amount of distress in what are meant to be pathetic scenes, but we read them comfortably without tears or undue emotion, unless, the sham-tragic lingo becomes too much for our patience. If, in spite of all this, he often writes finely, Rājasekhara flings out fine things and foolish things in *copia verborum* with equal enthusiasm or equal indifference. The rhetorician and anthologists abundantly quote his verses with considerable admiration (though not always without censure), but this only shows how later decadent taste could not properly distinguish between poetry and its make-believe; for even Rājasekhara's best passages seek and receive applause more by meretricious rhetorical contrivances than by genuine poetic quality. He deliberately models his style and even copies from the splendid examples of poetry and drama of his great predecessors, but he fails to transfer to his own works their ease and brilliancy.



TVANTOPĀDHYĀYA

(A long-lost name in the history of Navyanyāya)

By DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

JAYADEVA Miśra alias Pakṣadhara wrote the *Āloka* commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in the middle of the 15th century A.D. and at once earned a unique position among the contemporary scholars. His extra-ordinary eminence put to shade almost all the previous writers on Navyanyāya, whose works became extinct in no time. In our attempt to rescue the names of some of these long forgotten scholars of Mithilā we came across the extremely peculiar name of a scholar TVANTOPĀDHYĀYA—a name absolutely unknown uptil now. The discovery of this name, which is described below in exact details, is almost accidental and proves that a vast amount of materials for a history of Sanskrit literature is still lying hidden in the heaps of manuscripts in the private and public libraries. Collection of Sanskrit Mss and their cataloguing have proceeded more or less on stereotyped lines from the times of Sir William Jones. We venture to suggest that it is now high time to bring up the rare Mss from the stage of mere cataloguing to that of careful analysis. We state from personal experience that descriptive notes of Mss with extracts from beginning and end carry us nowhere near the vast riches that are in many cases unravelled by analysis. And, what is more important, sometimes stray leaves and scraps found within Mss (mostly thrown away as useless) lead us to unknown and welcome facts almost in a romantic manner. Such stray leaves which are found in heaps among manuscripts should be very carefully examined before they are destroyed.

Three years ago we thoroughly examined the Ms copy of the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* of a commentary named *Pakṣadharoddhāra* by Padmanābha Miśra, who was perhaps the greatest scholar of his age. The manuscript belonged to the B.O.R.I., Poona.¹ The actual name of the book is mentioned in fol. 39b : इति पक्षधरोद्धारे व्याप्तिनिरूपणम्. We have elsewhere² collected some new facts from Manuscript sources, which tend to show that like Pragalbha the Nyāya teacher of Padmanābha's father Balabhadra Miśra, the latter also belonged to Bengal. This is to some extent corroborated by the fact that in the *Pakṣadharoddhāra* Padmanābha not only refers to Pragalbha in extreme reverence e.g., fol. 13a:—अत एव तस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धरूपत्वेऽपि अवच्छेद्यान्यूनानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्ववत्येव तदिति परास्तमिति प्रगल्भचरणप्रवेशोऽपि न निस्तारायेति चेन्न . . . ;

fol. 14-5:—अत्र श्रीप्रगल्भा:—साध्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण यत्र तादृशधर्मवैयधिकारण्यावच्छिन्नत्वं नास्तीति प्रोचुः।

fol. 70a:—वस्तुतस्तु . . . इति प्रगल्भप्रसादादाकलयामः।

fol. 74a:—अत्र ब्रूमः— . . . इति स्वकीयं प्रगल्भभक्तिनिबन्धनं पन्थानम्।

and no Maithila scholar, it should be noted, ever paid such respects to Pragalbha, but in one place similarly expressed his devotion towards the great Bengali scholar (Vāsudeva) Sārvabhauma:—(fol. 28a) एवं च मिलितषट्द्वयं हि न पदार्थान्तरं किंतु

¹ MS. No 735 of 1887-91, fol. 90 entered in the list as '*Bhāva-prakāśa*.' The copy is incomplete stopping in the middle of the chapter on Hetvābhāsa. The book is extremely rare; we are aware of the existence of only another copy in the *Oriental Institute* Baroda—No. 11968, fol. 163; this copy goes to the end of *Anumanakhaṇḍa* omitting the *Īśvarānumāna*. We are, again, extremely grateful to the authorities of the B.O.R.I. and specially to Prof. P.K. Gode, curator of the Institute, for lending out this unique Ms. to us. The absence of such lending facilities in all the other Mss. libraries of India has been the greatest handicap to research scholars who work on Sanskrit Mss. We make bold to suggest that a uniform scheme of affording facilities to bona fide scholars should be adopted by all the libraries.

² *Vide* pp. 16-18 of the Introduction of an edition of *Puruṣottamadeva's Paribhāṣāṣṛṭti* etc. just (1946) published from V.R. Museum Rajshahi.

घटावेव, तत्र च यावद्विशेषाभावः प्रत्येकावृत्तिधर्मत्वादिति सार्वभौमभाषितं नामानुरूप-
भाषितमेव ।

In this commentary Padmanābha wrote learned discourses on favorite topics of Navyanyāya and one of them is a long note on (Vyāpti—) Siddhāntalakṣaṇa (fol. 22a-26a). Towards the end (f. l. 25b) we come across the following passage :—तथापि वद्विघटोभयवानसौ धूमादित्यत्रातिव्याप्तिं वारयितुं यदव-
च्छिन्नाधिकरणत्वावच्छेदेन साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यतया पूर्वप्रतीकवै-
यर्थ्यस्य त्वन्त-मते द्वेषणत्वादिति विचारसंक्षेपः । (The very unusual name found in the manuscript here looks like 'Tkanta', altogether a doubtful reading). Our suspicion that the name of one of the earliest commentators of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has been preserved in this passage turned into a conviction in a most unexpected manner. A couple of months ago we went to Trivenī (in the Hooghly district of Bengal) to examine what remained of the library of Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana (1694—1807 A.D.) the greatest scholar of his age in Bengal. A bundle of stray leaves was all that we could lay our hands upon, from which we recovered a very old copy in corypha leaves of Aniruddha's *Pitṛdayitā*. A stray palm-leaf torn at both ends was found in this copy containing a most interesting book list. We reproduce the whole of it below as a piece of direct evidence on the courses of advanced studies in Bengal in the middle of the 16th century. It is dated 'Sam 430, 23 Śrāvaṇa' evidently referring to the Lakṣmaṇa era which was adopted by the Nadia scholars from Mithilā. The date falls in the 5th decade of the 16th century A.D. The superscript reads 'Tālikā-pustaka-rakṣa-(ṇa) Nadia' (i.e., a list of books preserved at Nadia, the popular name of the city of Nava-dwīpa).

(Column 1) Kāvyaaprakāśa / Pūrvakhaṇḍana / Anumāna-
Miśra / Pratyakṣa-Kaṇṭako(ddhā)ra / Bauddhādhikāra // (5)
(Column 2) Śabdakhaṇḍa / Tattvāloka / Pratyakṣa-Miśra /
Vyavahā(ra)cintāmaṇi / Bauddhādhikāra-Saṅkaramiśra (5) //
(Column 3) Līlāvatyupāya (i.e. Līlāvatīprakāśa of Vardha-

māna) / Tat Jalada (i.e. comm. on-do-(the above) by Bhagīra-
tha whose surname was 'Megha', and 'Ja'ada' is again a
synonym of Megha) Kusumāñjalyupāya / Guṇa (i.e., the por-
tion of Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī on Guṇa) Śrāddhakalpa // (5)
(Column 4) Dravyopāya (i.e. Vardhamāna's comm. on the
Dravya part of Kiraṇāvalī / Kusumāñjali-Jalada / ŚABDA-
TVANTA / Guṇa- Jalada // (4)
(Column 5, torn) Guṇopā(ya) / Śabda-Gopī (nātha) Ācārā
(darśa) / Manu / Dra(vya ?) // (5)

The list is a good evidence that the Bengali scholars at that
time assiduously studied all up-to-date Maithila works,
specially on Navyanyāya. The mention of *Pratyakṣa-Kaṇ-
tā-koddhāra* by Madhusūdana Thakkura is important as
indicating the later limit in the date of its composition. The
mention of 'Śabda-Tvanta' (the reading is quite clear and
beyond any doubt) is certainly the most valuable feature
of the list. It proves that the long-forgotten Maithila)
scholar Tvanta wrote a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,
of which the last part (Śabda-khaṇḍa) was procured for
the private library of a scholar of Nadia. Padmanābha's
reference is to the second part of the same commentary. At
the present state of our knowledge this Tvantopādhyāya
happens to be the earliest known commentator on Gaṅgeśa's
Tattvacintāmaṇi for he preceded both Jayadeva Miśra
(Pakṣadhara) and Śaṅkara Miśra as we shall presently see.

*Tvantopādhyāya's commentary on the Kusumāñjali named
Makaranda.*

The Kārikās of *Kusumāñjali* were commented upon,
among others, by Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma and this
'Rāmabhadri' was extensively studied in the Nyāya semi-
naries of Bengal till the last century. In a printed list of
text books dated 1889 A.D. for the different Sanskrit exami-
nations held at Navadvīpa a part of the 'Rāmabhadri' is pre-
scribed as a text for the Title examination in Nyāya (p. 6)
This Rāmabhadra was a son of the famous Jānakinātha

Bhaṭṭācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi author of the *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*. He mentioned his father's name in most of his works, e.g., 1) in the beginning of the *Nyāyarahasya*, श्रीमद्वाचार्यचूडामणितनय इव रामभद्रस्तनोति. This commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras* goes to the end of Ch pter IV only, where the colophon runs—इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीमद्वाचार्यचूडामणितनयश्रीमद्वाचार्य-सार्वभौम-रामभद्रविनिर्मितं न्याय-रहस्ये चतुर्थोऽध्यायः (fol. 120b of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manuscript. No. 9 of the *Sararvatī-Bhavana*, Benares. The commentary on chapter V proves on examination to be a separate work named *Amṛkṣikī-tattvavivaraṇa* by Rāmabhadra's father Bhaṭṭācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi himself (*Vide Sāhitya-Pariṣat-Patrikā*, Vol. 51, pp. 69-70). In the beginning of the *Guṇarahasya*:—

चूडामणेश्चार्किकाणां पुत्रैर्गुणरहस्यकम् ।

रामभद्रसार्वभौमभद्राचार्यैर्विधीयते ॥

(v. 2, Ms. in our possession)

(3) In the beginning of a small work on smṛti named *Samayarahasya* :—

हरिहरचरणौ पितरं तार्किकचूडामणिं नत्वा ।

क्रियते समयरहस्यं श्राद्धानां सार्वभौमेन ॥

(Ms. in our possession)

(4-5) In a well known verse in the beginning of Rāmabhadra's *Padārthatattva Tīkā* (Benares Ed., p. 81) and *Nañvāda-Tīkā* R. A. S. B. Ms. no. III. G. 148, a unique copy dated 1597 Śaka):—

तातस्य तर्कसरसीरुहकान्तेषु, चूडामणेश्चिन्तनमणेश्चरणौ प्रणम्य ।

श्रीरामभद्रमुकुतीकृतिनां हिताय, लीलावशात् किमपि कौतुकमातनोति ॥

all doubts about the identity of Rāmabhadra and his father should now be finally dissolved (cf. *J.H.Q.*, xx, pp. 190-92). The strange introductory verses found in the beginning of Rāmabhadra's *Kusumāñjali-kārikā Vyākhyā* in all available Ms. copies—and we have examined scores of them—which created a baffling problem before two generations of scholars, must now be regarded as the composition of some scholar other than Rāmabhadra. The first verse of benediction (आमोदैः परितोषितः) has been traced in the *Amoda*, a commentary on the whole of *Kusumāñjali* (and not on the *kārikās* alone)

by the famous Śaṅkara Miśra of Mithilā, whose parents are again unmistakeably invoked in the second verse :—

भवानी-भवनायाभ्यां पितृभ्यां प्रणमाम्यहम् ।

यत्प्रसादादिदं शास्त्रं करक्षीरोपमं कृतम् ॥

Śaṅkara has referred to his father Bhavanātha's instructions in many of his works, e.g., *Vādivinoda*, *Līlāvatī-Kaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *Upaskāra*. It was MM. Dr. Gopinātha Kavirāja who first discovered a superscript in a Ms. copy of the 'Rāmabhadri' (fol. 6a, इत्यन्तं शंकरमिश्रकृतं ततः सार्वभौमीयम्), which clearly stated that the first 4 or 5 leaves of the book were of Śaṅkara Miśra's composition and the rest Sārvaabhauma's. (*Ku-umāñjali-Bodhanī*, S.B. Text, Introd., pp., II-III f.n.) The 'Rāmabhadri', has been published in the 'Āśutoṣa Sanskrit Series' of the Calcutta University (edited by prof. N.C. Vedāntatīrtha). There is indelible evidence in the commentary itself that it is a medley of two different compositions. The fourth kārīkā ('sāpekṣatvāt. . . .') is introduced *twice* in two different places, once on p. 11 (falling under Śaṅkara Miśra's portion of the commentary) thus :—तत्र चार्वाकस्येदमाकूतं, नहि कारणत्वं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं दण्डादौ दृष्टेऽपि तत्र सन्देहात्. . . . कथमेवमत आह—सापेक्षत्वादिति । It should be noticed that the prose line immediately preceding the kārīkā is explained in this portion. On pp. 13-14 again we read, तत्र चार्वाकस्यायं भावः, कार्यकारणभावे न तावत् प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं कारणतायाः संभावनयैव तदुपपत्तेरत्राह—सापेक्षत्वाद् । Here the explanation of the prose line is omitted and the rest of the earlier gloss is presented in a more elaborate and improved language. We should mention that this twice repeated explanation is found in all the Ms. copies we have examined including two in our own possession. That the earlier part was from the pen of Śaṅkara Miśra is directly stated in three more manuscripts we have examined. We are in possession of a very old copy where it is written distinctly in the margin of the front page, 'Śaṅkaramiśrasya *Ku-umāñjalivyākhyā*' and on fol. 5a after लिगादेरभावादिति the portion अत आह. . . . सापेक्षत्वादिति is cancelled by

smearing yellow pigment upon which it is written clearly इत्यंता श्रीमच्छंकरमिश्रकृता कुमुदाजिह्विकारिकाव्याख्या । अतःपरं सार्वभौमीया । In the ancestral library of the late Paṇḍita Dakṣiṇācāraṇa Smṛtīrtha of Calcutta we found another copy where it is written (fol. 6a) लिगादेरभावात् इत्यन्तं शंकरमिश्रीयं ततः सार्वभौमीयं । Yet another copy was examined by us in a village Sātgeche in the Burdwan district among the remnants of a magnificent library which belonged to (Rāma-) Dulāla Tarkavāgīśa (1731—1815 A.D.) one of the greatest Naiyāyikas of Bengal, whose '*Patrikāś*' on Navyanyāya became popular at one time throughout India. On fol. 5a it is written, मापेक्षत्वादिति । इति शंकरमिश्रकृतं समाप्तं अतःपरं सार्वभौमीयं । This earlier portion, however, is *not* identical with the extent *Amoda* commentary of Śaṅkara. Why this is so and what became of the first part of Rāmabhadra's own commentary will never perhaps be known and are likely to remain an unsolved mystery. * Such mysteries are not; however, unusual perhaps in an age when printing was yet unknown and publication of books was a very difficult craft indeed without evidently any organisation to cater to it. As an instance of yet another great mystery we may state that we are now in possession of a very good evidence to show that the celebrated book *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with its commentary the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* was *not and could not have been written by Viśvanātha Pañcānana*, to whom it is universally ascribed.¹

The third verse in the beginning of Śaṅkara Miśra's part of the *Rāmabhadri* is as follows:-

मकरन्दे प्रकाशे या व्याख्या परिमलेऽथवा ।

ततोऽधिकं पितृव्याख्यामाख्यातुमयमुद्यमः ॥

Of the three earlier commentaries on the *Kusumāñjali* mentioned in this important verse the *Prakāśa* by Vardhamāna is long available in print. The '*Parimala*' is by Divākaropādhyāya and a direct commentary on the text and not a sub-

¹ (Vide I.H.Q., XVII, pp. 241-44).

commentary on the *Prakāśā* as is sometimes supposed. Rucidatta cited from it five times in the *Prakāśa-Makaranda* (Benares Ed., 1912, I, p. 22-23, III, p. 21, IV, p. 1, v. p. 10); the language of one of these notes (तथा च परिमलसंवादोक्तिं वदन्ति I. 23) clearly suggests that it was an independent gloss like the *Prakāśa* and Rucidatta cited it second hand from a previous writer. A fragment of the *Parimala* has been discovered (*vide Pattana Mss.*, Vol. I, Intro., p. 43), but remains like many other valuable works beyond the reach of scholars. We shall attempt in a subsequent paper to give an account of Divākaropādhyāya, who was one of the greatest pre-Gaṅgeśa scholars of Mithilā.

Who was the author of the *Makaranda*, mentioned in this list by Śaṅkara Miśra? Not certainly Rucidatta, the author of the sub-commentary *Prakāśa-Makaranda*, who as a direct pupil of Jayadeva Miśra (Pakṣadhara) was at least one generation later than Śaṅkara Miśra. In fact this *Makaranda* is an earlier commentary directly on the *Kusumārjali* and we have traced a citation from it in the *Pratyakṣāloka* of Jayadeva (towards the end of 'Prāmāṇyavāda') :- अतएव मकरन्दे अन्वयासद्वेति न पक्षविशेषणतया व्याख्यातमिति । (fol. 28a of a very old copy with us). Jayadeva was not certainly referring here approvingly by name to any work of his own pupil Rucidatta. In fact a comparison with the corresponding passage in Rucidatta (St.II, p. 7) proves that the view cited by Jayadeva does not belong to Rucidatta. So the *Makaranda* happens to be a long-lost commentary on the *Kusumārjali*. Fortunately about two years ago we succeeded in getting hold of a copy of the '*Rāmabhadri*' in the collection of Dulāla Tarkavāgīśa, where an inquisitive copyist wrote down the following invaluable marginal notes upon the third verse cited above :

(1) *Makaranda*—“TVANTOPĀDHYĀYA-kṛta-śāstre”

(2) *Prakāśe*—“Vardhamānopādhyāya-kṛ(? gra-)ñithe”

(3) *Parimale*—“Granthaviśeṣe”

Date of Tvantopādhyāya

Śaṅkara Miśra in the above list of previous commentators has omitted other famous names notably the 'Bodhanī' of Varadarāja, who was a Kashmirian. It may be presumed that he preferred to confine himself to Maithila works only. As Vardhamāna came after Divākara and we have positive evidence to that, we are of opinion that Śaṅkara drew up the above list in an ascending order of chronology. In other words, Tvantopādhyāya came after Vardhamāna, though all three preceded Śaṅkara's father Bhavanātha as the words of Śaṅkara seem to imply. Now Śaṅkara preceded Pragalbha, who mentioned his name in the *Khaṇḍanaṭīkā* and as Pragalbha wrote his works about 1450-60 A.D. we can safely place the period of Śaṅkara's literary activity in 1425-40 A.D., considering that Pragalbha belonged to Bengal (and not to Mithila), though he lived at Benares. Śaṅkara was thus an exact contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra II and like the latter lived long enough to witness the meteoric career of Jayadeva Miśra. He was born, say, in 1400 A.D. and was still living at an advanced age in 1410 Śaka (*i.e.* 1488-9 A.D.), when a copy of the *Tātparyāṭīkā* was written in his seminary by a Vaidya scholar of Bengal (Śāstrī: *Nepal Darbar Library Cat.*, Vol. I (1905), p. 49). His father and teacher Bhavanātha lived, therefore, about 1400 A.D. and the date of composition of the two works of Tvantopādhyāya—*Tattvacintāmaṇīṭīkā* and *Makaranda*—may be placed within 1375-1400 A.D. We can hail the latter's name, therefore, as the earliest commentator of *Gaṅgeśa* so far discovered. It should be mentioned in this connection that Vardhamāna never wrote any commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A fragment (of fol. 44 up to *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* of the *Anumāna-khaṇḍa*) of Vardhamāna's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa* was reported by Venis (*Benares College Catalogue*, p. 193) as preserved in the *Sarasvatī Bhavana*, which is supposed now to be 'lost' (*S B. Studies*, III, p. 134). But it is really a myth. Vardha-

māna has mentioned all his numerous works in the cross references found in his various books, but there is not the remotest suggestion anywhere that he ever commented on his father's treatise. Moreover, there are a large number of citations from his various works in the well known classics of the Navyanyāya, but no body ever cited, as far as we are aware, his *Maṇiprakāśa*. Tivantopādhyāya's claim to be the first commentator of Gaṅgeśa cannot, therefore, be assailed upto now.

The discovery of this long-lost name among stray leaves, marginal notes and obsolete books hitherto consigned to the limbo of oblivion by most of our urban scholars raises immense possibilities in the field of Mss researches and we are confident that resourceful scholars taking up this new field will amply be rewarded by more such discoveries, throwing light on the obscure history of the different branches of Sanskrit literature.

ETHICS IN THE UPANIṢADS¹

By SAMPURNANAND

I remember reading an article by my friend, Dr. Mohammad Hafiz Saiyad, in which he refers to observations made by a distinguished foreign scholar, who has been accepted as an authority on Buddhism, to the effect that ethical teaching finds practically no place in the Upaniṣads. Dr. Saiyad's experience is by no means unique. One can understand exponents of Buddhism, particularly foreigners, advancing this criticism. As a matter of fact, Europeans are generally attracted towards Buddhism, not because of Buddhist metaphysics but of the moral content of Buddhist teaching. They are not interested in nirvāṇa as a practical proposition and have no intention of practising samādhi and attaining to the status of an arhat (अर्हत्) but they, certainly, look upon the 'madhyama-mārga' (मध्यममार्ग), 'the eight-fold middle path', as the solution of most of the ills from which humanity suffers. The historical background against which Buddhism first appeared upon the Indian scene, the endless wars of petty kings against one another, the jealousies and rivalries of parties in the gaṇa-rājyas (गणराज्य), the complicated rituals and bloody sacrifices into which Vedic Karmakāṇḍa (कर्मकाण्ड) had degenerated and the tāmas tapas (तामस-तपस्), to use the name given by Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagvad-gītā*, which looked upon self-imposed torture of the body as the last word in Saṁnyama (संयम)—all these combined to create an intellectual and spiritual atmosphere which assured the universal acceptance of the मध्यममार्ग. The doctrine is good in itself and worthy of being followed by all peoples in all times; it had

¹ Address read before the Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, held on Nov. 1947.

been taught in India, in other language, from very ancient times, but there can be no doubt that it owes a considerable part of its importance in Buddhist thought to the circumstances of the times in which it was preached. The absence of any form of popular worship which was a feature of early Buddhism must have been another contributory factor. This lacuna, in so far as one existed, was filled up by the luxuriant hierarchy of Gods and Goddesses with Bodhisattvas and Buddhas at the top, built up by the Mahāyāna School. By that time, the 'madhyama-mārga' had caused to be anything more than a sacred formula. Be this as it may, European admirers and students of Buddhism have drawn attention to the fact that ethical teaching does not occupy an equally prominent place in Vedic thought.

Other foreign students of Hindu philosophy have also noticed what they consider to be its remarkable shortcoming in this respect. They find it difficult to understand how such acute thinkers as those who developed the Māyāvāda and other Vedantic doctrines should have failed to realize the great necessity of developing a philosophy of moral conduct. Even the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school, as they point out, is not so much a school of moral philosophy interested in ethics, as a system of reasoning designed to establish the infallibility of the Vedas and the obligatory nature of the sacrifices enjoined by them. Ethical conduct is, at the most, a secondary consideration.

Criticism like this has had its effect on the Indian reader. Member of a race under foreign rule, he was naturally sensitive to criticism coming from scholars belonging to the dominant race. His attitude had sub-consciously become apologetic and he tried to meet such criticism by trying to explain away what seemed not to be in consonance with western thought. Centuries-old contact with Islam had gradually made the Hindu look upon his Īśwara as identical with Khuda or Allah. It was not difficult for

him, therefore, to reconcile himself to the further identification of this concept with that of the Christian God. Starting from this base, the criticism that Hindu philosophy is defective to the extent that it says nothing positive about ethics seemed to be perfectly logical.

I think we must pay closer attention to this question. In the first place, it must be admitted, not as an unfortunate fact but as a fact none-the-less, that ethics does not receive the same treatment and occupy the same position in Hindu philosophy as it does in certain other systems. And there is a definite reason for this. The Semetic religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—are monotheistic to an extent and in a sense which has no application to any of the religious systems which had their origin in India. The Semite's God is not only one without a second, he is intolerant, he will not permit any worship other than his own—'I, Jehovah, Thy God, am a jealous God' in the words of the *Old Testament*. The God of the *New Testament* speaks in softer terms but beneath the soft gloves one finds the same steel. This God is the Creator, the Sustainer and the Destroyer of this universe in every sense of this term. Judaism has managed to retain its pristine features almost unaffected. Christianity and Islam, on the other hand, came early in contact with western philosophy, particularly Platonic thought. They could not help being profoundly influenced by it. Inconvenient doubts would force themselves forward and demand an answer. The result has been a synthesis, a reconciliation, which has preserved intact the outer doctrines of these faiths, their positive categorical forms but has introduced an esoteric substratum which seeks to interpret and explain or explain away, what might otherwise seem crude and primitive. In the case of Christianity, probably early contact with Buddhism also induced this rapprochement with philosophy. Contact with Indian thought will have produced identical results in the case of Islam as it reached Iran and countries further east.

The result has been the growth and development of a mystic and philosophic movement side by side with the orthodox religious doctrine. But such a movement could not possibly transcend the limitations of the background in which it had to function, the positive nature of the religion which it was supposed to interpret. In its highest forms, it developed, in the case of Islam, into monistic systems, which expressed themselves in formulae, such as हमः अजोस्त and हमः ओस्त । हमः अजोस्त — Everything has emanated from Him—would, if it used Sanskrit terms, explain the emergence of the cosmos in the well-known Upaniṣadic words यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः etc.—as sparks fly out of a well-lit fire, in the same way egos (and other substances) emanate out of Him. This might also, with a difference in emphasis, be expressed in the words : यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च etc. :—as the spider throws out and draws in the threads that form his web, in the same way the Universe is projected and reabsorbed by Him. The हमः ओस्त doctrine could be similarly expressed in the words of those Upaniṣadic texts which lend, or seem to lend, support to शुद्धाद्वैतवाद. As Niyaz, the well-known mystic who asserts हम बन्दः हम मौलास्तम—I am both the devotee and God — says:

दीद अपने की यो उसे ख्वाहिश, आप को हर तरह बना देखा

It was not possible to rise higher. The He refused to become It.

Similarly, while God could say, “I am the Alpha and the Womega” and the good Christian could say with Christ, “I and my Father are one,” it was not easily possible for him to rise to the conception of the Reality in which the Father Himself becomes the shadow of Something which is both and yet neither.

In systems of thought and life dominated by a Personal Deity, howsoever good, kind and merciful He may be, a man's attitude towards that Deity becomes a matter of supreme moment. The Deity obviously does not want his

handwork to be spoilt; He will not brook destruction of his world except when He wills it. He has, therefore, in His infinite wisdom laid down rules conducive to the well-being of Society. It is no use questioning the propriety of His concept of a well-ordered society or the rules which He has enjoined. Wisdom lies in accepting this concept and following these rules. The good man, therefore, has his course of action laid out for him. He has to follow the behests of God unquestioningly. God made him as he is for no reason that he can imagine; it is in God's power to punish or forgive him. He has to exercise judgment only in those complicated cases in which positive commands are not to be found in Scripture. Ethical conduct is strictly religious conduct and ethical discussion is merely scholastic discussion on interpretation of Sacred Texts. The true Muslim can hardly go beyond this.

The *New Testament* is not so rigid. It leaves considerable scope for freedom of judgment. 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' and, 'Do to others as thou wouldst be done by' are noble codes of conduct but they easily lend themselves to elastic interpretation and philosophic discussion. Who is my neighbour? I have a number of selves, differing from one another in what may be called their extent of ego-centricity. Which particular self is to be the criterion of neighbourly love? I behave, and would have others behave towards myself, in different ways in different circumstances. I run after sense-indulgence at one time and practise austere self-restraint at another. It all depends upon what object I am pursuing. Before I can behave towards others as scripture enjoins, I must be sure about what behaviour I consider suitable about myself. A discussion of this topic leads naturally to the topic of what objects are worth aiming at, which are more important, higher in intrinsic worth, than others. To decide this question properly, I must first be able to set

standards by which to judge the comparative worth of objects. All this is clearly the domain of ethics and scripture has given man considerable latitude of thought and action within the four corners of its explicit commands, its positive विधि and negative निषेध.

Obviously man can solve complicated problems like the above and determine his correct conduct in any given set of circumstances only if he starts from absolutely correct premises, possesses a flawless intellect and is not swayed by any prepossessions. This means, in other words, that a man's conduct can be correct only in so far as his intellect reflects the Divine mind and is coincident with the latter. Man cannot always ensure this. It will be a result of Divine grace which is free and may not be coerced. All that man can reasonably hope is that if he performs his duty honestly according to his lights, humbly conscious all the while of his short-comings, Divine grace may descend on him and his sins of commission and omission may be forgiven. In this प्रपत्ति, utter throwing himself on the mercy of God, lies his sole hope of redemption, of Salvation. The proper performance of works in conformity with Divine Commandments and the Divine Will in so far as human reason can ascertain it becomes, therefore, a matter of the utmost importance.

Very few Western philosophers have consciously started from the Scriptures. Their approach has been more secular. Even those among them who were devout Christians have tried to steer clear of Religion. Nevertheless it was not possible to remain uninfluenced by the prevailing atmosphere. Ethical discussion retained its pre-eminence. If anything, the secularity of the approach gave it added importance. Religion or no religion, man is a social being. As a member of society, he has to shape his activities in a certain manner. What that manner shall be, what shall be the guiding factor or factors in determin-

ing the manner, at once become highly important questions. To those who do not look to Divine Command or guidance to show them the path of right conduct, ethics and ethical discussion become the pivot of all philosophy. Metaphysics, the Science of the Reality, discussion of the nature of the Universe, all this has a significance and an importance only in so far as it is of help in solving the problem of Right Behaviour. It is not surprising, therefore, that western philosophy, theological and secular, should give great importance to Ethics.

Indian Thought has come to the conclusion that the cause of bondage is not the fiat, the inscrutable and unchallengeable will of a personal God, but अविद्या (nescience). Now, ignorance can be removed by knowledge, just as darkness can be removed by light. Hence the cure of bondage is knowledge, knowledge of one's own self primarily and of whatever else there may be in the Universe. If God exists, He is also one of the objects to be known. It is of supreme importance, therefore, to determine what the possible objects and means of knowledge are and to pursue those means. This and this alone will lead to salvation. In fact, the word salvation has no place in this picture. The correct word is मोक्ष release, release from the bonds of ignorance. Indian thinkers do not believe that the soul is imperfect, born in sin, to begin with, to be made pure, to be saved or redeemed, later. They say that it is perfect in its nature. You have only to blow away the fog of अविद्या for its true nature to be revealed.

Different schools define the nature of the Self, of the Universe, of Avidya in different ways. The culmination is reached in Māyāvāda of the Advaita School. Instead of God, the He, it posits Brahma, the It. But every school, without exception, emphasises the supreme importance of knowledge and declares मोक्ष, liberation, from nescience as the परमपुरुषार्थ, the supreme object of life.

An important component of all systems of Indian philosophy is the doctrine of re-birth. It is profitless for me to discuss whether the संहिताभाग of the Vedas supports this doctrine or not. It is certainly an accepted belief in the Upaniṣads from which all philosophical thought starts. क्षीणे पुण्ये मर्त्यलोकं विशन्ति is almost an axiom. In such a scheme of thought, the position of God, even if His existence is posited, becomes radically different from that of the Semitic Jehovah. The Universe is no longer a creature of His fancy. The Karma of the Jiva determines his material and mental condition on earth and in heaven. He can shape his own destiny. The individual who believes in this Theory adds to his stature. He learns to bear his sorrows with fortitude and can look to his future with hope.

Removal of ignorance being the goal, the individual has no longer to try to adjust himself to the wishes of an all-powerful personality. Scripture is there to give him guidance but its injunctions lose their arbitrariness, when a man feels that they are only the kind of injunctions which an older brother may give to a younger. The younger will one day himself grow to realise the propriety of that advice. As effort is made to throw off the bond of nescience, as knowledge becomes more and more unfettered, right conduct flows from him as naturally as water from the clouds: his state is that of a चर्म-मेघ. He is no longer dependent upon teachings from Holy Writ, he is a law unto himself.

One can easily see that the emphasis here is on knowledge not conduct. Therefore ethical discussion cannot occupy the first place in treatises bearing on systems with central doctrines of this nature. The instrument of knowledge, as of ignorance, is the intellect. To reflect the truth, the intellect has to be achromatised, if one may say so. Normally, we have minds running ceaselessly from one object to another and such knowledge as we acquire is selective and incomplete. Being victims of a hundred desires and, consequently, of a

hundred aversions, we pick out only such knowledge as seems satisfying to us. Thus our vision is always coloured and distorted. What is needed is to ensure perfect receptivity, which can come only when the mind is freed from passion and made one-pointed. This means that before there is साक्षात्कार Realization of the Truth, there has to be समाधि and समाधि comes from अभ्यास and वैराग्य, practise of one-pointedness and with-drawing of the mind from the objects which distract the senses. Cessation of all activity is not possible, if desirable. What can be achieved, and should be attempted, is so to act that our actions shall not leave behind them a legacy of likes and dislikes, of unfulfilled wishes and frustration. Our actions, in other words, have to be निष्काम. They will become increasingly and naturally निष्काम as our nescience becomes less and less, as we advance on the road to समाधि, but in the beginning there has to be an effort; discrimination introspection, analysis have to guide every step. This is where and how ethics comes in. Right conduct is not an end in itself; it is not even the sole or direct means to the achievement of the supreme goal of human life. But it is an ancillary, an indispensable help in the acquirement of that mental poise which leads to the destruction of avidyā. It is a means, not to the fulfilment of desires, but to their extinction :

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः तदा मर्त्योऽमृतो भवति । ¹

when all the desires that are lodged in his heart are given up the mortal becomes immortal.

It will be clear, therefore, that there is nothing to be wondered at if Ethics does not occupy the same position, and receive the same treatment, in H'indu philosophy as in the West.

Nevertheless, there are, as there were bound to be, incidental references and discussions of great importance. In

¹ कठ-अध्याय २, वल्ली ३, मन्त्र १४

this paper, I confine myself to the Upaniṣads because they are the fountain-heads of all Indian philosophy. The orthodox darśana-sāstras are only commentaries.

I would, to begin with, draw attention to the first two verses of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*. To my mind, the whole of the *Bhagavadgītā* is nothing but a commentary on these two verses :

ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वं यत्किञ्च जगत्यां जगत् ।

तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथा मा गृधः कस्यस्विद्धनम् ॥

कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः ।

एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नर ॥

I take the second mantra first. Let a man live for a hundred years, namely, his full span of life, performing actions in such a way that they i.e., their after-math of pleasure and pain, hope and fear, virtue and sin, shall not attach to him. A commentary on what this hundred years should be like is provided by the following words :

पश्येम शरदः शतम् जीवेम शरदः शतम् शृणुयाम शरदः

शतम् प्रब्रूयाम शरदः शतम्, अदीनाः स्याम शरदः शतम् ।²

May we live for a hundred years, may our senses of knowledge serve us for a hundred years (चक्षु the sense of sight being a symbol of all the five senses of knowledge), may we continue to acquire spiritual knowledge for a hundred years (the Veda, is श्रुति that which is 'heard' in samādhi), may our senses of action serve us for a hundred years (Vāk, the sense of speech being a symbol of all the five senses of action), may we not be a burden on any one for a hundred years.

The first mantra indicates how actions can be performed in such a way that a man may not be affected by the fruits thereof.

The whole universe is to be covered by, looked at as permeated through and through by, God. Everything being

conceived as, and as a manifestation of, God, there is no question of one thing being preferred to another, of liking one object and disliking another. Therefore a man should enjoy, should experience, what life brings him through त्याग renunciation, non-attachment. He should have no greed, no desire to acquire for himself, the property of others. This last sentence is not a Vedic version of the Biblical Commandment—Thou shall not steal. The 'Others' are the senses and the objects which attract them and their property. The meaning is that one should not allow the senses to draw him towards their objects.

The Second बल्ली of the *Kāthopanīṣad* throws considerable light on some aspects of the good life and the relation of ethical action to the परम पुरुषार्थ i.e., the removal of अविद्या. It begins by pointing out that there is a distinction between the pleasant and the good and that the good alone is to be striven for :

अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यद्रुतैव प्रेयस्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः ।

तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु भवति हीयतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणीते ।

The good is different from the pleasant. They have different objects and bind the individual in different ways. He who selects the good prospers but he who selects the pleasant is deflected from the पुरुषार्थ, the supreme object. Further on, it is said

तमक्रतुः पश्यति वीतशोको धातुप्रसादान्महिमान्मात्मनः ।

The man who performs actions without attachment to the fruits thereof, who has transcended all sorrow, born of non-fulfilment of desires, realizes the greatness of the self through the '*prasāda*' प्रसाद of the dhātus (धातु). The word धातु stands for the mind and its instruments, the senses. How the प्रसाद of the mind is to be obtained is explained in the following well-known sūtra of the *Yoga darsana* of Patañjali:

मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणाम् सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्य-विषयेषु भावनातश्चित्रप्रसादनम्³

³ Samādhipāda, sūtra 33.

The 'prasāda' of the intellect is obtained by the practise of मैत्री towards सुख, करुणा towards दुःख, मुदिता towards पुण्य and उपेक्षा towards अपुण्य. He who wants to attain प्रसाद should actively try to increase the store of happiness in the world, should practise active compassion towards the afflicted, should actively help those who are engaged in doing good and develop an attitude of non-anger towards the wicked, while actively opposing their activities—the sin is to be hated but not the sinner.

Another mantra of the second valli says:

नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाशान्तो नासमाहितः ।

नाशान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैवमाप्नुयात् ।

He who has not turned away from evil actions, whose senses are not under control, who has not acquired equipoise through Samādhi, will not attain this, the Reality, through knowledge.

The place of Actions as a means of knowledge is emphasized in passages like the following :

तस्मै तपो दमः कर्मेति प्रतिष्ठा वेदाः सर्वाङ्गानि सत्यं मायतनम् (केन खंड ४, मंत्र ८)

Tapas, Control of the senses, Actions, The Vedas with all their six aṅgas (astronomy, grammar etc.) are the supports, the true containers, of Vidyā (knowledge).

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* contains interesting passages throwing light on the problem of good conduct in the back-ground of Vedānta. Incidentally, it elucidates the very comprehensive conception of the field of duty which Hindu philosophy posits. The Universe is an integrated whole, every part is related to every other. The highest gods and the lowliest monera form parts of one indivisible body, the Virāt. The proper functioning of every part is essential to the well-being of the whole. Ethical conduct, good conduct, is not to be limited in its operation to the world of men alone: it has to extend to the whole of creation. One may not, in the beginning cannot, have a clear picture of what the

Universe in its fulness is; a man's conception of one's duty to beings other than man may be very hazy but he has to make the necessary effort none-the-less. The effort itself will lead to an increase in efficiency and knowledge and knowledge will lead to better action. Let every one perform his own duty in a spirit of dedication, his rights will take care of themselves, because what is one man's duty is automatically another man's right.

स नैव व्यभवत्त ह्येयोरूपमत्यसृजत धर्मं तदेतत्क्षत्रस्य क्षत्रं

यद्धर्मस्तस्माद्धर्मात्परं नास्त्यथो अवलीयान्वलीयान समाशंसते धर्मैण⁴

Although Prajāpati assumed the forms of the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣātriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra in succession, he was not able to function effectively; so he created Dharma, the supreme good. Dharma controls the law which control everything. There is nothing higher than Dharma. Through Dharma the weak conquers the strong.

It should clearly be understood that Dharma does not mean Religion or a credo. In fact, Sanskrit has no exact equivalent for religion. 'धारणाद्धर्म इत्याहुः' :- Dharma is that which sustains the universe. Manu has described its ten constituents as perseverance in a good cause, mercy, self-control, non-covetousness, truth, etc.

अथो अयं वा आत्मा सर्वेषां भूतानां लोकः स यज्जुहोति यद्यजते तेन देवानाम्लोकोऽथ यदनुब्रूते तेन ऋषीणामथ यत्पितृभ्यो निपृणाति यत्प्रजामिच्छते तेन पितृणामथ यन्मनुष्यान्वासयते यदेभ्योऽशनं ददाति तेन मनुष्याणामथ यत्पशुभ्यस्तृणोदकं विन्दति तेन पशूनां यदस्य गृहेषु श्वापदा वयास्या पिपीलिकाभ्य उपजीवन्ति तेन तेषां लोको यथा ह वै स्वाय लोकायारिष्टमिच्छेदेवं ह वै विदे सर्वाणि भूतान्यरिष्टमिच्छन्ति⁵

This Ātmā engaged in works is the लोक, the source of enjoyment, the support, of all living things. By the sacrifices and the worship that he performs, he becomes the

⁴ बृहदारण्यक, अध्याय १, ब्राह्मण ४, मंत्र १४

⁵ बृहदारण्यक, अध्याय १, ब्राह्मण ४, मंत्र १६

loka of the Gods; by his study and his teaching, of the Ṛṣis; by his offering to the manes of his forefathers and by his wishing to leave progeny behind, of the ancestors of the Race; by his service of mankind, of men; by the food and drink he gives to animals, of animals; he becomes the loka of the dogs, the birds, the small creatures like ants who live in his house and gain their sustenance indirectly from him. Just as every one wishes well to his body, so do all living things wish well to him who knows and acts in this way.

The second Brāhmaṇa of the fifth adhyāya carries an interesting story. The three classes of the sons of Prajāpati viz., gods, asuras and men served him as his disciples for some time. Pleased with their devotion, he gave to each group the same advice, the letter 'द'. Each interpreted it in his own way. To the gods, it meant दाम्यत - suppress, control; to men दत्त - give and to asuras, दयध्वम्, have pity.

The Gods and asuras are often referred to as half-brothers, the sons of Prajāpati. They are the social and the anti-social, the altruistic and the ego-centric, the cultured and the elemental, tendencies of the mind. They are almost always in conflict. The good tendencies have to be kept under proper control, to be properly canalised, to be used purposively. A fanatical enthusiast for reform may work havoc and do more harm than good. The evil tendencies have to be curbed by the formula 'have mercy.' Reflect on the consequences of your act for humanity. For man, the injunction is given—renounce all that you have, give your all to the service of others.

An interesting commentary on the relation between Devas and Asuras is provided by the Paurāṇic story of the great war between the Asuras under Mahiṣāśura and the Devas under Indra. The Devas were defeated. Then Mahā-Lakṣmi who took form out of the combined tejas of all the Devas defeated the Asuras. She did not destroy them, so that 'लोकान् प्रयान्तु रिपवोऽपि हि शस्त्रपूताः', chastened

by being struck by her sword, these enemies might also go to the higher regions. The Asuras were killed as Asuras but were thereby purified and transported to the region of the gods. The meaning is plain. As so often happens, evil passions get the better hand and men's better nature goes under. The army of Mahiṣa—the buffalo signifies anger, unbridled strength, the drunkenness with power—is victorious. Faced with annihilation, the will asserts itself. Man puts forth all his strength in one supreme effort. Virtue conquers vice. But the psychic energy that was a constituent of the lower self is not thereby destroyed. It becomes available for work in the opposite direction. The evil tendencies, the anti-social complexes, are purified, sublimated to use a term from Freudian psychology, and converted into socially beneficent forces. That the pride of the gods on their victory over the Asuras, the pride, namely, which a man may feel over his self-control and freedom from the weaknesses of the flesh may lead to his fall and is thoroughly unjustified is illustrated by the beautiful यक्षोपाख्यान in the third khaṇḍa of the केनोपनिषद् in which Umā Haimavati humbles the pride of the gods over their victory.

The Upaniṣads have indicated the general principles of right conduct. They have not gone, as it was not necessary for them to go, into minute details. But they have emphasized over and over again the supreme importance of Truth. Let a man be true, true to himself and to others, let him through introspection tear the veil that conceals his own nature from himself, and all other virtues will follow of themselves.

सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा सम्यग्ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम् ।

अन्तःशरीरे ज्योतिर्मयो हि शुभ्रो यं पश्यन्ति यतयः क्षीणदोषाः ।

सत्यमेव जयति नानृतम् सत्येन पन्था विततो देवयानः ।

येनाक्रमन्त्यृषयो ह्याप्तकामाः यत्र तत्सत्यस्य परमं निधानम् ।⁶

⁶ मुण्डक, मुण्डक ३, खंड १, मंत्र ५ और ६ ।

This pure refulgent Ātmā whom the Yat's, who have got rid of all defects of character, see within themselves is attainable by Truth, Tapas, knowledge and Brahmacharya. Truth alone conquers, not falsehood. The path of the Gods by which the Ṛṣis, all whose desires have been fulfilled, rise to that supreme store of Truth, is opened out by Truth.

No description of Hindu ethics would be complete without saying a few words about 'Yajña'. This word is generally used to denote those rites in which 'ghī' and 'havis' (grain, incense, etc.) are poured into fire. While this is the common and popular form of yajña, it is by no means the only one. There are higher, more esoteric, forms. In the fourth chapter of the *Bhagvadgītā*, Śrī Kṛṣṇa speaks of Dravya yajña (the ordinary yajña), Tapasyajña, Yoga-Yajña, Svādh-yāya-yajña, and Jñāna-yajña. Any action performed from a pure sense of duty becomes a yajña. Every action should be performed in the spirit of a yajña. As Śrī Kṛṣṇa says : नायं लोकोऽस्त्ययज्ञस्य कुतोऽस्य :—What to speak of the other world, even this world is not for the man who does not perform his actions in the spirit of a yajña, who does not live his whole life as a yajña.

There are two essential parts of a yajña, besides the formal act itself. The first which precedes everything else is the संकल्प, the resolve to perform the act. The yājaka, the person performing the yajña whatever its form may be, does not enter upon his task with pride. He approaches it with humility. He calls the Divine Power to his aid and says:—इदं चरिष्यामि तच्छक्यम् तन्मेराध्यताम्⁷—I intend to perform this act, give me the power to accomplish it and then adds—this is really very important—इदमहमनृतात्सत्यमुपेमि⁸. Here I give up untruth and take up Truth. No yajña, no action,

⁷ *Yyurveda*, I.

⁸ *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*. I.

can be fruitful unless it is undertaken in a perfectly truthful spirit. There must not be any admixture of deception or, what is worse, self-deception, no mental reservation no simulation or dissimulation; an act to be right must be undertaken for its own sake, not with a view to earn the applause of, or escape censure from, others.

The other important element of a yajña is the 'Bali', sacrifice. The theory is that the power which is present in the balipaśu, the sacrificial animal, enters the sacrificer. The following mantra from one of the Tantric upaniṣads throws a flood of light on the nature of sacrifice, a gross mis-understanding of which is responsible for the shedding of the blood of innocent animals.

मेघैर्नारैश्च वैडालैरोष्ट्रै राजैश्च माहिषैः ।

पलैरेभिर्वज्रेद्यस्तु स मुक्तो नात्र संशयः ॥

There is no doubt that he is mukta who performs his yajña with the flesh of sheep, men, cats, camels, goats and buffaloes.

What a wonderful assortment! No one has ever heard of cats or camels being offered at sacrificial altars in Hindu India. As a matter of fact, these words are symbolic. Sheep stand for मोह, bewilderment, obsession, infatuation, mis-functioning of the buddhi; men for अहंकार pride, cats for लोभ, greed; camels for मत्सर hatred, envy; goats for काम incontinence and buffaloes for क्रोध anger. What is enjoined, therefore, is that मोह, अहंकार, लोभ, मत्सर, काम, and क्रोध are to be sacrificed. These six are the sacrificial animals. As a result of the sacrifice, the power that is in them, the psychic energy that they consume, the libido they store up, is made available to the sacrificer. The sublimation of these outgoing tendencies adds to his strength of will and character and gives him the power to accomplish otherwise difficult tasks.

Many a noble deed is vitiated by an element of selfishness entering into it. That is why Brahmacharya is strictly

prescribed for the yājak. In its narrow sense, this word stands for abstinence from sex-indulgence, but is also given a wider meaning and symbolises the inhibition of all sensual instincts. It is in this sense that the Chāndogya Upaniṣad says: यद्यज्ञः इत्याचक्षते ब्रह्मचर्यमेव तत्^१. That which they call a yajña, verily it is Brahmacharya.

Actions, then, are to be performed with humility, honestly and truthfully, purely from a sense of duty, and accompanied by a ceaseless fight against elemental instincts and self-seeking purposes.

The few excerpts that I have given will have shown, I hope, the trend of Upaniṣadic Thought on the subject of ethics. While not giving the first place to this subject, the Upaniṣads amply emphasize the necessity of right conduct. They lay down general principles of wide application. The Vedānta insists that विवेक—discrimination between truth and un-truth, duty and its reverse—is an essential qualification for the अधिकारी the person fit to be made a disciple. It points out that सत्कर्म—right conduct—and तपस्—austerity and self-control—go together, and, as Paul Deussen observed, it supplies the only rational and sufficient answer to the question 'Why', which may well be asked in connection with the noble Biblical advice 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. This answer is 'Because Thou Art Thy Neighbour'. No one outside a mental hospital would knowingly harm himself. For him who sees : आत्मानं सर्वभूतेषु सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि, himself in all creatures and all creatures in himself, none but the highest conduct is possible. The lesson of the oneness of all that exists has to be constantly kept before the mind. Wherever there is a distinction of I and Thou, a distinction of mine and thine is also sure to arise, in some form howsoever subtle. This may lead to clash of interests, and improper conduct. That is why the

Upaniṣad says द्वितीयादौ भयं भवति—verily, there is fear where there is duality.

It is not that the Upaniṣads concern themselves only with idealistic speculation, paying no attention to the needs of the common man. In the first place, what they say about right conduct is not idle fancy or a flight to heights unattainable by human effort. To say so is to confess to want of faith in man. Man is not essentially frail and wicked: he can rise to great heights of renunciation and selflessness. Instead of an appeal being made to his self-interest, enlightened or otherwise, let us appeal to his instinctive feeling that he is in bondage; let us urge him to shake off this bondage and regain his freedom. Let us tell him what he is. The most ethical actions we perform are those in which the sense of duality is lost for the time being. A man jumping into a running stream to save a drowning man or plunging into a house on fire to rescue a helpless child, the shivering beggar woman covering her sick child with the remnants of her tattered sari, all these lose their separate selves for a moment and identify themselves with the selves of those whom they seek to serve. And in that moment of identification, of loss of the sense of separateness, they transcend the limitations of time and space and experience their true nature which is Ānanda. The very next moment they may be dragged down to earth but that experience, short as it was, will have raised them above the race of common men. They will have trodden the path of the saints. If one could induce in oneself this sense of the identity of one's self with all that is, one's life would be sweeter and richer by far and one's actions be endowed with the stamp of truly ethical acts. This sense of identification will not come in a day. One will, therefore, make mistakes. One's steps will falter but one's endeavour will, none-the-less, be in the right direction. It will purify the doer, besides helping the object thereof. Let us, while knowledge of the self

has not come to us, take guidance from scripture, from the examples of noble men and the writings of great thinkers, by all means. Let us follow the path of virtue honestly according to our lights. But let us remember that action, howsoever good, is not a substitute for knowledge. Action performed as a consequence of knowledge of self is a source of peace and harmony to the whole universe; action performed without knowledge is unstable प्लवा ह्येते अदृढाः. Whatever serves to emphasize and bring about the sense of identification and one-ness is virtue; whatever, on the other hand, serves to bring out and emphasize duality is sin. The man who has realized the self is in the state of सहजसमाधि even when he is performing worldly actions. He experiences the आनन्द which is his own nature and spreads light and peace all around.

This to my mind is the essential feature of the Upanisadic attitude towards Ethical problems.

AIM AND SCOPE OF PURVAMĪMĀMSA ŚĀSTRA.

By V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI.

INTRODUCTION

THE Vedas constitute the true cultural and literary glory of the *Bhāratavarṣa*. The constant and systematic study of the Vedic texts developed its two important aspects—(1) the complete memorisation of the Vedic text in its proper accent by oral recitation and (2) the proper understanding of its contents with the help of the six *Vedāṅgas*. The first is attained by the Vedic student who after his *upanayana* ceremony goes to the residence of his *Ācārya*, attends to his conveniences, lives a rigid and well-disciplined life under the control of his teacher, and learns the text in the prescribed time orally as the teacher recites it to him in its proper accent. Every section of the text is to be repeated by him several times in the presence of the teacher and with his class mates, if any, till he becomes the master of it and finally alone, after he retires to his residence, every-day till his death. The famous advice in the *Sikṣāvallī* of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* goes thus—“स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः”—“Do not fail in reciting every day your *svādhyāya*—the portion of the Vedic text you have studied”. This is one of the *nitya karmas*—daily duties of a *dvija* failing which he is liable to suffer divine punishment.

The knowledge of the contents of the Vedic texts so studied under the *Ācārya* is to be attained by the vedic student by the study of the six *Vedāṅgas*—*Śikṣā* (phonetics), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *chandas* (metre), *nirukta* (etymology), *jyotiṣa* (astronomy) and *kalpa*—the three kinds of *kalpasūtras* - the *śrauta*, *gṛhya* and *dharma sūtras* (of which the *śrauta sūtras* are the practical guides of the Vedic texts). Along with the study of the Vedas, these *Vedāṅgas* are also to be studied by the student under the same *Ācārya* and

before the student retires to his residence, he is expected to have understood thoroughly the contents of the Vedic texts also. So *Vedādhyayana* implies these two aspects—the complete memorisation of the Vedic texts in its proper accent and the knowledge of the contents of the Veda as explained by the Vedāṅgas. These two aspects go hand in hand and it must be said that one without the other cannot by itself be called the true *Vedādhyayana*—study of the Vedas—though there is a tendency in later times to emphasise only the first—the memorisation of the Vedic texts. The famous Rk—“स्थाणुरयं भारद्वाजः किलाभूत् अधीत्य वेदं न विजानाति योऽर्थम् । योऽर्थज्ञ इत्सकलं भद्रमश्नुते नाकमेति ज्ञानविधृतपाप्मा ।”—the person who after memorising the Vedic texts does not understand its meaning is no other than a pillar, a statue which bears a burden on its head without knowing what it is; but the person who knows the purport of the Vedas is blessed with all auspicious things and goes to Divine regions, free from all sins by his knowledge”—proclaims the greatness of the man who knows the contents of the Veda but condemns him who simply recites the texts without knowing its meaning. Hence the equal importance of these two—memorisation of the text by oral recitation and the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts so studied as implied by the term वेदाध्ययनम्. No doubt, it is accepted that if both the aspects of the *Vedādhyayana* cannot be accomplished by the student at the residence of his teacher, he may at least learn the vedic text correctly in its proper accent by oral recitation and that this itself would bring him divine blessing—*Adṛṣṭaphala*—though the direct fruit of it—the knowledge of the contents of the texts is not attained. This does not in any way minimise the importance of the knowledge of the contents of the Veda on the part of the vedic student, since if there is any earthly or perceptible fruit of this memorisation of the vedic texts, it is only its utility for the performance of the various sacrifices enjoined

in the vedas, which is absolutely impossible without the knowledge of the contents of the veda. Hence अक्षरग्रहणेन अर्थज्ञानम्, अर्थज्ञानेन कर्मानुष्ठानम्, कर्मानुष्ठानेनाभ्युदयप्राप्तिः—the memorisation of the vedic texts leads to the thorough understanding of the contents of the Veda—sacrifices and the performance of those sacrifices with the full knowledge of those rituals and their accessories leads to the realisation of what is known as external Bliss—*abhyudaya*.

Does the correct knowledge of the contents of the Vedic texts arise from the study of the Vedāṅgas alone ?

No doubt, the Vedic student can understand the Vedic texts with the help of the six Vedāṅgas in a general manner. There are, however, many passages or sections in the Vedas which are ambiguous or doubtful and they cannot be made out with the help of these six Vedic accessories. The correct knowledge of these texts is to be acquired by the Vedic student only by the study of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* which contains rules of interpretation to suggest the correct meaning of those ambiguous or doubtful instances. Hence, *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* is known as *dharma- vicāra-Śāstra*—a system investigating dharma in the Vedic texts of some ambiguity or doubt, by enunciating certain rules of interpretation. The importance of the study of these rules of interpretation to the Vedic student for the correct knowledge of those texts cannot be therefore over-estimated.

The first sūtra in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*—‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’—explains the importance of the study of the *dharma- vicāra Śāstra* containing the rules of interpretation and it enjoins that the Vedic student should not leave the residence of his teacher soon after the study of the Vedic texts and the six Vedāṅgas, but he should continue there the study of the *Mīmāṃsā-śāstra* under the same Ācārya without which the study of the Vedas—the Vedādhyayana— which has the correct knowledge of the contents of the Veda viz., dharma, and its accessories, as its main fruit, cannot be

complete. The sūtra would therefore mean that 'after' the study of the Vedas along with the Vedāṅgas, since the study of the Vedas is mainly intended for the correct knowledge of the Vedic contents, the investigation of the Vedic texts (of some ambiguity or doubt) by the rules of interpretation is to be done by the Vedic student.—अथ=साङ्गवेदाध्ययनान्तरम्, अतः=अध्ययनस्य निश्चयरूपार्थज्ञानहेतुत्वाद्धेतोः, धर्मजिज्ञासा=संशयविपर्ययादि-ग्रस्तेषु वाक्येषु शास्त्रोक्तन्यायानुगृहीतः धर्मविचारः कर्तव्यः (माणवकेन आचार्यगृह एव स्थित्वा विचारशास्त्रमधीत्य) says Bhagavān Śābarasvāmin, the celebrated Bhāṣyakāra—"गुरुकुलान्मा समावर्तिष्ये, कथं नु वेदवाक्यानि विचारयेदित्येवमर्थोऽयमुपदेशः ।"

This sūtra forms the opening adhikaraṇa of the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* emphasising the necessity of the vicāraśāstra. Each adhikaraṇa has five or six parts—*viśaya*, the topic for discussion, *viśaya*—the doubt to be cleared of, the *pūrvapakṣa* the *prima-facie* view, the *siddhānta*—the conclusion, *prayojana*—the fruit of discussion, and *sangati*—the relation of propriety of such a discussion carried on :—

“विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् ।

प्रयोजनं सङ्गतिश्च प्राञ्चोऽधिकरणं विदुः ॥”

According to the Bhāṭṭas, the adhikaraṇa has the *vicāraśāstra* as the topic for discussion; the doubt is whether the *vicāraśāstra* is to be commenced or not (विचारशास्त्रं आरम्भणीयं वा न वेति) the *prima facie* view—पूर्वपक्ष is as follows : *It is not to be commenced.* Why ? It goes against the *smṛti* injunction—‘अधीत्य स्नायात्’ after the study of the Vedas, the Vedic student should perform the *samāvartana* ceremony (in order to enable himself to marry). If he were to remain at the residence of his teacher for the study of *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*, he would not be able to perform his snāna (*samāvartana*) ceremony soon after the study of the Vedas, as enjoined by the vidhi—अधीत्य स्नायात्, wherein the ल्यप्प्रत्यय which is the substitute for क्त्वाप्रत्यय indicates अध्ययनान्तरम् in reference to स्नान. How will he, then, be able to study the *vicāraśāstra* and acquire the correct knowledge of the Vedic

texts ? He need not ; for the injunction of the vedādhyayana स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः—enjoins the Vedic studies, not for the correct knowledge of the Vedic contents but for the complete memorisation of the text—अक्षरग्रहणार्थम् which will finally produce an adṛṣṭaphala only in the reciter. According to this interpretation the injunction will be an instance of अपूर्वविधि. If it enjoins adhyayana for the knowledge of the contents of the Veda it will be a niyamavidhi. From worldly experience everybody knows without even a Vedic injunction that adhyayana (of a text) is mainly intended for the knowledge of its contents—अध्ययनं अर्थज्ञानार्थम्—Then what is the use of the injunction—“स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः” ? It restricts the student from different methods of study such as we now see with some modern students of the Vedas, other than the prescribed adhyayana under an Ācārya—“गुरुमुखोच्चारणानुच्चारणरूपमध्ययनम् - with certain rules of discipline. The pūrvapakṣin (objector) questions—“What is the ultimate object of this knowledge of the contents of the Veda ?” Nobody can guarantee that this knowledge will be exclusively utilised for the performance of the Vedic dharmas. The context of this vidhivākya has reference to the five Mahāyajñas only. So the objector concludes that this adhyayana vidhi enjoins vedādhyayana for the benefit of an adṛṣṭaphala to the Vedic student. It may also be suggested that on the authority of the viśvajīda-dhikaraṇa, the vedādhyayana, if properly done, will produce Svarga for the enjoyment of the Vedic student. In no case is this adhyayana intended for अर्थज्ञान. So the vicāraśāstra need not be commenced.

The siddhānta (conclusion) is as follows:—To argue that the adhyayanavidhi has only the adṛṣṭaphala cannot be accepted when it can be explained as a niyamavidhi with a dṛṣṭa-phala—viz. arthajñāna ‘दृष्टे संभवति अदृष्टस्यान्याय्यत्वात्.’ Though the vidhi is studied in the context of the five mahāyajñas, it is to be taken away from the context and

interpreted as an universal injunction enjoining the study of the particular recension of the Vedic text that has been handed down from generation to generation - एकैकस्मिन्नपि वेदे पितृपितामहादिपरम्परागता शास्त्रैवाध्येतव्या'। This idea is explained by the word in the compound "स्वाध्यायः" This svādhyayādhyaṇa is enjoined by the vidhi for the sake of the correct knowledge of the Vedic contents which is an invariable and indispensable condition for the successful performance of the Vedic dharmas like agnihotra. Āpastamba says in his *Śrautasūtra* - "आचतुर्थ्यत्कर्मणोऽभिसमीक्षेतेदं करिष्यामि, इदं करिष्यामीति।" This emphasises the importance of the masterly knowledge of the Vedic dharmas for the yajamāna - the sacrificer - that he is expected to know and remember even the fourth item when he performs the first in the chain of karmas to be performed by him in quick succession. The arthavāda - अनधीयाना ब्राह्मणा भवन्ति' - condemns persons who do not study the Vedas, as vrātyas and the ṛk - 'स्थानुरयं भारहृरः किलामूत्' already cited, emphasises the importance of the knowledge of the contents of the Veda by praising him to heaven and by ridiculing him who simply memorises the Vedic texts without understanding their meaning. Thus it can be said that the vedādhyaṇa is obligatory for every *dhvija* - twiceborn - viz., the traivarnikas and that the study of the Vedas is intended for the Vedic student's full knowledge of the contents of the Veda. So it is not for an adṛṣṭaphala like svarga. The vidhi 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' therefore enjoins the अध्ययन for its ultimate fruit viz. अर्थज्ञान which is indispensable to every Vedic student for the performance of the Vedic dharmas soon after he retires from his teacher's residence and marries;—'प्रयोजनवदर्थज्ञानोद्देशेन स्वाध्यायाध्ययनं विधीयते।' or, 'प्रयोजनवदर्थज्ञानसाधनीभूतस्वाध्यायोद्देशेन अर्थज्ञानं विधीयते, तव्यप्रत्ययेन स्वाध्यायस्य कर्मत्वाभिधानात्'। The suffix 'tavya' in the form अध्येतव्यः conveys the कर्मत्व of the svādhyāya (i.e.) the svādhyāya is the आप्यकर्म- acquirable object or fruit of the

अध्ययन and this svādhyāya so acquired would give him with the help of the *vicāra-Śāstra* the correct knowledge of the Vedic dharmas which when properly performed would bless him to enjoy the divine happiness — 'अध्ययनेनार्थज्ञानम्' अर्थज्ञानेन कर्मानुष्ठानम्, तदनुष्ठानेनाभ्युदयप्राप्तिः।' The *smṛti* passage — 'अधीत्य स्नायात्' — also enjoins by *lakṣaṇā* the अस्नानादिनियम (i.e.) that the Vedic student need not observe any longer the duties of the brahmacārin at the residence of his teacher when he is asked to remain there for the investigation of dharma. The 'lyap' suffix in 'adhītya' explains only the time precedence since the suffix 'ktvā' and its substitute 'layp' are to be taken in the sense of time precedence according to the sūtra: 'समानकर्तृकयोः पूर्वकाले'। If ānantarya is also taken as the sense of 'ktvā', then the *mṛti* passage would prescribe the 'snāna' immediately after the study of the Vedic texts, or an adṛṣṭaphala, which is not acceptable under ordinary circumstances. The above interpretation of both svādhyāyavidhi and the *Smṛti* paśage dṛṣṭārthas-vidhis of a perceptible fruit - bids the Vedic student to remain at the residence of his teacher and investigate the true nature of dharma by the careful study of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstra* containing the rules of interpretation of varied character.

It may be questioned here—how is it that the adhyayana of the Vedic texts is to be performed only by the Trai-varṇikas especially when there is no word in the अध्ययनविधि to specify the adhikārī? The answer is simple. Though there is no specific reference to the Trai-varṇikas in the adhyayana - vidhi it is to be interpreted along with the Upanayana vidhis 'वसन्ते ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत, ग्रीष्मे राजन्यं, शरदि वैश्यम्' which enjoin the Upanayana ceremony only to the Trai-varṇikas in particular seasons. This Upanayana makes them fit and qualified for the वेदाध्ययन. Thus the Vedā-dhyayana is to be performed by those who are qualified by the Upanayana saṃskāra—'उपनयनसंस्कारसंस्कृतैः त्रैवर्णिकैरध्ययनं

कर्त्तव्यम्'। So also the vidhis do not enjoin various dharmas like Agnihotra and Jyotiṣṭoma to all persons who wish 'o have the *svargaphala*, as indicated by the *vidhivākya*s:- 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामः and ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत', but to those-Traivarnikas—only who possess (no doubt, the desire of svarga along with) the vidyā—knowledge—of those sacrifices by the prescribed study of the Vedic portions explaining the nature and scope of those sacrifices in question. This explanation is based on the 'ekavākyaatā' of the injunctions of all sacrifices and that of the वेदाध्ययन, which possess three accessories of Śābda-bodha - आकांक्षा (mutual expectancy), योग्यता (congruity) and सन्निति (proximity). So says Pārthasārathimīśra in *Śāstradīpikā* - "तत्रापेक्षासन्नियोग्यत्वैरेवं विज्ञायते-त्रैवर्णिकैरेवोपनीतैरक्षरग्रहणेनाध्ययनादिपरंपरयाऽर्थज्ञानं कर्त्तव्यमिति । एवं च फलवदध्ययनकर्तृभूतमाणवकसंस्कारत्वादुपनयनमध्ययनाङ्गम्, अध्ययनमपि दृष्टार्थज्ञानार्थम् । अर्थज्ञानत्त्वोपयिक्तत्वात्प्रसिद्धफलकमेवेति सर्वेषां फलवत्त्वम् ।" The explanation of the adhyayanavidhi together with the yāgavidhi is based on the generally accepted maxim—"आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ।", the injunctions enjoining various sacrifices enjoin them only in reference to people who possess the necessary qualifications or capacity to perform them successfully. One of such qualifications is the Vidyā or knowledge of those sacrifices as found in the Vedic texts, which can be acquired only by the prescribed Vedādhyaṇa. So the Vedādhyaṇa has its primary object viz. the knowledge of the contents of the Veda which can be had only by the study of not only the Vedāṅgas but the Mīmāṃsāsāstra explaining rules of interpretation in instances of doubt or ambiguity. Hence, the *Mīmāṃsā-Śāstra* is to be commenced. This idea is explained by the well-known verse of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa "धर्मे प्रतीयमाणे हि वेदेन करणात्मना । इतिकर्त्तव्यताभागं मीमांसा पूरयिष्यति" which emphasises well the need of the study of the *Mīmāṃsāsāstra* by the Vedic student to understand the nature of dharma from the Vedic texts.

PROBLEMS IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

By P. S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI

(i) *Pañcajanāḥ* in the *Ṛgveda Samhitā*.

THE *Ṛgveda Samhitā* mentions the terms *pañcajanāḥ*, *pañca-kṣitayaḥ*, *pañca-kṛṣṭayaḥ* and *pañca-jātāḥ*.¹ Commentators are at variance in their denotation.

Yāska in his *Nirukta*, states that, in the opinion of some of his ancestors they refer to “gandharvas, pitṛās, devas, asuras and rākṣasas”² and in the opinion of *Āpamanyava* they refer to the four *varṇas* and *niṣādas*.³ It is evident from this that the exact denotation of the term *pañcajanāḥ* was not known even to Yāska’s ancestors. Hence, it is nearly 2500 years since the problem of solving the denotation of the term has arisen. There are some difficulties in accepting either of the above two solutions. It is not certain whether *niṣādas* as a class were in existence at the *Ṛgvedic* time and it seems they are not mentioned in the *Ṛgveda Samhitā*. Hence the interpretation of *Āpamanyava* does not seem to be sound. As regards the former interpretation, the difficulties are:—(1) *Gandharvas* and *Pitṛs* cannot be classified among mortals on earth and *pañcajanāḥ* are said to be so.”⁴ *Rākṣasas* are said to be driven away by Indra, while *pañca-*

¹ अदितिः पञ्च जनाः (I, 89, 10)

इन्द्रः पञ्च क्षितीनाम् (I, 7, 9)

यस्य विश्वानि हस्तयोः पञ्च क्षितीनां वसु (I, 176, 3)

अस्माकं युष्ममधि पञ्च कुक्षिषु (2, 2, 10)

त्रिषधस्था सप्तधातुः पञ्च जाता वर्धयन्ती (6, 61, 12)

² & ³ पञ्च जना मम होत्रं जुषध्वम् गन्धर्वाः पितरो देवा असुरा रक्षासीत्येके ।

चत्वारो वर्णाः निषादः पञ्चम इत्यौपमन्यवः (*Nirukta* 3, 2, 1)

⁴ पञ्च क्षितीर्मानुषीर्बोधयन्ती (7, 79, 1)

janāḥ are said to be favoured by Indra.⁵ The mention of *asuras* is another point in its disfavour. The word *asura* in the *Ṛgveda Samhitā* is used only as a *viśeṣaṇa* in the sense of 'a valiant one', 'life-giver' etc. and is never used as a *viśeṣya*. Besides *asura* is not mentioned anywhere there as the enemy of *deva*. Even the word *deva* is mostly used as a *viśeṣaṇa* in the sense of 'shining', 'illuminating' etc. Both the words—*asura* and *deva* are used as *viśeṣaṇas* to the *Ṛgvedic* deities⁶. Sāyaṇācārya explains *asurāya* in a *Ṛk*⁷ with reference to *Rudra* as *prāṇāpabartre*, though he explains *asuram* in another *Ṛk*⁸ with reference to the same *Rudra* as *prāṇadātāram*. Hence he might have explained *asurāya* as *prāṇadātāre* instead of *prāṇāpabartre*. MacDonell says that *asura* in the tenth maṇḍala may mean *non-deva*. The word occurs in two places⁹. There also it should be taken to mean 'valiant' since it is an adjunct to *pitṛs* in one *Ṛk*¹⁰ and to Agni, Soma and Varuṇa in the other.¹¹

MacDonell suggests that *pañcajanāḥ* may denote Purus, Turvaṣas, Yadus, Anus, and Druhyus.¹² How he chose

⁵ इन्द्रज्यति । इन्द्रः पञ्च जित्तीनाम् (1, 7, 9)

यस्य विश्वानि हस्तयोः पञ्च जित्तीनाम् (1, 176, 3)

⁶ वृत्तप्रसक्तो असुरः.....अग्निः (5, 15, 1)

रुद्रं नमोभिदेवमसुरं दुवस्य (5, 42, 11)

हिरण्यहस्तो असुरः सुनीन्यः (1, 35, 10)

सोमो मीढवा असुरो वेद भूमनः (9, 75, 7)

यद्वाभिपित्वे असुरा क्रतुयते द्दिये मविदाशुषे वयं तदो वसवो विश्ववेदस उपस्थेयाममध्य आ (8, 27, 20)

⁷ उत वा दिवो असुराय (5, 41, 3)

⁸ रुद्रं नमोभिदेवमसुरं दुवस्य (5, 42, 11)

⁹ शंसामि पित्रे असुराय (10, 124, 3)

निर्माया उत्पे असुरा अभवन् (10, 124, 5)

¹⁰ A History of Sanskrit literature by A. A. MacDonell p. 153.

¹¹ त्वमाविश नयं तुर्वशं यदु त्वं तुर्वीति वयं शतक्रतो । त्वं रथमेतेशम्... (1, 54, 6)

¹² त्वं तदुक्थमिन्द्र...प्रावो दिवोदासं चित्राभिरूती (6, 26, 5)

them, it is not easy to determine. For one *Rk* says that Indra protected *Narya*, *Turvaṣa*, *Yadu*, *Turvīti* and *Ratha*,¹³ another *rk* says that he protected *Divodāsa*,¹⁴ and a third one says that he subjugated *Turvaṣa* and *Yadu* to protect *Divodāsa*,¹⁵ another that he defeated *Puru*¹⁶ and another *Anus* and *Druhyus*.¹⁷

The designation *pāñcajanyaḥ*¹⁸ given to Indra suggests that *pāñcajanāḥ* were those who were always under the protection of Indra. Hence the denotation of *pāñcajanāḥ* is a problem that has not yet been solved.

I wish to suggest the following solution for scholars to scrutinise.

Tolkāppiyāṇār, the author of the earliest extant treatise on Tamil Grammar and Poetics, possibly of the 2nd century B.C. tells us that the land was divided into five tracts:—*kuriñci* (mountainous tract), *marutam* (agricultural tract), *mullai* (forest tract), *neytal* (maritime tract), and *pālai* (desert tract) and *Murukaṇ*, *Indra*, *Viṣṇu* and *Varuṇa* were respectively the presiding deity of the first four.¹⁹ The word *collarum paṭum* in the sūtra suggests that this classification was not made by Tolkāppiyāṇār, but by his ancestors. It is also evident from the *sūtra* that the five

13 पुरः सद्य इत्थाधिष्ठेदिवोदासाय शम्बरम् ।

अधृत्यं तुर्वशुं यदुम् (9, 61, 2)

14 जेषं पूरं विदथे मृध्रवाचम् (7, 18, 13)

15 निगव्यवोनवोदुह्यवः (7, 18, 14)

16 चम्रीषो न शवसा पाञ्चजन्यो मरुत्वान्नो भवत्विन्द्र ऊती (1, 100, 12)

17 Māyōṇ mēya kāturai y-ulakam-um cēyōṇ mēya mai-varai y-ulakam-um vēntaṇ mēya tim-puṇat l-ulakam-um varuṇaṇ mēya paru-mana l-ulakam-um *mullai kuriñai maruta neytaal-eṇa-e colliya muraiyār collarum paṭum-ē*.

(Tol. Poml. 3)

Naturu-milai-t tinai-y-ē .. Ibid 11)

Vakai tān-e palai yatu puran-ē Ibid 73)

Māyōṇ=Viṣṇu; cēyōṇ—skanda; Vēnta—Indra; *Naṭum-nilai-t-tiṇai*—Tiṇai mentioned in the middle (ie) *Pālai*.

tracts differ from one another in nature and consequently their inhabitants also should differ in their nature, habits and occupation. The term *pañca-kṣitayah* suggests the varied nature of the tracts, *pañca-kṣṭayah*, the varied nature of the occupation of the inhabitants and *pañca-jātāḥ*, the varied nature of the inhabitants. Since rain is absolutely necessary for them, the term *pañcajanyaḥ* also seems to be appropriate.

Of the four Gods mentioned, three—Indra, Varuṇa, and Viṣṇu are found in the *Ṛgveda* and the fourth Skanda is referred to in the *Chāndogyōpaniṣad*. Some of the Tamil scholars think that *Murukan* is an indigenous tamil god. But all the descriptions about *Murukan* from his birth onwards described in Tamil literature—*Tirumurumkārrup-patai* and *Paripāṭal*—are almost identical with those of Skanda found in the *Mahābhārata*.

The home of the *Ṛgvedic* Indians had all these five different tracts of land. Hence *pañca-janāḥ* may refer to their inhabitants.

A NOTE ON PALLAVA SIMHAVIṢṆU AND THE HOSAKOTE PLATES

By K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

SIMHAVIṢṆU, the founder of the best known line of the Pallavas of South India, has been conjecturally assigned to the last quarter of the sixth century A. D. as no direct evidence of his regnal period is available. The discovery in 1938 of the Hosakote plates of the 12th year of Gaṅgā Avinīta¹ seems to render it probable that Simhaviṣṇu began his rule rather earlier than is usually believed. In these plates Avinīta himself is not so named but is called Kongaṇy-ādhirāja; but the genealogy recorded there and the epithet *Jananīdevatāṅka paryyāṅka-tala samadbigata-rājyena* (p. 16) leaves no room for any doubt about the identity of the monarch. Gaṅgā chronology is by no means definitely settled and there is conflict among inscriptions even about the genealogy of the line. Avinīta's reign was assigned the period A.D. 565-605² by Dubreuil, but it might well have started much earlier. There is also the question if the charters of Avinīta count his regnal years from the day he was crowned as a baby on the lap of his mother or from the time when after he came of age he began to exercise personal rule. After a fresh and independent study of the evidence at hand, one of my students, Mr. Anantharao Baji, has seen reason to suggest that Avinīta was crowned about A.D. 530, that his charters may be taken to date his regnal years from 555 and that his reign continued till about 600.³ I consider this a very probable scheme and on this

¹ *Mysore Arch. Rep.* 1938, P. 80.

² Dubreuil—*Ancient History of the Deccan*, p. 107

³ In a thesis on Gaṅgās which awaits publication.

basis the date of the Hosakote plates would be about A.D. 567 which is also the date suggested for the charter by the Mysore archaeologist Dr. M.H. Krishna.⁴

The object of the Hosakote plates is to record a grant by the king of some land and a house in the village of Pulliūra to a Jain temple built by the mother of Simhaviṣṇu, apparently in the same village. The operative passage in the charter reads:

Śrīmatā Kongaṇyādhīrājena ātmanah pravardhamāṇa vijayaiśvarye dvādaśe samvatsare Kārttike māse śukla-pakṣe tithau pournimamāsyām śāsanādhikṛtasya sakala-mantra - tantr - āntarggatasya vividhāgama - Jala - prakṣālita- viśuddha - bud. heḥ Simhaviṣṇu - Pallavādhīrājasya - Jananyā bhartṛkula - kīrtti-Jananyārthaṁ - cātmanaśca dharmma-pravardhanārthaṁca pratiṣṭhāpitāyā arhad - devatāyatanāya yāvanikasan - ghānuṣṭhitāya.dattam. (11=21 - 30, omitting the description of the land and house forming the subject of the gift).

I have cited the text to show that the date does not give details that admit of verification, and that there can be no reasonable doubt about the identity of the Simhaviṣṇu under reference. He is described as Pallavādhīrāja, engaged in ruling by means of commands (*śāsanādhikṛta*), as skilled in all *mantra* (counsel) and *tantra* (policy), and as possessed of a mind purified by the waters of several *āgamas*. These *āgamas* might have been Jaina scripture. We know that Simhaviṣṇu's son Mahendravarman was a Jain to start with and that he went over to Śaivism under the influence of the famous Śaiva saint Appar or Tirunāvukkarasu. We now find that Jainism was hereditary in the Pallava family for some time before that, for the Hosakote plates show that Simhaviṣṇu as well as his mother were ardent devotees of Jainism.

⁴ MAR. 1938 p. 88.

But Simhaviṣṇu has so far been regarded as a Vaiṣṇava in his personal faith; his name itself, and the epithet *bhaktiyārādhita-viṣṇuḥ* applied to him in the Udayendiram plates of Nandivarman II,⁵ and the presence of his relief together with those of his queens in the Varāha cave at Māmallapuram leave little room for any doubt on that point. There is nothing except the context to support the interpretation of the *vividhāgama* of the Hosakote plates as meaning the Jaina canon; but in this case the evidence of the context is quite strong and the question does arise how we are to reconcile it with the evidence of the Pallava records on Simhaviṣṇu's religious faith.

Again, the terms in which the foundation of the temple is mentioned are very peculiar. Simhaviṣṇu's mother (*Jananī*) is mentioned but her name is not given. The Jain temple (*arhad-devatāyatana*) is founded for the glory of her husband's family and for the increase of her own merit. What was her husband's family? Was it Pallava or some other? The husband again is not named, a fact which coincides significantly enough with the silence of the genuine Pallava charters regarding the father and mother of Simhaviṣṇu.

All this rouses our suspicion regarding the authenticity of the Hosakote plates. Its language is faulty particularly in the extract given above and its expressions unusual; *sāsanādhikṛtasya* strictly interpreted would not bear the meaning assigned to it above in accordance with the view of the editor of the plates; it would mean, 'one who was authorised in relation to *sāsanas*', it being not clear whether he is to issue or execute them. Again *antarggatasya* at the end of the next compound is also very unidiomatic or even meaningless. Likewise, *bhartrkula-kīrtti-jananyārtham* is also bad. Lastly, the date does not admit of verification.

⁵ *SII*. Vol.-II P 365.

‘The importance of this inscription’, says the editor of the Hosakote plates, ‘consists in furnishing the contemporaneity of the Pallava and the Gaṅgā kings Simhaviṣṇu and Avinīta respectively’; again, ‘this fact of contemporaneity mentioned only in the literary record, has been for the first time epigraphically substantiated by the Hosakote inscription’.⁶ He refers to the *Avanti-sundarīkathā* and its *Sāra*, and the story it gives of the migration of Damōdara-Bhāravi from the presence of Viṣṇuvardhana to that of Durvinīta and Simhaviṣṇu. The evidence of this *Kathā* has generally been treated as suspect and the Hosakote plates seem to represent an attempt to give epigraphical confirmation to a doubtful historical theory. The attempt does not appear to me to be a success and this is not the first time that archaeology in Mysore has fallen victim to tendentious hoaxes. The Hosakote plates far from strengthening the case for the contemporaneity of the three rulers mentioned in the *Kathā* go far to justify the reserve with which the evidence of the *Kathā* has been treated. The plates have a plausible look because (1) they take account of the latest results of genuine study as for instance on the close relation between the Gaṅgās and Pallavas lasting over several generations; (2) they take care not to present too broad a front for criticism, witness their silence about the parentage of Simhaviṣṇu and the vagueness of the chronological data and (3) they give evidence of some technical competence in manipulating the script of the period under question, though the writing in this case is perhaps too regular and correct for a genuine charter.

⁶ *MAR.* 1938, pp. 87-8

SHORT NOTES

I

DR. RAJA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BHARATA-VĀKYA IN THE MĀLAVIKĀGNIMITRA

By DASHARATHA SHARMA.

THE first two lines of the Bharatavākya in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*,

‘त्वं मे प्रसादसुमुखीभव चरिड नित्य-
मेतावदेव भृगवे प्रतिपद्हेतोः ।’

have been regarded by commentators as Agnimitra's request to his queen, ‘Dhārīṇī, to present for even a propitious countenance to him. According to them the word प्रतिपद् in the second line above refers to her rival Mālavikā. Writing in the pages of this *Journal*¹, Dr. C. Kunhan Raja has given it the new interpretation, Caṇḍī (Kālī), be even with a propitious countenance for me; this much I pray (thee) on behalf of those who are my opponents.” The Bharatavākya is in this case regarded, not as Agnimitra's request to Dhārīṇī, but the poet's prayer to Caṇḍī or Kālī. The *Pratipakṣas*, according to him, are ‘the the people who are not able to respond to Art even after seeing his drama.’ Regarding such people all that Kālidāsa could do was ‘to invoke the propitiation of Caṇḍī’.

We beg to differ from Dr. Raja's interpretation not because it is new but because it compares unfavourably with the olden explanation. It is easy to regard Mālavikā as a प्रतिपद् of Dhārīṇī, for both loved Agnimitra. They were real rivals. But is it not rather too much to expect us to take ‘people who could not respond to Art,’ as *Pratipakṣas* or rivals of the great Kālidāsa? Would Kālidāsa not be smiling down from his Elysian seat, if he knew that, for future, his rivals were to be neither Bhavabhūti nor Bhāsa but dunces and dullards im-

¹ Vol. IV, pp. 211-16,

pervious to the influence of fine arts and literature ? Beside, we must remember that Kālidāsa's prayers have been addressed to Śiva in his अर्चनारीश्वर form. We never find him praying to Caṇḍikā, nay even to Śiva's Śakti alone. Is it not therefore better to stick to the older explanation of the word चण्डी as अविचारासहिष्णु-भामिनी ? Dr. Raja's objection to it is that it is inconsistent with Dhāriṇī's character. But is it really so ? Polygamy was no doubt an accepted custom of Hindu times. But this does not mean that the queens liked the kings to bring a new wife every year. Dhāriṇī, though noble, was not without her natural share of wifely jealousy. Knowing her husband through and through as she did, she had carefully kept away Mālavikā from Agnimitra's sight, and had felt intensely chagrined when the king managed to see her as the result of a clever ruse. The poor Vidūṣaka too, though a general favourite, was for some time in disgrace with her because he helped his master in some of these amorous intrigues. In the end, however, her essentially noble nature prevailed. She agreed to the king's marriage with Mālavikā, because she found this to be the best means of rendering him happy. She was happy also to find that Mālavikā was her own cousin, and that her marriage with Agnimitra would be politically beneficial to Magadha. Not only the commentators of Kālidāsa, but great writers like Harṣa and Rājaśekhara appear to have taken the story in this light. In their plays, which have obviously been modelled on the *Mālavikāgnimitra*, they have the same dramatic motive. The hero falls in love with a lovely maiden who in the end proves to be a princess and a kinswoman of the queen. The queens are noble in character. It need hardly be said that they are the heads of a polyamous Zenana. In the beginning natural jealousy makes them oppose the idea of a marriage between the hero and the heroine. But in the end they yield. The marriage takes place. Peace and concord reign again in the family after the temporary conflict. Queens like Irāvati, the cowife of Dhāriṇī, who care more for

themselves and less for the husband's happiness, are rare in the field of Sanskrit and Prakrit dramatic literature.

The events described in the *Mālavikāgnimitra* prove that Dhāriṇī was in the beginning actually a *Caṇḍī* i.e. अवि-
चारसहिष्णु-भामिनी of the Bharatavākya though she had never the pettiness of Irāvati. It was only later on that she became प्रसादसुमुखी. She was then all kindness to Agnimitra as well as her *Pratipakṣa* Mālavikā. Agnimitra's request that she should continue so for ever was natural enough after the mental torment that both he and Mālavikā had suffered in the earlier part of the drama as a result of Dhāriṇī's opposition.

II

KONKAṆA-VIJAYA-PARVAṆI

By Da:harath Sharma

BHOJA PARAMARA issued two grants in the Vikrama year 1076, the Bānswāra grant, dated the 5th day of the bright half of Māgha and the Betmā grant, dated the 15th day of the bright half of Bhādrapada. The occasion for the first was कौंकणविजयपर्व and for the second कौंकणविजयग्रहणपर्व. These are similar expressions. But as there is a difference of not one near but of seven months and seven days between the two grants, provided the year may be taken to begin with Kārttika, as in the case of Bhoja's Ujjain grant of V. 1078, the expressions cannot obviously refer to one and the same festival observed on a certain fixed day of the year, say either on the 5th of the bright half of Māgha or the 15th of the bright half of Bhādrapada. The reference is to two different events. कौंकणविजयपर्व of the one grant must be something different from the कौंकणविजयग्रहणपर्व of the other.

Dr. Hultsch translated कौंकणविजयपर्व as 'the anniversary of the conquest of Konkaṇa'¹ Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar's

¹ *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XI, p. 181.

² *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XLI, p. 201.

translation on the festival day in consequence of the conquest of Konkāṇa² is perhaps better, but certainly not flawless, for as shown by the Betmā grant, the conquest of Konkāṇa (कोंकणग्रहण) actually occurred nearly seven months later than the कोंकणविजयपर्व commemorated by the Bānswārā grant. *Vijayadasamī* is a well known festival. The Marathas celebrated it, not because of any actual victories they achieved on this day, but because of its being the day of their विजययात्रा against the Mughals, the Nizam and their other enemies. For a Maratha of the Peshwa period विजय-दशमी actually meant विजययात्रादशमी. Similarly, कोंकणविजयपर्व of the Bānswārā grant may mean the कोंकणविजय (यात्रा) पर्व, i.e. the day on which the Paramāra forces started on their expedition for the conquest of Konkāṇa. Seven months and ten days later followed the कोंकणग्रहणपर्व i.e., the day on which the Paramāra forces of Bhoja occupied the whole of Konkāṇa. In translating thus we are giving no new meaning to the word ग्रहण, for as pointed out by the Editor of the *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XVIII³ the root ग्रह is used in the sense 'of taking possession' also in the words कोंकणाधीश्वराणां सर्वस्वं गृहीत्वा occurring in the Miraj Plates (*E. I.* Vol. XII, p. 313). That the paramāra forces should have started in Māgha and completed the conquest by Bhādrapada is only natural. They had a long distance to traverse and to encounter an enemy fighting for the independence of his kingdom.

³ P. 321, footnote 2.

APPENDIX A

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE ALLAHABAD.

This Annual General Meeting of the General Council of the Institute meets just nine months after the last Meeting. During these months there are not many activities to report. The abnormal condition of the country has prevented us from going out for collection of funds. Our president the Rt. Hon. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has been unfortunately seriously ill all this time and it has not been possible to get his usual help and valuable guidance. The Vice-President Pandit Amaranatha Jha has tried his best to interest persons in the Institute, but not many donations have been secured. The small non-recurring grant of rupees two thousand received from the U.P. Govt. has not enabled us to expand our work to any appreciable extent. Our activities would have been curtailed had not Pandit Amaranatha Jha donated Rs. 100 per month for Research Scholarships. The Institute is very grateful to him for this generous encouragement at this very critical moment. Continuous labour troubles have affected the press with the result that the publication of our Journal is delayed. Our first publication of Sanskrit State Documents under the editorship of Dr. S. N. Sen has been unduly delayed, but the major part of it has now been printed. We have several schemes before us, some of which may be mentioned here—publication of an authoritative History of Sanskrit Literature in all its branches; compilation of a critical bibliography of all the original contributions made to Indology which are scattered in Oriental Journals and other publications; preparing a chronology of Sanskrit works both printed and in manus-

cripts; publication of rare and useful Sanskrit texts and studies in Indology; collection of valuable manuscripts which are being destroyed by white ants, thereby resulting in a gradual loss by which Indian Scholarship is becoming poorer day by day, and so on. We realise what a vast field of research in every branch of Indology lies before us. So far the work has been done either by the foreigners or by those who imbibed their spirit. We think that it is high time that Indian scholars should themselves take up the work of research, free from prejudice and with critical detachment in all branches depending mainly on original sources. For all these we require funds and the active co-operation and sympathy of scholars and public at large. Unfortunately advanced original work in classics seems to be at a discount. Those who have power in their hands and influence should come to our help. It is a cause that deserves the support of our enlightened leaders. We are fortunate in these provinces in having at the helm of affairs Statesmen who have breadth of out-look and genuine love of scholarship.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of Ordinary Members of the Institute on the 1st of November 1947 is 96 as against 85 on December 31, 1946. The number of life-members is 80 as against 77 of the previous year and that of honorary members is ten as against nine of the last year. The total number of all the members of the Institute at present is 211, against 195 of the last year.

MEETINGS

There were only two meetings of the Executive Committee this year. Most of the other business was transacted by correspondence.

PUBLICATIONS

During the period under review Volume IV part II of our Quarterly Research Journal consisting of 106 pages has been published; parts III and IV are still in the press. Owing to the difficulty in securing matrices required for the type of the Journal the press has not been able to bring out the Joint-Number as yet. But we hope that within a fortnight we shall be able to place this Joint-Number in the hands of our readers.

We took up the publication of the Sanskrit records in the possession of the Govt. of India more than a year ago. About 100 pages have been printed off and some 300 pages are still in the press. The delay is partly due to the technical nature of the printing of Sanskrit documents, partly to the labour troubles in the press and partly to the want of paper quota. I may be permitted to repeat that the printing charges have gone up and we have to face a deficit unless the promised grant for this publication by the Tehri Darbar is enhanced.

LIBRARY

About thirty books have been received for review in the Journal this year; they have been placed in the Institute Library. We have purchased some books for the work of research scholars. In the manuscript section a small addition has been made. I am glad to state that almost all the manuscripts have now been classified and over 1,000 have been catalogued, arranged and put in separate cloth bindings. With great effort we were able to secure cloth for wrapping our manuscripts. The printed books are being classified and a catalogue is being prepared on the card system. About 1000 cards have been prepared so far.

The Institute has on its exchange list fifty research Journals and magazines. Most of these are not quite

regular due to various reasons. We have been able to secure back numbers of several Journals in order to complete our sets.

CONFERENCES AND RECOGNITIONS

The Institute has been invited to send delegates to the Indian Philosophical Congress, All India Writers' Conference and the Oriental Conference. We have also been invited by the Govt. of India to give our opinion on the scientific project undertaken by them.

RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIPS

We have three research scholars at present under the Institute: Shri A.S. Nataraja Ayyar an advocate of the Madras High Court working on the *Mīmāṃsā Rules of Interpretation*, Pandit Virendranatha Acharya and Pandit S. Dakshinamurthy Shastri engaged in compiling a comprehensive anthology in Sanskrit with English Translation for a volume to be entitled "*The Indian Portrait*", describing typical characters in Sanskrit literature. The latter two scholars are working under the supervision of Prof. Amaranatha Jha, while the former is working under my supervision.

OUR NEEDS

I am glad to inform the Council that the Govt. of the United Provinces have been pleased to send for the plans and list of equipments of the Institute Buildings. It is hoped that with the generous help of the Hon. Minister of Education who himself realises the importance of the activities of the Institute, the Govt. will be pleased to grant us sufficient recurring grants for expanding our activities and for the construction of the Building.

It is my duty to place before the members and also the public our needs. The authorities of the Hindu Boarding House have very generously placed at our disposal a Hall for our Library for the last four years. It is not proper to take advantage any longer of their generous hospitality. Besides without sufficient place for keeping books, Journals old and current, manuscripts, office rooms, rooms for research scholars, our activities are much hampered. Then again the condition on which land has been leased necessitates that we must get our buildings constructed within three years of which more than a year is already passed. Our prospective donors cannot be attracted unless we start our buildings. Visitors are disappointed for want of any place in the present Library where they can sit and consult books. Thousands of manuscripts promised to the Institute cannot be brought to the Library for want of space. The office is with the Secretary, Research scholars have either to work in the University Library or at the house of their supervisors. This is very unsatisfactory. We cannot exaggerate the immediate need of having our own buildings and more and more research scholars working under experts in calm and scholarly atmosphere.

The members are aware that the Executive Committee has decided to give scholarships of Rs. 100 to each research scholar but unfortunately for want of sufficient funds we are unable to abide by the resolution, at present. In the present circumstances of our country every province has its own projects and schemes and it is difficult to expect any financial help elsewhere. Our work is being recognised by all the provincial and Central Governments and the various States. We also do not confine ourselves to this province for selecting persons for the award of scholarship; yet our main field of work being in this province, we have to look up first to our own Govt.

All our schemes referred to above need large funds. Our President and Vice-president will certainly never miss any opportunity to help the growth of the Institute, but we should not forget that it is also the duty of every member of the Institute and the public at large to come to our help. We can only promise to make the best use of their help and produce first class standard works, if we get sufficient funds, cooperation and sympathy of our donors. Lastly I will be failing in my duty if I do not take this opportunity of expressing my sincere gratitude to those who have helped the Institute with generous donations, contributions of articles, and presents of books. I hope with your kind cooperation, help and sympathy the Institute will be able to achieve more and more success.

APPENDIX B

AUDIT REPORT ON THE ACCOUNT OF THE GANGA-NATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ALLAHABAD FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH, 1947.

The last audit of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad was conducted in February, 1947. This is the account for the period for 1st April, 1946 to 31st March 1947. The Income and Expenditure Account and Balance Sheet of the Institute are set out below.

Income and Expenditure a/c for the year ended 31st March 1947.

	Rs. a. p.		R. a. p.
To General Expenditure a/c. ..	846 10 9	By Donations a/c (including Govt. Grant).	2,801 6 3
To Postage a/c ..	26 7 6	By Life Membership a/c.	440 0 0
To Journal a/c ..	2,680 7 0	By Annual Membership a/c.	773 0 0
To Research Scholarship a/c.	706 7 3	By Benefactors a/c
To Surplus of Income over Expenditure.	3,174 13 9	By Interest a/c ..	3,235 0 0
		By Sales a/c ..	185 8 0
	7,434 14 3		7,434 14 3

Balance Sheet as on 31st March 1947.

Liabilities.

Investments and Assets.

Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
*Surplus of income over Expenditure (Balance 1st April 1946).	Almirahs and shelves a/c. 284 0 0
1,34,066 1 10	Securities a/c .. 1,32,363 2 11
Current year's surplus of Income over Expenditure (From 1st April '46 to 31st March 1947)	Cash in hand .. 14 4 3
3,174 13 9	Cash at Bank .. 4,578 6 5
current year.	Suspense a/c .. 1 2 0
1,37,240 15 7	1,37,240 15 7

*The surplus of Income over Expenditure Balance

(1st April) includes loan a/c of Dr. Mishra for	Rs. 99 14 0
That is, Surplus	.. 1,33,966 3 10
Loan a/c	-- 99 14 0
	1,34,066 1 10

1. Out of 12 Receipt books, reported to have been printed for the Institute, four receipt books containing receipts Nos. 101 to 200, 301 to 400, 401 to 500 and 801 to 900 were not produced in audit. It is stated that no collection from these books have been made. It is, therefore, suggested that these books should be called back and put up at the time of next audit so that they may be verified.

2. Receipt book No.VII containing receipts from 601 to 700 was left unused while subsequent books were used. The reason assigned to this was some change in form of receipts. In case this book is no more required all receipts contained in the book should be cancelled under the dated initial of the Secretary and presented at the time of next audit.

3. Loan account of Dr. Mishra for Rs. 99-14-0 and suspense account of Rs. 1-2-0 have not been cleared even this year. Steps may be taken to clear them as soon as possible before the close of the current financial year.

4. Subject to the above remarks the accounts were kept properly.

Dated 6th November, 1947.

A. Siddiqi
Treasurer

D. Kishore.
Honorary Auditor

Umesha Mishra
Secretary

APPENDIX C

AN ACCOUNT OF THE FINANCIAL ESTIMATE OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR 1948-49.

Income

Donations (and Govt. Grant)	10,000	0	0
Life-Membership Fee	600	0	0
Annual Membership Fee	1,000	0	0
Interest on Securities	3,500	0	0
Sale of Journal etc.	300	0	0
Dr. Amaranatha Jha's donation for Research Scholarship	12,00	0	0
			16,600	0	0


Expenditure

Pandit working (Part-time) in the Mss. Section	Rs. 30 p.m.	360	0	0
Clerk (Part-time)	Rs. 30 p.m.	360	0	0
Peon Rs. 15-0-0 P. M. Plus Rs. 10 as Dearness Allowance.	300	0	0
Chowkidar Rs. 15 P. M. plus Rs. 10 as Dear- ness Allowance	360	0	0
Publication of the Journal	4,000	0	0
Scholarships (Three at Rs. 100 P.M.)	3,600	0	0
Purchase of Books	1,500	0	0
Purchase of Mss.	500	0	0
Postage	50	0	0
Binding of Books and Journals	200	0	0
Contingencies	100	0	0
Publication of Books	5,000	0	0
Furniture	200	0	0
			Total	16,530	0	0

Umesha Mishra
Secretary

A. Siddiqi
Treasurer

20, 11. '47



REVIEWS OF BOOKS

ON THE CHRONICLES OF CEYLON. By Bimala Churn Law. Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Monograph Series Vol. III. Published by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. I Park Street, Calcutta. 1947, pp. viii and 76.

Dr. Law is a great scholar of Buddhism and Pali. We have from his pen this monograph on *The Chronicles of Ceylon*. The author discusses the entire subject of the chronicles in the Pali and Sinhalese languages beginning from *Dīpawamsa* under three heads—their chronological position, literary position and historical position. He has utilised all the available materials for arriving at his conclusions. The help rendered by the author in his treatment of the ceylonese chronicles will be of great help to the future historian writing the history of Ceylon and Indian Buddhism in Ceylon.

THERAVADA BUDDHISM IN BURMA. By Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray, University of Calcutta, 1946, pp. xv and 306. Price Rs. 7-8-0.

The book is a study in Indo-Burmese historical and cultural relations from the earliest times to the British conquest of Burma. The author has dealt with the history of Buddhism in Burma from the Asokan Mission up to the British conquest. The author is of opinion that Buddhism alone has been the great unifying factor in Burma, that it gave them a society based on the theory of equality of social standards, that it gave them a religion that replaced the primitive heathenism of earlier centuries and that it was Buddhism that brought Burma into the arena of culture and civilisation and in one line with other countries of the Indian Orient. Dr. Ray is a well known author of several works on the history of Burma, Burman life, art and civilisation. The present work will take a high rank as one of the valuable books on the history of Burma.

SOCIAL AND RURAL ECONOMY OF NORTHERN INDIA 600 B. C. TO 200 A.D. Vol. II. By Atindranath Bose., University of Calcutta, 1945, pp. xiii and pp. 153 to 507 and xxiv.

The book under review deals with the social and rural economy of Northern India under the following heads: Industrial Economy, Trade and Commerce, Banking and Currency, Occupation and Employment, and Social Physiognomy. Each of these heads is subdivided into several chapters. The treatment is methodical and accurate. The book is very useful for the research scholars on the questions dealt with therein. The book shows how ancient India was highly advanced in the arts of modern civilised life; and even today modern India may revive the rules of ancient trade guilds and avoid the pitfalls of modern trade unionism and thereby there will be a just adjustment of Capital and Labour and less interference by the State.

VIŚVA-BHARATI ANNALS. 1945. Vol. I. Cheena Bhavana. Edited. By P. C. Bagchi. Published by the Visva Bharati Publishing Department, Calcutta. Price Rs. 10. pp. v and 227.

The award of scholarships by the China government has enabled the research staff of the Visva Bharati to publish the volume containing 7 articles dealing with the history of China and India. Inter alia the book has restored into English and Sanskrit the ancient Sanskrit Text of the *Artha-pada Sūtra* from its Chinese translation. Thus books lost to the Sanskrit world are now reconstructed and they are thus indeed new finds to the student of Indian culture and history. The Annals should find a place in the library of every University, Institute and scholar.

THE BHĀJA GOVINDA STOTRA OF ĀDI ŚĀṆKARĀCHĀRYA-SANSKRIT TEXT WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES IN TAMIL. By A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, Research Scholar, the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute. 1948. 5th Revised Edition. B. G. Paul & Co. Madras. pp. 52. Price 4 as.

The great Śāṅkara inter alia composed in popular Sanskrit devotional poems and the present one is known as *Moha-mudgara* or *Bhaja Govinda Stotra*. A research scholar of this Institute has brought this revised 5th edition with notes especially from the unpublished Sanskrit commentary of Swayamprakāśa Ācārya. The Jagadguru Śāṅkarācārya of the Kanci Kamakoti Peetham has commended this book in his Śrīmukham. The book will be very useful as a text book in schools in the Tamil Province of Madras. The printing and get up and the tricoloured picture of Lord Kṛṣṇa add beauty to the publication.

ATTITUDE OF VEDĀNTA TOWARDS RELIGION. By Swami Abhedananda. Published by the Rāmākṛishṇa Vedānta Ma'h. Calcutta. 1947. pp. XVI and 192. Rs 6-8-0.

This volume is a collection of nineteen lectures, hitherto unpublished, on different aspects of Vedānta philosophy and religion delivered from time to time by Swami Abhedananda before the audiences in America. The Swami has covered the entire field of Vedānta and Religion. The lectures reveal the greatness of the author as a preacher of Vedānta and as a realised soul. He succeeded in curing the westerners of their credulity, blind faith, sectarianism and narrow bigotry. The author's knowledge of the religions and philosophy of the East, the philosophy of the West and the scientific ideas of the modern world is exhibited on every page; the English style of the lectures is simply captivating.

The Swami has shown that one should not be content with intellect, reason and argumentation though they are the

chief instruments in the domain of philosophy but should live a life of religion and states that this alone would make us transcend the world of sorrows and sufferings. This is the crying need of the West and of the East and the need is as insistent today as when the Swami originally lectured. This book is one of the few books which should be read, re-read and digested; and it should be a companion volume on our shelves to help us in the onward march of spiritual regeneration. A beautiful photo of the Swami adorns the first page. The printing and get up even in these difficult days are superb.

AN APOSTLE OF MONISM. By Sister Shivani (Mrs. Mary Le Page) published by the Calcutta Ramakrishna Vedanta Math. Calcutta 1947. pp. xv and 314. Price Rs. 7-8-0.

This is an authentic account of the life and activities of Swami Abhedananda by one of the Swami's American disciples.

Swami Abhedananda an apostle of the Sri Ramakrishna Order was born in 1866 and in 1897 he came to America and took charge of the Vedanta Society in New York. He came back to India in 1921 and established centres at Calcutta and Darjeeling and left his mortal frame in 1939. The Swami was second only to Swami Vivekananda in his influence on American life and carrying the message of Vedanta from India to America. He created by his lectures and practical life a most powerful impression on his audiences in America and his chief American disciple a lady has written this account of his life with special reference to his activities in America. We can truly compare her biography with such works as Romain Rolland's life of Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Vivekananda and Maxmuller's life of Ramakrishna Paramahansa;

and the work will remain as a classical biography of Abhedananda. Following the 19 lectures of Abhedananda newly published, she has also divided her book into 19 chapters. We have in this book how a rational mind of the West has been able to appreciate the superb life of the Swami devoted to religion and philosophy and preaching of the same as his one mission. An introduction of 20 pages is given by Basu Kumar Bagchi. There are 14 photographs adding to the beauty of the book. The get up is splendid.

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- (1) HISTORY OF SRI MAHABHARATA. PP. 18 and 346. (2) The Secret of Raja-Suya PP. 24 and 110. Price Rs. 1-12-0 and Rs. 1-0-0. Both by Pandya Venkata Subramanya Sastry. Pitha puram, Madras Presidency 1933 and 1938, respectively.

Both the books are in Telugu language and purport to deal with the criticism of *Mahābhārata* and the characters therein. The books have now been sent to us with the view whether they may be translated into English for the benefit of the scholars not knowing the Telugu language. At the outset we have to state that the revised English translation of the History of Indian literature Vol. I by Winternitz published by the Calcutta University deals with the *Mahābhārata* problem in a thoroughly critical way in 165 pages thereby rendering the translation of these works a superfluity. Secondly any criticism based on the earlier and later additions to the great Epic should await the completion of the scholarly editio princeps of the *Mahābhārata* now being published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Poona which alone deals with the text tradition in a thoroughly critical spirit.

Criticism of the achievements of national heroes like Lord Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna worshipped as incarnations by

millions of Hindus would not be tolerated unless it is based on Scientifically accurate data; in this respect the author's views on insufficient data cannot be accepted. Hence the present works may not be commendable for translation into English for the benefit of the non-Telugu Research scholars in India and abroad.

A. S. Nataraja Ayyar

ECONOMIC LIFE AND PROGRESS IN ANCIENT INDIA. By Narayanachandra Bandyopadhyaya. Vol. I Hindu Period. University of Calcutta. Revised 2nd Edition 1945 pp. XX and 347.

This is an economic history of Ancient India from the earliest times down to the rise of the Maurya Empire. The subject had not been worked out by many scholars. The author has discussed the foundations of Indian economic life, the peculiarities of the situation in India and its economic flora and fauna. Then he has discussed the history of the races which came to be settled on the Indian soil. Regarding the Vedic period the author has gone into great detail. The growth of guilds, town life and foreign trade have been fully discussed as also the forces and factors which brought in the interfering policy of the Maurya Government.

The author was a lecturer on Indian History and culture in the Calcutta University and unfortunately died before printing his second volume which is announced as ready for the press. The book is a store house of information on one of the recondite subjects in the history of ancient India; and it also affords useful guidance for the modern politician and statesman who wants to build up the future of India on entirely new lines foreign to its ancient tradition and civilisation.

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN ANCIENT INDIA. By K. L. Daftari. Nagpur University, 1947 price Rs. 3. Pages xviii and 182.

These are the ten lectures delivered in 1944 under the endowment of *the Mahadeo Hari Watlodakar Memorial lectures* instituted in the Nagpur University. The lectures deal with the public assemblies and functionaries the Varṇas, Manu and Saptarṣis, Āśramas, Yajña Asvamedha, Mārriage being the principal topics in the picture of ancient Hindu Society. The author claims to have made a new line of approach into the history of ancient India. He has subdivided ancient India into 6 periods which may not be accepted by the orthodox student of Indian History. The author states that we should revive the institution of the Manu and Saptarṣis and that they (the Manu and Saptarṣis) should if they think fit revive the institution of the Varṇas and Varṇāntara—the transfer of a man in one Varṇa to another and that the Sanyāsa Āśrama be prohibited. These are certainly strange suggestions and not likely to be accepted by the orthodox Hindu or by the reforming legislator. The author has drawn largely from his previous *Kinkbede lectures on "The Astronomical method and its application to the chronology of ancient India"* also delivered under the auspices of the Nagpur University.

THE INDIAN LITERATURES OF TODAY. (A Symposium)
 Edited by Bharatan Kumarappa for the P. E. N. All-India Centre and Published by The International Book House, Ltd. Asha lane, Fort Bombay, 1947, pages x and 181. Price Rs 5.

This is a volume containing sixteen essays on as many of the leading literatures of India, presented at the first All-India Writers' Conference held at Jaipur, Rajputana, from October 20 to 22, 1945 under the auspices of the P. E.

N. All-India Centre. The publishers aptly say, "For those who fancy that the days of India's literary achievement lie largely in the past, this picture of the activity in the modern period in many of the literatures of India will come as a revelation." If the Jaipur Conference had done nothing other than the organisation of this Symposium, it would have merited a lasting place in the general history of Indian Literature.

For the first time we have an opportunity of viewing in a short compass the development of every important Modern Indian language.

We share generally the view of Madame Sophia Wadia that these essays have gained in spontaneity and freshness of approach by not following a uniform pattern, but we regret that in some cases this has meant a positive drawback. For example, Prof. N.K. Sidhanta could have given us, along with his very illuminating and fascinating discussion of the charges against those who have chosen English as their medium of expression, an account of the contribution, if any, Indo-Anglian writers have made in various fields during the last forty-five years. Similarly, some essayists have unnecessarily taken several pages to discuss their literatures before 1900 when these essays are supposed to begin properly. Of course, there cannot be any watertight division of the progress of literature, yet one could make things fit in one pattern for uniformity and comparative study.

The essays are of necessity sketchy. Within the limitation of time and space most of them have been written remarkably well. The essays are on Assamese (By N.L. Mon Phookan), Bengali (By Kazi Abdul Wadud), English (By N. K. Siddhanta), Gujrati (By Jayant Krishna H. Dave), Hindi (By Ram kumar Verma), Kannada (By V. K. Gokak), Maithili (By Umesh Mishra), Malayalam (By C. Kunhan Raja), Marathi (By M.D. Altekar), Oriya (By Kalindi Charan Panigrahi), Punjabi (By Madan Gopal), Sanskrit (By R. N.

Dandekar), Sindhi (By Lalchand Jagatiani), Tamil (By M. R. Jambunathan), Telugu (By C. Narayana Rao) and Urdu (By Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi).

By reading these essays one learns that Nehru, Premchand, Iqbal, Tagore, Munshi, Gandhi and Mrs Naidu alone are not our leading writers. There are Lakshminatha and Hemachandra Goswami (Assamese), Madhusudana and Bankima chandra (Bengali), Nana lal and Kalelkar (Gujarati) Prasad and Pant (Hindi), Bendre and Jagirdar (Sri Ranga) (Kannada), Chanda Jha and Muralidhara Jha (Maithili), Vallathol and Panikar (Malayalam), Gadkari and Apte (Marathi), Madhusudan and Radhanath (Oriya), Nanak Singh (Punjabi), Jatoti and Asari (Sindhi), Bharathi and Ramalingam (Tamil), Veerasalingam, Gidugu and Proddatur brothers (Telugu), and Hali and Josh (Urdu). They have moved millions in the countryside and guided the destinies of the Indian Languages throughout the first half of the present century.

Two facts become clear from even a cursory reading of this volume. The impact of Western literatures (specially English literature) and the handicaps with which Indian Literatures have suffered owing to the predominant position occupied by English or any other neighbouring language (such as Urdu in the Punjab, Hindi in Bihar, and Bengali in Assam and Orrisa) have told heavily upon the growth of individual provincial languages. The duty of those who are charged with the shaping of our destinies today, ought to be to look into these things and let the real literary languages of the people have their proper place in educational and administrative spheres. If this is not possible without creating separate provinces on linguistic and cultural grounds, they should make provision for creating them immediately. There is no other way to educate millions of Indian citizens for shouldering the responsibility of a democratic state within the shortest possible time.

In some of these essays several minor spelling and grammar mistakes have crept in. In others a few salient facts are missed or misinterpreted. Thus in the otherwise excellent essay on Maithili it is mentioned that Maharajadhiraja Shri Kameshwara Simha donated sums to found a chair at the University of Patna and that the *Maithili Sāhitya Pariṣad* publishes the *Sāhityapatra*. The facts are that Maharajadhiraja Shri Kameshwara Simha donated sums to found a Maithili Chair to perpetuate the memory of his father and that *Bhūrati* was the *Pariṣad's* organ and was edited by Bholalaladasa.

The authors of the essays are to be congratulated for co-operating with Madam Sophia Wadia, the Founder-convenor of the P. E. N. Indian Centre in producing this very valuable appreciation of Modern Indian Literatures today. We hope the Second Writers' Conference held at Benares will issue a supplement to this volume giving the changes.

J. Mishra

INDIAN WRITERS IN COUNCIL: Proceedings of the first All India Writers Conference (Jaipur, 1945) Edited by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar for the P. E. N. All India Centre published by the International Book House Ltd. Bombay. Price Rs 7-8-0.

The prospects of holding the International Congress of the P. E. N. Club in India during 1940 having receded in the background owing to the declaration of the Second World War, the idea of an All India Writers' Conference, gained ground by the end of the war years. Jaipur, true to its history, extended a most cordial welcome to the Indian P. E. N. Centre and in October 1945 a large number of Indian writers assembled at Jaipur.

The Conference was a tremendous success. It was the first important meeting of writers in India; it gave the first

opportunity of expressing concretely the cultural unity of India against the background of division and strife. The volume under review is an account of the proceedings of the conference. It presents a faithful picture of old contacts renewed and new ones formed, of stimulating discussions and addresses on the ideals of Indian writers of well-thought out lectures and papers on a variety of topics—such as, “The development of Indian Literatures as a Uniting Force”, “the desirability of an All India Encyclopaedia”, “popularization of Indian Literatures outside India”, “Moral Values in several Literatures”, “The Indian Copyrightlaw”, “Ancient Indian Literature and New Forms”, “Values in literature of the several socials.” Altogether, the entire volume enables those who took the opportunity of visiting the Conference to re-live the wonderfully “rich” experiences (like the writer of the present review) and there who missed the opportunity to form an idea of what it was.

We whole heartedly commend this volume to the writers and the readers.

J. Mishra



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[Part 2

IS THE ṚGVEDIC RUDRA A 'HOWLER'?

By V. M. APTE

SUMMARY

§1-5 Sāyana, Yāska & Ts., Ms., S'B., J U B., Chu—Statements—responsible for the vogue enjoyed by the derivation of 'Rudra' from the root *rud*, 'to cry' or 'to howl' in its simple (and causal?) sense.

§6 and 7—Ṛgvedic evidence does not show Rudra either as a 'Howler' or as so purely malicious that he should be dubbed as a 'a god who makes people cry'! He is rather 'resplendent', 'sun-like', 'ruddy', 'brown' and 'golden'. The epithet *rudra-vartanī*, synonymous as it is with *hiranya-vartanī* both applied almost exclusively to the *Aśvins*—leaves no doubt about the meaning of *rudra* which must be 'shining', 'bright', 'reddish—yellow with the tints of Dawn'.

§8—The solutions of Grassman & Pischel—*rud* in the conjectural senses of 'to be bright' or 'to be red'.

§9 and 10 Rudra & *√rud* the deaspirated forms of 'Rudhra' & *√rudh* respectively. Authorities cited in support: Bollensen, Dr. Katre & Dr. S. K. Chatterjee,

§1. A review of all the Rudra passages in the *Ṛgveda* should induce the conviction (the writer submits) that there is next to no literary evidence in that *Saṁhitā*, to corroborate the usual (*linguistically unobjectionable*) derivation of the name 'Rudra' from the root *rud* in the sense of 'to cry' or 'to howl' and for the consequent interpretation of the name as the

'Howler'! ¹ And yet the vogue enjoyed by this etymological explanation of the name is amazing! The *raison d'être* of this vogue is therefore well worth a critical examination.

§2. The explanation of the name in the *Sāyaṇa-bhāṣya* on *RV*.I.114.1 probably set the ball rolling! Sāyaṇa himself follows Yāska who in his *Nirukta* (X.5) not only gives the derivation of 'Rudra' from \sqrt{rud} , 'to cry' but also traces the word to \sqrt{ru} , 'to roar' and \sqrt{dru} , 'to speed on' and accounts for Rudra as 'the god who roars and speeds on'. This latter root *dru*, in the sense of 'to melt' is also proposed by Sāyaṇa on *V*.73.8 to explain *rūdrā* (an epithet of the Aśvins) thus: *rut stutiḥ tayā dravaṇīyav*. But Yāska himself is an humble follower in the wake of the *Sambhitā* and Brahmana authors whose etymological speculations are based on their own mythological equations and legends about the equated deities. Thus Rudra-Agni is the equation in *AV*. VII.87.1; *TS*.I.1.5.8; *V*.4.3.1; *V*.5.7.4; *S'B* *V*.3.1.10; *VI*.1.3.7, 10; *VI*.2.4.3; *IX*.9.1.1 and *TMB*.XII.4.24. One of the names of Agni is 'Rudra' in *ŚB*. I.7.3.8 and Rudra is the name of one of the eight forms of Agni in *KB* (= *Sāṅkh. Br.*)

VI-1. This mythological equation has its roots in the *RV*. Agni is addressed as Rudra in II.1.6. *Rudra'* is an epithet of Agni in I.27.10 and IV.3.1. It is a well established² point in the *RV*. that Agni is occasionally identified with other gods, including Rudra and *vice versa* that Rudra is one of the several deities identified with Agni.

§3. It is interesting now to see how post-*Ṛg*vedic linguistic speculation exploits this identification. A legend

¹ Weber, *I S.* 2, 19-22; *Kuhn Herabkunft* 177; *K Z.* 2, 278; 3, 335; Max Muller, *Origin and Growth of Religion* 216; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*. (= *MVM*). 77.

² On the identification of Agni with Rudra, see *MVM*. 74-5; 95; Bergaigne, *Religion Védique*, 3, 36 and von Bradke, *Dyaus Asura* 54.

is developed with reference to Agni, in *T.S.* I.5.1.1 :—The gods entrusted their wealth to Agni on the occasion of their fight with the demons. When, at the end of the fight, they came back to claim it, they found that Agni had decamped and they had to use violence to recover it from Agni who reacted (we are told) to this treatment by 'crying'! So *ad rem* comes the derivation: *Yad arodīt tad rudrasya rudratvam*. Sāyaṇa commenting on this passage construes the same incident from another angle namely that because Agni usurped on this occasion one of the functions of Rudra, namely 'roaring'. he is identified with him! The same explanation of the name 'Rudra' is given by *MS.* IV. 2.12: *So s rodit, tadvā asyaitan nāma rudra iti* and *ŚB* VI.1.3.10: *yad arodīt tasmād rudrah*. *ŚB* VI.8.1.11 supports the same derivation but in a different context. Agni is Rudra because the rumbling of the wheels of the chariot on which he is carried represents (figuratively speaking) his roaring!

§4. This derivation from \sqrt{rud} seems to have appealed to other Brāhmaṇa authors also. But they give a 'causal' twist to the sense of the root and explain the name 'Rudrāḥ' (the plural form of Rudra) as 'those who make others cry'. The mythological equation formulated is that the Prāṇas ('Breaths' or 'Vital airs') are *rudras* because they make (people) cry when they leave this mortal coil. The *JUB* IV. 2.6 has: *prāṇā vai rudrāḥ, prāṇā hīdaṁ sarvaṁ rodāyanti*; the *ChU.* III.16.3 similarly reads: *prāṇā vāva rudrāḥ, ete hīdaṁ sarvaṁ rodāyanti*; *ŚB.* XI.6.3.7 (= *Brh. U.* III. 7. 1) adds the detail: *te yan martyāc charīrād utkrāmanty atha rodāyanti, tadyad rodāyanti tasmād rudrā iti*. *ŚB.* IX.1.1.6 clinches the derivation as it were, by stating: *tad yad ruditāt samabhavanti tasmād rudrāḥ*. [compare Sāyaṇa on *R.V.* III.32.3: *rodāyanti satrḥṇ iti rudrāṇ marutaḥ*]. The malevolence attributed to the 'Rudras' in this etymological speculation is easily traced to the malevolent traits *occasionally* exhibited by the Rudras who (except in a few passages where they represent

a separate class of gods like the Vasus) are none other than the Maruts who are often called 'Rudras' or 'Rudriyas' [I.64.2, 12; 85.11; V. 42.15; 59.8; VI.50.4; 66.11; VII 56.1; 58.5; VIII.20.17. etc.] i.e. 'the sons of Rudra.' The Rudras or Maruts share to *some* extent the destructive propensities which are frequently (though *by no means always*) attributed to their father Rudra.

§5. This evil side of Rudra is probably responsible for another etymology:—'Rudra' from \sqrt{ruj} 'to break', 'to shatter'—proposed in the *Kāthaka* [XXV. 1] and *Kapishthala Kaṭha* [XXXVIII.4] *Sambhitās*:—*tayā pūrah samaruṇat, yatsamaruṇat tadrudrasya rudratvam*; "With that he shattered the forts; because he shattered (them)—that is the 'shattering quality' of Rudra (the shatterer)". This derivation has naturally not found much favour as, from a linguistic point of view, it is a far cry from \sqrt{ruj} to 'rudra'! The same has been the fate of the alternative derivations from \sqrt{ru} , 'to cry' and from \sqrt{dru} , 'to run', proposed by Yāska and Sāyaṇa (See Section 2 above.)

§6. The only derivation that need be subjected to a critical scrutiny then, is the one³ from \sqrt{rud} , 'to cry'. As remarked at the outset, however, there is hardly a passage in the *RV.*, which represents Rudra as a 'crying' or 'howling' god or suggests the meaning 'crying' or 'howling' for the epithet *rudrā*! Rudra is called *babhrū*, brown [II.33.5, 8, 9, 15]; *aruṣā*, ruddy [I.114.5]; he is like the bright sun⁴ and shines like gold [I.43.5], is bedecked with shining golden ornaments [II.33.5], wears a resplendent many-coloured

³ *rend-*, SK. *rudāti*, *rōditi* 'cries, howls'; *rōdah* 'cry', Zd. *raod*, 'to cry', L. *rūdo-ere* 'to cry'. See Walde-Pokorny. *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch* and the Ph. D. dissertation entitled '*Rgvedic words etymologically equated in pre-Nirukta Vedic Literature*' (p. 194) prepared under the guidance of the writer by Dr. C. S. Venkateswaran, 1946.

⁴ Relevant in this connection is the conclusion that Rudra was an Aryan deity of *solar origin*, arrived at by N. Venkataramanayya *Rudra-Siva*. Univ. of Madras publication. (1941)

necklace [II.33.10] and is self-glorious [I.129.33.X.92.9. *Rudrā* is an epithet of Agni in IV.3.1, where the latter is called 'golden-coloured' and also in other passages [I.27.10; III.2.5]; the word is an epithet of Soma [VIII.72.5] and of the Aśvins [V.73.8; 75.3, etc.] *and these are all gods connected with light!* Rudra is generally looked upon as a storm-god but in the few passages cited in support of this view, it is the *sheen* of his lightning-shaft that is prominent rather than the howling of thunder! To attribute the 'howling' of the storm to Rudra because he is the father of the Maruts—the storm-gods—is rather far-fetched! Indra and Agni also are very intimately connected with the Maruts but are not supposed to cry or howl on that account! The Maruts again, though storm-gods, are constantly associated with brilliance and sun-light. They share the lustre of the sun [X.66.2]. They are *self-luminous* [I.37.2; V.53.4; VII.20.4]. The passages describing their sun-like radiance and shining quality are numerous⁵. Uncertain though the etymology of 'Maruts' is, the root appears to be *mar*, rather in the sense of 'to shine', than 'to die', 'to crush' as the former agrees best with the description of the Maruts in the R.V. But a most convincing set of passages, almost *decisive* for the meaning of *rudra* has not attracted the attention it deserves. *In all the four passages* in which the word *rudrā-vartanī* occurs [I.3.3; VIII.22.1, 14 and X.39.11], it is an epithet of the Aśvins and *must mean* 'those whose path or course is shining (*rudra*),' because the Aśvins are called elsewhere *hiranya-vartanī*, 'those whose path is golden'—another almost exclusive epithet of the Aśvins! This path or course [*vartanī*, or its variant *vartīs* which, with an exception or two, *is repeatedly used of the Aśvins only*] is traversed by them at the break of Dawn [VII.69.5], on their *shining* car [VI.62.10], in the company of the Dawn and the Sun

⁵ *MVM*, 78.

[VIII.35.7] is rich in gold [VIII.22.17] and therefore must be a *shining course, reddish-yellow like gold*. The root-meaning of *rudra* then, as 'shining' or 'reddish-yellow' should no longer be in doubt and can hardly be 'crying' or 'howling'!

§7. If next, \sqrt{rud} is taken in a causal sense and Rudra is made out to be 'one who makes people cry' as the Brāhmaṇa passages (cited in Section 4, above) have done, a lop-sided emphasis would be placed on the malevolent side of Rudra's nature—an emphasis which may land us into a different conclusion regarding the original nature of Rudra, as for example, that he is the god of death⁶ in the Veda. But Rudra, *at least* in the *Ṛ.V.* is not purely maleficent like a⁷ demon. He combines in himself demoniac as well as angelic features.⁸

§8. Grassman and Pischel evidently realized that the usual meaning of \sqrt{rud} ('to cry') does not accord with the *Ṛgvedic* picture of Rudra and cut the gordian knot—the former⁹ by postulating another root *rud*, which, according to him, is the radical element in words like *rudrā*, *ródas*, *ródasī* and *rodasī* in the sense of 'to shine' and the latter¹⁰ by hypothesizing a lost root *rud* in the sense of 'to be ruddy or red' so that 'Rudra' means the 'Red one', redness and lustre being closely related! These are ingenious suggestions and have the merit of being in perfect accord not only with later descriptions of Rudra in the *VS.* XVI.17; *MS.* II.9.2; and in the *Śatarudriya* sections of the *TS* but also with the epithets of Rudra in the *Ṛ.V.* (mentioned in Section 6).

⁶ Dr. Dandekar, *Rudra XII AIOC* (Summary) Benares 1943-44

⁷ *MVM* 76; C. V. Narayana Ayyar, *Origin and Early History of Saivism in South India*, Madras Univ. Dept. of Hist. and Arch. 6. 198.

⁸ G. Sitaramiah, *Rudra in the Ṛgveda*, *QJMS.* 32, Oct. 1941.

⁹ *Worterbuch Zum Ṛgveda.*

¹⁰ *Z D M G.* 40. 120; *Vedische Studen.* 1.57.

§9. The best solution, however, (in the opinion of the writer) would be to trace *rudrà* to a root **rudh*, **rub*, [Zend. *rud*], to¹¹ flow, assumed by Grassman to account for the post-Rġvedic *rudhirà*, 'blood' and the Rġvedic words *robīt* and *ròbīta* (= 'red' or 'red horse'). The root *rud* may be taken as the *deaspirated* form of \sqrt{rudh} or the deaspiration may have come at the stage of *rudbra* the Primary nominal Derivative. That this is not quite unusual may be seen from the following parallel cases. (a) The instance of \sqrt{vid} from \sqrt{vidh} , the former being the deaspirated form of the latter [compare Sāyaṇa's explanation of *vindhe* in R.V. I.7.7 as *vindāmi*] is cited by Bollensen in connection with the derivation of 'Indra' which thus provides another parallel: (b) He suggests¹² that 'Indra' be traced to \sqrt{ind} 'to be bright', which is the deaspirated form of \sqrt{indh} 'to kindle'. A very pertinent observation has been made in this connection by Dr. Katre¹³ "Thus in the *Brhad-Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.2.2, we read as follows: '*Indho* ha vai nāmaīsaḥ, tam *indham* santam *Indra* ityācakṣate', which in effect posits the equation *indra*- > < *indha*. If we study the history of Indo-Aryan during its transition from OI-A to MI-A., we notice that the presence of an *r* in a consonant cluster has often resulted in an aspiration; thus Sk. *tatra* > Pk *tattha*, Sk. **i-tra* > Pk. *ettha*, etc. Here then is a statement identifying the two words *indha*-and *indra*—, presuming unconsciously perhaps, the knowledge of such aspiration, which is lost in the actually attested MI-A. stage where we have only *inda*-."

¹¹ **reudh*-, SK. *robīta*, Zd. *raodita* 'red'. SK. *robīt*, 'red horse', *lobā*-, 'red', 'red metal'. *rodbra*, *lodbra* 'flower' (symplocos racemosa), the tree from whose bark a red powder is prepared. *rudhirā*, 'red' 'blood' GK ζρύω, ζρυρός, 'red' L *robustus*, *robeus*, *robustus* 'red' See Footnote ³ above. Compare also Bugge in KZ. 20.2 and K. F. Johansson in K Z. 30. 346 on *ru(d)hund verwandtes*'.

¹² ZDMG. 41. 505-7.

¹³ ABORI XX 276-292.

§10. Finally the very interesting suggestion of Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji¹⁴ regarding Rudra is too important and germane to the etymology proposed above to be passed over. Rudra (according to him) may be an approximation to the Aryan God Rudra [Roarer, Father of the Maruts etc.] from an original translation of Rudhra, the name of a Dravidian divinity meaning 'red god'. This view may be accepted with the reservation that Rudra (as shown above) even in the ṚV. is 'red or bright god' rather than a 'Roarer', so that the Aryan God Rudra (originally 'Rudhra'?) turns out to be identical with the Dravidian deity *Rudhra*!

§11. To sum up then, the Ṛgvedic Rudra is rather a *shining red (or reddish-yellow) god, whose glitter is all gold*, rather than a 'Howler', as the epithet *rudrā-vartanī* (synonymous with *hiranya-vartanī*) peculiar to the Aśvins is almost decisive for the meaning of *rudrā* (adj) as 'bright', 'golden' etc.

¹⁴ *Buddhist Survivals in Bengal*. B. C. Law Comm. Vol., Calcutta, 1945. (See the excellent summary of the article in Dr. Dandekar's *Vedic Bibliography*, Bombay 1946).

A CRITIQUE OF THE PRAMĀNAS

By K. C. VARADACHARI

I am deeply grateful to the Executive Committee of the *Indian Philosophical Congress* for having selected me to preside over the deliberations of the Logic and Metaphysics section of the Congress which is being held in Benares, the heart of spiritual India, and in the University founded by the revered saint Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and now guided by the great and eminent philosopher Dr. Radhakrishnan.

It is usual at this section for most presidents to give learned disquisitions on the metaphysical progress during the year or to describe the status of logical enquiries. Sometimes they have given enstructive hypotheses which revealed the contributions and modifications necessitated by the growing volume of knowledge. It is not my purpose here to make any such metaphysical speculation or give any metaphysical solution to our ever-recurring problems. It seems rather that a more modest effect is called for at this juncture.

We have met here in this most venerable City of Benares after the attainment of Indian Independence. This fact casts on us a very responsible task and that is the recovery of the initiative in matters spiritual and metaphysical, for even today Benares is the nerve centre of logical thinking, haloed by the debates of masters of logic and saints of knowledge, warriors of truth and servants of light. India liberated means the liberations of universal thought. And real integral universal thought is indeed the only force

¹ Presidential address of the Logic and Metaphysics section of the XXII Session of the Indian philosophical Congress, Benares, Dec. 1947.

that can be the liberator of mankind. That is the task set before us who are considered to be the metaphysicians of the Earth.

Philosophy and metaphysics are above the battle, the changing fortunes of political and economic studies which are tied to practical and particular interests and pragmatic arrangements based on trial and error, which more often than not are cut away from the unity of the whole. Philosophy or metaphysics must be the basic ground of all understandings of sciences of social endeavour. Or else we shall go on witnessing aberrations of emotion and sentiment and encroachments on the freedom of the individual and on the spontaneity that is the characteristic of the Whole.

What is needed today is a different emphasis on the points of view, a different approach from what we have been habituated to and are being habituated to by the strong impetus of materialism, fortified by the successes of amazing science. We have not yet begun to arrive at a co-ordinating activity of our intellect or consciousness. In recent years, thanks to the serious impacts of psychology and para-psychology, we have come to recognize that the hard and fast divisions that have marked our philosophical attitudes are being blurred. Yet it is also true that whilst considerable efforts have been made to make philosophical constructions which have dominant scientific methods, there have also come into existence extreme abstract mathematical formulations of thought called by the common name Symbolic Logic, which is claimed to make our thought and view of reality really scientific and to afford a truer picture of the structure of thought. Such abstract constructions or formal principles have truth as Professor A. N. Whitehead remarked though not the whole truth. But why should it be so? Is it likely that there is some truth about our intellectual apprehension, though we are also becoming increasingly aware that intellect and its reasoning are in-

capable of understanding certain aspects of experience. Intellect seems to be quite adequate for all the purposes of objective enquiry or objective knowledge as sciences have been showing to us. It is true that neither the ideal of science nor that of philosophy as defined by idealists of the objectivist schools who consider that the business of philosophy is to interpret the results of sciences seems to be a process that can ever end. Our intellect and our logic are essentially limited or restricted to the fields of sensory or observational experience, and since quantity and measurement have been considered to be truly of the scientific approach and explanation of the mechanical variety the only admissible category of explanation, we are almost at the end of our philosophical pursuit, not because it is completed but because it has to wait on the experiences and explanations of the scientists. But this movement of thought is neither necessary nor inevitable. We have indeed over again to investigate into the nature of our experience. After Kant's great and copernican Critiques we have been very much anxious to explain our experiences on the bases of the categories which we were warned by him not to use beyond limits.² It is true that whilst we were well advised we did not find it altogether to our taste, and indeed Kant himself shewed that our experiences did overflow the categories of Pure Reason.³ With Hegel we were enabled to traverse a longer distance, perhaps steeper, towards our present idealistic constructions but we also know that these were evidently too formal and based on dialectic of opposites which whilst promising what is called the explanation of evolution towards a grand synthesis or Absolute coherent whole endowed it with an inner contradiction. This inner contradiction may indeed be the secret principle

² Tarkā' pratiṣṭhānāt : *V. Sūtra*.

³ Aprāpya manasā saha : *Tait. Up.*

of evolution or dynamism. It is to Marx we owe this unseemly revelation of the intrinsic weakness or is it strength and richness of Hegel ? who showed this up by inverting the whole process and making dialectic not formal but actual, not merely logically necessary but economically deterministic, and historically inevitable. But what most philosophers were concerned in the West was not with the fundamental meaning of Reality that could be constructed with the help of the logical intellect refreshed by the deliverances of sense intuition and the æsthetic demand for an archetechtonic or system. We have also witnessed our scientists becoming philosophers and in the writings of Eddington, Whitehead and Russell we have varied speculative adventures in construction. At best sometimes we have been regaled with 'reinterpretations of terms whose meanings have been absorbed in the counters of thought'—so as to make them current sterling money so to speak.⁴

Indeed we have enriched our modern ways of expression both in respect of coining new terms in the place of the commonplace and in respect of symbols which are intended to serve old relationships with novelty. These dressings-up have been frequent and though at first rather attractive have not been altogether useful for they have helped the glossing over or velling the problems of urgent concern. I do not think that it is the perpetual task of philosophy merely to present old thoughts and problems in new garbs. It would indeed be much more useful as an evolution in thought if we could orientate our old thoughts and render them universally valid.

But it must be said to the credit of pragmatism that it has found its best formulation in modern times, and despite its human it has almost been forgotten as a system of thought

⁴ A. N. whitehead : The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system . . . by introduction of novel verbal characterization rationally coordinated.

or new way, for the business of philosophy seems to be according to it the interpretation of the scientific results which are daily coming to us, a task which has to be perpetual if not exactly Sisyphean.

We have indeed another philosophical school which is the organismic conception. It is quite old in one sense but its modern version is rather nebulous, and it does not appear to be as simple as the name sounds. Reality is organism, a living and dynamic whole comprising lesser wholes, evolving within itself, whose parts are in continuous processes maintaining the whole. This is the objective version. That it can have a subjective version and that this subjective version is mystical and more profound is the view that is held by many. It is fundamentally a unity of many, real, individual, many having unique points of view, value and yet mystically interrelated with the Whole which they represent, subserve, reveal or manifest.

Our biological interests have become dominant over our mechanical interpretations not only due to ourselves being biological results but also due to the fact that the mechanical view of reality which makes mere aggregations of points of view insufficient even to explain the processes of Nature which seem to conform to the laws of mind and life. The organismic view is much more real and truer as a system than that. It has become indeed a fundamental principle of explanation of the perceived diversity and unity of the whole, and in one sense has helped the refutation of the unfounded charge of anthropomorphism against such explanations. There is no doubt that pluralism and monism appear to be not so much alternative explanations of the same groups of facts but two extremes of the fundamental biune(?) Reality. Thus as it has been recognized even by absolute idealists the concept of Organism or Organic Unity does help a fuller appreciation of the nature of Reality than abstract monism or concrete pluralism. But it has been

shown that this organistic theory is yet in the process of birth in the writings of Whitehead. The concept of organism in his philosophy entails that the process be 'conceived as a complex activity with internal relations between its various factors'. Everything in the universe takes note of everything else, which means that it recognizes, feels the presence of everything else. If Leibniz affirmed that the monadic mirroring is on the level of reason (*ratio*), Whitehead's view leads to an emotional cognition which is introspective in advanced organisms. His doctrine of internal relations in a dynamic whole affirms that every organism or a part of the organism is on a level of pre-nension which is available to it from the level of feeling not merely with the whole but with each other part. Thus it is clear that there is universal intersubjective intercourse. Thus it is clear also that as long as our cognitive nature is tied to external relations of subject and object so long we can never really grasp or solve the problem of internal dynamic unity of awareness within the whole. It is true that some realists are content to be mere pluralists and yet try to arrive at unity by means of co-operative synthesis or unity by postulating a 'sense of community' or unity within limitations. This postulate of sense of community requires a metaphysical justification and it is to be found in the concept of organic unity of all within the whole. The instinct or sense of community that manifests itself is a result or consequence of the nature of the Whole rather than its cause.

There is much truth in the assertion that our inferential or rationalistic thought translates into forms of thought or ideas whatever it receives whether it is of the material world reflected by the human mind or of the spiritual. Our metaphysical understanding need not coincide with the dialectical process. Indeed all that materialism has been affirming is that all the processes and contradic-

tions available in our concepts are only the reflections, translations into the language of thought of contradictions which exist in the phenomena owing to the contradictory nature of their common foundation, namely movement. If then we can decide that our materialism is but a partial formulation of a further ultimate factor, the metaphysical concept of Reality would become more adequate and the manner of the Reality of such a measure or nature could be shewn. The contradiction between the dialectical absolutists and the dialectical materialists is then resolvable by the transcendence due to the higher perception of values. But then we are again confronted with the problem of human axiology, and we find that despite Signor Croce's formulation of another form of the dialectic namely the 'Dialectic of Distincts'—(and that is truer to the spiritual nature of the Real)—the spirit essentially limited to the affirmation of its nature by the human spirit or self. But we owe it to Signor Croce who assured us of the fact that these two dialectics are at work always, and achieve so to speak a progress that is remarkable for its double ascension in respect of the interpenetrative unity as well as dynamic progress that reveals the necessary polarity of all movement, which in a sense comprises horizontal as well as vertical possibilities. Being and Becoming and Non-Being are the forces inherent in Reality or rather distinguishable factors in Reality which establish the interpenetrative fusion of the values of beauty and truth and goodness in and for the individual and the whole. There are perhaps other values which are subordinate to this integrative action of Spirit and it must also be understood that this integrative action is one of concrete Freedom. By this action we register at once the continuity of the ideal purpose or action of the Spirit as the inner meaning or significance of all history. At any rate we are forced to consider the importance of the relation between the spiritual and the material as being somehow

established within the organic unity of the embodied being, the individual who is the bearer of ultimate values as well as the revealer of the Ultimate values at every stage of the evolutionary process, more or less. The goal of absolute perfection is there and it is this that makes possible the ascent of the individual by a kind of reaction or opposition to the past. It is indeed impossible for us to predict how it would happen and when ; but it is the inevitable destiny of the individual, the task his spiritual aspiration has set to itself. It is in the individual that we should find the fulfilment of this perfect unity of the spiritual and the material (including the vital and the mental); the subjective and the objective, the being and the becoming. It is true that this cannot altogether be due to the inner aspiration of the individual; under the concept of the materialist schools and the rationalists, this aspiration for becoming more is claimed to be inherent within or emerging out of the manifold responses—a type of *avayavi* (whole) emerging out of the *avayavas* (parts). But it is irrational to claim that there is this possibility in each of the parts or in their aggregation as such. Rather it is likely that this aspiration is a veiled movement of the eternal purpose or the Spiritual from within, acting both as an impulsion from behind (*sāṅkalpa*) and as an ideal ahead of us (*puruṣārtha*). It is in the human mind that we find these two aspects of the same eternal spirit uniting the aspiration and the ideal and forging the perfect unity of the past with the eternal present and the inevitable future. Indeed as it has been stated there is the descent from above and an ascent from below whose meeting place is the human heart. Thus the metaphysical view makes this the pattern of the whole of Reality ; or rather the individual whom we know and understand will help us to understand the pattern of the Reality of which he is an integral real part. But this itself is a presumption taken from the mystical doctrine, whose

pale counterpart is the view of the similarity of all the parts of a compound or the structure of the Atom or the molecule of a compound. It is indeed not like that exactly with each individual, but there is, as we can see, the element of identity which is most important. This identity is at once the fundamental principle of the unity of all within Reality as well as the difference that is clearly discernable as the modes of that Reality because this double rôle of the Absolute is at once the One within and of all the many and the multiplicity which manifests itself in all the many without undergoing any kind of essential change in any of its characteristics, though getting translated in varying degrees in different planes of consciousness or comprehension. It is clear that this double status of the One Reality or the Self (to use the organistic word) which alone can function in this manner of a *unitas multiplex* category is real, though it does in a sense go against the principles of abstract logic. This is due not to the impossibility of any thought to grasp the inner pattern of Reality,—for this is the promise of the mystics that we can know the pattern of Reality though we may not be able to know the content of it at all or completely ever—but due to the habit of thought to be restricted adapted to the individual in his finiteness, in his sensory experience and practical struggles with the environment which are limited or conditioned by the ability of the organism to deal with it. This conditioning and limitation of the organism itself to the practical and the immediate utilities though very useful for immediate survival, does indeed breed conflicts between the several members of the whole each of which has its own problems of survival, and struggle is the result. This struggle is undoubtedly a part of the reality in so far as the ascent to a larger point of view, a sense of security, is concerned. But that is the representation of the principle of sacrifice which the logical form of opposition and resolution represents or subsumption symbolises. Real

security comes from conscious subordination to the transcendent sacrifice or offering to the higher and the fuller and the universal.

Thus we must grant that our assumptions will determine the nature of the reality that we are going to construct. We have seen that the autonomy of the inferential reason or the abstract understanding has been most effectively denied by all alike. Its sovereignty is overthrown, and mostly because of its sensist affiliations. Whether we are pragmatists or idealists or common sense men or scientists, the regulative principles of thought are no longer of mere reason. More likely the regulative principles are of the practical and æsthetic order, and decided by our economic and political predilections or spiritual institutions and aspirations and in many cases by such personality factors that are determined by our subliminal and unconscious being. Metaphysics is not impossible but it has been forced to abandon the old routes of construction. In being loyal to sensist deliverances and hypothetical theories, intellect has been strictly confined to the construction of an abstract speculum (or measure) and not as we should very much like to have a speculum *sub specie eterni*.

I consider that this would be an appropriate occasion to evaluate the sources of our right knowledge *pramāṇas* and offer a criticism. I deem it very necessary that Indian philosophers and logicians should undertake a new evaluation of the categories of thought and especially make a thorough study of the use to which the *pramāṇas* have been put by Indian logicians. We have a right to do it if only for the simple reason that most logical treatises (of the scholastic and syncretist variety) are much more concerned with the analytical survey of these *pramāṇas* than the synthetical, and incidentally there has crept into their methodology a bias towards materialistic and sensist understanding. I offer on this occasion my remarks on this undertaking with

the fervant hope that it would lead to more close and critical thinking so as to enable us to evolve a logic more in tune with the fundamental philosophy of Spirit espoused by Seers of the Infinite than before.

Nyāya as logic considers primarily the *pramāṇas*, the instruments of right knowledge. It enumerates them and distinguishes them. Though these *pramāṇas* are not identical, they all cooperate in the act of knowing an object. The same object or *prameya* may be the object of certain *pramāṇas*, though some objects may not be objects of certain *pramāṇas* or some aspects of them be beyond some of these *pramāṇas*. But it is the hope of every philosopher ultimately to render all experience integral, that is to say, to enable all instruments of knowledge to function synthetically without opposition or conflict, or organically in one word. This is possible only when all these are subordinated to or directed by mystical intuition.

Accordingly each one of the *pramāṇas* may enable us to understand some aspect of the object that falls within its competence. It is also possible that there will always be the mutual or reciprocal interaction between these several *pramāṇas* so as to grant integrated knowledge. The several *pramāṇas*, if there be more than one, will grant fuller and profounder meaning to the object in so far as that is an object of knowledge, knowledge understood in its fullest sense. It is just likely that certain features or factors may be beyond the capability of one or more of these *pramāṇas*. We have also to recognize that no metaphysics or theory of Reality as such can claim that Reality is beyond the scope of all *pramāṇas*; for that would only lead to agnosticism. It would be our task to discover that instrument of knowledge which would enable us to round off our knowledge to perfection and enable us to go beyond the intellectual and sensory ways of knowing which are either private or abstractly universal and eriously limited to the avenues of our experience

as finite individuals. It is true that some well-known thinkers hold that it is impossible to know Reality so long as we are tied to the subject-object relationship, and that Reality is indescribable⁵ which is said to mean that it is either an experience transcendent to all relationships or describable as this or that.

Absolute Reality as I have already remarked may be beyond the comprehension of some of the *pramāṇas* that we know of and utilize but that it is unknowable at all is not acceptable. Indeed it is enunciated by the mystic teaching that the Spirit reveals itself to the individual chosen by It—*tanum svām vivṛuṇute*. It can be known and experienced and entered into.

What are the *pramāṇas*? They are considered to be four usually viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. To this are added *smṛti*, *āgama*, *itihāsa*, and *purāṇa*; some have added *arthāpatti*. Fully conscious as I am that you are all aware of these facts, I shall not labour to show to you the meaning of these *pramāṇas* except to point out that each plays a definite role in the structure of the integral experience into an organic unity.⁶

Pratyakṣa deals with the sensible aspect of Reality. *Pratyakṣa* as the name implies is the knowledge that is a resultant of response to stimulus. A construction of a universe primarily based on sense-experiences is impossible. Materialists really posit the complete objectivity of these sense impressions and objects and without much consistent thinking. Sensists are incapable of constructing a universe except with the aid of such irrational concepts as chance, faith or animal faith, as George Santayana claims. Confronted with private and personal and communicable experiences they are not

⁵ But see the *Kenopaniṣad* instruction : *pratibodhaḥviditammatam*

⁶ *Kaṭhcopaniṣad*.

⁷ *Tait. Ār.* 1. 2. 1. *smṛtiḥ pratyakṣam aitihiyam anumānas catusṭayam etairādityamaṇḍalam sarvair eva vidhāsyate.*

satisfied with the mere deliverances of the senses. These extra-personal experiences do indeed affirm the objectivity of the objects perceived and independent of individual volition. Common experiences in a world is the strongest argument for the existence of objective truth, which is universal and of the identity or similarity of the structure of minds. Irrationality is as much of the objects however as they can be of subjects, though we find their relational thinking is inevitable and useful for all practical purposes. It cements and systematises all those parts of our experiences as could be systematised and there is much that refusès to fit in with the pattern presented by inferential thought. It is an ideal when all experiences could be systematised, an ideal without any conceivable end. Thus anumāna (which literally means that which follows) follows these sense-experiences and becomes the chief function of thought among us.

There is of course the limitation of the play of inference to the field of the perceived data, though this limitation is in some definite manner surpassed or transcended by the fact of similarity in the experiences of objects and their relating by minds. Whether we are prepared to agree to the fact on the basis of pure inference or not, we have to assume that mind-activity is alike in all beings similarly physically constituted. This assumption is important and there have been learned but inconclusive treatises and discussions on the problem of how we do know other minds. In this context I can remark that Śabarasvāmin in his commentary on the *Pūṛva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* has noted that our knowledge of other minds is based not on inference or perception, though these two do aid us by revealing the sameness of the organic structure, but by upamāna (which literally means near-measure, measure taken when standing very closely).⁸

⁸ I. i. 5. "Further through Upamāna also this same self is pointed out in the words 'just as you perceive your own self so on the same Upamāna please understand that I perceive the self in the same manner'". (MM. Ganganatha Jha's trans). I have kept the word Upamāna untranslated.

A study or Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika method of approach reveals that despite much clear thinking it is dominated by the sense-order. Sensation dominates over inference or relational thinking for the reference to fact, correspondence of thoughts to things, and extrinsic test ensure the affirmation of material truth. The aim of science is this much. This entails many observers and mutual verification and organisation of experience. Secondly, perception grants an objective world-though of discrete objects and with discrete sensations which require a locus or foothold or āyatana, and which in other words, can be described as the unity of these qualities related in a definite manner. These qualities are general, found in more than one perceived objects, and we have come to see that these inferences of identity are not only of the general nature of these qualities but also their interrelations, as distinguished from those around them. They are innumerable and enumerable. They are related externally or in eternal conjunction in some cases. Motion too is observed between these objects as well as change of state. And thus we begin to see even the relative non-existence. Thus almost all the padārthas are perceptible facts though doubtless they seem to involve inference. These six ways of knowing an object really refers to the perception of these categories in one and the same object recognized as the common object for all. Samavāya, inherence, is also stated to be a percept, though it is really a relation, because of the observation of going together. The only point about the Samavāya is that it affirms a belonging together which is a category of inference, even as the concept of vyāpti or invariable concomitance between two sets of phenomena is.

That is why we find that the Vaiśeṣika darśana gives such a realistic, pluralistic, sensist account of reality. It realises however that the universe of reality has other factors regarding the subject of experience, oneself and other selves,

which are not perception-dependent. That is the reason why it accepts inference as an appendage to perception and includes Śabda under anumāna. Indeed the atomic theory, the theory of *adr̥ṣṭa* and others are due to inference and śabda. Its acceptance of scriptural teaching is limited to the sphere of the supersensible and the supraconceptual dharma and Īśvara. Jainism did not accept the āgama of the Vedic origin nor did Buddhism. Buddhists accept inference and rank it above perception and consider that thought when relieved of the perceptual limitations may be able to free us from the perpetual confusion that is perceptual experience. Jainism is nearer the scientific view, the pragmatic view of dominance of perception over reasoning.

When we come to deal with the Sāṅkhya view we find that Reason or inference is rendered more important as an instrument of knowledge and there is distrust too of the sense-deliverances. Reality is looked at with the aid of reason almost to the exclusion of the perceptual. Perception plays a subordinate rôle. Not so much the person but reason is important. All processes of Nature may be sensorially real but they are brought under the concept of reason or buddhi or intellect. It is the discrimination or rather the loss of it that produces the sensible world. Indeed sense-experience is a degradation or objective extension of the intellect. The laws of thought such as uniformity, causality, unity and oppositional interaction are dealt with in Sāṅkhya. Substance is equated with qualities which are not quite the mere responses of sense-organs to stimuli. A new concept of quality as dynamic, as combining at once the nature of a substance and its power of effecting some process or stimulation or motion is evolved. The individual conscient being is distinguished from Nature and the realms of spirit and consciousness are definitely distinguished from the realms of Nature or matter. There however seems to be several degree of their interconnection.

We can see the same first step in evolving intellectual systems here in India, as it was in the West, when sense was distinguished from reason and reason was considered to lead to truth whereas sense could only lead to ignorance. Undoubtedly, as Plato indeed saw, sense may be subordinated to reason in order to discover in it the reflections, however pale or attenuated, of the immaculate truths or eternal forms or ideas of Reason. Buddhism and Sāṅkhya are rational systems: but Sāṅkhya submits reason to the deliverances of mystic teaching. It is true that Buddhism also ultimately ended in evolving a mysticism but had to pass through a period of nirvāṇa-experience, a self-naughting and word-naughting experience poised on the supreme conception of an all-embracing compassion. The world-view granted by Sāṅkhya is a world of souls and a world of Nature. In the modern constructions of the philosophers we are indeed presented with this same pluralism of souls united by, or denizens of, a common Nature or universe charged with the task of understanding it and through that, understanding themselves. They have now come to assume that in this dynamic process of understanding they are organic to each other and must evolve a formula of existing together in harmony. But then the souls must first become spectators of the processes of Nature in which they are organically involved through senses or perception and affection and volition. Once they begin to exercise reason and withdraw from the senses and their objects they will regain that supreme intellectual state of perfect discrimination which neither accepts nor rejects or condemns anything of Nature, and by this training begins to experience a new dimension of Nature, universal in kind and a truer pulse of Reality as subject-object. The great contribution of Sāṅkhya thought with which we can compare those of the Platonic-Socratean philosophy is in the field of psychology of Nature, the subjective aspect of Nature as against the objective aspect

of Nature, an aspect open to the instrument of anumāna, inference rather than pratyakṣa, which can only present the surface fact. It is this higher type of anumāna which is considered to be alike to intuition, inseeing or in-measuring or valuing. This is surely a new meaning of the term anumāna. Yet by this alone is Nature understood from within as reality. By means of this anumāna, purified reason, Nature is not apprehended as the Reality but only as the subject as against the object. Our inferences are even shown to be vitiated at the very start. Our perceptive defect, akhyāti (non-observation) is shown to be the starting point of illusion and transmigratory and evolutionary process. This perceptive defect is not of the sensory order but of the primary intellect itself. Some thinkers find in this position echoes of the Kantian schools, but it might be said that this is a state of consciousness which is the turning-point of the subjective-objective, the crucial point when the subjective becomes projective and objective or else the point when the objective restores itself to the subjective status, as Nicolai Berdyeav intimates. The sensory knowledge that we now get is a more distinguished and emphasised one. Reverse the direction of perception from the objective to the subjective or still better or another way of stating of the same fact, substitute reason in the place of sensory perception as an instrument of knowledge, discrimination will arrest the movement of sensory infinity. This is the sādhana of the rationalists. Sāṅkhya and in a more radical measure, Buddhism follow this course. In Greece Socrates, Plato and earlier Parmenides and in Modern philosophy Des Cartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel follow this course. Evolution is sensorial, involution is rational; self is rational, nature is sensorial. Sāṅkhya is concerned with the self, the subject, the psychological core of being. Buddhism abolishes the subject as merely the configuration of ideas and images and as the womb of all

dialectical activity. But in neither do we arrive at a true metaphysic of reality which clarifies the fundamental problem of One-Many. As Plato said "Show me the man able to see both the one and the many in Nature and I will follow in his foot-steps as though he were a God."⁹

We are left with innumerable number of souls within one Nature. We arrive at the unity of Nature by means of reason but not at the unity of the individual subjects. It is indeed in Leibniz, - Nicolas of Cusa was an earlier formulator - we have a firm foundation of spiritual monadism which answers deeply to the need for the fundamental solution of the problem of one-many. The reality is subject-object, though we find that in our experience we have to pass from the object to the subject and understand that there is a close correspondence between them, if not precisely an identity in distinction. The higher the type of consciousness the closer does the correspondence happen. Inference however universal a property of subjects, is yet individuated and cannot apprehend Reality as a single whole. There are two reasons for this defect (i) the constant habituation in our life (or lives) of inference to the field of Nature or understanding the laws of Nature and (ii) the priority of sensations or sense-action or reaction to the world of Nature. As already pointed out Sāṃkhya and Buddhism seek to reverse these two habits (i) by constant habituation to inner knowing rather than to perception, so that ultimately to use reason alone as an instrument of knowing. Hence yama and dhyāna, dhāraṇā and samādhi are utilized as knowing instruments which lead to saṃyama in the place of saṃyoga. Supersensible knowing or para-cognition results. There is soul-sensibility of the integral universe as against the former prakṛtic or material sensibility of the organs to limited zones of experience.

⁹. Quoted by MacNeille Dixon in his Gifford Lectures: *Human Situation*.

Thus when pure reason is released from the strings of perception, it achieves two things: abstractly it begins to be able to be aware of the pure forms or essences or real ideas; and concretely it manifests the supersensible way of soul-seeing and release from the limited and very conditioned existence and deliverances of sensory experience. It rises to the level of intuition, intellectual sympathy, over-mind consciousness. We owe it to Sri Aurobindo who has shown that reason has upper reaches; and professor Radhakrishnan has classically emphasized this aspect of ascension of Reason or Pure Intellect to the levels of intuition (buddhi) in his exposition of this subject. It is here that we come across the third instrument of knowledge called Upamāna, which some systems do not recognize, whereas others have different versions of its utility or efficacy.

Supersensible objects are perceived supersensibly by the soul. Upamāna is used by Nyāya for the purpose not of analogical inference as such but for the purpose of recognition (of a kind) of an object referred to by a vākya or proposition. In the Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini school, Upamāna means the recognition that the object we see has similarity with that we have already known or seen. It is of the form of inference of the immediate type that A is like B therefore B is like A. In these two views we see that Upamāna grants a place to the principle of recognition of the seen in the unseen or unseen in the seen (supersensible in the sensible), since both ways are legitimate).¹⁰ But it is clear also that most expositors have preferred the former than the latter and thus made Upamāna a sensist category. It is however my point to show that Upamāna has come to play an important role

¹⁰. It is true that it may be in a sense equated with the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* or perception of the *sāmānya* or generality in a supersensible manner but then it is a vision of the universals like the Platonic perception of the archetypes. Upamāna when subordinated to sense-perception becomes the Naiyāyika Upamāna of recognition of the object referred to or denoted or connoted by the vākya by means of the similarity of the unknown with the known.

in the interpretation of philosophical literature. The study of Upamānas of the *Alaṅkārikas* (rhetorecians)¹¹ is a very helpful line of enquiry to open up a new interpretation of this instrument of knowledge. It is at the hands of the mystics and seers that Upamāna undergoes a transformation from the poor analogical reasoning that it is considered to be and just an extension of the inferential reasoning. The celestial world of light is opened. Gods and goddesses, processes supersensible and results supersensible are fully presented in this world of experience. Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-darśana has to deal with this extended world of the supersensible reality, the higher part of the sensible, multiplicity of gods and functions, powers and performers, hymnists and sacrificers, within and without are the denizens of this new world to which our consciousness has access. The Upamāna in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and in Seer—poetry is strictly governed by the scriptural revelation in a sense; it gets its sanction and authentic voice from the supernatural wisdom of the seers. The Mīmāṃsist's world though a pluralistic world of souls, it is a world of souls who perceive their continuous existence with the supersensible reality arranged according to grades and planes of being and perhaps with distinct laws (*ṛta*) and powers and informing intelligences. No doubt commentators have tried to subordinate this Upamāna, which is the instrument of the knowledge of the supersensible, to the anumāna, the strait-jacket of sensory inference or reasoning that is sense-dependent. But once we release the upamāna from the apron-strings of sense and inference, we shall find that it immediately helps us to know or intuit the inner nature of Reality as correspondential, symbolic, supra-subjective having its own unity of all grades and displaying mutual reflection which alone makes for the splendid

¹¹. *Alaṅkārikas* consider Upamās and rūpakas as useful for expressing poetic sentiment. This again is a restriction of the Upamāna as a instrument of knowledge or rather a misuse of the same for the purpose of enjoyment or mere expression.

multiple figures of speech that adorn all great language and literature. Language becomes significant, poetic in the true sense of the term, which embraces, encompasses all similars by referring to diverse planes and points of view of the celestial, terrestrial and subjective ādhidaiva, ādhibhūta and adhyātma. Thus language becomes richer and words gain significance and lakṣaṇa and dhvani. Concept develops or is recognized and is dissolved in higher consciousness resulting in or in being displayed in various metaphors all of which are discerned as being appropriate and as granting *rasa*. Knowledge in Upamāna grants ecstasy or delight and delight or poetic sentiment indeed becomes lifted to the levels of knowledge. We move along the route to the higher realms of the supersensible. Reality however rich in this form does not gain anything more than the universal quality of organic interpenetrativeness or continuity. Upamāna when it is utilised, even like the Upaniṣads, as the instrument of knowledge becomes the instrument of supersensible correspondence—knowledge. It reveals the Ṛta, law Divine which is supersensible. The Chandas is supersensible, ṛsis are seers of the supersensible. Hymns are supersensible. All these are perceived by this new instrument. How very different from the ordinary conception of upamāna this is can be seen clearly now.

Great poets always compare the persons and phenomena of the earth with the celestial and supersensible and supraconceptual phenomena. Vālmiki, Vyāsa, Kālidāsa and others use upamās or upamānas in this manner. The upamās are, of course, of two kinds: one svārthopamāna, that is similar to the svārthānumāna (subjective inference) which reveals or explains the sensible by means of the suprasensible, (this is Mīmāṃsists upamāna); and the other parārthopamāna, similar to the parārthānumāna (inference for others) which reveals or explains the supersensible by means of the sensible. (This is the Naiyāyika upamāna).

Upamānas grant knowledge as well as delight that is due to the discovery of the fundamental though manifold identity.¹² The Upamānas of Kālidāsa form an interesting study. He uses all kinds which make us feel the oneness of all things in and through their variegated diversity. The opening lines of the *Raghuvamśa*: 'vāgarthāviva sampṛktau' reveals the high seriousness, a characteristic of great poetry. Even the Bālakāṇḍa of Vālmiki's *Rāmāyaṇa* abounds in the upamānas which reveal the characteristic of great poetry to lie in this transference of sensory images to the supersensory and more importantly the application of the supersensory to the sensory. The characteristic of seer poetry seems to lie not so much in its being a 'criticism of life' but in this establishment of the continuity and correspondential identity between the supersensible and the sensible, which uplifts the sensible from its inchoateness to the sense of its truth in the Infinite. Thus also Milton's

What if earth

be but the shadow of Heaven

or Shelley's magnificent platonic

Life like a dome

of many coloured glass

stains the white radiance of eternity.

Instances can be multiplied to show that this is the place and function of Upamāna to explain the sensible by means of the supersensible and to make the sensible truly the mirror of the Real, the finite the abode of the Infinite.

In the Vedic Hymns, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads the use of the upamāna itself betokens realities. Suggests

¹². Upamāna inculcates further the identity through sāmānādhikarāṇya of knowledge and delight or *rasa*, fulness of Being, the feeling of the Infinite.

¹³. cf. *Raghuvamśa* : I. 36 : payovāham vidyud airāvataṁviva; II. 69. *śubhram yaśo mūrtam iṣvatiṣṇaḥ*. etc... cf. Venkatanatha's *Dayāsataka*.

cf. the poetry of Blake, Francis Thomson and other mystics. Sri Aurobindho's poetry illustrates this poise of the consciousness.

tion is utilised too in order to prove truth, reality - yathārthajñāna. The Yathārthakhyāti-vāda of Nāthamuni and earlier writers shows that they held the view that where there is possibility of similitude there must be some obscure or occult ground of identity, real ground- knowledge is always of the real; whether it is sensible or supersensible that is all that has to be discriminated.

Thus we go beyond the supersensory cognition of upamāna which is the field of supersensory intuition into Reality in its richness and transcendent universality. Yet this is necessary to go beyond. Thought itself must reveal its real concrete power and delight and total light. This is attained at the level of Śabda śruti the revelational thought that includes the revelational sense. The higher patterns of Reality are yet poured through supermental knowledge which reveals itself to all seers of seer-like consciousness as the One fundamental Truth of all realities and which also explains the movement and reflection of all lower grades of the knowledge and the 'ignorance'.

This knowledge it is, that is, of the Divine in which all are, in all of which He indwells, and from whom or who has Himself become all these. This seems to be the aim of knowledge—to understand the full and integral nature of Reality of which all the lower are partial reflections or representations or snatches or ragged excerpts for understanding which there are several ways of instruments of knowledge. All of them are necessary. That is why the term 'ānvīkṣikī' does not merely mean logical philosophy but also metaphysics of the Self or Ātman even as Manu held it to be at the earliest times¹⁴ (*Manu*. VII. 43). At any rate we know that when ānvīkṣikī was used as subordinate to the intuitions of

¹⁴. cf. *History of Indian Logic* p. 4. fn. and p. 6 where he holds that ānvīkṣikī was identical with darśana or seeing whole, and the meaning given to it later as hetu-śāstra or science of reasoning is a later adaptation.

the supramental or the Infinite Self it fulfilled its purpose of metaphysics, but when it was later also utilized for the purpose of understanding the interrelations between the perceived which belongs to the same order or as near those principles of the finite, it fell from its high purpose.

It would be apt if I quoted here the words of one of our most eminent living philosophers who states the problem of our knowledge in this manner: There is a fourfold order of knowledge (i) "the original and fundamental way of knowing native to the occult self in things is a knowledge by identity; second is the derivative knowledge by contact associated at its roots with a secret knowledge by direct identity or stating from it, but actually separated from its source and therefore powerful but incomplete in its cognition; the third is a knowledge by separation from the object of observation but still with a direct contact as its support or even a partial identity; the fourth is a completely separative knowledge which relies on a machinery of indirect contact, a knowledge by acquisition which is yet, without being conscious of it, a rendering or bringing up of the contents of a pre-existent inner awareness and knowledge. A knowledge by identity, a knowledge by intimate direct contact, a knowledge by separative direct contact, a wholly separative knowledge by indirect contact are the four cognitive methods of Nature." *Sākṣātkāra* or *Śabda*, *Upamāna* in its higher meaning as I have expounded here in this paper, *anumāna* and *pratyakṣa* are what are clearly discernable in the above classification by Sri Aurobindo.

We are all aware of the theory of Bertrand Russell about the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the first of the above distinctions drawn by Russell we have a suggestion of an intimacy of knowing, something that is affective or æsthetic as well as sensorial cognition. But it could be clearly seen that the same is a mere variant of Bergson's intellectual

sympathy or N. Lossky's intuition. Both the above kinds of Russell's enumeration fall within the third and fourth kinds of Sri Aurobindo's exposition of the doctrine of the *pramāṇas*, according to Indian Philosophy. Identity-theories, though speaking in terms of knowledge by identity yet fix their identity in the general concepts or ideas rather than on the spiritual or occult knowledge of the Self which is more than the private self or ego. Indeed if clearly conceived their's is a theory of knowledge *of* identity (contential) rather than *by* identity (as process). But then this distinction is not usually accepted or discerned.


I am convinced that there is a sage truth in the dictum that every unsolved problem or problem which has been debunked or avoided will return to us for solution. Reality cannot be avoided or escaped from, not any portion of it will permit us to avoid it for ever. There is the urgent need for taking all the ways of knowing which have been counselled to us by mystics, poet-seers, rationalisers and observers or scientists so that we may be enabled to arrive at the full knowledge of a metaphysics that shall not be a partial representation or a mechanical structure or an abstract configuration of the Real or even a delightful Expanse of *æsthesis*. It is bound to be organisitic displaying interdependence between the multiplicity, and concrete to each individual in its universal measure. That is the reason why we have to pass from the atomic and the partial and the fragmentary understanding of reality to the total conception of it. It cannot be said that the total reality is an absolute and infinite that cannot in any rational or understandable manner be described to us. The very fact that we strive to represent it is an evidence of that possibility. We have to pass to the logic of the Infinite which can justifiably be able to explain the rationale of the finite which refuses to remain finite, a refusal which is represented to us by the forms of evolution or development of our thought

from the sub-perceptual through the perceptual or sensory to the rational or relational and to the intuitive or para or suprarational to the meta-cognitive which does not dismiss the lower but assimilates them and grants them a firmer ground or being in the totality apprehended as Reality. And not only that—it is apprehended as the most valuable or the Ultimate Good and the Beautiful or Saccidānanda which belongs to the Self, the most real and concrete Universal, which is the unity of the many and their ground. Obviously it would entail that this Saccidānanda Self is the most complete personality—a unit as multiplex, whose reality is manifested in and through the process or History, which is a meaningful process.

The above is a sketch of the reconstruction of logical thought according to the logic of the Infinite and according to the organic conception which grants the primacy to the mystic understanding which accepts the dynamic unity of all experiences whilst not dissolving or dismissing any of them. This attempt is worthwhile since we have so long sought to view the Absolute from the standpoint of the finite individual and failed to arrive at the solution of the problem of the Infinite and the Self, and of the status of the ultimate values. It is only when we understand that the Infinite and Self is the abode of the ultimate values and is in fact the Ultimate value that we can understand the truth of the ancient seers that Brahman is the Parama Puruṣārtha. We have a method of knowing the Infinite, too. As Professor Macneile Dixon has with great attractiveness and lucidity pointed out the solutions granted by the poetic consciousness and seer-vision, which we have noted as equivalent to the upamāna in our exposition of the pramāṇa-śāstra today—have rendered possible certain definite scope for further thinking. They alone body forth the reality to the individual and reveal to him the unique status of himself and the supreme privilege of participation in the Life Divine,

the Brahman—the Organism. Not merely the content of the experiences of the mystic and R̥sis or seer-ports, but also the manner of their reception has a large part to play in the reconstruction of the Logic of the Infinite.

Indian metaphysical thought can yet play its fullest part as it did in the past. I have great hopes that in this most ancient city we shall be reminded of our hoary past and the inevitable splendid future and perform our duty to them.



THE DOCTRINE OF SPHOṬA

By K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

WHETHER the name “Sphoṭāyana” of one of the authorities mentioned by Pāṇini¹ in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was due to his having held the doctrine of Sphoṭa will always remain an uncertainty, though there is a tradition recorded by Nāgeśa in his *Sphoṭavāda* that the doctrine was his². When we come to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, not only is the doctrine of Sphoṭa implicit in many of their statements³ but they have also made open statements about ‘Sphoṭa’ on one or two occasions. The question whether a ‘varṇa’ or articulate sound or ‘phoneme’ as I propose to call it in this paper, borrowing an expression which has now become current among linguists and which distinguishes it from inarticulate sound or “dhvani”, whether this “phoneme,” pronounced at different speeds, remains the same or not is answered by them in the affirmative. They have declared that the real phoneme is the sphoṭa which is manifested by the sounds or dhvanis, uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. Because the phoneme or varṇa is manifested by the sounds and figures in the consciousness of the listener as interwoven with or coloured by the sounds, the latter may be said to be the attributes

¹ अवङ् स्फोटायनस्य । ‘Pāṇini’ VI. 1.123.

² वैयाकरणनागेशः स्फोटायनऋषेर्मतम् ।
परिष्कृत्योक्तवांस्तेन प्रीयतां जगदीश्वरः ॥

Nāgeśa-*Sphoṭavāda*-p. 102 (Adyar Library series No. 55)

³ See Kaiyyata’s *Pradīpa* on

(a) the *Bhāṣya* passage : येनोच्चारितेन etc. (*Mahābhāṣya* vol. I. 12, Pt. Guru Prasad Shastri’s edition, Benares)

(b) the *Bhāṣya* on the *Vārttika* : अक्षरं न क्षरं विद्यात्, *Mahābhāṣya* vol I, p. 155-Pt. Guru Prasad Shastri’s edition)

(c) the *Bhāṣya* on the sūtra ‘अ इ उ ण्’ *Ibid*, pp. 79—98.

of the former : स्फोटः शब्दः । ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः, says Patañjali.⁴ Any difference which appears when it is pronounced at different speeds is a case of a difference really existing in the manifesting sounds, the vaikṛta-dhvani, being wrongly attributed to the phoneme itself.

This distinction between 'Sphoṭa' and Dhvani again referred to in the *Bhāṣya* statement : द्वौ शब्दात्मानौ, नित्यः कार्यश्च,⁵ becomes an essential part of the doctrine of Sphoṭa as it develops in later times. Unfortunately, we do not possess any grammatical work belonging to the Pāṇinian school, coming between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. There must have been some, but none has come down to us. In Bhartṛhari we see not only a Vaiyyākaraṇa, but also an Advaitin, one who believes in śabdādvaita and Sattādvaita. The doctrine of Sphoṭa, already adembrated in the *Mahābhāṣya* develops through nearly eight centuries and becomes merged in the Advaita of Bhartṛhari.

The different Systems of Philosophy and the Science of Grammar were all interested in the word, the शब्द. The systems of Philosophy had a two-fold interest in it. First of all they had an epistemological interest in शब्द; they had to decide whether or not to recognise it as an independent means of knowledge. Secondly they had to determine the nature of it as a purely physical phenomenon. They had to make up their mind as to whether it was made up of air waves, as the Mīmāṃsakas held, or of waves of आकाश as the Naiyāyikas held or whether it was a product of a combination of atoms or whether it was somehow derived from consciousness, questions which to-day would be considered by physicists rather than by linguists.⁶ The

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 531.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 30

(a) *Vāk.* I; p. 118 (edited by Pt. Chāru Deva Shastri, Lahore)

⁶ *Vāk.* p. 102 (edited by Pt. Chāru Deva Shastri, Lahore.)

Grammarians who, as linguists, began to take interest in Śabda as a means of communication, ended by dealing with it as a psychologist and a metaphysician.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas were particularly interested in शब्द and it is, therefore, not surprising that each came to be associated in the popular mind with one aspect of शब्द. The former are called वाक्यविद् and the latter पदविद्, two rather paradoxical expressions, considering that the वाक्यविद्, the Mīmāṃsaka fights for the reality of the पद and the पदविद्, the Grammarian believes only in the reality of the Vākya.

They have certain views in common : both look upon शब्द as नित्य as against the Naiyāyikas and Bauddhas for whom it is अनित्य. Both make a distinction between व्यञ्जक and व्यंग्य; ध्वनि is व्यञ्जक and शब्द is व्यंग्य to both. But this resemblance is superficial. When we try to find out what they mean by शब्द, the difference becomes quite clear. The difference is due to certain fundamental beliefs and needs of the two schools of thought. The Grammarian is not interested in epistemological problems. His main task is to explain the formation of words. If he speaks about the eternality of the word, the meaning and their mutual relation, it is to emphasize that the grammarian's task begins only when these three things are given. He has nothing to do with the creation of any one of the factors. These three things being given, he merely explains them.⁷ When he describes them as नित्य or eternal, he has chiefly व्यवहारनित्यता or प्रवाइनित्यता in mind, continuity in usage कूटस्थनित्यता belongs only to Brahman identified with शब्द. These three things have come down from time immemorial, from generation to generation. What is the nature of this शब्द

⁷ कथं पुनरिदं भवतः । णिनेराचर्यस्व लक्षणं प्रवृत्तम् । 'सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे । सिद्धे शब्देऽथ सम्बन्धे चेति ।

(*Mahābhāṣya*, vol. I, p. 47—Pt. Guru Prasad Shastri's edition, Benares.)

which has come down from time immemorial ? That is the central problem of the Sphoṭa doctrine ?

The Mīmāṃsaka, the believer in the स्वतःप्रामाण्य or self-validity of knowledge was supremely interested in epistemological problems and if he is interested in proving that the word is eternal, it is because the eternality of the word is very important for the establishment of the self-validity of the knowledge which we derive from the Vedas. Secondly, the Mīmāṃsā had taken upon itself the task of evolving principles for the interpretation of Vedic texts relating to ceremonial, so that all apparent contradictions and difficulties could be removed and the Yajamāna could proceed with the task of performing ritual in all its details, free from any doubts or hesitations. Some of these methods of interpretations involved the removal of a word or words from a sentence found in a particular context and their application to another context. Such a procedure, if it is to acquire validity, must be based on the reality of the individual word. The self-validity of the knowledge derived from Vedic words and the reality of the word within the sentence, these two basic principles of Mīmāṃsā have coloured its attitude towards the problem underlying the sphoṭa doctrine.

The central problem is stated in identical terms by Patañjali and Śābara in their respective *Bhāṣyas* : अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? ⁸ In that complex cognition expressed by the word 'गौः' and which consists of many elements such as the Universal, the particular, quality, action, phonemes etc., which element is it to which the name शब्द or word is applied ? To this question, the earliest Mīmāṃsaka's answer is that of

⁸ (a) अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः—*Ibid.* p. 8

(b) अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः—*Lakṣmīpuram Srinivasacharya—(Mīmāṃsā bhāṣya:bbhāṣanam p. 81—Mysore 1928.)*

Bhagavān Upavarṣa, mentioned in the *Śabarabhāṣya*.⁹ His answer is that the word is nothing more than the then phonemes themselves. The word 'गौः' is nothing more than the three phonemes which are found in it, namely, ग्, औ and विसर्ग. The word 'Śabda' must obviously be something which can be heard when somebody utters the word 'गौः'. It is also these very phonemes which cause the understanding of the meaning of the word. When phonemes are grouped together according to the units of meaning which are conveyed, they are called पद or individual word. Each individual word is therefore, an aggregate of phonemes and expresses one unit of meaning called 'padārtha'.

Of course, one has to explain how this grouping together of phonemes can take place. One cannot group together things which do not exist at the same time. They are uttered by the speaker one after another and as soon as they are uttered, they disappear. The listener also hears them one after another and as soon as he has heard each one it disappears. Only one of them figures in each cognition. How can they be grouped together? Unless they are grouped together in some way and thus become one word, they cannot convey the meaning together. It is true that certain things which exist in a sequence and not simultaneously seem to produce an effect jointly. The different moments in the act of going have a sequence and yet together they produce the effect of reaching the other place. Each moment of the act covers a point of space and that becomes the cause of the reaching of the next point of space. Does anything like that happen when the speaker utters and the listener hears the phonemes ग्, औ and विसर्ग one after another? 'Yes', says Śabaraswāmin. The cognition of each phoneme,

⁹ गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः। श्रीत्रग्रहणे ह्यर्थे लोके शब्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धः। ते च श्रोत्रग्रहणाः। *Ibid.* p. 81.

though momentary by nature, leaves a lasting impression called संस्कार. In the word 'गौः' the cognition of the visarga at the end, accompanied by the impressions of the cognitions of the two previous phonemes ग् and औ, produces the effect of conveying the meaning of the listener.¹⁰

What is meant by 'संस्कार' in this explanation of Śabarāswāmin is that well-known kind of impression which, when awakened, results in remembrance. It is a kind of latent power of the self. To this well-known latent power productive of remembrance, a further result is attributed in this explanation. It is said to convey the meaning also. Or rather, the understanding of meaning is a fact and it is explained by the presence of these impressions. Where these impressions do not exist, the meaning is not understood. If somebody merely utters the विसर्ग in our presence, we do not understand the idea of a 'cow' from it. But if it is uttered after ग् and औ, we do understand the meaning. In the first case, the impressions of the previous sounds are absent in the hearer, because he never heard them. And as he does not understand the meaning, the natural conclusion is that the cognition of the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions of the previous phonemes, is responsible for the comprehension of meaning. In this explanation the संस्कार are credited with a function which they usually do not perform. Ordinarily, they, when awakened, cause remembrance. A saṃskāra, left by the cognition of ग्, when awakened can only cause the remembrance of ग् previously cognised.¹¹ Here it is credited with bringing

¹⁰ पूर्वपूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोज्ज्वलो वर्णः प्रत्यायकः । *Ibid.* p. 82.

¹¹ संस्काराः खलु यद्वस्तुपलंभसंभावितात्मानस्तत्रैव नियतनिमित्तलब्धप्रतिबोधा धियमाविर्भावयन्ति । नार्थान्तरे । न हि जातु गवावग्रहप्रत्ययप्रभाविताः संस्कारोऽवस्मरणमूपकल्पयति । *Maṇḍana Miśra-Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 45 (Madras University S. S. No. 6.)

the idea of a cow to the mind of the listener, because the understanding of meaning takes place when the impressions are present and does not take place when they are not present. The *samskāras* are credited with a new function because here, in their presence, a new effect, not seen elsewhere is seen. Rather than postulate another cause for this new effect, it is simpler to credit the *samskāras* themselves, the existence of which is admitted by everybody, with a new function.¹²

But now a difficulty arises. The impressions of the cognitions of the previous phonemes are supposed directly to convey the meaning. But we sometimes see that even in their presence, the meaning is not understood. If somebody utters औ first, ग् next and the *visarga* last, the idea of a 'cow' will not be understood.¹³ But why not? The impression of ग् and औ are there. The cognition of the final *visarga* also takes place. What prevents the understanding of the meaning? The fact that the phonemes were this time uttered and heard in a different order should make no difference to the impressions themselves. Order is an attribute of the act of utterance or of audition and does not affect the phonemes or their impressions. The phonemes are eternal and all pervasive *नित्य* and *विशु* according to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and have no sequence temporal or spatial. Sequence can, therefore, never become their attribute, neither when they figure in cognition nor when they exist in the form of impressions. It would not improve matters very much to say that the impressions do not directly convey the meaning. Being permanent, they can all co-exist. From all of them, there

¹² तस्मात् कार्यान्तरपरिकल्पितसत्ताकस्य संस्कारस्यैव शक्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पनामात्रमस्तु, इह विषये कार्यान्तरदर्शनात् न तु स्फोटपरिकल्पना युक्ता, बलुप्तसत्ताकस्य तस्यैव शक्तिमात्रकल्पनया कार्योपपत्तावर्थापत्तिपरिक्षयात् ।' *Ibid.* p. 48.

¹³ अपि च क्रमव्यतिक्रमभावितपूर्ववर्णसंपादितसंस्कारसद्भावेऽपि नार्थाधिगमः समीक्ष्यते । तन्नासौ तद्वेतुर्भवेतुमर्हति । *Ibid.* p. 56.

arises a single cognition of all the phonemes. It is this cognition or the phonemes which figure in it which convey the meaning. This single cognition inconceived of by some as a complex cognition, partly perception, partly remembrance, perception as far as the last phoneme is concerned and remembrance as far as the previous phonemes are concerned. Others think of it as a simple remembrance of all the phonemes, taking place after the last phoneme is cognised. This simple remembrance is, of course, due to all the impressions being present at the same time. In this collective remembrance, the phonemes do not figure in any order.¹⁴ But this way of looking at the functions of saṃskāras does not impress matters, because in the collective remembrance, caused by all the impressions, the phonemes do not figure in any particular sequence. Why should not the meaning be understood even if the phonemes are uttered in a different order. ? Why should the word नदी convey a meaning different from the word दीन ! Unless the sequence also figures in the final cognition, the same meaning would be understood from both these words. And the sequence cannot figure in the final cognition because originally the sequence was an attribute of the act of uttering or hearing the phonemes and not of the phonemes themselves and it is only the phonemes which figure in the final remembrance. If the sequence were also an attribute of the phonemes it would also figure in the final remembrance. But as said above, the phonemes are all eternal, according to the Mīmāṃsakas whose view

¹⁴ (a) न खलु साक्षाद्भावनानां व्यापारमभिधेयप्रत्ययविषयमुपेयः । अपि तु ताभ्यः स्थायित्वेन प्रतिलब्धयोगपद्याभ्यः प्रत्ययमृष्टसकलवर्णरूपात्मा एकः प्रत्यय उदेति । तत्र स एव वा तद्विपरिवर्तिनो वा वर्णास्तत्र समधिगतसहभावा जनयन्त्यर्थ-
बोधमिति शब्दपरिकल्पनापरिश्रमः । *Ibid.* p. 59.

(b) अन्यैस्तु सकलवर्णोपलब्धिनिबन्धननिखिलभावनाबीजजन्मा युगपदखिल-
वर्णरूपपरामर्शी चरमवर्णप्रत्ययक्षोपलब्धिसमनन्तरः स्मरणैकरूपः सङ्गीर्यते । *Ibid.* p. 61.

is now being explained and there cannot be any sequence between them.¹⁵

It is in order to meet their difficulties that the Mīmāṃsakas explain the part played by the Saṃskāras slightly differently and give a final shape to their view regarding the way in which the meaning is understood by one who hears the word गौः uttered in his presence. When the same speaker utters the phonemes of a word in their fixed order, they are heard by the listener in the same sequence. The cognition of each phoneme leaves an impression in the mind of the listener. It is not that kind of impression which, when awakened, causes remembrance of the phoneme previously cognised. It is more like potency, अपूर्व, which is generated by the various subsidiary acts of a sacrifice and ultimately brings about the reward of heaven to the performer of the sacrifice.¹⁶ The chief characteristic of the impression which causes remembrance is that it causes something similar to that which produced it. That is not the function of अपूर्व in a sacrifice. It is produced separately by the various acts constituting a sacrifice and by the sacrifice as a whole and inheres in the soul of the sacrificer as a kind of potency, until it brings the reward of heaven. Its result is very different from its cause. The impression left by the cognition of a phoneme is very much like this अपूर्व. It is produced by the cognition of a phoneme but it produces the comprehension of meaning. In the case of a sacrifice, the potency is

¹⁵ स्वतो वर्णा नित्यतया विभुतया च न देशनिबन्धनं नापि कालनिबन्धनं परापरभावमनुपतन्तीति प्रख्यातनिबन्धन एष सम्पाश्रीयते। तच्चेदमद्वयमक्रमम्। यद्विपरिवर्तिनस्तेऽर्थप्रत्ययद्वेतवः। न चेदं पूर्वोपलब्धिसम्बन्धिनां परापरतां गोचरयति। वर्णावलंबितया तदुपलब्धीनामविषयीकरणेन। *Ibid.* pp. 66-68.

¹⁶ मा भूदेव ज्ञानप्रसवः स्मरणनिमित्तं संस्कारः। अपि तु यागादिकर्मभेदोपपादित इव स्वर्गादिनिमित्तमपूर्वाभिधानोऽन्य एव नियतक्रमकर्तृभेदप्रयुक्तवर्णविज्ञानोपहितोऽर्थाधिगमफलः यथा चापूर्वाभिधानभावनोपजने कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात् तत्रेहापि कार्यव्यवस्थादर्शनसामर्थ्यात् कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः। *Ibid.* Pp. 86-88.

produced only if the various subsidiary acts are performed in a particular order by a particular agent. In the case of words also, the phonemes must be uttered by the same speaker in a particular sequence and cognised by the hearer in the same sequence if their impressions are to produce the effect in question, namely, the comprehension of meaning. Of course, it must be remembered that it is not the *saṁskāras* which directly denote the meaning, but the cognition of the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions of the cognition of the previous phonemes. The *Mīmāṃsakas* cannot maintain that the *saṁskāras* directly denote the meaning because they, after all, cannot be called शब्द and it is शब्द which is eternally related to meaning according to them. This position is safeguarded in the view that the final phoneme of a word which is a शब्द conveys the meaning helped by impressions of the previous phonemes. The exact nature of this help is that the impressions become a kind of *vyāpāra* or intermediate-cause. They help the final phoneme in its task of conveying the meaning. The cognition of the final phoneme is the agent which brings about the understanding of meaning. All agents depend upon a *vyāpāra* or a mode of performance for bringing about the result. But this does not in any way diminish their agency. The meaning is not any less the result of the phonemes because the impressions come in the middle. The phonemes are uttered for conveying the meaning and not merely for the sake of leaving impressions.¹⁷

¹⁷ संस्कारापेक्षिणश्चात्त्ववर्णस्य प्रत्यायकत्वान्न शब्दस्याप्रत्यायकत्वम् । येन शब्दार्थसंग्रह्यानि स्यात् । न होतिकर्तव्यतापेक्षित्वं कारकाणां कारकतां विहन्ति । सर्वत्र व्याहृतिप्रसङ्गात् । पूर्वेषु च वर्णाः संस्काराभिधानव्यापारोपाया यथास्वमभिधेयप्रत्ययमुपपादधाना नाप्रत्यायकाः । न हि स्वव्यपारव्यवायः कारकाणां कारकतां विहन्ति मोषघाति सर्वत्रेति । न च संस्कारोपजनार्थं शब्दोच्चारणम् अपि त्वर्थप्रतीत्युद्देशेन—*Ibid.* pp. 88-90.

The chief points in this final Mimāṃsaka conception of the word are—(1) that the cognition of the final phoneme, somehow helped by the impression of the previous ones, conveys the meaning, (2) that the cognition of the individual phonemes leaves an impression different from the one which causes remembrance and is like *अपूर्व* in a sacrifice, (3) that the phonemes have to be uttered and heard under special circumstances, namely, that the speaker must be the same and there must be a fixed sequence of utterance, (4) that the unity of the word consists in a certain number of phonemes figuring in a final simple or complex cognition and jointly conveying one unit of meaning. All these points are open to criticism.

A word conveys a meaning according to convention. When we learn the convention in childhood, we never associate the meaning with the final phoneme and the impression of the previous ones. These impressions are invisible entities and the child who learns the language cannot cognise them. Nor do the elders who teach the child say anything connecting the impressions with the meaning.¹⁸ So much for the first point.

Secondly, though it is natural that the Mimāṃsaka should apply in this case a principle which he has already accepted elsewhere, a special kind of impression, different from the ordinary one which causes remembrance is a psychological impossibility. The Mimāṃsaka's position amounts to this: The phonemes, when uttered singly or in a different order or by different speakers cause impressions which are only capable of causing remembrance. When uttered by the same speaker in a particular order, they cause the other

¹⁸ विदितसङ्गतयो हि शब्दा यथास्वमर्थान् प्रकाशयन्ति । न चास्त्यवर्णमात्रमर्थ-
सम्बन्धितया प्रतिपद्यन्ते पुरस्तात् । मा भूत् केवलादर्थविज्ञानमिति । नापि संस्कार-
विशेषणम् । तस्यातिपतितेन्द्रियविषयसीम्नः साक्षादवेदनात् । *Ibid.* pp. 105-106.

kind of impression, that which causes the comprehension of meaning. Now this is a psychological impossibility. The phonemes are the same no matter by whom they are uttered. They can, therefore, cause only the same kind of impression, that which causes remembrance and not the one which causes the understanding of meaning. If the phonemes somehow become different by different kinds of utterances, they may be expected to leave different kinds of impressions. But that is not the case. Any difference in them must be due either to their own nature or to association with others. Neither is possible in this case. The Mīmāṃsakas for whom the phonemes are eternal and all-pervasive must be the least ready to admit any difference in them merely due to a particular kind of utterance. Nor is any difference perceived by us and if it is not perceived by us, it cannot have anything to do with the comprehension of meaning. Nor can any difference due to association arise because no such association is possible. As they are uttered in a sequence, they cannot co-exist. It is true that their impressions are more permanent and, therefore, the impression left by the first one can somehow modify or qualify the second phoneme and bring about a difference in it and so on till the last one. But what about the first one. As nothing has gone before, it must always remain the same. Thus, the position that the phonemes leave an impression which is different from the ordinary one which causes remembrance cannot be maintained.¹⁹

The third point that the phonemes have to be uttered by the same speaker in a definite order before they can

¹⁹ द्विविधा हि हेतवः कार्यतिशयमुपकल्पयितुं क्षमन्ते-स्वरूपतो वातिशयशालिनः सहकारिसमवधानप्रकल्पतातिशया वा । तत्र न स्वरूपभेद एवामुपेयते । नाप्यपरसमवधाननिबन्धनः । नियतक्रमवृत्तितयानापन्नयोगपद्यत्वेन । यद्यपि च पूर्वोपहितात्मनः संस्कारस्य स्थेम्ना तत्सन्निधिश्रुतस्मतिशाययेत् प्राचीनस्य तु नापरसमवधाननिबन्धनः नाप्यात्मना भेद इति कथमिव सोऽर्थप्रत्ययानुगुणं संस्कारमदधीत । *Ibid.* pp. 101-103.

convey the meaning is also a weak one. Because, in that case, unless the fact of the speaker being the same is ascertained, the phonemes would not convey the meaning at all. But we cannot always ascertain this fact and yet we understand the meaning even when the speaker or speakers are hidden. At the time of learning the convention, we are never told that the speaker must be the same.²⁰ As to the other condition, namely, that the phonemes have to be uttered in a definite sequence, the Mīmāṃsaka has not been able to show its necessity considering that, for him, they are eternal and cannot have any inner sequence. If sequence is important in the performance of the different parts of a sacrifice, it is only because the Vedas prescribe the sequence too and we cannot go against that prescription. So we follow it even if we do not see the need for it. Here, unless the need for sequence is proved, there is no reason why we should accept it.²¹

The fourth point that the unity of the word consists in all the phonemes figuring in the same final cognition and conveying one unit of meaning is exposed to the difficulty called *अन्वोन्याश्रय*, reciprocal dependence. Unless the word is cognised as a unit, a unit of meaning cannot be cognised and unless a unit of meaning is cognised, the limits of the word cannot as a unit be ascertained---a very unsatisfactory position.²²

It is in order to meet such difficulties that the Grammarians propose their own explanation of the way in which meaning is understood from words, an explanation

²⁰ अङ्गत्वे तु ज्ञापकानुप्रवेशान्नानवधारितार्थप्रतीतिसिद्धौ हेतुः। दृश्यते च व्यवहिततिरोहितोदोरितेभ्यो वर्णभ्योऽर्थज्ञानम्। न च व्यवहिततिरोहितयोरकस्मादेकत्वज्ञानं वक्तुः सम्भवति। सम्भवति हि स्वरसादृश्ये निरन्तरोच्चारणे वक्तुर्भेदेऽपि कलकलश्रुतौ चार्थज्ञानम्। कस्तत्र वक्तुरेकत्वानात्वे विवेक्तुं क्षमः। *Ibid.* pp. 117-119.

²¹ दशदिपूर्वविषये हि कर्तृक्रमादिनियमनिमित्तं बहुतरमदृष्टमगत्या शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात् कल्प्यते; न त्विह तथा; गत्यन्तरसम्भवात्। *Ibid.* p. 97.

which is based upon their conception of the word itself.

For the Vaiyākaraṇa, the word is something over and above the phonemes. It is not a mere collection of phonemes. It is something eternal and indivisible which exists in the subjective being. The phonemes, when uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer, do not more than manifest this Sphoṭa which is already within us. Once manifested, this sphoṭa conveys the meaning. The sounds, dhvanis, uttered by the speaker are the manifesting agencies. That is why they are called व्यञ्जक and the sphoṭa itself व्यंग्य. This Sphoṭa which is व्यंग्य stands towards meaning as i.s vācaka. Between dhvani and sphoṭa, the relation is व्यंग्य-व्यञ्जकभाव; and between स्फोट and meaning the relation is वाच्यवाचकभाव. All of us instinctively feel the existence of this entity within us. The Grammarians further argue that this instinctive belief shows itself even in our ordinary expressions. For instance, when we say “गोशब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे”, why do we use the singular number after the word शब्द ?²³ Does it not show that we instinctively believe that the word ‘गौः’ is an entity quite apart from the three phonemes which we see in it ? But it is not merely a matter of inference. It is one of the important points of the sphoṭavāda that not only are the phonemes cognised directly by the sense of hearing. This indivisible entity is also similarly directly cognised. I shall revert to this point a little later.

Each phoneme of a word reveals this sphoṭa, the whole of it, the first one vaguely, the second one more clearly and so on, until the last one, helped by the impressions left by the previous comparatively less clear cognitions

²³ अहो लोकशास्त्रप्रसिद्धयोः परः परिचयः यदिदमपि न दृष्टं शब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे भावार्थः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया प्रतीयेत इति भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे इति च ।
Ibid. pp. 21-22.

of the *ṣphoṭa* reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. To explain this process, the texts give two illustrations. When a jeweller examines a precious stone by continuously gazing at it for sometime, he has a series of cognitions of it. It is assumed in the texts dealing with this subject that cognitions are momentary. Each one lasts only for three moments. So a continuous cognition means a series of cognitions. In each one of these cognitions, the genuineness of the precious stone is perceived. In other words, the object of all the cognitions is the same, but the object is perceived progressively more clearly. Each cognition leaves its own impression behind. The last cognition, helped by the impressions of the previous cognitions, grasps the genuineness of the precious stone in all its clarity. If one does not admit that each cognition leaves its impression behind, one would not be able to explain how the object, namely the genuineness of the stone, figures clearly in the last cognition and not in the first one or in the intermediate ones.²⁴ The other illustration is the process of learning a verse by heart by reading it repeatedly. Each later reading of it results in a clearer impression of the verse than the one left by the previous reading. The last reading, helped by these impressions, fixes the verse fully and clearly in memory.²⁵

A reasonable explanation of what is meant by the first phoneme manifesting the whole word vaguely, the next

²⁴ पूर्वे ध्वनयोऽनुपजातभावनाविशेषमनसः प्रतिपत्तुरव्यक्तरूपोपग्राहिणीरुत्तर-
व्यक्तपरिच्छेदोत्पादानुगुणभावनावीजवापिनीः प्रख्याः प्रादुर्भावयन्ति । पश्चिमस्तु
पुरस्तन्ध्वनिनिबन्धनाव्यक्तपरिच्छेदप्रभावितसकलभावनावीजसहकारिस्फुटतरविनिविष्ट-
स्फोटविवर्धितप्रत्ययमतिव्यक्ततरमुद्भावयन्ति । यथा रत्नपरीक्षणः परीक्षा-
माणस्य प्रथमसमाधिगमानुपाख्यातमनुपाख्येयरूपप्रत्ययोपाहितसंस्काररूपाहितविशे-
षायां बुद्धौ क्रमेण चरमे चेतसि चकास्ति रत्नतत्त्वम् । *Ibid.* pp. 129-131.

²⁵ यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति ।

आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरूप्यते ॥

Vāk. I. p. 82 (Charu Deva Shastri's Edition, Lahore)

one less vaguely and soon until the last one manifests it fully clearly is given by Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the guru of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his *Sphoṭatattvaniripāṇa*. As soon as we hear the syllable 'क' uttered by a person who intends to say कमल, we have grasped not only that syllable 'क' but also the whole word rather vaguely, because we know now that he wants to pronounce a word beginning with 'क' and not with any other sound. But there are thousands of words beginning with 'क' and we do not know which one is going to be uttered. In other words, our knowledge of the whole word is vague. As soon as the speaker utters the next syllable 'म', the field is narrowed down. All words not having 'कम' at the beginning are now excluded. Our knowledge of the whole word is now less vague. When at last he utters 'ल' also, there is no more room for doubt. There is now a clear cognition of the word.²⁶

One can now understand why the meaning cannot be understood irrespective of whether the phonemes are uttered in the right or wrong order. According to the Mimāṃsakas, they are eternal. So a mere change in the order of utterance or the sameness or otherwise cannot make any difference to them or to their saṃskāras. Thus in their view, the same meaning should really come from नदी and दीन. This is not so in the Vaiyākaraṇa view. The phonemes are not the same irrespective of the sequence of their utterance and the sameness or otherwise of the speaker. They differ according to the difference in the effort to produce them and difference in effort again depends upon intentions. As the intention can never

²⁶ तथाहि कमलमित्युक्ते ककारमकारानुभवेऽपि किं कमलीयः स्फोटः कमनीयो वेति संदेहो नापगच्छति तावद् यावन्न चरमो लो नो वानुभूयते। तस्माद्विषत्वं संदिग्धत्वं निश्चितत्वमेव स्फुटतरत्वम्।

Vādarthasaṅgraha Pt. I (Śeṣakṛṣṇa-Sphoṭatattvaniripāṇa) p. 10
Gujarati Printing Press, 1913.)

be the same in नदी and दीन, the phonemes must differ too and thus the words which they manifest will also differ. न in दीन is not the same as न in नदी, because they are not the result of the same kind of effort. न in दीन is the result of the effort to pronounce दीन and न in नदी is the result of the effort to pronounce नदी.²⁷

The noteworthy point in this explanation is that the Grammarian does not postulate any peculiar kind of saṁskāra not seen elsewhere and not admitted by anybody. That was the weak point in the Mīmāṃsaka theory. There the impressions were left by the cognition of the phonemes, but when awakened, they were supposed, not to bring back the phoneme previously cognised, but to cause the understanding of meaning. In other words, the awakened saṁskāra was supposed to have an object different from that of the cognition which left it. This, the sphoṭavādin maintains, is an impossibility. In his explanation, the vague cognitions have the sphoṭa as their object, the saṁskāras which they leave have the same object, and they help the last phoneme in causing a clear cognition of the same object. This is a distinct improvement on the Mīmāṃsaka way of looking at things.²⁸

It cannot be denied that even though each previous phoneme causes a vague cognition of the indivisible sphoṭa, the phoneme itself also figures in the cognition. In other words, each cognition has the sphoṭa as its viṣaya or object, but has the form of the phoneme. Any cognition the object of which is different from its form is a kind of error. When we mistake a rope for a snake in the dark, the rope

²⁷ प्रयत्नभेदतो भिन्ना ध्वनयोऽस्य प्रकाशकाः ।

प्रत्येकमनुपाख्येयज्ञानतद्भावनाक्रमात् ॥

Maṇḍana Miśra - *Sphoṭasiddhi*, verse 18 (Madras University Sanskrit Series, vol. 6.)

²⁸ अनुपाख्येयाकारस्कोटोपलब्धिजन्मानश्च संस्कारास्तत्रैव स्फुटरपरिच्छेदां धियमुत्पादयन्तीति न वर्णवादिन इकार्यविषये नानात्वदोषः । *Ibid.* p. 133.

is the object of our error, but the error has the form of a snake. The rope is the object because, after all, it is the rope which is in contact with the senses and not the snake. Similarly, the sphoṭa is the object of the cognition of each one of the phonemes, but it appears as the phoneme. In other words, when we finally get a clear cognition of the sphoṭa, it is through a series of errors that we come to it. Here also the Grammarian can point out analogies. Sometimes when we look at a tree from a distance, it looks like some other object, say an elephant. If we keep on looking at it, ultimately, it appears in its true form. We have come to the truth through a series of errors. The sense is in contact with the tree and not with the elephant. Thus the errors have the tree as their object and the elephant as their form. When the final cognition takes the form of the tree itself and thus the object and the form of the cognition become one, the previous errors have played a part in it. The final correct cognition takes place without any change in the circumstances. It is not that we went any way nearer to the object. We cannot, therefore, say that distance was the cause of error and proximity that of the correct cognition. Standing in the same place and gazing continuously at the object results in a correct perception of it. Here, therefore, we have another case of a series of errors leading to truth.²⁹

Not only does the sphoṭa appear as the phonemes but these phonemes appear as the parts of the indivisible partless sphoṭa. How does this error take place has to be explained. The speaker makes various efforts with the intention of uttering different phonemes, words and sentences. These efforts produce various air-waves which strike at

²⁹ (a) यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वदूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा ।
अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथेवाध्यवस्यति ॥

the different places of articulation. Thus various phonemes are produced which manifest the शब्द in the form of a word or a sentence. Though these phonemes are different from one another when they become suggestive of different words, yet they seem to resemble one another on account of the similarity of the place of articulations and therefore get mixed up. That is why when the sphoṭa is cognised, we think, we are cognising the phoneme. When we hear the word 'ayam' for instance, we think that the syllable 'Yam' is a part of that word, though that word is really indivisible. That is because there is another word in the language, 'Yam', the accusative singular of the relative pronoun, 'Yad' and to pronounce that word we have to make with our vocal organs movements very similar to those which we have to make to pronounce the word 'अयम्'. To take another example, the three sounds ग्, औ and विसर्ग which manifest the word गौः are similar to the three which suggest three different words, namely, गङ्गा, औष्ण्यं, वृद्धः. There is ग् in गङ्गा, 'औ' in औष्ण्यं and विसर्ग in वृद्धः. These three are similar to the three found in the word गौः, because they are produced by similar movements of the same vocal organs. It is because of this similarity in the movements which we have to make in order to utter the suggestive sounds that the

व्यज्यमाने तथा वाक्ये वाक्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुभिः ।

भागावग्रहरूपेण पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ॥

Vāk. I. p. 90 (Charu Deva Shastri's Edition, Lahore.)

- (b) दृष्टमिदमारूपालोचिताः पदार्थाः क्वचिदन्यथा प्रकाशन्ते यथा दूराद् वनस्पतयो हस्त्यादिरूपप्रख्याताः बहुतरालोकाच्च देशान्मन्दतरालोक-गर्भगृहादिषु प्रविष्टस्य रज्ज्वादिषु व्यक्तमप्रकाशमानेषु सर्पाद्याकार-प्रकाशोदयः । न च तेषां न प्रथनमिति सांप्रतम् इन्द्रियस्य सन्निकर्षात् । न ह्यन्यसन्निकर्षोऽन्यज्ञानहेतुः । असन्निकर्षजत्वे वा तदपेक्षा न स्यात् । तस्मात् पूर्वदर्शनान्येव यथोत्तरोत्कर्षेण संस्कारमदधति व्यक्तवृक्षादिप्र-तिपत्तिनिमित्तं भवन्ति । अन्यथा प्रथमदर्शनेऽपि स्यात् । तद्देशावस्थि-तानामिव च प्रणिधानाभ्यासक्रमेण भावान्न दूरत्वादलब्धजन्म। सामीप्यादुदेतीति युक्तम् । *Maṇḍana Miśra, Sphoṭasiddhi,* pp. 139-142.

suggested 'sphoṭa' though really indivisible, appears to have parts which appear to be identical with the different suggestive elements. The word गौः appears to have three parts similar to the parts of three different words. Because the three elements which suggest the single indivisible word गौः are similar to the three elements suggestive of three different words. How the cognition of the indivisible sphoṭa produced by each phoneme has the form of that phoneme is explained in that way. The principle may be briefly stated thus. If for the manifestation of two indivisible words or sphoṭas one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the phonemes produced by these movements appear to be parts of both these, indivisible words. This, of course, is an error.³⁰

Thus it turns out that the phonemes which are the cause of the manifestation of the sphoṭa are also the cause of the error in which the sphoṭa appears as the phoneme a rather paradoxical result. And yet, say the Vaiyākaraṇas, the process is not without analogy. Elsewhere also the cause of error is often also the cause of a correct

30. (a) प्रत्येकं व्यंजका भिन्ना वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये ।

तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि सङ्कीर्णा इव शक्तयः ॥

वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिघ्नन्ति । स्थानाभिघातप्राप्तसंस्काराश्च ध्वनयो- यद्यपि परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वभावास्तथापि गोगवयजात्युपव्यजनवद् भ्रमणरेचनादिकर्मसामान्यविशेषाश्रयवच्च तेषामुपव्यजनानां दुर्ज्ञानो भेदः । सामान्यमात्रया कयाचिदनुगतः प्रविभक्तकार्याणामपि शक्तीनामात्मा कुतश्चित् कार्यविशेषात् संकरेणैवावस्थितः । ततश्चायं निरवयवेषु वर्णेषु मात्रं त्रिभागाध्यवसायः, पदेषु वर्णविभागाध्यवसायः, वाक्येषु च पदविभागाध्यवसायः । Vāk. I. p. 89.

(b) ध्वनयः सदृशात्मानो विपर्यासस्य हेतवः ।

उलंभकमेवेष्टं विपर्यासस्य कारणम् ॥

यद्यपि वर्णपदवाक्यविषया भिन्नात्मानः प्रयत्ना सहितश्च तदुदीरिताः स्थानाभिघातिनः स्थानाभिघातलब्धात्मानश्च ध्वनयः शब्दाभिव्यक्तिहेतवः तथापि स्थानाकरणादिसाम्येन कथंचित्त्वत्सादृश्याः सङ्कीर्णा इव । तन्निश्चरतोऽयं शब्दान्तरेषु शब्दान्तरप्रहणाभिमानः ।

cognition. When a distant tree is mistaken for an elephant, the sense contact is certainly one of the causes of error and when ultimately, the truth dawns on us, the sense contact is again responsible.³¹

One peculiarity of this error in which the sphota appears as the phoneme is that there is a certain fixity about it. Its occurrence is universal, its sequence is fixed and its form is also fixed. This is not the case with other errors. One man may mistake a rope for a snake, but that does not mean that others also do it. If others also commit a mistake, it need not be of the same kind. One man may mistake a rope for a snake while another may mistake it for a little stream. Thus the form of the error may differ from person to person. Nor is there any fixity in the order of the errors. Sometimes one mistakes a rope for a snake at first and later for a stream. At other times, just in the opposite order. In the case of the word appearing as the phoneme, the error takes place inevitably in the case of everybody, it is a universal error. Every body commits the same kind of error. The indivisible sphota of the word गौः appears as ग्, औ and विसर्ग for everybody. And finally in the case of the word, the error appears

(c) पदतत्त्वमेकं प्रत्येकमभिव्यञ्जयन्तो ध्वनयः प्रयत्नभेदभिन्नास्तुल्यस्थान-
करणनिष्पाद्यतयाऽन्योन्यविसदृशतत्तत्पदव्यञ्जकध्वनिसादृश्येन स्वव्यं-
जनीयस्यैकस्य पदतत्त्वस्य मिथो विसदृशानेकपदसादृश्यान्यापादयन्तः
सादृश्योपधानभेदादेकमन्यभागमपि नानेव भागवदिव भासयन्ति ।
भामती on शङ्करभाष्य on ब्रह्मसूत्र, I.3.28

अन्योन्येति—ये हि गकारौकारविसर्जनीया गङ्गा औष्ण्यं वृक्षः इति च
विसदृशपदव्यञ्जकास्तैः सदृशा अपरे गकारादयो ध्वनयो गौरित्येकं पदं
व्यञ्जयन्ति । ध्वनीनां सादृश्ये हेतुः तुल्यस्थानेति । भिन्नपदव्यञ्जकध्वनि-
सदृशध्वनित्यक्ते एकस्मिन्नपि पदे सन्ति भिन्नपदसादृश्यानि इति भेदभ्रमः—वेदान्त-
कल्पतरु on the above.

³¹ उपलब्धनिबन्धनमेव च विपर्ययस्य निमित्तं, हेत्वन्तरानवसन्धानात्—

Māṇḍana—*Sphoṭasiddhī*, pp. 147-148.

in the same order for everybody. How are we to account for this fixity of verbal error? ³²

Here 'avidyā' or the limitation of the individual self is mentioned as the chief cause. It is due to this that we ordinary mortals have no other means of cognising the sphoṭa, except the phonemes, the phonemes which though they are different from one another because of their manifesting different sphoṭas, yet resemble one another because of resemblance in the place and means of articulation. Such phonemes are the only means available to us ordinary mortals for cognising the sphoṭa and they can do it only by presenting the sphoṭa as phonemes. That is why all of us are subject to the same error: As this error is a means to the ultimate correct cognition, it must necessarily precede it. The particular order in which the errors follow one another is a means to the final correct cognition of the sphoṭa. Therefore there is a fixity in the order of the errors also. The process is somewhat like what the Vaiśeṣikas accept for the cognition of higher numbers pertaining to things. We first perceive the lower numbers which really do not exist in these things and finally cognise the higher number. The cognition of the non-existing lower numbers is a means to the apprehension of the higher true figure. This inevitability of the sphoṭa erroneously appearing as the phonemes is sometimes also compared to the Vijñānavāda view that consciousness always appears as coloured by an

³² नियमानुपपत्तिश्च । न खलु रज्ज्वादिषु सर्पादिविपर्यासा नियोगतो भवन्ति । नियोगस्तु वर्णग्रहणसरूपाः पदपरिच्छेदात् पूर्वं बुद्ध्यो जायन्ते । न च सर्वप्रतिपत्तू-
णामेकरूपो विपर्यासो युक्तिमान् । रज्ज्वां हि कश्चित् सर्प इति विपर्यस्यति कश्चिद्वा-
रेति । न च विपर्यसि क्रमनियमः । कदाचित् धारा इति विपर्यस्य सर्पः इति विपर्यस्यति,
कदाचिद् विपरीतम् । इह तु नियतभावी नियतक्रमो नियतरूपश्च विपर्यास इति किमत्र
कारणम् । *Ib d*—pp. 137-138.

external object though there is no such thing as an external object at all ³³.

While all this is true of us ordinary mortals, the great Ṛṣis are credited with the power of cognising the indivisible sphoṭa directly, without going through the process of errors ³⁴.

That the cognitions of the phonemes are really errors is further proved by the fact that they are ultimately superseded by the cognition of the word as a whole, i.e., the sphoṭa. We know that error has taken place when we see it sublated later on. That is just what happens here. But for the final cognition of the word as a whole, the meaning would not be understood. Whenever an erroneous knowledge is sublated, the sublation can take a negative or a positive form. The correction of the error of mistaking a rope for a snake takes a negative form. We say : This is

33. (a) असतश्चान्तराले याच्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते ।
 प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥
 भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचस्वोपप्लवो ध्रुवः ।
 क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाग् ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम् ॥
 यथाद्य संख्याग्रहणमुपायः प्रतिपत्तये ।
 संख्यानन्तराणां भेदेऽपि तथा शब्दान्तरश्रुतिः ॥ *Vāk. I. 85-87.*

- (b) निमित्तमेवेदं शब्दतत्त्वोपलब्धेर्यद् विपर्यासयदेव शब्दमुपलभ्यतीति, नियतसारूप्यत्वात् । न हि शब्दान्तरविषयध्वनिविलक्षणा ध्वनयो-ज्ये तस्य व्यक्तौ नः सन्ति येनाविपर्यासोऽवसीयेत । अत एव च तुल्यरूपः सर्वप्रतिपत्तुणां विपर्यासः । तन्निमित्तस्य समानत्वात् । क्रमनियमश्च नियतक्रमत्वात् । यथा चाविद्यमानात्मभूतसंख्यानन्तरज्ञानं संख्यानन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ निमित्तं तदुपायत्वात् । तथेहापि शब्दान्तरपरिच्छेदः । न हि क्वचित् क्रियायां हि निजिज्ञासितसंख्येषु शतादिसंख्यापरिच्छिन्नेषु वस्तुषु पूर्वसंख्यासम्भवः । संख्यायाः परिच्छेदरूपत्वात् तस्य च तत्रासंभवात् । *Sphoṭasiddhi*, pp. 150-153.

- 34 (a) निष्क्रमं तु दाशतयमप्युपायान्तरेण (?) प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रतिपादयन्ति च ।
Vāk. I. verse 85, p. 86. (Charu Deva Shastri's Edition, Lahore.)

- (b) अपरप्रदर्शितविषयास्तु परमर्षयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणोऽव्याहृतान्तःप्रकाशा विधूतविपर्यासक्रमं च वाक्तृत्वं प्रतिपेदिरे प्रतिपादयामासुरिति च प्रतिज्ञायते । *Maṇḍana Miśra-Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 154.

not a snake. In this case, it takes a positive form. We do not say : this is not गू, or औ or विसर्ग. We say to ourselves : This is the word गौः³⁵

This process in which the phonemes produce progressively clearer cognitions of the sphoṭa, until the last one, helped by the impressions of the previous ones brings the sphoṭa clearly to the mind, and then the meaning is understood, this process cannot be adopted by the Mīmāṃsaka to his theory. He cannot say that the first phoneme conveys the meaning vaguely the next one less vaguely, the next one still less vaguely until the last one brings the meaning fully clearly to the mind. If this were possible, one could dispense with the sphoṭa coming between the phonemes and the meaning. But this is not possible because when the phonemes convey the meaning, that would be a case of शाब्दज्ञान i.e. understanding of meaning from शब्द. Phonemes are after all शब्द. It is accepted by the adherents of all systems of philosophy that it is only perceptual knowledge which admits degrees of clarity. The distinction between निर्विकल्पक and सविकल्पक belongs only to knowledge produced by sense contact. The understanding of meaning from phonemes would not come under प्रत्यक्षज्ञान. But the cognition of the sphoṭa from the phonemes, the Grammarians maintain, is a case of प्रत्यक्ष. That is why we can safely speak about its being vague at first and becoming progressively clearer.³⁶

We have now to see how it is a case of प्रत्यक्ष. It is प्रत्यक्ष because the final cognition which is different from the

³⁵ यन्तु विपर्यासित्वं प्रत्ययविपर्यासाधीनं तदभावे बालोल्लापनं इति, सत्यम्, यदि स न स्यात् । अस्ति तु व्यक्तैकशब्दपरिच्छेदादर्थसिद्धेश्चान्यथालभ्यत्वादुक्तेन प्रकारेणावश्याभ्युपेय एकः शब्दः । *Ibid.* P. 165.

³⁶ प्रत्यक्षज्ञाननियता व्यक्ताव्यक्तावभासिता ।

मानान्तरेषु ग्रहणमथवा नैव हि ग्रहः ॥ *Ibid.* p. 169.

previous cognitions having the form of the phonemes, must have an आलंबन or basis and this must be different from the phonemes themselves.³⁷ This final cognition is not mere memory in which all the phonemes figure together. The unity of that final cognition does not merely consist in its being a single cognition reflecting all the phonemes at the same time and conveying one unit of meaning. It is not that we wrongly attribute unity to an aggregate of phonemes simply because they figure together in the same remembrance and convey one unit of meaning. That is the Mīmāṃsaka view³⁸. For the Vaiyākaraṇa it is the unity which is the truth. He maintains that the fact that this unity seems to be somehow mixed up, interwoven with the plurality of the different phonemes should make us blind to its existence as a separate entity. This unity which the phonemes have been progressively revealing and which shines fully clearly when the last phoneme is cognised, is the real Śabda, it is the स्फोट, the padasphoṭa aspect of it which we have been considering in this article. Its cognition is a case of auditory perception. A cognition which seems to be interwoven with plurality may still have unity as its real object, argue the Vaiyākaraṇas. They quote the illustration of our cognition of a picture. The picture figures as a unity in our perception though it may appear interwoven with the plurality of its different colours³⁹. To deny this unity in verbal cognition would lead

³⁷ कथं प्रत्यक्षवेद्यता स्फोटात्मनः । वर्णविज्ञानविलक्षणस्य पश्चात् गौः इति विज्ञानस्य निरालंबनत्वायोगात् । नहि तद् वर्णालंबनमेव, वर्णबुद्धिविलक्षणत्वात् । तस्मादर्थान्तरमवलंबितुमर्हति । *Ibid.* p. 172.

³⁸ अथ मतम्—'गौः' इत्येकं विज्ञानम् । को बाह्यन्यथा ? ज्ञानं तु नैकम् । श्रेये तु तदग्राह्यतयैकार्थकारितया वैकत्वभ्रमः एकत्वोपचारो वा वनादिवत् । *Ibid.* p. 105.

³⁹ चित्ररूपावभासिनी च प्रख्या अवयवगतनीलादिरनाभेदेऽपि नार्थान्तरगोचरतां जहाति । न ह्यर्थान्तरसमवायि नीलानीलादिमात्रं चित्रम् अवयविनी नीरूपतया अक्षाक्षुषत्वप्रसङ्गात् । *Ibid.* p. 180.

to the denial of all unity anywhere, say the Grammarians. The word is therefore, something over and above the phonemes. When the phonemes are the same as in नदी and दीन, the words are different. When the phonemes are different as in the case of ग्, औ and विसर्ग there is only one word and that is cognised by direct experience.


All this effort on the part of the Grammarian to prove the existence of the individual word as an entity distinct from the phonemes might lead one to think that he believes in the ultimate reality of it. In fact, he did it only for the benefit of the Mīmāṃsaka who had identified the word with the smallest element of speech, namely, the phoneme and could not think of anything higher. In this argument the Grammarian was chiefly interested in pointing out that the phonemes by themselves cannot constitute the word. He was aware that all the arguments by which he sought to prove that the phonemes by themselves cannot convey the meaning and that a separate entity must be postulated could be used to show that the words also cannot convey the meaning and that another entity, higher than the words, namely, the sentence must be postulated to explain how we understand the meaning when we hear somebody speak. The psychological difficulties involved in the acceptance of the phoneme as an entity would militate against the acceptance of the pada as an entity too. Besides, in every day life, it is sentences which we use and not words. Sentence is the unit of speech, words are only abstractions which have no real existence. Sometimes it is very difficult to delimit the form of a word. In quick speech, forms of words are mutilated. Still we all understand the meaning. If words were real entities, they shouldn't convey any meaning if their form is in any way mutilated during quick speech. That is why Grammarians hold that a sentence is an indivisible unit and it is through avidyā again that we can mani-

fest it only through words which have no real existence. This is the Vākyasphoṭa. This process of going to higher and higher units can be continued. If words have no real existence within the sentence, can we not say that the sentence has no real existence apart from the paragraph. It is the paragraph which through 'avidyā' appears as various sentences which again appear as the divisions of the paragraph which has really no divisions. Even the paragraph is not the ultimate unity. Perhaps it is only an unreal division of the chapter of the book. Perhaps there is only one indivisible reality within our literary self which, due to our fundamental 'avidyā' can only manifest itself as such unreal divisions as the sentence, the paragraph and the chapter. We can go still further. Our literary life is only a part of our inner life. There are so many other aspects of our inner life which may all be no more than unreal manifestation of one central, eternal and indivisible principle. What is this principle? People like the Vedāntins call it ब्रह्मन्. Vaiyākaraṇas call it स्फोट which is the same as शब्द. Sometimes the two terms are combined and it is called शब्दब्रह्मन् the central reality out of which all manifestations arise. That brings us to the metaphysical aspect of the sphoṭa doctrine, called शब्दाद्वैत, mentioned by Bhartṛhari in the very first verse of his *Vākyapadīya*—

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

But that subject will require separate treatment.



CHAPAWAT BALLU
A WELL KNOWN AND TYPICAL HERO OF
RAJPUTANA

By BISHESHWARNATH REU

RATHOD BALLU¹ was the son of Thakur Gopaldas, a feudal chief of Ransigaon in Marwar. From even his childhood, he was a man of bold nature and hot temper. His father Gopaldas, being feudatory and favourite of Raja Gaj Singh (1619-1638 A. D.), the then ruler of Marwar, was in constant attendance with the latter.

There was a reserved grass farm in the village Ransigaon. Once the graziers of the Maharaja's camels allowed their herd to trespass in the said farm, which caused much damage to it. In the early morning when Kumar Ballu went out for a ride towards the grassfarm, he saw the camels grazing there. He, therefore, inquired of the herdsmen why they were allowed to damage the farm and to whom the camels belonged. He also ordered them to turn the camels out of the farm. But they did not carry out his bidding, and obstinately replied that the camels belonged to his father. Thereupon Ballu himself began to turn out the animals, but the grazier obstructed him, with the result that Ballu struck off his head and killed two or three of the camels which ran hither and thither. Seeing all this one of the herdsmen hurried to Jodhpur with the complaint that the camels of the Maharaja himself had been killed in Ransigaon, and that one of the Raikas (graziers) was also murdered. The Maharaja thereupon ordered that the culprit be brought at once in his presence, as he desired to see him personally. Thereupon some Sardars proceeded to Ransigaon and conveyed the Maharaja's orders to Ballu,

¹ He was born about 1610 A. D.

who prepared to offer resistance, and said that he could be arrested only on his death. Any how the Sardars calmed him and persuaded him to accompany them to Jodhpur, where after presenting him before the ruler, they would try to secure his pardon. On this assurance Ballu accompanied them to Jodhpur fort. As it was prohibited to carry arms before the Maharaja, the fort-guards asked Ballu to leave behind his sword, but he refused to do so. On a representation to the Maharaja, he allowed Ballu to enter the royal court with his sword. When he arrived before the Maharaja, he inquired of him the reason for killing the state camels. Ballu replied that he only killed them when the graziers told him that they belonged to his father. When the Maharaja further asked him how the head of the grazier was lopped off the complainant Raika (grazier) was then standing just on the right side of Ballu. Therefore he (Ballu) waved his sword and the head of the Raika rolled off on the ground. Excepting the Maharaja the entire body of the courtiers were enraged. After that the Maharaja inquired of Ballu his name and parentage to which he replied that his name was Ballu, and he was the son of the Thakur, who was just then standing near the Maharaja. The Maharaja then inquired of Gopaldas what was the matter as he had been telling him that he had no son. Gopaldas replied that a bad son was not in fact a son so called. But the Maharaja said that Ballu would turn out to be a man, who would carve his name in this world, and asked him (Ballu) to stay with him (the Maharaja). Ballu gladly obeyed the command. After some days the Maharaja deputed Ballu to serve and remain on duty with the elder Maharajkumar Amarsingh (1638-1644)². In the course of time, due to some unexpected reasons, the Maharaja became displeased with Maharajkumar Amarsingh, and banished

1 He was born in 1613 A. D.

him from Marwar. That day Amarsingh was out ahunting. But the Maharaja's order was sent to the city gates, with the instruction that on his return Amarsingh be acquainted with the said order. That day as Ballu did not go with Kumar Amarsingh, he was present at the Maharaja's Court. But this order was a guarded secret, known only to a few persons. One Pandit, who was in the know of it, recited the following stanza in the court :—

‘स्थानभ्रष्टा न शोभन्ते दन्ताः केशा नखा नराः ।’

i.e., “The teeth, hair, nails and men when once dislodged from their position, do not look graceful”. This utterance was not palatable to Ballu. He, therefore, retorted to the Pandit that if a person has the power, prowess or any other special quality, his dislocation only brings his qualities to light and estimation. For instance, the large tusks of an elephant, so long as they are in his mouth, are used for no other purpose, than digging the earth or rubbing against the stone, but when they are dislodged from their natural place, and come to the market to be turned into bangles to adorn the arms and wrists of females, right from the richest to the poorest folk, they become an auspicious sign of the wife-hood. Such is the high estimation of the bangles. Next take the hair. The tuft of hairs at the end of the tail of a yak, as long as it is attached to its tail, only serve the purpose of removing flies or mosquitoes, but when it is off its place it is converted into a fly whisk with gold handle and is considered the insignia of the royalty and waved over the heads of the kings, the emperors and even the idols of deities.

As regards the nails as long as they are stuck to the paw of a lion they are used only to kill the weaker animals and are always smeared with blood and dust, but when they are cut from their growing place they are framed in gold and put in the necklaces to be wearied by the children to protect them from the effect of the evil eye.

Hearing such remarks from Ballu the Pandit lost his temper and said that as soon as a man is off his position, he loses all his influence and grace. There upon Ballu retorted that he was not concerned with other people, but he could prove it false about himself. Having said this, he left the royal court for his residence and after taking his arms rode on his charger and arrived at the city gate, just at the time when Maharajakumar Amarsingh reached there. Arriving at the gate Maharajkumar Amarsingh read the order of the Maharaj and placing it on his head, in token of compliance, he turned his horse back. The courtiers stayed there, whereas Ballu accompanied him on his charger. Going a little distance, Amarsingh looked back and seeing Ballu coming after him, inquired why he was following him as the banishment sentence was passed only against him (Amarsingh), due to the displeasure of the Maharaja. To this Ballu replied that he also had to prove his mettle, as so long he had enjoyed a happy life with Amarsingh, and he would be an unworthy person if he now failed to stand by him at the time of his hardship. He also uttered the following couplet :—

साम उभारे सांकड़े रजपूतां आ रीत ।

जब लग पाणी आवटे तब लग दूध निचीत ॥

“i.e. “It is the duty of a Rajput to faithfully stand by his master in the time of adversity. So long as there is water in the boiling kettle, milk has nothing to worry about.”

Further he said, “He alone is the true servant, who remains steadfast in adversity, just as the shadow of one’s body remains constantly with it in the sun.”

After some days both of them reached Agra. At that time Emperor Shah Jahan (1628-1658 A. D.) was anxious to have such brave warriors and he took both of them in his service and appointed them officers in the Imperial Army. In 1638 A. D. Maharajkumar Amarsingh was granted the title of ‘Rao’ and the Jagir of Nagaur. Amarsingh then

began to reside at Nagaur and he granted a fiefship to Ballu and made him his honoured Sardar.

Rao Amarsingh was fond of the fight of rams and he had a good herd of them. Once a ram was killed by a wolf. This being brought to his notice by the herdsman, Rao Amarsingh ordered that a sardar may by turn be deputed to accompany the grazier on horseback, while the rams went out for grazing and to kill the wolf if it reappears. After some days it was Ballu's turn to go. The warder communicated this to him in the presence of the Rao. Ballu thereupon said that it was the duty of the grazier and not his. On hearing this the Rao remarked in irony that he (Ballu) was not going to drive rams, but indeed meant to drive back the Imperial Army. Hearing these words Ballu retorted that as desired by the Rao, he would one day carry out the same mission and taking Rao's permission, departed from the place, and reached Bikaner. Raja Kurnasingh (1631-1669 A. D.) of Bikaner heard of his arrival and asked his Sardars to bring him to his court. Accordingly he attended the Bikaner "Durbar." The Maharaja asked him to stay on there. Ballu accepted the request and in course of time gained so much favour of the Maharaja that he had a mind to grant him a Jagir. Meanwhile the Bikaner ruler received some sweet water-melons as present. Out of these one big and sweet water-melon (Matiro) was sent by the Maharaja to Ballu. As soon as it reached Ballu's residence he saddled his horse to depart from the place. When this news reached the Maharaja, he sent his Sardars to ask Ballu the reason of his leaving Bikaner and reconcile him if possible. But Ballu remarked that though the Bikaner Maharaja did not openly tell him to go, yet he had hinted to him not to remain there by sending a 'Matiro' which literally means "do not stay", and so he was not going to stay. Ballu then left the place and reached Amber.

When the Mirza Raja Jayasingh (1621-1667 A. D.) of

Amber, who had heard much about the bravery of Ballu, heard of his arrival, he too called him up through his Sardars, and gave him due honours and appointing him to the post of a military officer, bestowed upon him a Jagir as well. Once the Maharaja of Amber went out ahunting. In a villlage, by the bank of the river, the crops were in good condition. The Maharaja praised the bumper crops and inquired as to whom the village belonged. The attendants replied that it belonged to Ballu's Jagir. Next, the party reached another village, which had also good crops and which the Maharaja again praised very much. The attendants similarly submitted that that village also belonged to Ballu. Then they reached the third villlage, which had better crops than those of the last two villages. The Maharaja admired the condition of the crops there all the more and inquired about the owner of the villlage. The same reply that that too belonged to Ballu, came from the attendants. Ballu, who was also accompanying the Maharaja, took out the patta (royal edict) of the Jagir from the scabbard of his sword and returned it to the Maharaja. When the Maharaja inquired its reason, he said that as the Maharaja wanted to advertise himself his favours to a Rajput, he does not think it proper to carry the burden of such obligation any more. The Maharaja tried to appease Ballu a great deal, but to no avail. Ballu left the Maharaja then and there and departed.

From here he went to Mewar. As soon as Maharana Jagatsingh (1628-1652 A.D.), who was in search of such a person, heard of his arrival, he sent his Sardars to bring Ballu to his court. On his arrival, the Maharana received him with due respects and granted him a Jagir and honours similar to those of his Sardars. After some time Ballu fell ill and could not attend the court. Meanwhile the Maharana went out for a lion hunt. On his return, he visited the residence of Ballu and there a reference was

made to the lion hunting of that day. The attendant Sardars spoke very highly of the hunt, but Ballu kept silent. On the Maharana's asking him about his silence he said that a lion was nothing before the Maharana and so many Sardars and that it was an ordinary affair. The Maharana and his Sardars did not like this remark. In a few days Ballu recovered from his illness, and he began to attend the Maharana's court. One day, on receipt of information about a lion, the Maharana and the Sardars again went out for a hunt. There was a hue and cry and the lion began to approach. The criers intimated the Maharana that the lion was coming up.

Then the Sardars, due to the jealousy caused by the remarks of Ballu the other day, requested the Maharana that Ballu may be permitted to do the hunting that day. As soon as the Maharana assented, Ballu got down from his horse at once and laid aside all his arms. He tied only a scarf round his left hand and began to proceed towards the lion. Then the Maharana inquired why the horse and arms were left behind, Ballu replied that the lion had neither a ride nor arms. Meanwhile the lion approached nearer and pounced upon Ballu, but he hastened to put his left hand, wrapped up with the scarf, into its mouth and at the same time he gave such a hard blow with his right fist just behind the lion's ear that the brute fell down senseless. It remained so some time,, and as soon as it recovered senses, it fled away. Then Ballu remarked that it was not manly to kill a foe, who is laid low or is flying. Returning from the scene, Ballu took up his arms, rode his horse and paying his respects to the Maharana, departed. On the Maharana's insistence to retain him, he replied that it was futile to live in a place where there was no worth for a Rajput, that if the Maharana desired to test him, the fit occasion was to depute him to face a deadly foe, and not a beast. Leaving the Maharana, Ballu intended to go to

Agra through Bundi. When the Maharao Chhatrasal (1631-1658 A. D.) of Bundi got the information of Ballu's arrival at Bundi, he sent out his Sardars to fetch him and gave him due honours. Ballu stayed there for some days. One day at the time of Maharao's dinner, the plates of all the Sardars were served before them. In the course of conversation, the 'Diwan' of the Maharao said whether there was any one who would kick off the ready plate of food before him (meaning that it was difficult for a man to leave off his means of livelihood). There upon Ballu did kick off his plate and gave such a hard knock with it on the head of the 'Diwan' that he got a severe pain in his skull, while Ballu rode his horse and set off for Agra.

He reached the court of Emperor Shah Jahan. At that time the Emperor was in need of a man of Ballu's mettle. He, therefore, again conferred on him due honours and made him a high officer in the Mughal army. In course of time Ballu became a favourite of the Emperor, hence the latter was intending to confer further higher rank and honour on him. But meantime there cropped up a dispute between Rao Amarsingh and Fouj Bakhshi (Army Minister) Salabat Khan. Salabat Khan was going to call Rao Amarsingh as "Ganvar" or rude. But only the first letter of this word could be uttered by him before the rest of the syllable escaped the lips of Salabat Khan, the dagger of the Rao went piercing his heart. A couplet to that effect narrates the event—

‘उण मुखते गगो कछो उण कर लई कटार ।

वौर कहण पायो नहीं जमदह हो गइ पार ॥”

“i.e., He (Salabat) uttered the letter “Ga” and he (Amar Singh) took up his dagger and before the remaining syllable “var” could be spoken to finish the word “Ganvar”, the dagger of Amarsingh pierced the heart of Salabat Khan”.

A large number of persons too were killed at the hands of the Rao. This incident took place in the Imperial Court

of Agra on Shravan Sudi 2, 1701 V. S. (25th July 1644 A. D.). The Emperor then ordered that Amarsingh be arrested dead or alive, but none came forward except one Arjun Gaud, who was a brother-in-law of the Rao. When Amarsingh was getting out of the fort gate, Arjun Gaud attacked him from behind and even after the head of Rao Amarsingh had been severed, the latter threw his dagger, which stuck into the stone pillar, which still signifies the said event in the fort at Agra. The gates of the fort were then closed. The Ranis of Rao Amarsingh prepared to immolate themselves and become Satis, but Amarsingh's head or body was not available. They, therefore, sent a message to Ballu through Kumpavat Bhau that he (Ballu) was the favourite companion of the late Rao even from his childhood and that was the most opportune time to serve the cause of the Rao by bringing his head and body from the fort. Thereupon Ballu, along with his own warriors and the soldiers of Rao Amarsingh, started to attack the fort in order to bring the head and body of the Rao. In the nick of time there arrived a man with an autograph letter and a horse from Maharana Jagatsingh. The horse had a peculiar narrative.

It is said that a merchant brought two horses to the Maharana and described the qualities of the horses that holes in the stone rock be got dug for the hoofs of the horses to be placed therein and then the hoofs be fixed up by pouring in molted lead in the holes. Then a kick be given to the horse to start off. This was actually done with one of them, with the result that the hoofs remained in the holes into the rock, while the horse sprang forward and fell at a distance.³ It showed the great vitality of the horse. The Maharana paid off their price to the merchant and asked the Sardars as to who was the fit rider for such a horse. Some of them named the Maharana himself, while the others

3 This narrative seems somewhat exaggerated.

suggested the Maharaj-kumar as its fit rider. But the Maharana however expressed that the horse was only befitting the ride by Champavat Ballu.

The Maharana then sent the horse to Ballu with his autograph letter. The horse reached just at the time when Ballu was going to attack the fort of Agra and had ridden his own horse. Reading the Maharana's letter, Ballu got down from his horse and getting saddled the white charger sent by the Maharana rode on it and in reply sent a poem to Maharana acknowledging his gratitude. Then he rushed up to the vanguard, and by the time the two forces faced each other Ballu pierced through the Mughal army and breaking open the fort gate brought Rao Amarsingh's head and body and handed them over to his Ranis (Queens). He then asked Bhau to make haste in seating the Ranis on the funeral pyre and to set fire to it, as the Mughal army would not allow the ceremony of the Sati. He was severely wounded all over and desired that by the time he fell dead, it would be proper if the rite of Sati was finished. When the Satis sat on the funeral pyre and it was lighted Ballu gave this message to the Satis:—

‘बल्लू कहे गोपालरो, सतियाँ हाथ सँदेश ।


पतशाही धड़ मोड़ ने, आवाँ छाँ अमरेश ॥’

“i.e., Ballu, son of Gopal, sends a message through the Satis that O Rao Amarsingh ! he is also coming (soon) after driving back the Imperial Army (hams).” By the time the Ranis were half immolated, Ballu continued fighting nearby and when he was satisfied with his accomplished task, he hurried to the front and wielded his sword so bravely that the Imperial forces fell back. At last Ballu met his heroic death on the battle field.

The following are the Jagirs held by the descendants of our hero Champavat Ballu in Marwar and elsewhere:

(1) Harsolao; (2) Bapod; (3) Dhamli; (4) Laroli; (5) Khokhri in Mariosi and a villlage Bhomo in the Punjab.

This is a true story of a Rathod hero of the 17th century A. D. and depicts the outstanding peculiarities and trend of character of a chivalrous Rajput of the age. The hero had several brothers, none of whom breathed his last in bed, as such a death was considered derogatory for a true Rajput.



A PLEA FOR LOCAL MUSEUMS

By ADRIS BANERJI

I

THE purpose of this paper is to point out the necessity of 'Local Museums' all over India—a need when properly met is likely to fulfil the gaps in the mosaic of Indian cultural history. Thereby the usefulness of a central museum at Delhi is not ruled out; but the writer feels that such an institution can only succeed when phenomena have been sufficiently recorded and interpreted. Let us recapitulate, what must be known to every school boy, that India is a sub-continent, and this term explains a whole world of complex questions that invariably face any investigator in this country. The diversity of climate, soil, flora, fauna and races—as large as any European nations, with their social customs peculiar to themselves, as in a continent, are all present here inspite of a fundamental unity. Modern transport and progress of science, has made the term 'inaccessibility' a fiction. Nevertheless, this 'inaccessibility' was a great factor in the origin, development and decay of regional culture, in ancient times. Only when great powers were able to unify any considerable tract of the country under their control. we find a homogeneous culture. As soon as that political power degenerated, environment ceaselessly went on giving local colour to that particular culture. Take for example the jungle tracts of Central India, the Mauryas, the Sungas, the Guptas all extended their hegemony to these difficult area known as the *āṭavika deśa*. Then came wild Gonds with their immortal queen Durgāvatī, challenging the might of the Great Akbar. Still it had lapsed again to its primitivity, before modern communications swept away its secludedness. What a wealth of material does not wait there, for an ethnologist,

archaeologist, social anthropologist or the historian? The function of the Indian Museums movement is to record, to interpret, this 'unity in diversity' which is fast disappearing due to thoughtless political pressure, inspite of the danger we run in encouraging parochial patriotism.

Before proceeding to lay my point of view in public, let me define 'local museum'. A local museum is that, whose functions and obligations, relate to single well defined locality, as opposed to 'site Museums'. Thus Kennedy observes: "For local museums, the most suitable scheme of development will be found, as a rule, in the preservation, exhibition, study and interpretation of specimens and records bearing on the area over which the local public travels—its geological structure, its fauna and flora, its history and its industry." This is a very well defined and all comprehending scheme. That is a function, which has seldom been thought of, in the planning of our museums, except in very few cases. It may be asked, what is the justification of such schemes? The justification lies in collecting, recording and explaining varied information regarding every single region or, shall we say, district. To illustrate, what information we have about the antiquities, topography, and industries of the districts of 24 Parganas, Murshidabad, Nadia, Howrah, Burdwan, Bankura and Birbhum of Bengal, except an antiquated list published long ago. The districts of Unao, Lucknow, Hardoi, etc., were surveyed by Furber, since then what attempts have been made to supplement his labours? What attempts have been made to record the shifting course of the rivers, growth in the density of the population, and enlargement of cities, silting up of old river beds and *tals* by which many ancient landmarks must have been lost for ever? What records exist about these changes in the configuration and topographical features of the land to guide later researches? In Bengal, the *Varendra Research Society* was formed in the earlier part of this century by

a few enthusiasts, but want of proper support did not permit the desired amount of progress. In the provinces our Local Self-Government Act lacks even the much criticised enlightened features of its counterpart in England. Further there is another danger, a scientific institution is likely to be made a pawn in the political field.

We may now proceed to define the various sections of a local museum.

GEOLOGY—Soil, configuration and knowledge of the drainage and riverine systems. To illustrate, the fact that the valley of Ganges in places is of recent origin and is sufficiently well known, but the fact that earlier rock formation lies beneath the alluvium deposits is imperfectly known.

Well established geological facts have yet to be popularised. Neither was there a popular school to relieve the more serious worker from what seemed to him a thankless task. But the more over-riding features of the neglect is the want of a well organised drive to make the man in the street understand the configuration and topographical features of the various regions of India, such as the Ganges and the Indus valleys, the Deccan plateau, the sub-Himalayan *tarai*, with particular reference to the thoughtless deforestation¹ and consequent loss of wealth and opportunities of exploiting the natural resources of the country. The origin and course, with their respective moraines, of the famous

¹ To give an idea about the forest wealth of only one province, U.P.; I may refer to the Press note issued by the Forest Department of the provincial government. The forest wealth in U.P. excluding the valuable forests in Kumaon, "runs along the foot hills of the Himalaya from Dehra-Dun to Gorakhpur, with an outlying area in Bundelkhand." The yield of revenue under the head 'Forests' was :—

Year	Net Revenue	Expenditure	Surplus
1938-39	Rs. 48,50,000	Rs. 28,00,000	Rs. 20,50,000
1943-44	Rs. 1,86,22,177	Rs. 63,32,057	Rs. 1,22,90,120.

(Published in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, dated the July, 2nd, 1945).

Gangotri and other glaciers would be more powerful contribution to basic education in the real sense of the term. The soft alluvium on the banks of the Ganges and the Indus is unable to withstand the terrific velocity of the water in monsoon or when in spate, with the result that change of course is a natural feature. These changes have sometimes wrought havoc, or brought fabulous wealth, to the inhabitants of the cities on the banks of these rivers. Has not a particular course of the river Ganges been designated *Kīrttināsā* (destroyer of monuments) ! The serious change in the course of the river Damodar, which wrought so much havoc in the Burdwan district, in 1943, must be still fresh in public memory. What a wonderful record of these treacherous changes and the drainage system of Bengal would be a plaster cast model with definite positive values for the teachers and students of primary and secondary schools.

AGRICULTURE—India is primarily a land of agriculture. Till the present war the economic condition of India was not based upon its mushroom industries but on its agriculture. The chief source of revenue of the provincial governments is land revenue. Yet with the same callous neglect and thoughtless way of life we have lived on for generations, no attention has been paid to the necessity of a popular drive for improved and scientific methods in agriculture. The ignorance of the man in the street is colossal. There was a humorous story current in our childhood which is probably illustrative of this national weakness. A city bred youngman was asked what trees supplied the wooden beams of his house. The prompt and unhesitating reply was 'rice trees.' There are many such people still in existence. Since a local museum's chief function is to cater to public needs in well defined locality, the second most important section should be denoted to agriculture. Specimens of staple crops, different kinds of soil and the best method of utilising them, such as contour

sowing. Samples of manure, indigenous as well as foreign chemicals. enlarged models of pests, models of forms and plantations, improved methods obtaining in other countries, information about which can be obtained from the provincial Directors of Agriculture. All these in course of time will be of interest to the illiterate and not so dumb millions of India. I know how difficult it is to override their conservatism, and particularly to prick their ill developed brains. Big charts and statistics will be of very little help in rousing their enthusiasm, though such records must form an integral part of the museum exhibits. Models explaining the peasant's home life and exhibiting in detail his doings from sunrise to sunset would be of absorbing interest to foreign visitors as well as to special reformers.²

ZOOLOGY—The next important section is zoology. The best collection in this country was that in the Indian Museum, Calcutta. But it was on an all Asia basis. The ignorance about the animal and bird life of our own country, even amongst educated classes is pitiable. Sitting on our lawn in an Indian village, we observe so many kinds of birds and insects that our life is never dull, but the trouble commences when children ask names. Here again models of insects should always form a source of attraction. If the veins, musculature and structure of frogs, cockroaches, etc. are shown, what a joy it would be to the ingornat village children and particularly to their grave experienced parents, to alleviate the dull monotony of their lives. Birds and animals should be carefully mounted. Furniture of a museum, particularly exhibition cases, require to be designed according to the needs of each individual case. Clay models of local fishes would cater to public knowledge.

² An attempt to establish an agricultural museum at Guntur in the Madras Presidency is being made. In spite of the fact that this is a "subject museum" if it is run on proper lines, it would be a distinct contribution to the cultural development of India.

BOTANY—Nature which is before our eyes so much is apt to be forgotten, and the tropical growths that are at times such a nuisance should have their share in a local museum. Uniformity in the plant life of the Ganges valley, for example, is to be expected. Nevertheless there would be interesting variations. For example, the cocoanut trees which are so plentiful in the coastal districts, never occur in Bihar or U. P.

ARCHAEOLOGY—India has developed a marked archaeological consciousness. Whether it is for the better or worse, time alone can prove. The value of sculptures, coins, sealings and inscriptions are well appreciated. The politician too realises that after all archaeology is a good weapon in his hand for exploiting the mass mind, in painting a rosy, if not accurate, picture of the past. We should not have any scruples in accepting such helps, though it may not always be in the best interest of science. But the most significant cultural trait—the pottery has so far been neglected, for the lack of a proper approach to the subject. In this respect a very correct lead in proper appreciation of the pottery of the historical period, was given by Rao Bahadur K. N. Dikshit at Ramnagar, Sar-Dehri, Khokra Kot and Rajghat. Pandit M. S. Vats have also been issuing directions for collecting potsherds from various ancient sites in U. P. I am sure the collection housed at Safdar Jung, New Delhi, under the fostering care of Mr. Hilary Waddington will one day prove to be the richest collection in Asia, if properly nursed. In the recording and study of pottery the local museums can play no insignificant role.

ART—Art is one of the most important cultural traits. Unfortunately however the interpretation of aesthetics in our museums is one sided and unbalanced. The art sections of the Indian Museum, Calcutta, and the Prince of Wales Museum, Bombay, are known to me since childhood. The art collections of Lahore Museum, Provincial Museum,

Lucknow, Ashutosh Museum, Calcutta, have been visited by me often. All these Museums with the exception of the Ashutosh Museum are stereotyped. They have a few old or modern paintings and textiles and that sums up all their efforts. The fact that there exists in this country a lesser activity, yet as representative as those creations which find honoured places in our art collections is totally forgotten. We may conveniently denominate this as 'Folk art'. These arts have various kinds of productions, such as 'pat' paintings '*kāthā*' and wood engravings of Bankura in Bengal, *ālīpanā* system in Hindu homes, the wall paintings of Benares etc. The 'pat' paintings have been to some extent dealt with by Mr. Ajit Ghose of Calcutta (*Indian Art & letters*, Vol. V, No. 2). There is a good collection of Bengal *Kanthās* (sort of *rezais*) in the Ashutosh Museum. The wall paintings of Benares may seem to unsympathetic eyes very crude, yet as Mr. Sailoz Mukheji has pointed out "The primeval strand of its fabric, steeped in the Hindu tradition of spirit and perfected through ages of devout practice, remains undefiled even to this day. This pure art free from all stamp of foreign influence, often leads the unimaginative to view it as rudimental and inferior. The truth is very much the otherwise. The flat two-dimensional grammar speaks of a highly cultivated level. Primary colours are used throughout, lemon-yellow, brown, vermilion, pink, blue mauve and green of all shades. An harmonious composition and the perspective accentuated with an outline in bold black shows masterly treatment in the truly modern trend. The vicinity in Benares where this art of Pata and the applied art of making toys of wood and clay thrives is known as Harha Mohalla. This art belongs to an hierarchy of old traditional families of Benares and each member plays his part. While one is drawing pigment from stone and vegetables, another busies himself in treating lumps of clay yet another prepares the paperpulp for the masks. Thus the irksome necessities

of the painter's craft are cared for by willing hands and he is left to devote his whole energy and skill to the creation of masterpieces in colour". Decorative art with its lively and delightful motifs instinct with virility and charm are another interesting aspect of this art. It is a pity that the *Bharat Kala Bhavan* gives pride of place to modern paintings but has not got wall space even to spare to the artists in its neighbourhood.³ The best place for local museums in Post War India would be to devote themselves to the collection of folk art as well as works of local modern artists. It is the local talent, ancient and modern, with which they are concerned and not modern master-pieces of Tagore, Chaghtai, Haldar and Bose.

LOCAL HISTORY—History and archeology, at least in India is inextricably mixed up. There is practically no demarcating line between the two. It should not however be forgotten that local history has no mean part to play in the development of historical studies in India. Only when the local pictures are complete then and only then, will it be possible for a future Gibbon and Momsen to write a monumental history of India. Let me however make one point clear. History is not merely a jumble or a well documented volume consisting of names, succession, wars of kings, their ministers and generals. History in the broadest sense of the term cover a much wider field, such as religious, social and economic conditions; those immutable factors that lead to the decay and downfall of organisations. What is presented to us in the garb of 'history' is merely political history. Recently the *U. P. Historical Society* is making an effort to make a survey of pre-mutiny records in the different collectorates. But this is merely one side of the case, no attempt has been made to resurrect

³ *Modern Review*, Vol. LXXV. Feb. 1944 pp. 118-121; Ajit Mukherji —*Folk Art in Bengal*. Calcutta.

private records, which might have survived the neglect due to ignorance and ravages of white ants. What a splendid document would be an account book of a village grocers shop, in pre-mutiny days, or the eras after it. The revenue book of a local zamindar, or menus, accounts of expenditure of marriages of sons and daughters of the zamindar and a middle-class family, will be of immense help in throwing light, on the conditions of local gentry, their habits, food, commodities available, ingredients of cooking, actual dishes taken, conditions of the tenantry, crops, famine, pestilence, draught, local epidemics etc. Autobiographies, Diaries, Wills, old maps, and plans, likely to throw light on local history and society, would be valuable. To conclude, I might be permitted to draw attention to one fact. The method of cooking dishes of Indian gentry throughout the ages is a problem which has never been tackled. When sufficient materials are collected, it would be found that culinary methods might have undergone changes imperceptibly in contact with other peoples. A couple of years ago an article appeared in *Prabasi* on the food given to Khullana of the Bengal folk-tales, and three fourth of the articles of food mentioned there with side dishes are not now taken by Bengalis. This is an interesting piece of research which any museum Curator can take up.

INDUSTRY—Local industries are divisible into two broad groups. Exhibition of bigger industries have undoubtedly a value, but the museum movement can certainly make a definite contribution in regenerating cultural conditions in India as well as helping the economic reorganisation of the country, by laying stress on the cottage industry or handicrafts. Another function which municipal museums or district Board museums can easily perform, is to persuade industrialists to donate models of living quarters of their labourers, and layout of their factories, to the museum, which would be a monumental record of the housing condi-

tions of labour in different district and different industrial organisations, throughout the country. The industrialists thereby will have the advantage of making comparative study and appreciate rooms for improvement. With regard to local industries I might give a concrete example. Recently I had an occasion to pay a visit to Turtipar. In the days of E. I. Company, before Moradabadi *thālis* made their advent, Turtipar utensils were famous throughout U. P. This industry has totally disappeared bringing ruin and starvation on the once flourishing countryside. During my stay, I could not secure one single piece of the famous Turtipar *varttan*. Majority of the population in Benares, Azamgarh, Ghazipur, are weavers either muhammadans or low class Hindus, generally converted from Buddhism, or converts to Islam, or such as the Koiris, Kunbis or Bhars with their new-fangled notion of *Kshattriya*-hood (warrior caste). Yet, not even in the provincial Museum, Luknow, there is a single model of their weaving machines. Lacquer work *Sari* borders, Brass toys, utensils and carved wood work should all find a place in local museum collection. The manufacture of musical instruments is another important industry to which no attention has been paid, where it flourishes. It would be far better if models are made to order with the different instruments being played, so that, the method of use would be intelligible to foreigners. If there are primitive tribes, their arts and industries, should find an honoured place.

II

Let me now end the discussions by referring to the two proposals alluded to at the very beginning, which inspired me to write this paper. The first was the energetic Administrative officer of a superceded municipality. While officially directing him to approach the Director General of Archaeology in India, for loan of antiquities, I suggested that the

model of the Allahabad Museum should not be followed. I have always felt that inspite of the admirable zeal of the founder, the museum not only had not made its collection representative of the antiquarian remains in the Allahabad district, but the typographical features, riverine system, and the rural industries, including the Jhusi Sugar Mill have all been neglected. As an archaeologist my vanity is flattered by the rising historical consciousness of the people, but as a man of science, I cannot but deplore the neglect of other branches of studies, which are as essential for a proper appreciation of India's cultural contribution. The administrative officer should give a proper lead to the province by paying attention not only to the past but also show a greater partiality for the contemporary. A relief model showing the whole district, its drainage system important cities and antiquarian remains, centres of trade, location of schools, colleges, dispensaries and communications should be displayed at the central hall. Just like that of the Taxila valley prepared by the late Mr. M. N. Dutta Gupta. The collection should be representative of the economic, social and agricultural life of the people as well as folk cultures. Needless to say no further enquiries have been received so far.

The second was the request made by the authorities of the Gurukul University, Hardwar. This time concrete suggestions were sought for. They needed duplicates from various museums, on the ground that Hardwar being a famous place of Hindu pilgrimage the establishment of a museum will be of greater value. In my reply I pointed out that if public education was the fundamental principal behind the proposal some well established data about the variegated landscape, sub-Himalayan flora and the various races inhabiting this area would be of greater value. Add to this, ancient remains of the place and relief model of the sacred Gangotri and Yamnatori glaciers with their moraines

and sources would be dynamic contribution to public knowledge. The knowledge of the average Hindu pilgrims about these natural phenomena is very little. Probably, most of them have never heard of them. When the organisers of the museum have really accomplished this and collected and interpreted local data, they should rightly claim the sympathetic attention of the Central Government ; for the advantage of the local public who will not be in a position to travel to different parts of India, some duplicates will of invaluable help.

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A NOTE ON THE JAINA PRAŚNA-VYĀKARAṆA
SŪTRA

By B. C. LAW

THE *Pañbhā-Vāgarāṇa Sūya* (*Praśna-vyākaraṇa sūtra*) is counted as the tenth *āṅga* of the Śvetāmbara Āgama. It is otherwise known as *Praśna-vyākaraṇadaśā* for the simple reason that it consists of 10 lectures or chapters (*ajjhayanas*), the five of which are devoted to the topic of *anbha* and the remaining five to that of *samvara*. Abhayadeva Sūri wrote an authoritative commentary on it. It has been edited along with the text. Winternitz points out that it is a purely dogmatic presentation, which does not correspond either to the title of the work or to the table of contents in the *Thānamga* 10 and in the *Nandī*. Schubring (*Worte Mahāvīras*, p. 13) says that a later work took the place of the old *āṅga* which is lost. The title of the *sūtra*, *Praśna-vyākaraṇa*, implies at the first sight that the text is the catechism or book of questions and answers. But the text, as we now have it, is not of this nature. The contents of a *Pañbhā-Vāgarāṇa* as given in the *Sthānāṅga* and *Nandīsūtra* presuppose a canonical work consisting of 108 *praśnas*, 108 *apraśnas*, 108 *praśnāpraśnas*, *vidyātīśayas* and discourses of saints with Nāgākumāras and other Bhavanapatis. The present text does not meet these requirements. On the other hand, it appears as a methodical

and elaborate exposition of the two topics mentioned above. As such it may be judged as a learned dissertation on the subjects and as an important literary production of the scholastic age. Abhayadeva is compelled to explain the title of the present *sūtra* in a manner to suit its contents. He says *Prasṇānām vidyāviśeṣānām yāni vyākaraṇāni teṣāṃ pratipādanāparādasā dasādhyāyana pratibaddhāḥ granthāḥ paddhataya iti Prasṇavyākaraṇadasāḥ*. The *Prasṇa-vyākaraṇadasā* is a treatise comprising ten lectures that establish the exposition of certain select topics. The methodical expositions are all ascribed to Sudharman the fifth gaṇadhara, who addressed them to his pupil Jambuswāmin. The two main topics dealt with in this treatise are *aṇḥaa* and its anti-thesis *saṃvara*. The term *aṇḥaa* is equated with Sanskrit *āśnavaḥ* (*āśravaḥ*) Thus *aṇḥaa* is taken to be the same as *āśrava* which goes to form an anti-thetical pair with *saṃvara*. The anti-thetical pair which occurs in the Pillar Edicts of Aśoka verbally corresponds with the *puṇya* and *pāpa* of Jainism. In these edicts *āsinava* stands in contrast to *kayāna*: *apāsīnave babukayāne*. It would seem that the word *āsinava* is employed there as a synonym of *pāpa* as opposed to *kalyāṇa* or *puṇya*. There is still a difference of opinion¹ as to whether the Aśokan word *āsinava* corresponds to the Ardhamaṅgadhi *aṇḥaa* or to the Pali and Sanskrit *ādīnava*. There is evidently no such Sanskrit word as *āsnava* used in the Brahmanical or Buddhist works. Here we have *ādīnava* in its place but the Aśokan term *āsinava* clearly presupposes a Sanskrit word like *āsnava* as suggested by the Jain scholiast. So far as the meaning of the two words *āsnava* and *ādīnava* is concerned, it is practically the same. Just as in Jain literature it has *āśrava* for its synonym, so in the *Amaraśoṣa* the two synonyms suggested for *ādīnava* are *āśrava* and *kleśa*². It is important

1. D. R. Bhandarkar, *Aśoka*, revised Ed., pp. 107-109.

2. Cf. P. T. S. Dictionary—*Kleśa* and *āśava*.

to note that *aṇhaa* is characterised in our text as *anāḍika* (*ādivirahitaḥ*) 'beginningless', 'that of which the sinful action is the root cause', as explained by Abhayadeva. This suggests no doubt that our text is concerned not so much with the sins as with 'the innate proneness to sin'.

The five sinful deeds that one commits due to the innate proneness to sin stand as opposed to five great vows (*mahāvratas*) that follow from the principle of *saṃvara* or self-restraint. The five sinful deeds are enumerated as *himsā* (harming life), *moṣa* (lying), *adatta* (thieving), *abambha* (incontinence), and *pariggaha* (hankering after wordly possession). Each of them is taken up as a subject for separate treatment. The harming of life is deprecated by the Jainas as a sinful deed which is fierce, terrible, mean, rash, undignified, shameless, inhuman, fearful,⁸ dreadful in re-action, greatly fearful, horrible, frightful, unlawful, causing anxiety, reckless, unrighteous, uncompassionate, pitiless, leading to a hellish life and destructive in effect. This sinful deed serves to generate delusion and great fear and it brings about mental distress in fear of death. This is the first door to impiety. It is defined as violence done to life, driving soul out of the body, arousing suspicion in the mind of other beings, harming those who can be harmed, and that which should not be done. It consists in hurting, killing, doing violence, oppressing, killing in three ways of thought, word, and deed, emulating ending the lease of life, and the like. Harming life is an iniquity of which the consequences are bitter. It is of various kinds and it has various modes. It causes pain and brings misery to others. It is an outcome of unrestraint. In this connection our text furnishes a long but interesting list of the fauna and flora, classified according to the number of senses possessed by them. Many are the root causes that lead beings to commit this sin. The main causes are however anger, pride, conceit, and greed, all of which are ultimately

rooted in delusion. It stands to destroy all good things in men. In the same connection our text discusses the position of the professional boar killers, fishcatchers, fowlers, hunters and the like. It also discusses the position of several cruel tribes and peoples such as the Śakas, Yavanas, Śabaras, Barbaras, Kāyas, Muruṇḍas, Udas, Bhadakas, Tittikas, Pakkanikas, Kulākṣas, Gauḍas, Simhalas, Pārasas, Kroñcas, Andbras, Drāviḍas, Bilvalas, Pulindras, Arosos, Dumbas, Pokkaṇas, Gandhabārakas, Vālbhikas, Jallas, Romas, Māsas, Bakusas, Malayas, Cuñcukas, Cūlikas, Koṇkanakas, Medas, Pahlavas, Mālavas, Mahuras, Ābhāsikas, Ānakkas, Cīnas, Lāhsikas, Khāsas, Hāsikas, Nebaras Mahārāṣṭras (Maustikas), Ārabas, Dovilakas, Kuhaṇas, Kekayas, Hūṇas, Romakas, Roravas, Maruḱas and Cīrāṭas (Kīrātas).³ The list of tribes and peoples notorious for their cruel habit and nature is sufficient to indicate that our text is a compilation of a post-Christian period.

The second door to impiety is lying which is defined and characterised as telling an untruth which makes a person light and fickle, which is fearful, which causes enmity and brings ill-fame and the like. It is an immoral act in which the law born persons indulge. It is cruel in its effect and it makes a liar untrustworthy. It is deprecated by the best of saints. It is linked up with the blackest of soul colourings and it only serves to increase a man's state of woe and degradation, and to bring about the cycle of rebirths. It carries with it the idea of indulgence in falsehood, cheating, deceiving, crookedness, false deposition and useless talks and the like. Anger, greed, fear and envy are the various mental factors that are behind lying. This door to impiety also includes the preaching and promulgation of false doctrines and misleading philosophical views of life. Some typical instances of false doctrines and misleading views

³ Vide for details of some of these tribes—B. C. Law, *Tribes in Ancient India* (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Series No. 4.).

are given. The first of them is typically the philosophical view attributed in the Pāli Nikāyas to Ajita Kesakambala represented as an avowed *nāstika*. The Buddhist doctrine of the five aggregates is also put in the category of *nāstikya*. The *nāstikavāda* is taken to mean the denial of manly energy, the existence of heaven and hell, and the possibility of reward and retribution and the like. The instances of *āstikavāda* cited are shown to be equally misleading. The Jain teacher repudiates the idea of God as the Creator and ordainer of all things and of all beings. He discards the theory of soul as a passive principle. Both the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta doctrine stand self-condemned in his opinion. That there is a sectarian note in the statement and criticism of the views of other schools of thought is undeniable. The details of the modes of lying practised and committed with reference to persons and things are important as throwing light on the social condition and moral standard of the age.

The third door to impiety is taking away what is not given (*adattādāṇam*). It is defined as an act of stealing, oppressing, bringing death and fear, an iniquity which is terrifying, a sinful deed which is rooted in covetousness and greed. It is undignified in its nature and it produces a bad name. It is equally deprecated by goodmen. By it one incurs the displeasure of persons, near and dear. It is full of passion and delusion. It goes by the name of theft, stealing other people's property, seeking gain from the belongings of others, greed for the wealth of others, cupidity, thieving, spoiling the hand with the ugliness of the act and the like. Robbery, dacoity and such other daring acts all come within the definition of taking away what is not given. Plundering, looting, carrying spoils and booties in the name of war are also included in this act of impiety. In this connection our text furnishes some details about warfare, weapons, and ornaments. It also supplies

some interesting information regarding different punishments meted out to the thieves and robbers. Their miserable life here and hereafter is described in detail.

The fourth door to impiety is known as incontinence (*abambham*). It is defined as a sexual dalliance coveted in the worlds of gods, men and demons, which is a net and noose of amour, which is a hindrance to the practice of austerities, self-restraint, and chaste life, which brings about death, bondage, and coercion, and which is a cause of infatuation and delusion. It bears the name of sexual congress, sex-indulgence, delight in vulgar life, sexual passions and overt act. Even the Vaimānika gods have sexual enjoyments with the goddesses and family maidens. They too are not free from this kind of infatuation. The demons, *nāgas*, *garuḍas* and *supannas* too are no exceptions to the rule. Among men the monarchs, king overlords, chaplains, high officers of the state all run after this. The same passion is equally perceptible among the lower creatures. In this connection our text gives us the details about the physical forms, dresses, beautification, wiles and guiles, various pleasing artifices, by which women entice men. Incidentally the modes of generation are discussed, according to which, living beings are to be classified as viviparous, oviparous and the like. This classification is the same as that met with in Pāli and other Indian texts.

The fifth door to impiety is known as *pariggaha* or hankering after worldly possessions such as varieties of gems, gold, jewels, perfumes, scents, unguents, conveyances, utensils, household furniture, landed properties, wealth and opulence. It is rooted in greed and it is an expression of craving and thirst for worldly things. So it goes by the name of craving (*taṇhā*), worldly attachment (*āsatti*) and it is characterised by the great longing for earning, acquisition, accumulation, hoarding, insatiety and the like. Even the gods are not free from this hankering after worldly posses-

sions. The emperors, *Vāsudevas*, *Baladevas*, *Māṇḍalikas*, Chieftains, *Tālavaras*, Commanders-in-chief, millionaires, bankers, *Rāṣṭrikas*, *Purohitas*, and the like are all guided by it. Worldly possessions comprise all secular sciences and arts, worldly enjoyments, agriculture, industry and commerce by which men are implicated in various conflicts and clashes of interests. In this connection our text speaks of 64 sciences and arts (*catusaṭṭhi*).

After having dealt with the five doors to impiety the Sūtra takes up for consideration the five doors to *saṃvara* or self restraint, one by one. They are spoken of as virtues that stand for the deliverance from all kinds of suffering. The first is called *ahiṃsā* (non-harming), the second, the truthful speech (*saccavayaṇam*), the third, taking only what is given (*dottamanuṇṇā*), the fourth, continence (*bambhaceram*) and the fifth, non-hankering after worldly possessions (*apariggabattam*), which constitute the five great vows that are conducive to the good and welfare of the world.

The first principle of non-harming is praised as the island, the refuge, the destination, the basis, and *nirvāṇa* to the worlds of men, gods and demons. It is just another name for pity (*dayā*), forbearance, purity, goodness, welfare, protection, morality, self-control, self-restraint, self-guarding and the virtue which is the abode of the perfected ones (*siddhas*).

The truthful speech is the second door to self-restraint. This is the accepted principle of all noblemen, teachers and saints. It implies one's moral purity and uprightness, and it is a virtue which inspires confidence. It requires a person to abstain from praising himself and condemning others. In this connection the Sūtra speaks of 12 kinds of language, namely, *Prakṛta*, *Sanskṛta*, *Māgadhbī*, *Paiśācī* and *Apabbhramśa*, each distinguished according to prose and verse. Some grammatical details are also given which are too well-known to need any comment here.


The third door to self-restraint is accepting what is given. It implies an abstinence from taking away what is not one's own, from stealing and committing theft. This too is a virtue well-praised and a noble principle of self-control and self-restraint.

The fourth door to self-restraint is continence or chaste-life. It is the root principle of the best of austerities, regulated life, knowledge, faith, conduct and perfect discipline. It implies moral rectitude which is cultivated as a path to deliverance. In its magnitude it is mighty like the Himalaya and it is extolled as something in the heart of the deep ocean. This is indeed the very fundamental principle of religious life.

The fifth door to self-restraint is non-hankering after worldly possessions. The non-hankering may be both internal and external. The external hankering is an obstacle to religious practices and the internal hankering leads a person to the incorrectness of method, recklessness, thoughtlessness, and moral contaminations. This is the principle of non-attachment which is conducive to the practice of *samitis* and *guptis*. This stands on the very top of the path which leads to deliverance and emancipation.

Of the five great moral vows (*pañcamahāvratas*) enforced by Mahāvīra the first four represented the four principles of self-restraint (*catuṣyāmasamvara*) as prescribed by Pārśvanātha for his followers. It is the fifth principle of non-hankering after worldly possessions that was added to the earlier list of four by way of an improvement. The five moral precepts as enjoined by the Buddha for the guidance of the conduct of the laity are somewhat different from the Jaina five great vows. The three principles of *ahiṃsā*, non-harming, non-stealing, and truthful speech, are common to both. The fourth Jain vow of chastity (*brahmacarya*) is deeper in its significance than the Buddhist principle of non-excess in sexual indulgence. The Jain vow corres-

ponds more with the Buddhist principle of *brahmacariya* which is prescribed for the recluses. The fifth Jain vow is implied in the Buddhist principle of non-participation in any worldly transaction by the recluses. Although the enumerations of the principles are somewhat different, they are all important to both the systems. We have a systematic exposition of the moral precepts in the Pali commentaries, particularly in Buddhaghosa's encyclopædic work known as the *Visuddhimagga* or the Path of Purity. It will be seen that the Buddhist method of exposition is more lucid, direct, and clearly psycho-ethical. There is an important point of difference between the Jain and Buddhist presentations of the vows and precepts. In the Jain presentation a greater emphasis is laid on the side of abstinence from impious acts, while in Buddha's presentation much stress is laid on the positive aspect of virtues. It is not enough that a person abstains from doing a wrong thing inasmuch as a progressive man is expected to cultivate and develop friendliness, honest life, truthfulness, etc. But the difference is one of degree and not of kind.



ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S DEFENCE OF *DHVANI*

By K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

As stated by Ānandavardhana in the very first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka*, there seems to have been a widespread opposition to the theory of Dhvani from various quarters. Rhetoricians, philosophers, and the general readers—all appear to have united in attacking the newly-proposed theory of Dhvani in poetics. The reasons that actuated such criticism were not, however, the same always. They differed from critic to critic. The rhetoricians held that the field of poetry had been exhaustively explained by the well-known categories of *Alaṅkāra* etc., and that there was no scope left for propounding any original theory like Dhvani afresh; the philosophers denied the validity of the theory of Dhvani on logical grounds, and laymen simply asserted that Dhvani was a thing beyond their comprehension.¹ In such a hostile atmosphere Ānandavardhana addressed himself to the task of defending the theory by offering full justification for its soundness. The greatest part of his task consisted in carrying conviction to the redoubtable rhetoricians about the truth of the new theory since they were strongly entrenched in their prejudice in favour of the older concepts. The whole of the *Dhvanyāloka*, containing as it does the definition, classification and illustration of Dhvani, as also the clear line of demarcation between Dhvani and other concepts, should be regarded as one long and thorough-going reply to the charge of

¹ काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्वं-
स्तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद्वाचां स्थितमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयं
तेन ब्रूमः सहृदयमनःप्रीतये तत्स्वरूपम् ॥ *Dhva.* I. :.

rhetoricians and others that Dhvani was a superfluous and meaningless concept. Without going into minor matters of detail, it is proposed in this article to indicate Ānandavardhana's arguments to show how the theory of Dhvani does not conflict with the premisses of the three major systems of thought viz., *Pada* (*Vyākaraṇa*), *Vākya* (*Mīmāṃsā*) and *Pramāṇa* (*Tarka*).

To take up the system of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā first: Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtras* holds that the relationship between word and its meaning is natural and eternal, not conventional.² Words may be those uttered by men (*Pauruṣeya*) or those revealed in the Vedas (*apauruṣeya*). The Vedas are regarded as eternal having no human authorship. And as such the Vedic injunctions are supposed to be eternally valid as instruments of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). But the validity of human utterances depends upon the trustworthiness (*āptatva*) of the persons concerned. Sentences uttered by men (*Pauruṣeya-vākyas*) may be sometimes valid and at other times invalid. The drawbacks in the speaker contribute towards the invalidity of his utterances. Now the question arises. How do the drawbacks in the speaker bring about falsity into his statements? For, as we saw above, the relation between a word and its meaning is natural and eternal and hence true also; and whatever the words he chooses to use, they must invariably carry valid meaning. The drawbacks of the speaker cannot therefore affect the eternal relationship between word and its primary meaning. The explanation of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the drawback vitiates the judgment or intention (*abhiprāya*) of the speaker.³ According to Ānandavardhana the above expla-

² The word *Utpatti* in the *Sūtra* 'अत्रोत्पत्तिस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः' is to be interpreted as *Nitya*; Cf. Śābara-svāmin's *Bhāṣya* on the above.

³ Cf. एवमयं पुरुषो वेदेति भवति प्रत्ययः न त्वेवमयमर्थ इति ॥ Śābara-bhāṣya quoted in the *Locana*, p. 440. (*Kaśhī Sanskrit Series Edn.*)

nation implicitly presumes that in addition to their primary meanings, words convey the intention of the speaker also. And since the relation between the intended sense and the word is not eternal (like that between the primary sense and the word), the difficulty seen above will be got over. For the intention is conveyed by an adventitious function of the word (here suggestion or *Vyañjanā*), leaving untouched the eternal relation between a word and its primary meaning. Similar phenomena are found in the world of physical nature also. The moon, for instance, is famous for its cool and delightful effect on the onlookers. The relationship between coolness and moon may be said to be constant. But to lovers afflicted by the burning pangs of separation, the same moon is said to cause a scorching sensation. This is due to an adventitious circumstance which in itself is powerless to take away the constant connection between the moon and coolness. It will be clear from the above how a recognition of an adventitious function of words like *Vyañjanā* is rendered necessary in the system of *Mīmāṃsā* if the distinction between *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya*—sentences is to be properly explained. Far from being opposed to the doctrines of that system, the principle of suggestion will be found to be extremely serviceable.⁴

So far as the system of grammar is concerned, the question whether the theory of *Dhvani* is compatible with that system or not does not arise at all; for the very expression *Dhvani* has been borrowed into the field of poetics from the grammarians who maintain that *Śabda* in its eternal form of *sphoṭa* is identical with *Brahman* or the Absolute

⁴ तस्माद्वाक्यतत्त्वविदां मतेन तावद् व्यञ्जकत्वलक्षणः शाब्दो व्यापारो न विरोधी प्रत्युतानुगुण एव लक्ष्यते। *Dhva.* p. 443.

For the whole discussion, see *Dhva.* pp. 438-443.

Reality⁵ and that *sphoṭa* is only suggested and never expressed.⁶

Turning to the rationalistic system of *Tārkikas* or Logicians,⁷ it will be seen that the theory of *Dhvani* cannot clash with their view either, since they hold that the relationship between a word and its meaning is conventional, or unnatural (*kṛtrima*). Being rationalists, the *Tārkikas* have to admit that whatever is true to experience is real. They can enter into controversy only over such questions as do not come under our direct experience. Whether the relationship between *Śabda* and *artha* is a natural one or a conventional one, is such a question that allows dispute. But there can be no dispute about universally perceived facts such as black colour and sweet taste. With reference to an object of which there is an uncontradicted experience of 'black', the logician cannot direct his objections and say 'This is yellow, not black.' He has to accept it as valid. In the same way suggestion as a phenomenon is experienced not only with reference to meaningful words, but also with reference to meaningless but melodious sounds of music and expressive gestures in dance. This universal and uncontradicted experience of suggestion cannot be denied by the logician at all.

But the logician might attempt to equate *Vyañjanā* with *anumiti* or Inference on the ground that *Śabda* (word) itself forms the *Liṅga* (probans) justifying the inference of

⁵ Cf. (i) अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।

विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, I, 1.

(ii) स्फोटाख्यो निरवयवो नित्यशब्दो ब्रह्मैवेति ।—*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, P. 140.

⁶ परिनिश्चितनिरपभ्रंशशब्दब्रह्मणां विपश्चितां मतमाश्रित्यैव प्रवृत्तोऽयं ध्वनि-
व्यवहार इति तैः सह किं विरोधाविरोधौ चिन्त्येते ।—*Dhva*. pp. 443-4; for a detailed
account of *Sphoṭa* and *Dhvani*, Vide—my article, "The Germs of the
Dhvani Theory", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*,
1947-48.

⁷ And also Buddhists who hold the view that the relationship between a word and its meaning is non-eternal.

the so-called Vyaṅgya which deserves to be looked upon as Liṅgin (probandum). In other words, suggestion of the speaker's intent from words would be nothing but an instance of inference, the words acting as probans and the speaker's intent being the probandum. The logician might further say that the speaker's intent is never suggested but only inferred and therefore Vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva is nothing other than Liṅga-liṅgi-bhāva.

Ānandavardhana meets this objection of the Tārkikas in a two-fold manner. First of all he points out that even granting for argument's sake that the above proposition is true, the position of the Dhvani-theorists that Vyañjakatva is a function of words over and above Vācakatva and guṇavṛtti is not disproved. The phenomenon will be recognised as a fact though the designation given to it by them might vary. Instead of the term Vyañjakatva they may use the term Liṅgatva. But beyond the difference in nomenclature, nothing further would be achieved.

Next Ānandavardhana subjects the view of the Tārkikas to a searching scrutiny and proves how Vyañjakatva and Liṅgatva are not, as a matter of fact, identical. The argument of the logician is that a speaker's intent is inferred and not suggested as Ānandavardhana maintains. But Ānandavardhana amplifies his statement very analytically. He points out that when he refers to a speaker's intent as being suggested, he does not preclude other varieties of suggestion on the one hand and does not mean that it should be looked upon as a justification for the theory of Dhvani, on the other. The criticism will thus be seen to be grounded on a misinterpretation of his earlier statement. By carefully analysing the facts about the real nature of word, meaning and inference this is what one would find:—śabda or word has a two-fold scope (Viśaya) (1) Anumeya or Inferable and (2) Pratipādyā or connotative. Of these, Anumeya is always of the nature of Vivakṣā or desire to speak. This

Vivakṣā may be towards uttering sounds for their own sake or towards uttering them with the aim of conveying some meaning. Vivakṣā of the former type does not play any part in verbal department. It only serves to distinguish an animal from a non-animal. But the latter type of Vivakṣā plays the part of a proximate cause (Karaṇa) in verbal department though it is rather remotely connected (vyavahita) with the comprehension of the words used. And both the above types of Vivakṣā are inferable from words. At the same time these exhaust the inferable scope of words. That is to say, one infer on the basis of words only the desire in the speaker to employ words or meaningful words but what that meaning itself is cannot be so inferred. It must be understood from the words themselves.

This brings us to the second scope of words viz., the connotative (Pratipādyā), which is also two-fold 1. Vācya, and 2. Vyaṅgya. The speaker may use words with a view to conveying his meaning directly by means of those words and then we have Vāc्यārtha. But he may also use words which do not directly convey his meaning with a view to other considerations, and then we have Vyaṅgyārtha. Both these aspects of the connotative scope of words are far from being understood as Liṅgin or probandum of any anumāna or inference based on Śabda. The relationship between śabda and its connotative scope is something quite different. It may be natural or otherwise. It is only the desire to utter meaningful words in the speaker that can be taken as the probandum inferred from the probans of śabda, not the meaning itself. In case the signifi-catory functions too really come under inference, there should be no scope for doubt at all whether a meaning is right or wrong. For instance, when fire is inferred from smoke, fire is a certainty. But with reference to meanings of words there is no such certainty.

Further, simply because there is no such direct relationship between śabda and Vyaṅgyārtha as between śabda and Vācyārtha, one cannot deny that the two are related. Directness or remoteness does not happen to be the differentiating condition of a relationship. That Vyajñakatva is related to Vācakatva has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that while vivakṣā of the speaker is inferred, the meanings are signified or connoted.

Let us take instances of meanings which are suggestively signified by a word—They may be of the nature of intent (abhiprāya) or not. Can we say that such meanings are conveyed by Vācakatva alone of the words? If not, some other function of words must be admitted and that is exactly what we call Vyañjakatva. And Vyañjakatva is not co-extensive with Liṅgatva since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent. Just as the primarily signified meaning of a word is not identical with the probandum of an inference based upon the word as probans, so also the suggestively signified meaning of a word not the same as such an inference. Contrariwise, such an inferred probandum (e. g. vivakṣā) is never signified, but only understood as an attribute. And as already stated above, the fact of doubts arising with regard to the meanings of words is explicable only by considering them to be not amenable to inference.

It is no doubt true that sometimes one does resort to inference and other pramāṇas while deciding the truth or falsity of even an expressed meaning. But this does not in the least destroy the importance of Abhidhā as a function of Śabda. The same is true of Vyañjanā also. As a matter of fact, this question of logical truth and falsity does not arise in literature at all whose soul is suggestion. There is also no question of seeking the aid of other pramāṇas in setting the truth or falsity of passages in literature. Such a procedure would look

ridiculous because poetic truth is not on a par with material or scientific truth.

Moreover, the suggested aspect which admits of being inferred from words (viz., Vivakṣā) is not all an intrinsic determining the nomenclature of Dhvani. It is quite an unessential feature and it was put forward as an argument only to elicit the support of even the Mīmāṃsakas. Vyañjakatva, as a matter of fact, sometimes coexists with Liṅgatva at other times is enlivened by Pratyakṣa Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā etc., and is found in meaningful as well as meaningless sounds. As such it is something existing over and above them all and deserves to be accepted universally.⁸


In this connection Ānandavardhana refutes also the charge of critics who hold that Dhvani is an inscrutable feature of poetry and dismisses as untenable a similar view held by Buddhists that all things are indefinable (anirdeśya). The critics draw an analogy between the uniqueness of preciousness (Jatyatva) in particular diamonds, which can only be felt by those who deal in them but cannot be described, and the uniqueness of charm in particular types of poetry which can also be felt by some gifted connoisseurs, but at the same time is indefinable. Ānandavardhana points out that the analogy is not valid since the uniqueness of poetic charm can be detected and described unlike the uniqueness of diamonds. The uniqueness of words as such in poetry consists in avoiding inconsistency and repetition. The uniqueness of words as conveyers of sense consists in clarity and suggestiveness. The uniqueness of the senses consists in their lucidity, in their capacity to become instruments of suggestion and in their ability to derive the assistance of suggestion. All these unique characteristics in poetry have been fully explained in the *Dhvanyāloka* and

⁸ For the whole discussions see *Dhva.* pp. 444-456.

there would thus be no point in the criticism that Dhvani is an indefinable and unique feature of poetry. If the critics still persist in their view in spite of the *Dhvanyāloka*, it would only show that they refuse to exercise their sense of judgment. Logically, this anākhyeyatva or indefinability is a impossible concept, if it is to mean—‘being beyond the pale of all expression’; for ultimately it has to be referred to at least by the expression ‘anākhyeya’ itself. The critic might say that by ‘anākhyeyatva’ he means an indeterminate experience of something which eludes determinate usage of words. This view also is admissible only in the case of the unique charm of diamonds and not with the charm of poetry, since the latter has been explained by several writers on poetics quite determinately unlike the former whose values are fixed only by imaginary standards. The similarity between diamonds and poetry is thus not intrinsic but only extrinsic. There is, of course, similarity in the fact that only a few skilful persons can discover their unique preciousness. Just as Vaikaṭikas (jewellers) alone can judge the value of diamonds, it is only the true connoisseurs (Sahṛdayas) that can pass remarks on poetry.

As regards the theory of the Buddhists according to which everything in the world is indefinable and which *ipso facto* goes against the definability of Dhvani, Ānandavardhana feels that a thorough-going refutation is out of place in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The curious readers who want to pursue the point further are, however, referred to his other work *Dharmottamā*,⁹ a commentary on Dharmakīrti's work on Buddhist logic entitled “Pramāṇa-Viniścaya-Ṭīkā.” Ānandavardhana contents himself with the remark that just as the Buddhists themselves are seen to indulge in the definitions of perception, etc., in spite of their theory of universal indefinability, the definition of poetry attempted in the *Dhvanyāloka* might be justified.

⁹ It is a matter of regret that this work of Ānandavardhana on Buddhist Logic has not come down to us.



SOME MORE POINTS OF MR. ATHAVALE'S ARTICLES ON MAHĀBHĀRATA EVENTS

By SWĀMĪ BHŪMĀNANDA

In my last article "*Sarpa-Satra and Takṣaṣilā*," which appeared in the *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad, (Vol. IV, parts 3-4) for May-August 1947, I tried to show with internal evidences alone

- (a) that the Sarpa-Satra of King Janamejaya was not a campaign against Takṣaka,
- (b) that Takṣaṣilā was not founded by Takṣaka Nāga,
- (c) that the Sarpa-Satra was celebrated at Takṣaṣilā,
- (d) that the Mahābhārata was narrated by Vaiṣampāyana at the Sarpa-Satra and not at King Janamejaya's Aśwamedha Yajña in Hastināpur,
- (e) that Vaiṣampāyana was a disciple of Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa,
- (f) and that Lomahaṛṣaṇa and Ugraśravā were two different persons—father and son, and not one and the same man.

All these findings are, no doubt, against the statements made by Mr. Athavale and I have therefore, requested him to give us further elucidation on the questions raised.

2. Now I wish to bring to the notice of the interested scholars, some other points from Mr. Athavale's article "*The roles of Vyāsa, Sañjaya, Vaiṣampāyana and Sauti in the Kuru war narration*," which appeared in this *Journal* (Vol. 3, Part 2) for February 1945. The statements of Mr. Athavale are in Italics for easy reference.

3. *During the war...Dhṛtarāṣṭra was probably 90 and Vyāsa was probably 95. Page 136.*

I don't understand how this can be. *Mahābhārata* clearly states that at the request of Bhīṣma and Satyawati,

mother of Vyāsa, Mahārṣi Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana begot Dhṛtarāṣṭra in the Kṣetra (widow) of Vicitravīrya—

मातुनियोगाद् धर्मत्मा गांगेयस्य च बीमतः
क्षेत्रे विचित्रवीर्यस्य कृष्णद्वैपायनः पुरा
त्रीनग्नीनिव कौरव्यान् जनयामास वीर्यवान् ॥
उत्पाद्य धृतराष्ट्रञ्च पाण्डुं विदुरमेव च
जगाम तपसे धीमान् पुनरेवाश्रमं प्रति ॥

Adi. i. 94-95.

This statement has been repeated more than once in the *Mahābhārata*. I don't understand how, in the face of this statement, Mr. Athavale could say that the difference between the ages of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Vyāsa was only 5 years; in other words, according to his calculations, Vyāsa begot Dhṛtarāṣṭra when he was only a boy of five years of age! On the other hand, if the above quoted statement of the *Mahābhārata* is discredited, the whole geneology of the Kurus is upset and the entire structure of the epic falls to the ground. I don't know how Mr. Athavale will reconcile this inconsistency.

4. *Sūta* (Ugraśravā Sauti) is not telling that he was present at the time of the dialogue (between Vaiśampāyana and king Janamejaya). Page 123.

I find, however, that Ugraśravā Sauti, the narrator of the *Mahābhārata* at Naimiṣāranya, says definitely that he had been present when the *Mahābhārata* was recited by Vaiśampāyana to king Janamejaya and that after hearing it, he went out on pilgrimage, travelled over many places and finally came to Kurukṣetra and from there he was coming to Naimiṣāranya. The verses quoted by Mr. Athavale in support of his statement, are not as they appear in the epic but have been mutilated and adjusted to serve his purpose and they have, therefore, lost their original meaning. The complete verses are quoted below for information of the readers. They are too clear to require any special note or explanation and they show definitely that Sauti had heard

the story at the Satra when it was narrated by Vaiṣampāyana—

जनमेजयस्य राजर्षेः सर्पसत्रे महात्मनः ।
 समीपे पार्थिवेन्द्रस्य सम्यक् पारिक्षितस्य च ॥
 कृष्णद्वैपायनप्रोक्ताः सुपुण्या विविधाः कथाः ।
 कथिताश्चापि विधिवद् या वैशम्पायनेन वै ॥
 श्रुत्वाहं ता विचित्रार्था महाभारतसंश्रिताः ।
 बहूनि संपरिक्रम्य तीर्थान्यायतनानि च ॥
 समन्तपञ्चकं नाम पुण्यं द्विजनिषेवितम् ।
 गतवानस्मि तं देशं युद्धं यत्राभवत् पुरा ॥
 कुरूणां पाण्डवानाञ्च सर्वेषाञ्च महीक्षिताम् ।
 दिदक्षुरागतस्तस्मात् समीपं भवतामिह ॥

Ādi. I. 94-95.

I don't understand, how in the face of the above statement, Mr. Athavale could say that Ugraśravā "is telling the stories which he has heard during his travels" and that he was not present when the *Mahābhārata* was narrated by Vaiṣampāyana at the Sarpa-Satra of king Janamejaya.

5. *Parikṣit ruled in the same way as the king Yudhiṣṭhira for about 15 years. Page 127. His age was thus 40 when he got the throne. Page 126.*

Taking 3018 B. C. to be the time of the Kuru-war as finally calculated by Mr. Athavale, the birth of Parikṣit must have been in 3017 B. C. just before the release of the horse for the Aśwamedha Yajña of Yudhiṣṭhira. Now, in the 36th year of Yudhiṣṭhira's reign, he crowned Parikṣit and left Hastināpur for Mahāprasthāna—

(a) षट्त्रिंशे त्वय संप्राप्ते वर्षे कौरवनन्दनः
 ददर्श विपरीतानि निमित्तानि युधिष्ठिरः ॥

Mausala, I. 1.

(b) अभिषिच्य स्वराज्ये च राजानञ्च परिक्षितम् ।

Mahāprasthāna, 17.

(c)निर्ययौ गजसाह्वयात् ॥

Mahāprasthāna, 12.6

So the crowning of Parikṣit took place in (3018-36)

2982 B. C. His age at the time therefore was (3017-2982) 35 years and not 40 as calculated by Mr. Athavale.

Again, Parikṣit died at the age of sixty i.e. in (3017-60) 2957 B. C.—

परिश्रान्तो वयस्यश्च षष्ठिवर्षो जरान्वितः ।
क्षुधितः स महारण्ये ददर्श मुनिसत्तमम् ॥

Ādi. 49.26

therefore he reigned for (2982-2957) 25 years and not 15 years as stated by Mr. Athavale.

6. The place-name Takṣaśilā appears only twice in the whole of the Mahābhārata. Page 132.

But I find that the name of Takṣaśilā has been mentioned thrice and not twice in the Mahābhārata. Evidently Mr. Athavale has missed the third reference to Takṣaśilā. When Utanka went to Hastināpur to exhort king Janamejaya to take vengeance on Takṣaka who was the cause of the death of his father Parikṣit, he saw that the king had just returned victorious after conquering Takṣaśilā—

स हस्तिनापुरं प्राप्य न चिराद्विप्रसत्तमः ।
समागच्छत राजानमुतङ्क्षो जनमेजयम् ॥
पुरा तक्षशिलासंस्थं निवृत्तमपराजितम् ।
सम्यग् विजयिनं दृष्ट्वा समन्तात्मन्त्रिभिर्वृतम् ॥

Ādi., 3.171-172

7. It means that he (Śuka) too must have passed away. This tallies quite well with the following statement of Sauti (Page 135)

जातेषु तेषु वृद्धेषु गतेषु परमां गतिम् ।
जनमेजयेन पृष्टः सन् वैशंपायन अंतिके ॥
स सदस्यैः सहासीनः श्रावयामास भारतम् ।
कर्मातिरेषु यज्ञस्य चोद्यमानः पुनः पुनः ॥

It is not understood how Mr. Athavale has connected the above stray passages with Śuka. The quotations are not connected ślokas but only parts of different ślokas of the first chapter of the Ādi-Parva—

(a) जातेषु तेषु वृद्धेषु गतेषु परमां गतिम् This carāṇa with slight alteration belongs to Śloka 96 and

refers to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Pāṇḍu and Vidura and it has nothing to do with Śuka.

(b) जनमेजयेन पृष्टः सन् This is the first half of the first carāṇa of śloka 97.

(c) वैशंपायन अन्तिके This is the second half of the second carāṇa of śloka 97.

The correct reading is वैशंपायनमन्तिके.

(d) स सदस्यैः सहासीनः श्रावयामास भारतम् This is the last carāṇa of śloka 97.

(e) कर्मातिरेषु यज्ञस्य चोद्यमानः पुनः पुनः This is the first carāṇa of śloka 98.

I don't understand why these mutilated portions have been stitched together into a different shape and a distorted meaning attributed to it. It is curious that the undernoted portions have been omitted altogether—

(a) अब्रवीद् भारतं लोके मानुषेऽस्मिन्महानृषिः ।

(b) शशास शिष्यमासीनं

and वैशम्पायनमन्तिके" has been changed into वैशम्पायन अन्तिके. The passages as they stand in the *Mahābhārata*, along with their previous connections are given below—

मातुर्नियोगाद् धर्मात्मा गाङ्गेयस्य च धीमतः¹

क्षेत्रे त्रिचित्रवीर्यस्य कृष्णद्वैपायनः पुरा

त्रीनग्नीनिव कौरव्यान् जनयामास वीर्यवान् ॥94॥

उत्पाद्य धृतराष्ट्रञ्च पाण्डुं विदुरमेव च

जगाम तपसे धीमान् पुनरेवाश्रमं प्रति ॥95॥

तेषु जातेषु वृद्धेषु गतेषु परमां गतिम्

अब्रवीद् भारतं लोके मानुषेऽस्मिन्महानृषिः ॥96॥

जनमेजयेन पृष्टः सन् ब्राह्मणैश्च सहस्रशः

शशास शिष्यमासीनं वैशम्पायनमन्तिके

स सदस्यैः सहासीनः श्रावयामास भारतम् ॥97॥

¹ The reading of the critical Edition of the *Mahābhārata* published by the Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, is—

पराशरात्मजो विद्वान् ब्रह्मर्षिः संशितव्रतः

मातुर्नियोगाद् धर्मात्मा गाङ्गेयस्य च धीमतः ।

Adi . 1. 53.

These verses are quite simple and easy to understand and therefore require no explanation, commentation or supposition for further elucidation. They very clearly mean that at the request of Bhīṣma and Satyawatī mother of Mahārṣi Vyāsa, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana begot three sons viz. Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Pāṇḍu and Vidura, in the Kṣetra (widows) of Vicitravīrya and went back to his Āśrama. These sons lived up to a ripe old age and it was after their death that Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana first narrated the history of the Kurus. Subsequently, at the request of king Janamejaya at his Sarpa-Satra to narrate the story, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana asked his disciple Vaiṣampāyana, who was with him, to relate it and Vaiṣampāyana accordingly took his seat amongst Sadaśyas and recited the *Mahābhārata*. There is nothing in these verses which can be construed to mean the previous demise of Mahārṣi Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana and his son Śuka (Śuka-Kṛṣṇa-Vyāsa as named by Mr. Athavale). I therefore fail to understand how, in the face of these statements, Mr. Athavale could, with the help of his self-adjusted fragments of verses, attempt to prove that both Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa and his son Śuka were not alive at the time when the *Mahābhārata* was narrated before king Janamejaya. I further find that Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana on hearing that a Sarpa-Satra had been arranged by king Janamejaya at Takṣaśilā, went to the Satra with his son Śuka and other disciples including Vaiṣampāyana, and the king appointed him as a Sadaśya for the Satra—

सदस्यश्चाभवत् व्यासः पुत्रशिष्यसहायवान् ॥

Ādi 53.7

After this, Vaiṣampāyana began to narrate the *Mahābhārata*. So I don't understand how Mr. Athavale has concluded that Śuka was not alive at the time of *Mahābhārata* narration at Takṣaśilā, nor even his father Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana who, according to Mr. Athavale, expired long before the death of his son and therefore his presence at the Satra was out of the question—"Dwaipāyana Vyāsa is

certainly out of the question." Even the last carāṇa of his quotation—

“कर्मन्तिरेषु यज्ञस्य चोद्यमानः पुनः पुनः”

is a strong evidence against his own assertions. This carāṇa has been detached and disconnected and has been linked with Vaiṣampāyana. The connected śloka read together mean that being specially requested, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana himself also related certain portions of the *Mahābhārata* which principally dealt with the family-history of the Kurus. The Śloka as they appear in the epic are given below—

कर्मन्तिरेषु यज्ञस्य चोद्यमानः पुनः पुनः
विस्तरं कुरुवंशस्य गान्धार्या धर्मशीलताम्
क्षतुः प्रज्ञां धृतिः कुन्त्याः सम्यग्द्वैपायनोन्नवीत् ॥१९॥
वासुदेवस्य माहात्म्यं पाण्डवानाञ्च सत्यताम्
दुर्वृत्तं धार्तराष्ट्राणामुक्तवान् भगवान् ऋषिः ॥१९॥

Does Mr. Athavale take द्वैपायनः and भगवान् ऋषिः to mean Vaiṣampāyana? There must be something radically wrong in the volume of the *Mahābhārata* consulted by Mr. Athavale and also in the punctuation of the verses, some of which are composed of three carāṇas instead of two as usual. The Printer's Devil has, by omissions and commissions, wrought miracles in many places of the *Mahābhārata* and I am afraid Mr. Athavale's copy is not untouched by him. In many places of the *Mahābhārata*, as also of some other old publications, I have seen that one carāṇa of a Śloka has been omitted and it has been made good by adding one carāṇa of the next Śloka and the newly created verse has been punctuated accordingly; the result is that all the subsequent verses have thus been automatically dovetailed.

8. *As the king asked him (Vaiṣampāyana) to tell the history it seems that he must have been a disciple of Śuka Kṛṣṇa Vyāsa.*

It is evident from the passages quoted by me in para 7 that the king never asked Vaiṣampāyana to narrate the history but he requested Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa to do so and

the latter asked his disciple Vaiṣampāyana who was with him, to narrate it. I have already written too much about Vaiṣampāyan's being a disciple of Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana, to require any further evidence.

9. *The third chapter opens with a description of a Satra of the king Janamejaya, which had continued in Kurukṣetra for 12 long years* (Page 130).

There is very little description of the Satra in this chapter and there is no mention of the Satra having continued for 12 years ; it is only said that it was a long Satra—

जनमेजयः पारित्तितः सह भ्रातृभिः कुक्षेत्रे दीर्घसत्रमुपास्ते ॥

Ādi. 3.1.

10. On page 129, Mr. Athavale mentions the names of three families of the Nāgas and Sarpas, viz. Ananta, Vāsuki and Airāvata; but in chapter 57 of the Ādi Parva I find the names of the following four families—

1. Vāsuki. 2. Takṣaka. 3. Airāvata. 4. Dhṛtarāṣṭra.

11. On page 124, Mr. Athavale refers to Ślokas 96-99 of the Ādi Parva and translates them as follows—

“When all had passed away after continuing to live up to a ripe old age, the king Janamejaya and his courtiers requested Vaiṣampāyana to tell the past history.”

The translation, I am afraid is not according to the context and has therefore lost the original meaning. I have already quoted in para 7 the complete Ślokas referred to by Mr. Athavale, from which it will appear that after the death of Pāṇḍu, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Vidura, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa first narrated the *Mahābhārata* story and subsequently at the Sarpa-Satra of king Janamejaya, it was recited by Vaiṣampāyana on being asked to do so by his preceptor Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa. Evidently Mr. Athavale has taken “तेषु जातेषु वृद्धेषु” to include Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa and his son Śuka. The king and his courtiers asked Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana and not Vaiṣampāyana to narrate the history.

12. Mr. Athavale has more than once, referred to the Aśvamedha Yajña of king Janamejaya—

(a) *A big victory sacrifice must have taken place at Hastināpur. It was in this sacrifice that king Janamejaya asked Vaiśampāyana the chief priest to recount the Victorious deeds of his ancestors.* (Page 134.)

(b) *The time and the occasion on which Vyāsa told the account was the last two months of Aśvamedha.* (Page 124)

(c) *Thus the king Janamejaya performed his horse sacrifice 90-92 years after the Kuru-war.* (Page 135.)

There are also many other references to the horse-sacrifice but I don't consider it necessary to give them all here. I have got to say only that I have not been able to find out any description whatever of Janamejaya's Aśvamedha Yajña in the *Mahābhārata*. The only mention of the sacrifice I find is in chapter 48 of the Ādi Parva, where king Janamejaya, after finishing his Sarpa-Satra at Takṣaśilā, requested Āstika Muni to come again and become a Sadasya when he could perform an Aśvamedha Yajña. I hope Mr. Athavale will for easy reference and convenience of his readers, kindly quote the numbers of the chapters and verses in which the details of the Aśvamedha Yajña are given.

13. *Vaiśampāyana in his turn, is recounting some old history, which was composed by Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana Vyāsa and had the name Jaya.*

“Jaya” is not a special name of the *Mahābhārata*, but it is a general term applied to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, *Purāṇas*, etc.—

अष्टादश पुराणानि रामस्य चरितं तथा
विष्णुधर्मादयो धर्माः शिवधर्माश्च भारत ॥
काण्वं वेदं पञ्चमं तु यन्महाभारतं स्मृतम्
श्रौता धर्माश्च राजेन्द्र नारदोक्ता महीपते
जयेति नाम एतेषां प्रवदन्ति मनीषिणः ॥

Bhaviṣya Purāṇa, 1.4.86-88

14. On pages 133 and 134, Mr. Athavale has given

a list of some *Mahābhārata* events with their dates according to the Christian era, taking 3016 B. C. to be the date of the Kuru-war. Now that he has changed the date from 3016 B.C. to 3018 B. C., I hope he will publish a revised statement in this Journal for the information and convenience of his readers and future research scholars.²

15. There are still some more controversial minor points but it is no good beating more about the bush for nothing and I therefore, refrain from proceeding any further.

² Mr. Athavalé has since sent me a copy of his reply to my queries in my previous article, in which he has acknowledged his mistake in stating that Takṣasilā was founded by Takṣaka—"Before I begin to write my reply I must thank Swāmī Bhūmānanda for pointing out my error about the originator of the Takṣilā town".

GAUḌAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ

By JNANENDRA LAL MAJUMDAR

(ALĀTAŚĀNTI)

(With English translation, notes and Exposition)

'ALĀTAŚĀNTI' is the name of the fourth (last) chapter of Gauḍapāda's Kārikās on *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Herein the ācārya has propounded a philosophy concerning the world and the Super-world in a manner obviously different from that of the Śruti. The Śruti speaks of the world as born of ātmā, but Gauḍapāda speaks of it as unborn (ajāta). Was Gauḍapāda himself the originator of his philosophy or he got it from anywhere else? The philosophical terminology of the Alātaśānti chapter is un-Śrauta and in fact different from that of the previous three chapters. How to explain this terminology was certainly a hard problem with later scholars. Even Śaṅkara fumbled and faltered on it. In his effort to explain the 'Alātaśānti Kārikās' according to the Śruti he misinterpreted the text and assigned queer meanings to terms like buddha, paratantra, dharmadhātu, agrayāna and catuṣkoṭi. Indeed what was really the highest form of Bauddha Mahāyāna philosophy was interpreted as anti-Buddhist. Without attributing any sinister communal motive to the great-Śaṅkara it may be said that the cause of this calamity was the disappearance of the Mahāyāna literature from India. Its slow reappearance since the establishment of the *Buddhist Text Society* in India and the *Pali Text Society* in England gradually opened the eyes of scholars to the necessity of re-interpreting the 'alātaśānti' chapter. But this could not be properly done till the publication of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* in Japan and its translation

by Professor Suzuki of the Otani Buddhist College. This Sūtra, which is a voluminous one, contains an elaborate and excellent exposition of the highest form of Mahāyāna philosophy of which the famous treatise entitled "*The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna*" (*Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpādasāstra*) is a short summary. That Gauḍapāda got his philosophy from this Sūtra will be evident to any dispassionate student of it. I have simply tried, very imperfectly though, to put together the Kārikās and relevant passages from the Sūtra. The exposition, which I have added, running from the first to the last Kārikā will show how systematically and logically Gauḍapāda proceeded to expound his philosophy.

Enunciation

All things are one with the Ultimate Reality which is realisable by transcendental knowledge, and the phenomenal world is unborn.

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥१॥

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः ।

अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥२॥

Translation—(1) With (transcendental) Jñāna (knowledge), like unto the sky, he who fully understood the Dharma, which are comparable with space, to be not different from (i. e., one with) the jñeya (the Supreme Knowable), Him the greatest of men I adore. (Sambuddha or the Fully-enlightened is a permanent epithet applied to the name of the Buddha.)

Exposition :—

This verse, with which may be taken the following four verses, enunciates at the start the Mahāyāna theme of Right knowledge, One only Reality and Non-birth. Verses 6 to 90 contain the proof and verses 91 to 100 the conclusion of the proposition thus enunciated.

Translation—(2) Asparśa-yoga (Touchless Unity) is its name. It (i. e., its realisation) is blissful to all beings, beneficial and free from dispute and contradiction. To him I bow who has taught it.

Exposition:—

(1) True knowledge consists in knowing all Dharmas to be one, an infinite principle of eternal sameness.

(अजं साम्यं विशारदम्—Conclusion).

(2) There being no tittle of duality in it, this unity is touchless, blissful and free from conflicts.

भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि ।

अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥३॥

भूतं न जायते किञ्चिद्भूतं नैव जायते ।

विवदन्तोऽद्वयां ह्येवमजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ते¹ ॥४॥

ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैरनुमोदामहे वयम् ।

विवदामो न तैः सार्धमविवादं निबोधत ॥५॥

Translation—(3) Some philosophers desire the birth of the born, while other wise men (that) of the unborn. Thus do they dispute with each other.

Translation—(4) (The truth is that) nothing born is born, certainly neither is the unborn born. Thus these disputants (philosophers) simply prove non-birth which is nondual.

Translation—(5) We approve of non-birth which they (thus) prove. We shall not dispute with them, (for) know that it (i. e., the principle of non-birth) is beyond dispute,

Exposition:—

(3 to 5) The idea of birth is, therefore, wrong. Non-birth is the truth.

¹ The reading अद्वयाः is far-fetched. The reading अद्वयास् अजातिम् which we have adopted here is better, for it contains the principle of non-dual non-brith which is established in these verses.—Translator.

*Proof**I. Birth of the Un-born untenable*

अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।

अजातो ह्यमृतो धर्मो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥६॥

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा ।

प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ॥७॥

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य धर्मो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् ।

कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥८॥

सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी सहजा अकृता च या ।

प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या ॥९॥

Translation—(6) The philosophers desire the birth of even an unborn Dharma. An unborn Dharma is certainly immortal. How will (it) get mortality ?

Buddhist Text.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra IV—“Mahāmati, the philosophers maintain that there is a first cause from which continuation takes place....Their first cause is known as Pradhāna, Purusha, Isvara, Kāla or Paramānu”.

Translation.—(7) The immortal does not become mortal, nor the mortal immortal. What is one's nature will by no means be changed.

Translation.—(8) He who maintains that the Dharma which is immortal by nature attains mortality, how, according to him, will the immortality which is acquired remain unshaken (i. e., permanent) ?

Translation.—(9) What is fully established, natural, inborn and unacquired, that should be known as nature which does not forsake its nature (itself, literally)

जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः ।

जरामरणमिच्छन्तश्च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया ॥१०॥

Translation.—(10) All the Dharmas are by nature devoid of decay and death. Those who desire (their) decay and death, fall through that mentation.

Buddhist Text

Awakening of Faith. pp. 70-71—"A man who is lost goes astray because he is bent on pursuing a certain direction; and his confusion has no valid foundation other than he is bent on a certain direction."

"It is even the same with all beings. They become unenlightened, foster their subjectivity and go astray, because they are bent on non-enlightenment."

Exposition:—

Proof

There are two ideas associated with birth, namely, emanation and causation, both of which are wrong.

(6 to 10) *Emanation*.—The idea of emanation is wrong because an eternal principle cannot, by virtue of its very nature, be born and thus assume the character of mortality. The feeling of being mortal comes from an attachment to the perverse notion of mortality.

Causation.—In causation four conditions may arise, namely, (a) cause eternal and effect born, (b) cause and effect both born, (c) cause and effect both eternal, and (d) cause born and effect eternal.

II. *Ideas of Causation untenable*

कारणं यस्य वै कार्यं कारणं तस्य जायते ।

जायमानं कथमजं भिन्नं नित्यं कथं च तत् ॥११॥

कारणाद्यद्यनन्यत्वमतः कार्यमजं यदि ।

जायमानाद्धि वै कार्यात्कारणं ते कथं ध्रुवम् ॥१२॥

Translation—(11) He who maintains that the cause is the effect, according to him the cause is born. How is that which takes birth unborn and being different (as the effect) how is it eternal?

Translation—(12) If (the effect is) not different from the cause and if, for this reason, the effect is unborn, then how, considering that the effect takes birth, is your cause eternal?

Buddhist Text

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. XVII—"If, again, Mahamati, the philosophers prove the eternity of their eternal-unthinkable in contradistinction to the becoming and therefore the non-eternality of things created, Mahamati, by the same reasoning I can prove that their eternity has no reason to be known as such just because things created are non-eternal owing to their becoming."

Exposition:—

(11) (a) An eternal cause cannot be born as an effect and also remain eternal.

(12) If it is said that the effect is not really born, because it is not different from the cause which is eternal, it can from the opposite side be said that because the effect is born the cause, which is not different from the effect, is not eternal.

अजाद्वै जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्य नास्ति वै ।

जाताच्च जायमानस्य न व्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥१३॥

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च ।

हेतोः फलस्य चानादिः कथं तैरुपवर्ण्यते ॥१४॥

Translation—(13) He who maintains that (the effect) is born from the unborn, has no example to cite (in his support). And if (it is said that) a thing takes birth from what is born, then there is infinite regress.

Translation—(14) Those who maintain that the effect precedes the cause and the cause precedes the effect, how do they assert (i. e., establish) the eternity of the cause and the effect?

Exposition:—

(13) It is not in human experience that anything is born of an eternal cause.

(b) And if it is born of a cause which itself is born, then there is no rest in the backward process, an infinite regress occurs.

(14) If, to avoid this infinite regress, you say that the effect is prior to the cause and the cause is prior to the effect, you cannot at the same time say they are eternal.

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिहेतुः फलस्य च ।

तथा जन्म भवेत्तेषां पुत्राज्जन्म पितुर्यथा ॥१५॥

सम्भवे हेतुफलयोरेषितव्यः क्रमस्तद्वया ।

युगपत् सम्भवे यस्मादसम्बद्धो विषाणवत् ॥१६॥

फलादुत्पद्यमानः सन् न ते हेतुः प्रसिद्धचति ।

अप्रसिद्धः कथं हेतुः फलमुत्पादयिष्यति ॥१७॥

Translation.—(15) Those who maintain that the effect precedes the cause and the cause precedes the effect, for them the birth (of the cause and the effect) becomes like the birth of the father from the son.

Translation.—(16) In the rising of cause and effect you must admit a gradation, for in simultaneous rising there is an absence of connection like that between the horns (of a bull).

Lankāvatāra Sūtra.XXXI.—"There is no gradual or simultaneous rising of existence. Why? Because, Mahamati, if there is a simultaneous rising of existence, there would be no distinction between cause and effect, and there would be nothing to characterise a cause as such. If a gradual rising is admitted, there is no substance that holds together individual signs, which makes gradual rising impossible. When a child is not yet born, Mahamati, the term father has no significance."

Translation.—(17) As your cause takes its rising from the effect, it has no prior existence. Then how will the non-existent cause give rise to the effect?

यदि हेतोः फलात् सिद्धिः फलसिद्धिश्च हेतुतः ।

कतरत् पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया ॥१८॥

Translation—(18) If the existence of the cause comes from the effect and the existence of the effect from the cause, whose existence is first determined in relation to which (the other's) existence (is determined).

III. *Non-birth taught by the Buddhas*

A. *Itaretarāśūnyatā*—Emptiness of mutual (non-existence)

अशक्तिरपरिज्ञानं क्रमकोपोज्यवा पुनः ।

एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्धेरजातिः परिदीपिता ॥१९॥

Translation—(19) Inability (to answer this question) proves thorough ignorance, or else (if you assert simultaneous rising) there is the loss of gradation (between cause and effect) again. Thus for certain the Buddhas have brilliantly established non-birth in all respects.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XXVII—“Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness of mutual (non-existence)? It is this: when a thing is missing here, one speaks of its being empty there. For instance, Mahamati, in the lecture-hall of the Mṛigārāma there are no elephants, no bulls, no sheep, but as to the Bhikshus I can say that the hall is not devoid of them; it is empty only in so far as they (the animals) are concerned. Further, Mahamati, it is not that the lecture-hall is devoid of its own characteristics, not that the Bhikshu is devoid of his Bhikshu-hood, not that in some other places, too, elephants, bulls and sheep are not to be found. Mahamati, here one sees all things in their aspect of individuality and generality but from the point of view of mutuality (*itaretara*) some things do not exist somewhere.”

Ibid, XIX—“Mahamati, according to the teaching of the Tathagatas of the past, present and future all things are unborn”.

Ibid, XXXI—“There is nothing to be born, nor is there anything that has been born; even causation is not;

it is because of worldly usage that things are talked of as existing."

• Exposition :—

(15 to 19) And if they are not eternal, then you are launched into the impossible position of the cause being the effect of the effect (15) and losing its character as the cause of the effect (17).

And, again, there arises the fallacy of indeterminate sequence, for you cannot say whether the cause precedes the effect or the effect precedes the cause. If, to avoid this, you say that they both arise simultaneously, then the causal connection between them is lost (16).

If the causal connection is sought to be maintained, the fault of indeterminate sequence arises (18).

For these reasons the Buddha taught non-birth (19).

The Itaretara-Śūnyatā—Emptiness of mutual Non-existence—is thus established, for when the effect is born there is not the cause and when the cause is born there is not the effect.

बीजांकुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि सः ।

न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य युज्यते ॥२०॥

पूर्वापरापरिज्ञानमजातेः परिदीपकम् ।

जायमानाद्धि वै धर्मात् कथं पूर्वं न गृह्यते ॥२१॥

Translation—(20) The case of a seed and a seedling as an example (of a cause and an effect in an eternal cycle) itself always requires proving. A *hetu* (premiss) which itself requires proving cannot certainly be fit for the proving of a proposition.

Translation—(21) Ignorance (i. e., non-recognition) of antecedent and consequent (at one and the same time) fully establishes non-birth. From the dharma (effect, consequent) which takes birth, why is not the antecedent (cause) cognised ?

Exposition :—

(20) (c) To say that both the cause and the effect are eternal like the seed and the seedling and so the above grounds of objection to causation do not arise, is to beg the question itself, for you have first to prove that the seed and the seedling are eternal, and this you cannot do.

(21) Moreover, if the cause and the effect are both eternal, both should be perceived at one and the same time, but that is not actually the case.

स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु जायते ।

सदसत् सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिद्वस्तु जायते ॥२२॥

Translation—(22) Nothing is born from itself or from another. Nothing is born as a being or a non-being or a being-and-non-being.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XII—“Mahamati, body, property and abode have their existence only when measured in discrimination (vikalpa). The hare's horns neither are nor are not; no discrimination is to be made about them. So it is, Mahamati, with all things, of which neither being nor non-being can be predicated.”

Exposition :—

(22) Hence nothing is born of its own self (emanation) or of another thing (causation).

(d) The fourth condition is palpably absurd and is not discussed.

B. *Bhāvasvabhāva—Śūnyatā*—Emptiness of self-nature

हेतुर्न जायतेऽजादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः ।

आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥२३॥ *

Translation—(23) Neither a cause nor an effect is born of an unbeginning self-nature. What has no beginning (in an antecedent cause) has certainly no beginning for itself (i.e., is unborn).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XXVII—“Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness of self-nature? Mahamati, it

is that all things in their self-nature are unborn, hence the emptiness of self-nature."

Ibid, XXVII—"To have no self-nature is, according to the deeper sense, to be unborn. That all things are devoid of self-nature means that there is a constant and uninterrupted becoming, a momentary change from one state of existence to another; seeing this, Mahamati, all things are destitute of self-nature."

Exposition :—

(23) Thus is established the Bhāvasvabhāva-sūnyatā—the Emptiness of Self-nature, that is, an ego or prior substance of which a thing may be supposed to be born.

Non-birth of all things is, therefore, the truth.

IV. *Objective existence is relative. (and) The falsity of Nimitta (form)*

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः ।

संक्लेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥२४॥

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।

निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वमिष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥२५॥

(इष्यतेऽभूतदर्शनात् इति वा पाठः)²

Translation—(24) A perception is associated with a *nimitta* (appearance), otherwise both are destroyed. For this reason and also because there is consciousness of defilement, relative (paratantra) existence is admitted.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXIII—"In the relativity (paratantra) aspect of svabhāva, realities appear in various ways, as having forms, signs and shapes The knowledge of the relativity (paratantra) aspect rises from the separation of subject and object."

² The reading इष्यतेऽभूतदर्शनात् is more probable in consideration of the next verse (26) which says अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थः ।

Ibid, LXIX.—तद् यदि भगवन् परिकल्पित एवासौ न भावस्वभावलक्षणावधारणम् न तु ते भगवन्नेवं ब्रुवतः संक्लेशव्यवदानाभावः प्रसज्यते परिकल्पितस्वभावभावितत्वात् सर्वधर्माणाम् ।

(Translation—“ If, Blessed One, it is but [the creation of] false imagination and there is nothing in the world which is to be conceived as indicative of self-nature, does it not, Blessed One, come to this, according to your statement, that there is neither defilement nor purification, because all things are of the nature of false imagination ?”

Translation—(25) Looking at reasoning one thinks that a perception is associated with a *nimitta* (form, appearance). (But) looking at things born (seemingly) or things unborn (really) according to a probable different reading) one thinks that a *nimitta* is not a *nimitta*.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LXXXV—“ When all things external or internal are examined with intelligence, Mahamati, knowing and known are found to be quiescent.”

Exposition :—II. Worldly existence in relative and therefore false.

(24 and 25) It may be objected : If nothing is born, then nothing is existent, but we do perceive the existence of the outer world of visible objects and of the inner world of feelings and emotions ; and we cannot give denial to this perception. True, but it must be considered that this existence is Paratantra or relative. i. e., dependent on the discrimination of subject and object—the subject depends for its existence on the existence of the object and vice versa. And you know that two objects which have no realities on the strength or basis of their own independent ego or self-substance but have to depend on one another for appearing as realities are really unreal. Hence, objects, though they appear as realities are not objects in reality.

The Buddha never used the term ‘unborn’ in the sense of unperceived. He said, “ Not that all things are not born, but that they are not born of themselves

To have no selfnature is, according to the deeper sense, to be unborn." (L. *Sūtra*—XXVII).

Thus the falsity of Nimitta (form) is established.

V. *To the Mind the world is unborn*

चित्तं न स्पृशत्यर्थं नाथाभासं तथैव च ।

अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नाथाभासस्ततः पृथक् ॥२६॥

निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशत्यध्वसु त्रिषु ।

अनिमित्तो विपर्यासः कथं तस्य भविष्यति ॥२७॥

Translation—(26) The Mind (or, more correctly, Consciousness or Light) does not touch an object and similarly not also the perception of an object. As an object is certainly unborn the perception of an object is not different from such.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, VII—"Body, property and abode are objectifications of the Ālayavijñāna, which is in itself above (the dualism of) subject and object; the state of imagelessness, which is in compliance with the awakening of Mind itself, is not affected by such changes as arising, abiding and destruction."

Translation—(27) In the three paths (of time as past, present and future) the Mind never touches a *nimitta* (appearance). How will there arise an error (false imagination) in it in the absence of a *nimitta*?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 216 "The Citta in its essence is thoroughly pure, the Manas is defiled, and the Manas is with the Vijñānas, habit-energy is always casting away (its seeds)."

Ibid, XLIII—"It is like Māyā, Mahamati, the error has no character in it making for attachment; if, Mahamati, the error had any character in it making for attachment, no liberation would be possible from the attachment to existence, the chain of origination would be understood in the sense of creation as held by the philosophers"

“The wise do not see error, nor is there any truth in its midst ; if truth is in its midst, error would be truth.”

“If there is the rising of *nimittas* apart from all error, this (there ?) will indeed be error, the defiled is like darkness. “(That is when the objective world which is the product of the defiled Manas, is itself darkness or non-existent, there can be no error-existence).”

Ibid, LV—“When well pondered with intelligence there is neither relativity nor false-imagination ; where perfect knowledge is there is nothing (dualistically) existent; for how with intelligence can discrimination take place ?”

Exposition :—

(26 and 27) It may be argued that when the mind which is the light in everybody sees objects, how can we say that objects are unrealities ? In reply to this objection, it has only to be pointed out that this mind which is the cogniser and the subject, is itself unreal, a false light, dependent for its own existence on the existence of the cognised object which it seems to light. The real Mind (Citta) which is the independent Light of consciousness has no cognisance of an object or the perception of an object ; otherwise it would not be the real Light. So the Buddha said, “When (we know that) there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than thought-constructions.” (*L. Sūtra*, LXXI). It cannot also be said that the Mind at least sees hallucinations in the shape of the objective world ; for when the objective world is non-existent to it, there can be no ground for seeing such hallucinations.

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते ।

तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जातिं खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥२८॥

अज्ञातं जायते यस्मादजातिः प्रकृतिस्ततः ।

प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ॥२९॥

Translation—(28) Hence the Mind is not born (as

perception), the Mind-sight, Sight of the Mind which is the Mind as it is seen, (an object of perception) is not born. Those who see its (Mind's or Mind-sight's) birth certainly see footprints in the sky (i. e. it is a mere unsubstantial vision).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XXXI—"When effect-producing objects (samskrita) are regarded as like unto a barren woman's child or a flower in the sky, one perceives that grasping (subject) and grasped (object) are an error and desists (from committing the same error)."

Translation—(29) Because it is the Unborn (Mind) that is born, therefore non-birth is the nature. What is nature will by no means be changed.

Exposition :—

(28) Hence Mind is not born either as perception or the object perceived. Our perception of their birth is like the perception of foot-prints in the sky.

(29) The conclusion, therefore, is that although things are perceived to be born in a relative aspect, they are, in their true nature, unborn. For, the Mind being by nature unborn cannot be born as other things. Hence non-birth is the nature of all things.

अनादेरन्तवत्त्वञ्च संसारस्य न सेत्स्यति ।

अनन्तता चादिमतो मोक्षस्य न भविष्यति ॥३०॥

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्त्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥३१॥

Translation—(30) It will never be proved that the samsāra (birth-and-death) which has no beginning can have an end. And the emancipation which has a beginning will never be endless.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXVIII—"Here, Mahamati, is nobody in bondage, nobody in emancipation, except those who by reason of their perverted wisdom recognise bondage and emancipation."

Translation—(31) What is non-existent in the beginning (past) and in the end (future) is so also in the present. Being like unto falsehoods (unrealities), they appear as non-falsehoods (realities).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LXVII—“Mahamati, there is really nothing evolving, nothing dis-appearing, as it is like seeing things that evolve in a vision and a dream. Mahamati, it is like perceiving the rise and disappearance of things in a dream; it is like the birth and death of a barren woman's child.”

Exposition:—

(30) Moreover, if the *samsāra*, that is, birth-and-death, has been really existing from an unbeginning time, there can be no end of it, for one end of infinity cannot be finite. For the same reason, liberation also, if it be supposed to come somehow, cannot be infinite. But infinite liberation is a realisation of the wise which we can not ignore.

(31) Therefore, worldly objects which have merely a momentary existence in the present, without a past and a future, are also really non-existent in the present. Their appearance as existence is a mere vision in which emptiness is seen as reality. So the Blessed one said, “That all things are devoid of self-nature means that there is a constant and uninterrupted becoming a momentary change from one state of existence to another” (*L. Sūtra*: XXVII).

VI. *The lesson of a dream*—the world is unborn

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते ।

तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥३२॥

मर्त्ये धर्मा मृषा स्वप्ने कायस्यान्तनिदर्शनात् ।

संवृतेऽस्मिन् प्रदेशे वै भूतानां दर्शनं कुतः ॥३३॥

न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालस्यानियमाद्गतौ ।

प्रतिबुद्धस्य वै सर्वस्तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ॥३४॥

Translation—(32) Their necessity is disproved in a dream. Hence, as they (in a dream) have a beginning and an end, they are rightly considered as false.

Translation—(33) All the Dharmas (objects) are false in a dream, for they are seen within the body. How can (truly) born things be seen in this enclosed region?

Translation—(34) It cannot be argued that the sight takes place after going (to them), for there is an absence of any law for the time required for the going, and no awakened person is found to be in that place (i. e. the place where they actually lie).

मित्राद्यैः सह संमन्त्र्य सम्बुद्धो न प्रपद्यते ।

गृहीतं चापि यत्किञ्चित् प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३५॥

स्वप्ने चावस्तुतः कामः पृथगन्यस्य दर्शनात् ।

यथा कायस्तथा सर्वं चित्रदृश्यमवस्तुकम् ॥३६॥

Translation—(35) After a conversation with friends and others (in a dream), the awakened person does not remember it. And the awakened person does not also see the things that he grasped (then).

Translation—(36) In a dream the body (i.e., the dream body) is a nothing for another (i.e., the body of the waking state) is seen separately. As is the body so is every sight for the Mind a nothing (in a dream).

Exposition :—

(32 to 36) Of what value, it may be asked, is this discourse on non-birth when objects themselves have characteristic marks of individuality and generality which distinguish them as existents? When their existence is thus proved, no amount of speculation will undo it. Their characteristic marks are utility or usefulness, extension in

space and time and persistence in perception. In reply to this ostensibly powerful objection, Gaudapāda says, I shall show you that objects, even if they are clearly perceived to be useful, occupying time and space and persistent in perception, are not really so. This happens in the case of a dream which is in everybody's experience. The usefulness of things vanishes as we sojourn from the dreaming state to the waking state or from the waking state to the dreaming state. For example, the food that you have taken in the waking state to appease your hunger becomes useless in your dream where you feel hungry inspite, and vice versa, even if you have a full meal in a dream you feel hungry on waking. As regards extension in space, a whole world of objects is perceived in a dream within the small compass of individual's body. The reality of extension in time also vanishes when in a minute's dream you make a year's journey or even live a century. Similarly, persistence in perception disappears when on waking you never again see the persons you met in a dream. Thus, usefulness and other marks which apparently distinguish objects are no tests of their reality.

ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत् तद्धेतुः स्वप्न इष्यते ।

तद्धेतुत्वात् तस्यैव सज्जागरितमिष्यते ॥३७॥

Translation—(37) Because a dream is perceived as like unto a waking state, it is supposed that it (the waking state) is its cause. But, again, on the supposition that it (the waking state) is its cause, the waking state is supposed to be real.

Exposition :—

(37) You may argue that the waking state is real and a dream, which is a mere copy in imagination of the waking state, is false. But you fail to see that here you argue in a circle because your argument, if clearly set forth, comes

to this that a dream is what it is because the waking state, which it resembles, is its cause and real, and that the waking state is real because it is the cause of the dream which is unreal.

उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादजं सर्वमुदाहृतम् ।

न च भूतादभूतस्य सम्भवोऽस्ति कथञ्चन ॥३८॥

असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः ।

असत् स्वप्नेऽपि दृष्ट्वा च प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥३९॥

Translation—(38) Everything (in a dream) has been shown to be unborn, because birth (of objects) is not known (or proved) there. And an unborn (dream object) can by no means have its rising from a born (object of waking state).

Translation—(39) After having seen unrealities in the waking state, a person full of them sees (the unrealities) in a dream. And after having seen unrealities in a dream also the awakened person does not see (them).

Exposition:—

(38) A dream is unreal not because the waking state is real, but because objects seen in it are unborn, In fact, an unreality cannot spring out of reality, and so a real world cannot be the cause of an unreal dreamland. If the dreamland is unreal the so-called real world must also be unreal.

(39) It may be said that if we see in a dream what we see in the waking state and see in the waking state what we see in dream, then there is an unbroken persistence in the perception of objects which proves their reality. But, as has been pointed out before, we do not see on waking things which we have seen in a dream and hence this objection does not stand.

नास्त्यसद्वेतुकमसत्सद्वेतुकं तथा ।

सच्च सद्वेतुकं नास्ति सद्वेतुकमसत् कुतः ॥४०॥

विपर्ययाद्यथा ज्ञानदचित्त्यान् भूतवत्स्पृशेत् ।

तथा स्वप्ने विपर्ययाद्धर्मास्तत्रैव पश्यति ॥४१॥

Translation—(40) There is no unreality of which an unreality is the cause; similarly there is no reality which has an unreality for its cause. There is even no reality which has a reality for a cause. How then can an unreality arise from a real cause?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXX—“But, Mahamati.....things in their self-nature are like Maya, like a dream; for they are in one way perceived (as existing) and in another way are not perceived (as such), and all things are thus seen in (two) ways in accordance with knowledge or ignorance.”

Translation—(41) Just as, through error, the inscrutables (unattainables) of the waking state are touched (i.e., perceived) as born things, even so in a dream, through error, one sees the Dharmas (appearances) there also (as born things).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXVII—“Blessed one, you assert that all things are neither born nor annihilated as their being and non-being is unattainable.”

Exposition:—

(40 and 41) The truth is that the idea of causation itself is an absurd hallucination, for there can be no causal relation between things real or between things unreal or between things real and unreal. This has been fully explained before. Therefore the reality of a world cannot be the cause of the unreality of a dream. Non-birth is the cause of the unreality of both, and whether we are awake or dreaming all our perceptions are erroneous and the things we perceive can only be designated as inscrutable, because they are born in worldly usage and unborn in truth.

उपलम्भात् समाचारादस्ति वस्तुत्ववादिनाम् ।

जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेस्त्रयमतां सदा ॥४२॥

Translation—(42) The Buddhas, however, teach birth (i.e., origination of things) for those who maintain that things exist because of the perception and usage [of things] and are always frightened by (the doctrine of) non-birth.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXVIII—"The Blessed one replied:....The reason why the Tathagatas who are Arhat and Fully-enlightened ones, teach the doctrine pointing to the Tathagatagarbha is to make the ignorant cast aside their fear when they listen to the teaching of egolessness and to have them realise the state of non-discrimination and imagelessness."

Ibid. LXXVIII—"If there is an object coming to exist and yet is non-existent, by which law of causation is there the recognition of it? Things here are of mutual origination and for this reason causation is declared."

Ibid. LXIX—

Exposition :—

(42) You ask, why then did the Buddha himself preach an elaborate chain of causation signifying birth? We reply, he did so out of his infinite mercy for those unfortunate ignorant people who, because they perceive and use things, are so much obsessed by the idea of their reality as to be frightened by the mention of non-birth.

अजातेस्त्रसतां तेषामुपलम्भाद्वियन्ति ये ।

जातिदोषा न सेत्स्यन्ति दोषोऽप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥४३॥

Translation—(43) As regards those amongst these people frightened by (the doctrine of) non-birth, who go astray (from the doctrine of non-birth) (simply) because of the perception (of things), the evils of (holding the idea of birth) will not be of consequence, and the amount of evil will also be small.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, LXXX—"At the seventh stage the Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas, giving up the view of self-nature as subsisting in all things, attain perfect tranquillisation in every minute of their mental lives, which is not however the case with the Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas; for with them there is something effect-producing, and in this attainment of perfect tranquilisation there is a trace

(of dualism,) of grasped and grasping. Therefore, they do not attain perfect tranquilisation in every minute of their mental lives which is possible at the seventh stage. They cannot attain to (the clear conviction of) an undifferentiated state of all things and the cessation of (all) multiplicities. This attainment is due to understanding the aspect of all things in which their self-nature is discriminated as good and as not-good."

(43) You may be shocked and exclaim, what, the Buddha purposely teaching a false doctrine and thus sending the poor people to damnation! But we assure you on the authority of the Great Buddha himself that the doctrine of origination which he taught was such as to lead them to the realm of non-birth by gradually opening their eyes to the futility of their faith in objective existence.

उपलम्भात्समाचारात्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते ।

उपलम्भात्समाचारादस्ति वस्तु तथोच्यते ॥४४॥

जात्याभासं चलाभासं वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च ।

अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्वयम् ॥४५॥

Translation—(44) Just as owing to perception and usage one speaks of an elephant magically created, so owing to perception and usage one says that a thing exists.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam, 126—"Like an elephant magically created, like golden leaves in a painting the visible world is to the people whose minds are saturated with the forms of ignorance."

Exposition :—

(44) Still you may say that perception and usage are not to be belittled in this way, for they do certainly point to the existence of something which is perceived and used. True; but the existence which they undoubtedly point to is like the existence of "an elephant magically created", as we have learnt from the Buddha. (*L. Sūtra, Sagathakam*, 126).

Translation—(45) (The world is) a birth-like image,

a death (lit. passing away)—like image and similarly an object-like image (conveying the impression of abiding or existence). Unborn, undying, devoid of objectivity (i.e. unabiding as an object), Vijñāna is quiet, non-dual.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Sagathakam 366—"Nothing is born and yet things are being born; nothing dies and yet things are passing away; all over millions of worlds what is seen simultaneously is like a lunar reflection in water."

The Awakening of Faith, p.79—"While the essence of Vijnana is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled Vijnana. But inspite of the defiled Vijnana, the Vijnana (itself) is eternal, clear, pure and not subject to transformation.

(45) Thus we have succeeded in reducing everything to a shadow—birth is a shadow, objective existence is a shadow, death is a shadow—shadow, shadow,, shadow everywhere. Is it not then absolute nihilism on which we have wrocked ourship? Certainly not, it is the heaven of absolute securit and peace to which we have, by the grace of the Lord, been able to guide it through the nightmare ocean of relative existence. The shadows of birth, existence and death are death are comprehended in the shadow of our perception with its harrowing restlessness and endless multiplicity. But behind it is the invariable light (Vijñāna or Citta), calm and non-dual, of which it is the shadow.

एवं न जायते चित्रमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः।

एवमेव विज्ञानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥४६॥

"Further, as its original nature is free from particularisation, it knows in itself no change whatever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of existence."

(See also quotation below next verse.)

Translation—(46) Thus the Mind is not born, thus the dharmas (appearances) are known to be unborn. Those who know thus do not fall into error.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Sagathakam 213—"The mind being influenced by habit-energy, there rises a something resembling real existence (bhavabhasa); as the ignorant do not understand, it is said that there is the birth (of realities)."

(See also quotation below verse 28.)

Exposition:—

(46) This light has no birth, neither have the objects of the world a birth. To know this is to be emancipated from the error of worldly existence.

VII. *The lesson of a moving fire-brand*—the world is an inscrutable image, unborn.

ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासमलातस्पन्दितं तथा ।

ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं तथा ॥४७॥

Translation—(47) Just as when a fire-brand is set in motion there are images appearing as straight, curved and so forth, so when Vijñāna is set in motion there are images appearing as perception and the perceiver.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Sagathakam 173—" (Individual existences are) appearances, images, like Maya, like a mirage, a dream, a wheel made by a revolved fire-brand, the Gandharva's (cattle), an echo—they are all born in the same manner."

Awakening of Faith p. 79—"Therefore, we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostasised and established only through ignorance (avidya) and subjectivity (smṛiti) on the part of all beings, have no more reality than the images in a mirrorwhen the Alayavijñāna is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced, but when the Alayavijñāna is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears."

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XIX—"The self-nature and characteristic marks of body, property and abode evolve when the Alayavijñāna is conceived by the ignorant as grasping and grasped."

[To be Continued

WHITEHEAD AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA OF ŚĀṆKARA

BY NAGARAJA RAO

I

THE celebrated definition of religion by Whitehead runs as follows, 'Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.'¹ Besides this eloquent passage he has given us in an unforgettable epigram the definition of religion: 'Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness'².

The above definitions of religion have much in common with the description of religious experience (Brahman realisation) of the Upaniṣads. It can also be held that many passages in the Upaniṣads are similar to Whitehead's description of religion.

The Advaita Vedānta of Śāṅkara is not to be merely construed as a close system of metaphysics exhibiting great speculative daring and logical subtlety. No doubt the philosophers of the world have all given us rhapsodic appreciations of 'the austere intellectualism and remorseless logic of the system.' Some have held that it is a great example of a purely philosophic description. But its value is more than its intellectual and metaphysical merits.

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 238 (1933).

² *Religion in the Making*, p. 6 (1927).

The Advaita of Śaṅkara is the most profound philosophy of religion.³

Systems of philosophy that are erected merely to satisfy the intellectual curiosity of men are no doubt perfect exercises in logic. They give us systems neatly developed where the logical development of thought marches on indifferent to the hopes and beliefs of man. The satisfaction of the rational instinct in man has been the major motive of most philosophical systems in the west. As a result of this we have dozens of philosophical systems in America, England and on the continent. Bradley held the view 'that philosophy seeks to gain possession of reality but only in an ideal form.'⁴ A later day thinker J. S. Mackenzie adds that 'its (philosophy's) mission terminates in the quest rather than in any actions that may follow it.'⁵

The philosophical systems of the west aim at explaining Reality after the logical manner. It is man's essential nature not to rest satisfied till he understands his place in the universe. Hence the philosophers of the west make magnificent intellectual efforts to map out reality and give a neat account of it. The quest is for a comprehensive and non-contradictory account of reality. The philosophers seek truth and not comfort. They study reality as a whole unlike the scientists. Their approach is scientific in spirit and aims at an integrated view of man and the universe in which he lives.

The mere study of philosophy and the art of philosophising are not without their good effect, though they are not sufficient; still a great many savants of humanity have held the view that the quest for a rational outlook is instinct

³ See S. Radhakrishnan *Indian Philosophy* (Second edition) reprinted 1941, Vol. II, p. 656-658.

⁴ F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 12 (1914).

⁵ J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 26 (1924).

with man. Hegel defined philosophy 'as the thinking consideration of things.' Though philosophy may be 'the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.'⁶ Philosophy is 'an interpretation of Reality.

Bradley in his monumental work *Appearance and Reality* has argued the case for philosophy with great force and effect. In the very introduction he points out that there is the irrepressible instinct of wonder in men expressed in the development of the arts and sciences. The anti-metaphysician has either to oppose and condemn all reflective activity as such or grant the need for the pure development of thought which is another name for philosophy. It is unsound to say, 'you can think so far and no farther.' To condemn all the reflective activities of man is to break with the highest in human nature. It militates against the conception of man.

Philosophy, even when it represents the non-religious view, and though it is not theistic in its outlook has still a salutary effect on the mind and habits of men. It improves our capacity for clear thinking. In the words of Dr. Joad 'it may not produce goods but it gives us understanding. It may not help us to enlarge our incomes or achieve social success or gain popularity, but it will give us a lively understanding of the problems of life.'⁷

In a memorable article⁸ Bertrand Russell the unrepentant rationalist philosopher gives a very eloquent account of the essence of philosophical thinking without the theistic bias. The article has for its caption *Essence of Religion*. He says that philosophy facilitates a certain habitual direction of mind, frees us from finiteness and tyranny of

⁶ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, preface, page 12.

⁷ Dr. C. E. M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 201-271.

⁸ *Hibbert Journal* 1912, October, F. 8.

desires and daily cares. It has a quality of infinity about it. It frees us from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts. The disinterested contemplative vision of philosophy has liberating influence on our outlook on life. 'When we reflect on the size and antiquity of the stellar universe the controversies on this rather insignificant planet lose some of their importance and the acerbity of our disputes seems trifle ridiculous.'

Philosophy gives us the integral view of reality and we have an insight into its pattern. This helps us to know the ends to which we must direct our powers. It tells us what motives should animate us, and by what standards we should value our life and to what activities we should devote our time.

In short, philosophical outlook gives us the 'quality of infinity' (a pet phrase of Russell). 'This infinite part of our life does not see the world from one point of view; it shines impartially, like the diffused light on a cloudy sea. Distant ages and remote regions of space are as real to it as what is present and near. In thought, it rises above the life of the senses, seeking always what is general and open to all men. In desire and will, it aims simply at the good, without regarding the good as mine or yours. In feeling, it gives love to all, not only to those who further the purposes of the self. Unlike the finite life, it is impartial:—its impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling.'⁹

Philosophical systems of the west, most of them, are not touched by any practical interest. They pursue Truth for Truth's sake and not for any other end. The systems of philosophy outlined by Whitehead, McTaggart, Russell and Alexander are the daring expressions of the search

⁹ B. Russell *The Essence of Religion*, *Hibbert Journal* Oct. 1912, See also Russel's *An Outline of Philosophy*. Chapter XXVII.

for truth. Professor R. G. Collingwood has a fine description of an ideal Oxford philosopher. He writes that the Oxford philosophers 'were proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their hands on their hearts and say it was no use at all; a philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstruse that only a whole-time student, and a clever man at that, could understand it. They were resigned to the contempt of fools and amateurs.'¹⁰

Indian philosophical systems are born not purely from the instinct of curiosity. In them philosophy and religion are combined. They are different philosophies of religion. The pragmatic and practical function of philosophy is the distinguishing feature of Indian thought. It is this practical aim that is responsible for the blending of the religious and the philosophical in India. When Plotinus was asked, 'What is philosophy?' He answered after the manner of a typical Indian thinker, 'What matters most is philosophy'. Indian philosophical systems indicate ways of life from *saṃsāra*. They are not logical facts or exercises indulged in for the sake of satisfying the speculative and rational instinct in man. They 'are sought not in the interest of speculative thought but for the light they throw on the ultimate significance of life.'¹¹

Every system of Indian philosophy makes philosophic knowledge and the resulting religious experience from it a way of overcoming the sorrows of life. Philosophical systems are not mere logical legerdemain nor dexterous display of dialectics. Philosophy is described as *Ātma-Vidyā*. All other arts are subordinated to it. It is the

¹⁰ R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*. p. 38 Pelican edition 1944.

¹¹ M. Hiriyanna "The Indian Conception of Values", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*. Vol. XIX part I.

highest object of life. The general name for the philosophic ideal towards which man should strive is *mokṣa*. It is liberation from the trials and troubles of life. Most systems of Indian philosophy begin by analysing the world of goods and their nature. The great commentator, Vācaspati, argues at great length in his commentary on the first verse of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* the case for the antimetaphysician. He argues that if there is trouble and suffering in this world, there is no need to fly to the study of philosophy and religion as escapes from it. It would be folly to do so, because in our search, we are likely to forego the certain goods of our life within our reach in order to meditate and attain an uncertain and perhaps a chimerical good. If all that we want to find out is a way out from human suffering we have patent remedies open to us. 'Physical disease can be cured by medicine and mental distress by indulgence in pleasures. Enemies may be circumvented by diplomacy and spirits may be won over by charms.'¹²

But a critical examination of these positive means of pleasure betrays their bankruptcy. The states of happiness that result from these methods are not permanent. They all depend upon the strength and the good condition of the sense organs. Most of the above mentioned roads to happiness are impermanent. With the decay of the sense organs they too do not yield pleasure. The channels to happiness do not always secure the end sought to be attained through them. What was successful once or in the case of one person may not be so at another time or in the case of another person. Even when the means prove successful, the satisfaction derived through them is only provisional, in that it is sooner or later replaced by a desire for some other mode of satisfaction. Thus most of the

¹² S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, English Translation of *Iṣvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya Karika*, Madras University, Third Edition p. 2

goods are precarious. Some times medicine fails to cure, fortifications fall and let in the enemies. Diplomacy and spirit charm are double-edged weapons. Most of the patent remedies cannot prevent the recurrence of the troubles they get over. The finite things of life are not the good, they appear to be on the surface. To a reflective mind transitoriness of the things of the world is plain.

In the pursuit of the things of the world such as wealth, fame, etc., we become the inevitable prey of passions which distract and disturb our souls. In the pursuit of the finite objects we expose ourselves to strife and jealousy of men from whom we wrest the objects. Further, we open ourselves to fear and anxiety while we possess the object. We finally, land ourselves in sorrow when we have lost the objects. If we are sufficiently critical about the nature of our pleasures, we find that the normal appetites of men grow with what they feed on. There is no final satisfaction for a life of impulses and pleasures; once we take to the indulgence of pleasures, with every satisfaction the want increases and it becomes in course of time a tyrant passion, an obsessive craving. The craving in its turn gives rise to discomfort. The individual who takes to a life of pleasures oscillates between satisfaction and craving. This psychological effect is not only true of minor instinctive cravings, but also of major human passions such as ambition, vanity, etc.

Further, the more continuously a pleasure is indulged in, the smaller is the satisfaction which it yields. There is the economic 'Law of diminishing returns' operating in the field of desires also.¹³

Lowes Dickinson in an article on *Optimism and Immortality*¹⁴ points out that no body 'seriously maintained that for

¹³ See C. E. M. Joad, *God and Evil*, 281-284.

¹⁴ G. Lowes Dickinson, "Optimism and Immortality," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. I. 3.

most people live on earth as we know it is so transcendently good that it deserves in itself, without reference to anything beyond, to be supported and perpetuated with delight.' That may be the view of a fortunate few, but certainly they are unimaginative. 'Too few of us, surely, attain the good even of which we are capable, too many are capable of too little; and all are capable for so short a time.' Indian philosophical thought, after the manner of Spinoza and Plato, concludes that all the patent remedies do not give men everlasting happiness. Sage Patañjali the author of the *Yoga Sūtra* in a significant aphorism sums up the wisdom of ages and concludes 'that to the enlightened all is misery.'¹⁵

Spinoza, in his unfinished tract on the *Improvement of the Understanding*, writes that only 'love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness; wherefore it is greatly to be desired, and sought for with all our strength.'¹⁶ He rules out the possibility of wealth and fame giving us such an experience.

Plato points out that the knowledge of all the sciences and the arts of the world will be of no avail without the knowledge of 'the science of Good and Evil.' He says 'It is not, the life of knowledge, even if it included all the sciences, that creates happiness and well-being but a single branch of knowledge—the science of Good and Evil. If you exclude this from the other branches, medicine will be equally able to give us health, and shoe making shoes and weaving clothes. Seamanship will still save life at sea and strategy win battles. But without the knowledge of Good

¹⁵ Patañjali, *Yoga Sūtra*, II 15.

¹⁶ See Spinoza *Tractatus De intellectus emendatione* (English translation) Joachim (1940). Chapter I.

and Evil, the excellence of these sciences will be found to have failed us'.¹⁷

The supremacy of the spiritual life is upheld as the highest by every system of Indian philosophy. Mokṣa is the final goal of life. There is a remarkable unanimity among the systems of Indian philosophy in the formulation of the goal, though the descriptions differ in their details. All of them embody a practical interest and no mere intellectual curiosity. They do not stop with the discovery of truth as the west does. They do not subscribe to the view 'truth for truth's sake, or Art for Art's sake.' All the values of life such as Dharma, Artha and Kāma (ethical virtue, possession, and passions) are subordinated to Mokṣa.¹⁸ The values other than mokṣa are brought under the head of the instrumental goods. Their instrumentality consists in securing for us Mokṣa.

They must be harnessed to the end mokṣa. The description of mokṣa differs from system to system. But all the systems are agreed in describing the final phase of religious life in terms of experience. It is not a bare abstract knowledge but a rich integrated experience. Radhakrishnan in his inaugural lecture to the Oxford University distinguishes the religions of the world in two classes, 'those which emphasize the object and those which insist on experience.'¹⁹ The Indian philosophical systems insist on experience. Spiritual experience in some form or other is a characteristic feature of Indian thought. All the systems envisage

¹⁷ Plato, *Charmides*, 174.

Education for a world adrift. (1943) Sir Richard Livingstone remarks that Plato speaks the language of his civilisation and talks of medicine, weaving, shoemaking and seamanship. Today we would say that Science, Economics and Sociology, Industry and Commerce will provide us with the frame of our society and satisfy its material needs. (1943) p. 25.

¹⁸ M. Hiriyanna, *The Quest after Perfection*. Principal Miller Endowment Lecture, 1940-41.

¹⁹ S. Radhakrishnan, *The World's Unborn Soul*, p. 19 (1936).

the distinction between the spiritual and the profane. 'Religion is a transforming experience than a notion of God'.²⁰

Whitehead's description of religion 'as an experience of the togetherness of the various aspects of Reality' and 'as a transforming' agency are in perfect agreement with the general position of the Indian philosophical systems in respect of their definition of the final phase of religion as experience.

Gautama, the propounder of the Nyāya system refers to the knowledge of the sixteen categories²¹ (padārthas) as a means to mokṣa which is a state of absolute freedom from pain and sorrow for the soul. The Sāṅkhya system holds the view that the knowledge of Prakṛti, (in the Evolved and the Unevolved states) and Puruṣa terminates the three-fold miseries to which man is heir.²² The later Mīmāṃsā school was not content with the concept of svarga (Heaven) as the goal for the performance of scripture-ordained duties. They fall in line with other thinkers and introduce the idea of liberation (niśśreyas). The disinterested performance of rituals leads to a state where the 'soul remains in its own intrinsic nature beyond pleasure and pain.' It is this state that prevents the cycle of births and deaths. The purpose of Dharma is the attainment of liberation²³.

The Vedāntic systems refer to jñāna as a method for mokṣa. The term jñāna in its plenary sense means experience. It does not mean mediate knowledge. It is in

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 19.

²¹ Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* I, I, I. 'tattva-jñānāt-niśśreyasādhigamaḥ'.

The sixteen categories are:—Pramāṇa, Prameya, Samśaya, Prayojana, Drṣṭānta, Siddhānta, Avayava, Tarka, Nirṇaya, Vāda, Jalpa, Vitanḍā, Hetvābhāsa, Chala, Jāti, and Nigrahasthāna.

²² Śvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* verses 1 and 2.

²³ Pārthasārathi, *Sāstra-dīpikā*, 125-131, Bombay edition.

the words of Radhakrishnan 'not conceptual reasoning, not metaphysical perspicacity but is illumined being'.²⁴ The *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* describes jñāna only as a way (panthā). It is not an end in itself.

Among all the systems of Indian philosophy, the Advaita Vedānta and its description of religious experience is very close to Whitehead's description. Let us study in some detail the description of Whitehead in comparison with the Advaitin's view point. The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara is not a mere barren metaphysical system constructed from the abstract concepts to satisfy the rational requirements of men. It is a profound philosophy of religion.

The chief requirement of any sound philosophy of religion is that it must be based on a rational analysis of experience and must take the various factors of experience into account.²⁵ It should not erect a metaphysical system based on pure abstract concepts, as speculative theology. Speculative theology works with the help of pure reason and discards experience. Further, a sound philosophy of religion is to be distinguished from dogmatic theology. It should not say: 'Blessed are those that believe and surrender their intellect, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.' Dogmatic theologies are entirely based on revelation and the exposition of the prophets. They do not go beyond the limits of the revelation. Within the set limits the theologians interpret the texts with freedom and resolve the contradictions in the texts. The dogmas of the revelation are obligatory on all who subscribe to it. Thus a sound philosophy of religion is distinct from dogmatic theology, and it refuses to accept the finality of any revelation or the interpretation of any prophet. It rejects both the methods of speculative and dogmatic theologies. It applies itself

²⁴ O. Malley, *Modern India and West* p. 340-341 (1940).

²⁵ S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*. Chap. III, p. 84 to 126 (1937), Revised edition.

to a rational and scientific analysis of experience—Here it must be pointed out that the experience taken into account by the philosophy of religion is not merely confined to the sense level. It takes into account the entire human experience unlike the Naturalist who only takes a part of it. It examines the spiritual and religious experience of men of all creeds. From an appeal to experience, philosophy of religion steers clear of Scientific Naturalism and dogmatic theology.²⁶

So philosophy of religion bases and builds its metaphysics on the facts of religious experience. It has for its data the experience of the mystics who have recorded their intuitions. Unlike psychology, it regards, that as sense perception answers to Reality, spiritual intuitions too give us a bonafide experience of Reality. Our experience of the British constitution and the perception of the Ganges are no more real than the vision of Arjuna, on the battlefield and the vision of Augustine on the road to Damascus in the Italian garden.

The great advantage of a sound philosophy of religion over other creeds is its universality and non-sectarianism. It has a great tradition behind it in the East as well as in the West. The tradition of mysticism has its roots in all ages and in all climes. It is a doctrine which has the longest intellectual ancestry. Professor F. Heiler in his book on *Prayer* observes that 'the history of religion knows only three great independent currents of development, which may possibly go back to two. There runs an unbroken chain from Ātma-Brahman mysticism of the Vedic Upaniṣads to the Vedānta of Śaṅkara on the one side and on the other through the mystical technique of the Yoga system to the Buddhist doctrine of salvation. Another

²⁶ See S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, pp. 288 to 299.

line of development equally continuous leads from the Orphic-Dionysiac mysticism to Plato, Philo and the later Hellenistic mystery cults to the Neoplatonic mysticism of the Infinite of Plotinus, which in turn is the source of the 'mystical theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; perhaps this second chain is only an off shoot from the first.'²⁷

A philosophy of religion which bases itself on the spiritual experience of men is the only kind of religion that has any chance in a world of science and reason. The conclusions of science and reason do not go against the declarations of a philosophy of religion. It is scientific because in the last resort it rests on verifiable truth. The ultimate authority is no creed or dogma, no revelation or priest but one's own spiritual experience. The discovery of new scientific facts and theories does not affect the truths of the philosophy of religion. It is not contingent on any events past or future. It is not based on any unique miracle or historic self disclosure of God to any one prophet. Its 'only apologetic is the testimony of spiritual experience. It is not committed to the authenticity of any documents.' Creedal puzzles do not confound it. It answers to the deep needs of men. It is based on the belief that the ultimate destiny of man is Divine.

Whitehead's celebrated definition of religion is in agreement with the Advaitin's view of religious experience as described by Śaṅkara. Both have hit at the view that a sound philosophy of religion conceives the supreme goal of religion in terms of experience. A sound rational mysticism is the goal of religion. The goal cannot be attained by the pure method of logic unaided by intuition. On this point also Whitehead agrees. Further the mystic experience is not capable of being completely described in logical

²⁷ F. Heiler, *Prayer* (English Translation). P. 136.

terms. It is an integral experience. We cannot employ scientific categories to describe it.

Both Whitehead and Śaṅkara support their conceptions of religious experience by different patterns of metaphysics. The metaphysics of Śaṅkara fits in more with the concept of mysticism as the goal of religion than the philosophy of organism outlined by Whitehead. Let us take up the definition of Religious experience given by Whitehead and see how every aspect of it fits in with the metaphysical doctrines of Śaṅkara. Spiritual experience as the goal of religion is integral to the metaphysics of Śaṅkara. The various attempts to make mysticism fit in with the different patterns of metaphysics are only half-way houses to the absolute idealism of Śaṅkara. To prove this completely is beyond the scope of the present thesis.

The distinguishing features of the metaphysics of Śaṅkara are that it is able to answer the requirements of a strict metaphysics and a sound philosophy of religion.

The first part of the definition of religious experience is 'religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the flux of immediate things.' Brahman in Śaṅkara is the chief philosophical category. In fact it is the only ontological entity that Śaṅkara posits. He describes it as pure, homogeneous, untrammelled consciousness. It is not tainted by evil, it is ever free and is self luminous. It is described by Śaṅkara as *nitya*, *śuddha*, *buddha*, *mukta*, *svabhāva*. It is the Reality 'which stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things.' The Upaniṣads describe Brahman in the same manner. There are texts that describe the all-pervasive nature of Brahman.

'Brahman, indeed, is this immortal. Brahman before, Brahman behind, to right and to left. Stretched forth below and above, Brahman indeed, is this whole world, this widest

extent.²⁸ The Chāndogya says 'Verily, this whole world is Brahman. Tranquil, let one worship it as that from which he came forth, as that into which he will be dissolved, and that in which he breathes.'²⁹ But the all pervasive nature of Brahman does not mean that he is exhausted in it as some Pantheists hold. Brahman is not the world and nothing else. He is something more than the world and gives reality to the world of objects. He is not exhausted 'in the flux of immediate things.' He is there in it as the sustainer of the flux, the immanence of Brahman is not effected through a complete immersion or dissolution into Nature. Brahman is not identified here after the Spinozistic manner with Nature. Brahman is the *antaryāmin*, the inner ruler of the entire universe. He is the mechanic without whom the universe cannot run.³⁰ He is referred to as the *charioteer* at the heart of things in possession of the reins.³¹ The conception of Brahman as *antaryāmin* has a prominent place in the Upaniṣads. There is a celebrated section in the *Bṛhadārṇyaka* called the Antaryāmi-Brahmana.³²

Sage Yājñavalkya instructs Uddālaka Āruṇi about the nature of Brahman as the inner controller. The inner controller is referred to 'as a thread (sutra) by which the world and the other world and all things are tied together,' 'The antaryāmin is described at great length as inner controller of the earth, water, fire, the atmosphere, the wind, the sky, the sun, the heavens, the moon and the stars, space, darkness and light. In the fifteenth mantra, Yājñavalkya says 'He who, dwelling in all things, yet is other than all

²⁸ *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* II, II, 11.

²⁹ *Chāndogya* III, 14, 1. See *Gītā* IX, 5.

³⁰ *Gītā* XVIII—61.

³¹ *Kaṭha* I, 3, 3.

³² *Bṛhadārṇyaka* III, VII.

things, whom all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within. He is your soul, the inner controller and the immortal³³.

After describing the presence of the inner controller in all the material things, Yājñavalkya describes Brahman as the controller of the self and its activities. He is dwelling in and controls breath, speech, eyes, ear, mind, the skin and the understanding of men. The section closes with a description of Brahman as the real activity behind the universe. The antaryāmi concept saves Advaita from becoming a purely Pantheistic creed. There are passages in the Upaniṣads which describe Brahman as a supra-personal Being and as the abode of all infinite attributes. Brahman is not a tendency or a Law or a Nisus for world evolution. He is represented as the creator, sustainer, etc., of this universe.³⁴

From the above descriptions of the Upaniṣads it follows that Brahman is not only immanent but also transcendent. He is the heart of the universe and its Reality.

Besides the description of Brahman as the immanent controller and creator of the world there are very clear passages in the Upaniṣads which describe Brahman in negative terms. They support Śaṅkaras postulation of Brahman as homogeneous consciousness.

Śaṅkara analyses experience in a manner which has become the model of analysis for the subsequent Idealist philosophers. Śaṅkara makes out the distinction between the self and the not-self. The self as the ātman principle is consciousness is different from the objects. The subject can never be expressed in terms of the object. The subject-object relation is present in all the finite states of life. Śaṅkara's analysis of human experience finds that men seek in

³³ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* III, VII—15.

³⁴ *Vedānta Sūtra* I, I, 2;
Taittirīya III, 1.

every form of experience, happiness. Men marry and mate, trade and drive a hard bargain, seize up a rival and fight, write books and proclaim their views. In all these activities man seeks to perpetuate his happiness. This ever fugitive nature of man presupposes that if his endeavour is to have any meaning at all there should be the possibility of an ideal of infinite happiness. Without such an ideal human endeavour loses all its meaning and significance. Further, men pass from one kind of happiness to another with the hope of attaining a permanent happiness. At the heart of man there is a desire for eternal paradise; he longs for infinite happiness and feels the fetters of the finite nature. If he was purely finite he could not realise the ideal. If he was purely infinite he cannot account for the experience of the fetters.

So man turns out to be in the words of Bosanquet *finite-infinite*. But whence comes this fetter for consciousness? and how does it come about? In our experience we find that experience persists in all the stages and only the objects of experience change. The subject is constant. 'The seeing is common though the sights are different.' This consciousness of the subject cannot be described or expressed in terms of the object. The consciousness is just awareness and it is never an object. It is 'the spectator of all time and existence.' Time and existence belong to the world of objects. The spectator consciousness is not touched by it. No regular proof is necessary for the existence of the consciousness. For it is the very nature of the self that doubts it. Śāṅkara points that no one thinks, 'I am not.' But here it must be noticed that there is some difference between *cogitio* (thinking) of Descartes and Śāṅkara's consciousness. Descartes identified the self with only one aspect of experience i.e., the experimenter. Śāṅkara takes the entire integral experience into account and identifies the self with it. The objects of cons-

consciousness frequently change. They are responsible for the mixed nature of our happiness. The immutable is consciousness. It is not subject to the defects of the objects of the world. It is homogeneous and it does not suffer from any configuration.

The objects of which we are conscious are not of the same stuff as consciousness. If we realised our nature as consciousness and not as objects we would be happy.³⁵ Such a consciousness is Brahman, i.e., ātman, the only ontological entity postulated by Śāṅkara. There is nothing besides it.

There are several passages in the Upaniṣads which describe Brahman as consciousness. Throughout the Upaniṣads we find a clear distinction made out between spirit on the one side and the world of objects on the other side. Most of the systems of philosophy in the East and as well as in the west have effected this distinction between the pure subject and the object. In Greek philosophy Heraclitus held the view that he sought for the *I* principle and was not able to discover frontiers. Pithagoras once observed 'that life was like an Olympian festival. It was a motely crowd that gathered there. Different people assembled. Some to do business others to win laurels. There were others who were spectators.' The spectator of all times and existence is the self. Plato distinguished between the world of shadows and spirits. Aristotle drew the clear distinction between matter and the Entelechy. Descartes distinguished between matter and self with distinctly different qualities. Kant held the two realms as separate, the phenomena and noumena. This distinction is made out in the Nyāya system as between ātman and matter.

The Sāṅkhya described the plurality of Puruṣas as having no taint and as different from the Prakṛti. The

³⁵ See S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Śāṅkarācārya*, pp. 50-59; (1941).

theistic schools of Vedānta Rāmānuja and Madhva distinguished between self, matter and God. Śaṅkara's metaphysics agrees with this great tradition which effects a clear distinction between the subject principle i.e., consciousness and the object side. He held the view that the subject side can not be expressed completely or adequately in terms of the object. But he does not admit like the others that this subject-object relation is ultimate and that it is insurmountable. He finds the sanction for a state of consciousness which transcends the subject-object relation. The consciousness that is beyond the subject-object relation is the integral experience and is impartite in its nature. Śaṅkara's argument for the existence of such a consciousness is derived from mystic experience, the authority of the Upaniṣads and the force of dialectics. He presses into service all the three instruments of knowledge to prove his ultimate philosophical category. The special distinction of Śaṅkara's philosophy of religion is that he is able to go beyond the subject-object distinction in the formulation of the nature of Brahman. This by itself would not do, for it would lead to abolition of all distinctions and reduce the world of plurality to a magic show. Śaṅkara knows his critics well; so he has elaborated in his metaphysics a thorough going explanation of the relation between Brahman and the world. By these two doctrines Advaita in the hand of Śaṅkara rises to the status of an excellent philosophy of Religion.

The Upaniṣads too undertake an analysis of experience and point to a state of consciousness which is above the distinction of subject-object relation and beyond the substrate-attribute view of things. Brahman consciousness or the transcendent aspect *turiya* state is beyond all three other states. The *Mandukya Upaniṣad* gives a very clear analysis of experience and points to a transcendent state both on the cosmic as well as the individual side.

The first three states of waking life, dream-experience and that of deep sleep, all presuppose the consciousness and the presence of the subject-object relation. The fourth state which is called *turiya* state transcends the subject-object distinction. The Upaniṣad describes that state.¹ 'It is unseen by sense organs (*adr̥ṣtam*), unrelated to the things of the world (*avyavahāryam*), incomprehensible by the mind (*agrāhyam*)', it is indefinable in terms of any category (*alakṣaṇa*), unthinkable (*acintyam*), indescribable (*avyapadeśyam*), essentially of the nature of consciousness which constitutes the character of the self (*ekātma pratyayasāram*), the negation of phenomena (*prapañcopaśamaṁ*), the tranquil (*śāntam*), the blissful (*śivam*) and the nondual (*advaitam*)'.³⁶

Yājñavalkya to his persevering disciple Gārgi describes Brahman thus 'That, O Gārgi, Brāhmaṇas call the imperishable (*akṣara*). It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, not glowing (like fire), not adhesive (like water), without shadow and without darkness, without air and without space, without stickiness, (intangible), (a) odourless, tasteless, without eye, without ear, without voice, without wind, without energy, without breath, without mouth, without personal or family name, unaging, undying, without fear, immortal, stainless, and not uncovered, not covered, without measure, without inside, and without outside. It consumes nothing so ever. No one soever consumes it'.³⁷

The negative description of the fundamental Reality is not peculiar to the genius of the Advaita metaphysics of Śaṅkara. It has a very respectable intellectual kinship. The great religious prophets have all echoed the Upaiṣadic description. The same technique is adopted, but the tenets are different. Gautama, the Buddha refused to dogmatise

³⁶ *Māṇḍūkya* V. 7.

³⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 3, 8, 8.

about the nature of the ultimate.³⁸ He further pointed out that it is impossible to speculate upon it. The Upaniṣads describe it 'as not this, not this.' Jesus's silence to Pontirus Pilate's question what is truth? is another illustration of the great truth that the ultimate consciousness cannot be described in terms of the finite categories.

The description of ultimate Reality as consciousness indescribable, should be understood with great care. Many have equated it with the void. Śāṅkara posits the existence of Brahman as consciousness on the authority of the Śruti. He has the mystic experience (anubhava) of Brahman. It is because of this he is able to declare in unfaltering accents about the Reality of the Spirit. To the modern student of the philosophy of religion the description of Brahman as an indeterminate consciousness of the authority of Śruti and experience does not suffice. So Śāṅkara, by the use of a powerful and convincing dialectic has sought to establish the intelligibility of the concept of *Nirguṇa Brahman*.

Many of the traditional schools have criticised Śāṅkara's Brahman as serving no philosophical use. They have equated it with the void (Śūnya) of the Buddhist. Madhva and Rāmānuja vie with each other in running down the *nirguṇa Brahman*. Rāmānuja deplores the atheism of Śāṅkara and calls him a *Pracchanna Banddha* or a Buddhist in disguise. One of the great dialecticians of the Rāmānuja's school called Vedānta Deśika has catalogued a hundred defects in the Advaita of Śāṅkara.³⁹ A good many of them is directed against the concept of nirguṇa Brahman. Deśika equates Advaita with crypto-Buddhism.

Madhva is most vehement in his attack of Śāṅkara. He describes Advaita as an inauspicious religion full of

³⁸ A Mādhyandina (version).

³⁹ The text is named *Śatadūṣiṇī*.

contradictions'.⁴⁰ In a most powerful philosophical tract *Tattvodyota* he equates Advaita with the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism. He points to the fact that the Buddhists too admitted two types of Realities. They called them *saṃvṛt* and *paramārtha*. The Advaitin calls them *vyavahāra* and *paramārtha*. Madhva concludes that 'the void of the Mādhyamika Buddhists is Brahman of the māyāvādin'.⁴¹

Śaṅkara anticipating the above criticisms points out that Brahman is not a void or an abstraction. It should not be confused with the *Ens abstractissimum* of pure nothing. It is not an infinite abyss of negatives and abstraction which purporting to be the secret of Reality is in fact attenuated into the indescribable. The Nyāya school holds the view that we can never have an attributeless cognition.

To be continued.

⁴⁰ Mādhva cites a passage from the *Padma Purāṇa* as authority for his views on Śaṅkara. (1, 14).

"Māyāvādaṁ asacchāstraṁ pracchannaṁ buddhaṁ eva ca mayiva kathitaṁ devī kalau brāhmaṇarūpiṇa."

⁴¹ Vallabha's *Aṇubhāṣya* on the *Vedānta sūtras* II, II 29. Yat śūnya-vādiṇaḥ śūnyam tadeva Brahma māyinaḥ. For a lucid and running commentary on *Tattvodyota* see Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma's *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy* (the chapter on *Tattvodyota*.)

For a positive interpretation of Buddhism See, S. Radhakrishnan's British Academy lecture on *Gautama the Buddha*.

SHORT NOTES

1. SOME WELL-KNOWN FACTS RE: THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

By SRI PENDYALA V. S. SASTRY

THE *Mahābhārata* is commented on by eminent scholars of Western Orientalists and of the East. Sri Pandit Sitanathatwabhushan writes that Śrīkṛṣṇa of the *Mahābhārata* is not a single individual but a being imagined out of the combination of the different individuals 'Aṅgīrasa Kṛṣṇa and Asura Kṛṣṇa,' of the *Rgveda*, and 'Devakīnandana Kṛṣṇa' of *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*.

2. Dr. R. Bhandarkar writes that Kṛṣṇa of the *Mahābhārata* and of the *Bhāgavata* were two different individuals. R. C. Dutt and Sawami Vivekananda deny the existence of the Pāṇḍavas and say that they were mythological persons of the *Mahābhārata* and assert that the Kuru-Pāṇḍava War of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* was described as the Kurupāṇḍava war of the Epic.

3. Vincent Smith, in his *Oxford History of India*, relates with illustrative maps that he could find on archaeological survey no traces connecting the story of Kurupāṇḍava with Hastinapur and its suburbs.

4. While matters stand thus, it is a pity that some vain and ignorant paurāṇics unable to meet the learned writers and get at proper authority call these able commentators, stupid and carping monutebanks.

5. Beside the continental writers and non-Andhras there are many Andhra writers of eminence whom they dislike to consult before they indulge in vituperation. May God give them proper understanding!

6. I make bold to place before the public some facts not already included in the above-said works.

7. There is the following verse of invocation in the beginning of the *Mahābhārata* meaning that Jayam i. e. the story of victory is to be written after invoking Nārāyaṇa, Nara, the chief of the Naras, and Saraswati whose unstinting help is absolutely necessary.

“Nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya

Narancaiva narottamam.

Devīm Sarasvatīmvyāptaḥ (Caiva, Vyāsam)

Tato jayamudīrayet.

8. The above is Nīlakanṭha's commentary. There are some other commentaries of Arjunamiśra, Vadirājatīrtha, and Ānandatīrtha. The first gentleman reads 'Caiva' and the second one 'Vyāsam' in place of 'Vyāptaḥ' in the above verse. B. G. Tilak writes that 'Caiva' but not 'Vyāsam' is the correct rendering as Vyāsa could not be considered to do obeisance to himself.

9. Whatever it be, the question arises whether Nārāyaṇa referred to in the above verse is the Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Omnipresent God (Śrīmān Nārāyaṇa) or Nārāyaṇa maharṣi, the son of Dharma and Dakṣaprajāpati's daughter, elder brother of Nara and father of Urvaśī. Or is it Śrī Kṛṣṇa?

10. If Nārāyaṇa refers to the All-pervading Spirit, to whom does the word 'Nara' immediately following refer? The reading undoubtedly forces the suggestion that it must be either Nara Maharṣi, or Nara which is one of the several names given to Arjuna in the Epic. If Nārāyaṇa admittedly means Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Nara must refer to Arjuna. In all probability Nara refers to the son of Dakṣa's daughter; for otherwise it places Vyāsa in the inconceivable position of doing obeisance to his own grand-son Arjuna as Nara.

11. Śrī Kṛṣṇa, no where in the *Bhagavadgītā*, gives Nārāyaṇa as one of his several names, whereas he names his army of Gopālas as Nārāyaṇī and asks Duryodhana to choose either him on the one hand or his army on the other

to help him against Pāṇḍavas. Probably, Nārāyaṇa in the verse does not refer to him.

12. Nara and Nārāyaṇa being two contiguous words inevitably suggest the Mahatṣis of these names, and may have nothing to do with the *Mahābhārata*. Bhīṣma, after Sañjaya Rayabhara relates to Duryodhana that Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna are the incarnations of Nara and Nārāyaṇa. (The story of Nara-Nārāyaṇa appears in two portions of *Bhāgavata*).

13. In Sambhava-parva, a portion of the Ādiparva, *Vaiśampāyana* tells Janamejaya that Kṛṣṇa is the Avatāra of Śrī Mahāviṣṇu, and Arjuna of Indra. In the same parva Vyāsa narrating the story of Pañcandropākhyāna to Drupada said that Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa were the two white and black hairs (negligibly infinitesimal portions) of Śrī Mahāviṣṇu. In the second Skandha of *Śrī Madbhāgavata*, in the chapter relating Nārāyaṇa Lilāvātāra, Balarāma and Śrī Kṛṣṇa are said to be the white and black hairs of Nārāyaṇa. The same wording without the least change is adopted by poets like Nanniah, Potana, Sripada Kṛṣṇamurti Sastri, Sathaghantana Venkatarangiah and a host of others and its reiteration is nothing derogatory or disparaging to a clean conscience.

14. That the *Mahābhārata* is a collection (Samhitā) of the utterances of several *Mahatṣis* at different times and that it is not the work of a single poet, is held by eminent writers as Rao Bahadur Chintamani Vydia, Saprey, Bankimchandra Chatterji, and many others. But the commonly prevalent idea that the 18 parvas of *Mahābhārata*, *Brahma Sūtras*, *Vyāsa-Sikṣā* and Vedavibhāga were done by the same person makes the large number of inconsistent narrations in those several works irreconcilable.

15. Similarly, the word Nara in several places admits of several interpretations. But the readers of the *Mahābhārata* will naturally understand the word to mean Arjuna.

16. But Arjuna, when giving his ten names to Uttarā omits Nara. The ten names are "Arjuna, Phālguna, Pārtha, Kiriṭi, Śvetavāhana, Bibhatsu, Vijia, Kṛṣṇa, Savyasāci and Dhananījaya." How these names were got was also explained by him.

17. Instead of Pārtha in the above list, the word Jīṣṇu is found in the Sanskrit *Mahābhārata* in Andhra characters.

18. In 13 A. D., Tikkana Somayaji, rendering a portion of the *Mahābhārata* into Telugu, writes that Pārtha is applicable to Arjuna. The verse runs 'My mother is known as Pritha and hence I am called Pārtha. This is not vainly said and I am Dharmarāja's younger brother.' This verse makes it applicable to Arjuna alone. Even Nakula and Sahadeva, sons of Mādri, Kuntī's co-wife, along with the rest, are styled pārthas in several places. This might, in my humble opinion, be due to all of them being brought up by Kuntī. But the name Pārtha has come exclusively to mean Arjuna and Arjuna alone. This throws out a vague suggestion that Arjuna may be the only son born of Kuntī, the rest being the sons of some other ladies.

2. PERIOD OF THE VEDAS

By GIRISH CHANDRA AWASTHI

THE Vedas are the most sacred books of the Hindus. European scholars have tried their best to cast doubts on their authenticity and their admirers are still engaged in the selfsame pursuit. They claim that their philological studies have led them to the conclusion that the difference in the language of the Vedas can be explained only by their having been compiled in different periods and they are therefore not contemporaneous writings. They assert that the *Rgveda* was written first and the other Vedas followed much later. But this conclusion cannot be admitted without a searching scrutiny.


In my humble opinion such a theory is simply ruled out of court owing to the fact that the names of the other Vedas are to be found in the *Rgveda*. If the other Vedas did not exist when the *Rgveda* was compiled how was it possible to mention their names in the *Rgveda*.

We find in Maṇḍala 8, Sūkta 87, Ricā 1 (Cf. *Rgveda-Sambhitā*—F. Max Muller—Second Edition—London—Oxford University Press Warehouse, 1892) the word “stoma” and stoma prayers are used only in the *Sāmaveda*. Again the word “uktha” occurs in *Rgveda* M. 6, S. 36, R. 13; M. 8, S. 6, R. 35, and M. 8, S. 16, R. 2, and this word is the title of one category of the *Sāmaveda*. In *Rgveda* M. 10 S. 90, R. 9, the simultaneous birth of the *Rgveda*, *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda* has been recorded. In *Rgveda*, M. 10, S. 100, R. 6, we come across the word “samag” which means the reciter or singer of the *Sāmaveda*. At the same place occur the words “Uktha-śasa” denoting the “śansita” of a special kind of *Sāmaveda* or in other words the performer of prayers with it, “yajanya” meaning the leader

of the yajña, "adhwarya" implying the knower of *Yajurveda* and "brahma" connoting the knower of all the Vedas. The portion of the Vedas containing mantras (incantations) alone is called the *Sambitā*. The other portion in which the procedure for performing yajña, the ṛṣis of the mantras and methods of performing prāyaścitta (penance) etc. are given is called the Brāhmaṇa. The Brāhmaṇa of the *Rgveda* is named the *Aitareya* and we find the following account in it in Chapter 25 Section 7. Prajāpati collected the materials and made the knower of the *Rgveda* the hota. He made the knower of the *Yajurveda* the adhwaryu and the knower of the *Sāmaveda* the "udgātā". He made the knower of all the three Vedas the "Brahmā". All these four Ṛtwiks are essential in every yajña. It is the function of the Brahmā to listen quietly to the incantation of the mantras. Later on, if the Ṛtwik makes a mistake in the pronunciation of the *Rgveda* he will perform havana in the gārhapatya fire with the bhū Vyāhṛti. If there is a mistake in the pronunciation of the *Yajurveda* then if there is Somayāga he will perform havana in the agnīdhriya fire with the bhuwaḥ vyāhṛti and if there is haviryāga he will perform havana in the anwāhārya pacana fire. Yajñas in which soma juice is poured into the havana are called somayāga, Yajñas in which barley, rice, til (sesamum seed) etc. are poured into the havana are called haviryāga. If there is a mistake in the pronunciation of the *Sāmaveda* the havana should be performed in the fire with the swaḥ vyāhṛti.

This latter havana is necessary as where the mantra is pronounced incorrectly that portion of the yajña is nullified and not only is that part spoilt but it causes injury otherwise also. It is, therefore, the duty of the Brahmā to remedy the defect by performing prāyaścitta (penance) i. e. by performing havana. If havana is performed the result is right.

All these things are clearly described in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. The *Rgveda* is the principal book of yajñas and it would be a purposeless publication if there are no yajñas and no other vedas. Therefore, the existence of the other Vedas along with the *Rgveda* is axiomatic. We come across the description of Raja Paijavan's Aśva-medha yajña in *Rgveda* M. 3, S. 53, R. 11, but its procedure is given only in the *Yajurveda*. Thus the description of the yajñas in the *Rgveda* proves the pre-existence of the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*.



REVIEWS OF BOOKS

RŪPAKAPARIŚUDDHI (A STUDY IN THE FIGURES RŪPAKA AND UPAMĀ). By Paṇḍitarāja D. T. Tatacharya, M.O.L. The Venkateśwara Oriental Institute Studies, No.2, Tirupati. P.61. 1946. Price Rs. 2.

The subject matter of this book is the same as that which appeared before in *JVOI*, Vol.III, No. 1 (Jan.-June, 1942) under the title *Padapāṅkajam*—Rūpaka and Upamā. There has been some further improvement in this book and the author has discussed here many more topics on the basis of other standard works on the subject. The author has very carefully discussed the two alaṅkāras and has also criticised some of the old views on them. The book has been written in easy and lucid Sanskrit. The author has shown his critical judgment in a scholarly manner.

GAUTAMA-DHARMASŪTRA-PARIŚIṢṬA (Second Praśna). Edited by A.N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T. Adyar Library Series No. 64., pp. xlvi + 130. 1948. Price Rs. 9-0-0.

The book under review is the second chapter (Praśna) of the Pariśiṣṭa of the *Gautama-Dharmasūtra*. The Dharma-sūtra has been published several times and the first praśna of the Pariśiṣṭa also has appeared in the *Mysore Sanskrit Series*. But this portion is for the first time placed before the scholars. This portion contains twenty chapters with an *Anukramanikā* at the end. The text of the latter is in the reverse order and is very useful to give a clue to each of the chapters. The authorities of the Adyar Library have done a great service to the cause of our Ancient Literature by bringing out this volume.

DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF SANSKRIT MANUSCRIPTS IN THE ADYAR LIBRARY, VOL. VI (GRAMMAR, PROSODY AND LEXICOGRAPHY).—By Pandit V. Krishnamacharya under the supervision of Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. pp. xxxii+451. 1947 Price Rs. 25-0-0.

The volume under review was published on the occasion of the celebration of the centenary of Dr. Annie Besant and the Diamond Jubilee celebration of the Adyar Library. The volume contains notices of 1037 manuscripts with 746 for Vyākaraṇa, 48 for Chandas, and 243 for Kośas.

Manuscripts are really our most valuable treasures of knowledge. In old days these were the only means of the preservation of knowledge for posterity. But now due to the influence of the Printing Press very few people have any interest in these Mss. They have become in a way a source of burden to their possessors. They throw them in the rivers or allow the white ants to live upon them, but they will not part with them easily. This is the reason why thousands of Mss are being destroyed every year. It is the duty of big public Institutions and also of the State to collect these and preserve them in proper manner. No one should grudge to spend any reasonable amount on them. We know that efforts are being made towards this direction, but they are not quite satisfactory. The Adyar Library deserves every help and our congratulations in continuing its interest in this national cause.

THE ART OF HINDU DANCE: Manjulika Bhadury and Santosh Chatterji, 123-1 Upper Circular Road, Calcutta. Pp. 275. Price Rs. 6.

The Hindu Dance is a difficult art and with the cultural awakening in India, has come to be revived to an extent.

But before this can be done, it is necessary that the complicated theoretical background behind the practical performance is fully explored and understood. The volume under review seeks to do that: to give the history of the evolution of the Indian dancing and to relate it to what is practical in India to-day. But so far as the earlier portion is concerned no original matter is presented to us while the latter portion depends mostly on second-hand material, thus resulting in a desultory treatment of a difficult subject. Even the last twenty pages purporting to give five biographical information about some exponents of Indian dance do not contain accurate information and betray a lack of sufficient judgment in the selection of the names. The book can be useful only to a general reader who does not bother much for critical material.

A. Mukerji

LIFE IN ANCIENT INDIA AS DEPICTED IN THE JAIN CANONS.

By Jogadish Chandra Jain M. A. Ph. D. New Book Company Ltd. Bombay. 1947. Pages 420. Price Rs. 35.

The author, a Jain scholar, has compiled all the materials available from the Jain āgamas, both published and in manuscripts. In order to have a thorough understanding of Indian culture and civilisation, the study of the Jain āgamas is as important as that of the Brāhmanic and Buddhistic literatures. The author has arranged his materials in 24 chapters under several big sections like administrative organisation, economic aspects, social conditions, geographical material and some kings and dynasties. The Jain canons on which the present work is based do not belong to one particular period. They were compiled and redacted thrice between 4th century B. C. & 5th century A.D. The object of the thesis is to present all the materials embodied in the

Jain Sūtras and exegetical literature and therefore the basis is not in chronological order. The historical material in the Jain canons are so scanty that hardly any history in the real sense of the term could be written beyond putting all the historical materials together. The best and longest section of the work under review is on geography which is in fact a geographical lexicon for the period. The book as a source book of Indian history is very valuable.


THE VISHVABHARATI QUARTERLY—Education number, Vol. XIII. parts. 1 & 2 May—October 1947. Pages 215+4+vii. with 10 illustrations and 2 colour impressions by boys & girls aged 6&9.

Sri Rabindranath Tagore was one of the world's greatest educational thinkers who put their ideals into practice. He founded the Shantiniketan school in 1901 and the Vishva Bharati University in 1921. In this Education number there are 27 articles from scholars of repute including foreign scholars and ministers of Education. The articles are substantial and of varied range and interest. Special mention should be made of extracts from Tagore's writings on education, a bibliography alone of his writings in Bengali & English extending to 12 pages. Tagore's sentences read like Sūtras recalling Bacon's style. To quote a few, "Religion is the true centre of gravity of our life....A teacher can never truly teach unless he is still learning...We must give reverently....Let there be no want of reverence in our self dedication to the village." The other articles are *inter alia* on Religious education, Place of English, Wardha Scheme, Montessori System, Music & Education, Basic Education and Education for rural areas.

The publication of this number is very timely as all thoughts are today concentrated on deciding important questions like the place of religion in schools, the choice of a national language, the place of Sanskrit and the development of modern scientific literature in India. The articles here would be useful to all thoughtful men including the University commission now in session. The making of a modern nation or country would be in charge of the schools & colleges. The true aim of education is development of character & unfolding of the personality of man. The ideal should be as in ancient India not to produce mere recluses or scholars but whole men, ideal house-holders who would perfect family, society and country.

The volume under review would stem the tide which, in the words of Radhakumud Mukerjee in his '*Ancient Indian Education* (1947)', is sweeping India off her traditional moorings, the anchor of her soul, to drift into the unfathomed waters of unchartered seas and it is, therefore, of utmost concern to her future that she must not drift away from her national heritage and basic ideals in the sphere of culture and learning where her achievements constitute to this day her title to recognition in the comity of nations of the world. India is still in request in the world for the treasures of her thought. These treasures are embedded in Sanskrit and its off-shoots Pali and the Prakrits which still remain in the literature of the world remarkable for its vastness, volume, variety, quality and longevity and justifies the *education* of which it is the product.

A. S. Nataraja Ayyar



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[Part 4

GAṆAPATI-WORSHIP, AND THE UPAPURĀṆAS DEALING WITH IT

By R. C. HAZRA

ISOLATED chapters or verses on Gaṇapati-worship are to be found in many of the extant Purāṇic works¹, but there are only two Upapurāṇas which belong exclusively to the sect of the Gāṇapatyas. These are the *Mudgala-purāṇa* and the *Gaṇeśa-purāṇa*. Of these, the former work is preserved in manuscripts not available to us at present, and the latter has been published by Gopal Narayan & Co., Bombay, 1892.

Though both these Upapurāṇas are comparatively late works, the worship of Gaṇapati Vināyaka can be traced back to a fairly early period.² The earliest mention of 'Vināyaka' is found in the *Mānava-gr̥hyasūtra* (2. 14) as well as in the extracts quoted from the '*Baijāvāpa-gr̥hya*' in *Aparārka*

¹ Viz., *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, *Vārāha-purāṇa*, *Skanda-purāṇa*, *Agni-purāṇa*, *Garuḍa-purāṇa*, *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa*, *Vāmana-purāṇa*, *Bhaviṣyottara*, *Devī-purāṇa*, *Viṣṇudharmottara* etc.

² Nagendranath Vasu is of opinion that the cult of Gaṇapati 'must have existed before the rise of Buddhism.' He refers to a tradition, recorded in Oldfield's *Sket cher of Nipal*, Vol. II p. 198, that the ancient temple of Gaṇeśa, which stands on the north of the famous temple of Paśupati-nātha in Nepal, was built in the third century B. C. by Cārumati, a daughter of the Maurya king Aśoka. (see Nagendranath Vasu, *Archaeological Survey of Mayurabhanja*, I, pp. xxiii. See also H. Krishna Sastri, *South-Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses*, p. 168, footnote 3).

and Śūlapāṇi's commentaries on the *Yājñavalkeya-smṛti*.³ According to these two Sūtra works the Vināyakas are malevolent demons four in number. The *Mānava-gr̥hyasūtra* gives their names as Śālakataṅkaṭa, Kūsmāṇḍarājaputra, Usmita and Devayajana, and says, "The following are the symptoms of those who are possessed by these (Vināyakas). (Such a person) pounds clods, tears grass, writes on his limbs, and have various inauspicious dreams, in which he sees waters, men with shaved heads, men with matted hair, persons wearing red clothes, camels, pigs, asses, Cāṇḍālas and so on. (He feels that) he is moving through the air; and, when walking along the road, (he) thinks that somebody is pursuing him from behind. When possessed by these Vināyakas princes do not get their kingdoms although they are (otherwise) qualified, girls cannot secure husbands although they are eager to do so and possess auspicious signs, women do not get any issue although they are anxious to have offspring and are otherwise qualified, children of virtuous women die, a learned teacher fails to attain the position of an Ācārya, students face great interruptions in the course of their study, merchants' trade fails, and agriculture of husbandmen yields poor crops. The *Mānava-gr̥hya-*

But Alice Getty rightly says that there is no reason to put faith in the tradition mentioned above. See Getty, *Gaṇeśa—A Monograph on the Elephant-faced God* p. 10.

For information about Gaṇapati-worship see R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (pp. 147-150) Alice Getty, *Gaṇeśa—A Monograph on the Elephant-faced God*; P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra* (II, pp. 213-6 and 725); H. Krishna Sastri, *South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses* (pp. 165-176); Nagendranath Vasu, *Archaeological Survey of Mayurabhanja* (I, pp. xxii-xxiii); Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (II, p. 807, and VI, pp. 175-176) *Viśvakosa* (a Bengali encyclopaedia edited by Nagendranath Vasu, Vol. V, pp. 202ff.) T. A. Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography* (especially I. i pp. 35-67).

³ Aparārka's commentary on the *Yājñavalkeya-smṛti* (Anandāsrama Sanskrit Series edition), pp. 563 and 565. Śūlapāṇi's *Dīpakalikā* (Dacca University manuscript No. 602), fol. 43b.

sūtra next prescribes a rite which is both expiatory⁴ and propitiatory in nature and in which various things including meat and fish (both raw and cooked) and wine and cakes are to be offered and a strange variety of beings, both divine and otherwise, is to be invoked, viz., Vimukha, Śyena, Baka, Yakṣa, Kalaha, Bhīru, Vināyaka, Kūṣmāṇḍarājaputra, Yajñavikṣepi, Kulangāpamāra, Yūpakeśi, Sūparakroḍi, Haimavata, Jambhaka, Virūpākṣa, Lohitākṣa, Vaiśravaṇa, Mahāsenā, Mahādeva and Mahārāja. The '*Baijavāpa-gr̥hya*', on the other hand, names the 'four Vināyakas' as Mita, Sammita, Śālakataṅkata and Kūṣmāṇḍarājaputra but agrees with the *Mānava-gr̥hya-sūtra* in describing the symptoms of those who are possessed by these Vināyakas⁵. That originally the Vināyakas were four in number, is further indicated by the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*⁶ (NSP ed.) and the *Viṣṇudhar-*

⁴ Cf. *Mānava-gr̥hyasūtra* 2. 14. 22—teṣāṃ prāyaścittam. (It is to be noted that with this *sūtra* the author of the *Mānava-gr̥hyasūtra* begins to describe the rite).

⁵ Aparārka's commentary (= com.), p. 563—atṛa baijavāpa-gr̥hyam—“atha vināyakāḥ catvāraḥ khalu vināyakā bhavanti mitas ca sammitas ca śālakataṅkatas ca kūṣmāṇḍarājaputras ceti etair vināyakair upasṛṣṭa-lakṣaṇā brāhmaṇāḥ svādhyāyavanto'py ācāryatvam na labhante etc. etc.”

See also p. 565 for another extract from the '*Baijavāpa-gr̥hya*'.

Śūlapāṇi's *Dīpakalikā*, fol. 43b—catvāro vināyakā bhavanti mitaḥ sammitaḥ śālakataṅkataḥ kūṣmāṇḍarājaputras ceti baijavāpagr̥hyavacanāt.

⁶ mitas ca sammitas caiva tathā śālakataṅkataḥ
kūṣmāṇḍarājaputras cety ante svāhā-samanvitaiḥ

This verse of the *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti* (= *Yāj.*) occurs in Aparārka's com., p. 566, Śūlapāṇi's *Dīpakalikā*, fol. 43b, and Viśvarūpa's com., p. 177. (Viśvarūpa reads 'śālakataṅkataḥ' for 'śālakataṅkataḥ' and 'japet svāhāsamanvitān' for 'ity ante svāhāsamanvitaiḥ')

But Viṣṇuśvara gives the text of this verse as follows:—

mitas ca sammitas caiva tathā śāla-kataṅkatau
kūṣmāṇḍo rājaputras cety ante svāhā-samanvitaiḥ

It is to be noted that in this verse Viṣṇuśvara breaks up the four names of the Vināyakas into six without any authority. Although Viṣṇuśvara's text of this verse is found to occur, with slight change, in *Garuda* p. (= *Gd.*) I. 100.10b-11a, *Bhaviṣya*-p. (= *Bhav.*) IV. 32.22 and 44.16, and *Devī-purāṇa* (Vanga. ed.) 69.15, it is certainly wrong. For mention of the names of the 'four' Vināyakas in the *Viṣṇudharmottara* (= *Viṣṇudh.*) see the following footnote.

*mottara*⁷ (Venkaṭ. ed.) The *Mahābhārata* (Vaṅgavāsī ed.) also speaks of the Vināyakas in the plural number⁸. On the top of the pillar established at Ghāṭiyāla in Samvat 918 by the Pratihāra king Kakkuka there are four images of 'Vināyaka' facing the four quarters;⁹ in *Gaṇeśa-p.* I. 46.139 Gaṇapati-Vināyaka is called 'four-faced' (caturmukha); in Nepal the four headed Gaṇeśa was not unknown;¹⁰ and in Indo-China there is a small bronze image of Gaṇeśa with four heads¹¹. According to the Sūtra works mentioned above, the offerings to be made to these Vināyakas are to be placed at a crossway (catuṣpatha), most probably for the convenience of the Vināyakas. It is highly probable that the four Vināyakas originally presided over the four cardinal directions and created various kinds of obstacles (vighna) to the people. It should be noted that in *Mānava-grhyasūtra* 2.14 and in the above-mentioned extracts of the *Baijavāpa-grhya* the Vināyakas are neither connected with Rudra-Śiva nor called leaders of Gaṇas, they are not described as being elephant-headed. Bṛhaspati is regarded as a distinct deity like Agni, Indra, Soma, Varuṇa, Vāyu and Viṣṇu¹² and there is no mention of the use of the Ṛgvedic *mantra* 'gaṇānāmtvā gaṇapatiṁ' which is addressed to Bṛhaspati in the *Rgveda* (II. 23.1).

⁷ See *Viṣṇudh.* II. 105, which, though consisting mostly of verses taken from the *Yāj.*, lacks the verse 'mitaś ca sammitaś caiva' (given in the immediately preceding footnote) but names the four Vināyakas as Mita, Sammita, Śālaṅkākaṭa and Kūṣmāṇḍarājaputra (mitāya sammitāyātha śālaṅkākaṭāya ca kūṣmāṇḍarājaputrāya tathaiva ca mahātman-*Viṣṇudh.* II. 105.19).

⁸ *Mahābhārata* (= *Mbh.*) III. 65.23, XII. 284.131, XIII. 150.25.

⁹ *Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, Western Circle, for the year ending 31st March 1907, pp. 34-35. *Epigraphia Indica* IX, pp. 277ff.

¹⁰ Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, p. 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15 and 50, and Plate No. 27 (c).

This 'representation of Gaṇeśa with four heads is in a private collection at Spean Thmar, Kendal.'

¹² See *Mānava-grhyasūtra* 2. 14. 26.

The next stage in the development of the idea of Gaṇapati is exhibited by the comparatively early portions of the *Mahābhārata*, in some of which the Vināyakas are looked upon as unfriendly, malignant demons like Bhūtas, Rākṣasas and Piśācas,¹³ and their number is taken to be more than two.¹⁴ It is further indicated in these portions that these Vināyakas are always bent on creating obstructions in the actions of men and that they can be made favourable by means of propitiating rites.¹⁵ In one place of the *Mahābhārata* the Vināyakas are characterised with the epithet 'gaṇeśvara' and it is said that these 'Gaṇeśvara-Vināyakas' control all the worlds.¹⁶ Thus the *Mahābhārata*, though believing in many Vināyakas and looking upon them as no better than malevolent demons, identifies them with the Gaṇeśvaras (i. e. Gaṇapatis) who are followers of Rudra. It should be mentioned here that in *Rgveda* II. 23.1¹⁷ the term 'gaṇapati' (which is synonymous with 'gaṇeśvara') is applied to Bṛhaspati, who is the 'Lord and Leader of the heavenly hosts' according to *Rgveda* IV. 50.5¹⁸, accompanied by a band of

¹³ *Mbh.* XII. 284. 131—

na rākṣaṣā na piśācā na bhūtā na vināyakāḥ
vighnaṁ kuryur gr̥he tasya yatrāyaṁ paṭhyate stavah

¹⁴ See footnote 8 above.

¹⁵ Cf. *Mbh.* III. 65.23—na pñjā vighna-kartṛṇām athavā prathamam
kṛtā.

¹⁶ *Mbh.* XIII. 150.25—Īśvarāḥ sarva-lokānām gaṇeśvaravinā-
yakāḥ.

¹⁷ gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatiṁ havāmahe
kaviṁ kavīnām upamaśravastamam
jyesthatajaṁ brahmaṇām brahmaṇaspata
ā nah śṛṇvannūtibhiḥ sīda sādhanam

(According to Sāyaṇācārya the word 'gaṇānām' means 'devādi-gaṇānām').

That this verse is addressed to Brahmanaspati (i. e. Bṛhaspati) is pointed out clearly by the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* (IV. 4) which says: "gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatiṁ havāmahe iti brāhmaṇaspatyaṁ brahma vai bṛhaspatir brahmaṇaivainaṁ tad bhiṣajyati".

¹⁸ sa suṣṭubhā sa ṛkvaṭā gaṇena
valam ruroja phaligaṁ ravena
bṛhaspatir usriyā havyasūdaḥ
kanikradad vāvaṣatir udājat

Sāyaṇācārya takes the word 'gaṇa' to mean the band of Aṅgirasas.

singers, and in *Ṛgveda* X. 112.9¹⁹ this term is applied to Indra; but in the *Yajurveda* the word 'gaṇapati' is used as an attribute of Rudra (the lord of beasts)²⁰ as well as of the 'chiefs' of his hosts, who, ²¹ as the *Śāṅkhāyana-śrautasūtra* (IV.19) tells us, are maleficent spirits attacking men and beasts with disease and death and receiving the bloody entrails of the victims. It is to be noted that the *Yajurveda* speaks of many leaders of Rudra's Gaṇas and not of only one, and that the Gaṇapatis, unlike the Vināyakas,²² can claim to have a Vedic origin.

We have already seen how, in the *Mahābhārata*, the Vināyakas have been identified with the Gaṇeśvaras (or Gaṇapatis), but we do not know definitely when the idea of a single Gaṇapati-Vināyaka was first introduced and how he came to have the elephant's head. The *Yājñavalkya-*

¹⁹ ni śu sīda gaṇapate gaṇeṣu
tvām āhur vipratamaṁ kavīnām
na pte tvat kṛiyate kiṁcanāre
mahām arkaṁ maghavañi citram arca

Sāyaṇa explains 'gaṇeṣu' as 'stotṛ-gaṇeṣu'.

²⁰ *Taittirīya-saṁhitā* IV.1.2.2 (= *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* II.15) pratūrvann ehy avakrāmann aṣastī rūdrasya gāṇapatyaṁ mayobhūr ehi.

According to Sāyaṇa the word 'gāṇapatyaṁ' means paśusamūha-patitvaṁ.

See also *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* 22.30—gaṇapataye svāhā.

²¹ *Taittirīya-saṁhitā* IV.5.4.1—namo gaṇebhyo gaṇapatibhyas ca vo namaḥ.

Commenting on this line Sāyaṇa says : devasyānucarā bhūta-viśeṣā gaṇās teṣāṁ pālākā gaṇapatayas tebhyo namaḥ.

See also *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* 16.25, where the above mentioned line (namo gaṇebhyo gaṇapatibhyas ca etc.) occurs. Mahidhara explains this line thus : devānucarā bhūta-viśeṣā gaṇās tebhyo namaḥ gaṇānām pālākā gaṇapatayas tebhyo vo namaḥ.

²² These must have been aboriginal deities, probably Dravidian in origin. (See Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, p. 1). In the verse

viprānām daivatam śambhuḥ kṣatriyānām tu mādhavah
vaiśyānām tu bhaved brahmā śūdrānām gaṇanāyakaḥ

which is ascribed to Manu, Gaṇanāyaka is called the deity of the Śūdras. (For mention of this verse see Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, p. 212, footnote, and Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 487). It should be mentioned here, that this verse is 'quite a modern forgery' and does not occur in the present text of the *Manu-smṛiti*.

smṛti, which should not be dated later than 300 A. D.²³, tells us, perhaps following the doctrine of monism of the Vedānta, that there is one single Vināyaka known by the four names Mita, Saṁmita, Śālakāṭaṅkaṭa and Kūṣmāṇḍa-rājaputra.²⁴ It further states that Rudra and Brahmā appointed this Vināyaka to create obstacles in the actions of people, to help them in attaining success, and to act as the leader of the Gaṇas, that his mother is Ambikā, and that he is also known as Mahāgaṇapati.²⁵ Among the things to be offered to Vināyaka it includes fish and meat (both raw and cooked), wine, radish (mūlaka), cakes and sweetmeats (modaka).²⁶ Thus, the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* records an appreciable advance in the conception of Gaṇapati-vināyaka but does not appear to know the peculiar form and most of the attributes of the later Gaṇeśa.

That Gaṇapati-Vināyaka came to have the elephant's head earlier than the sixth century A. D. can be shown by a large number of evidences, sculptural, epigraphic and literary. On the Kāntaka Cetinga *stūpa* near Mihintale in Ceylon, there is a frieze of Gaṇas, one of which 'has the face of an elephant, complete with trunk and tusk'. According to S. Paranavitane, this image is to be ascribed to the first centuries of the Christian era.²⁷ In his *Ancient India* (Plate No. 39) Codrington gives the photograph of an elephant-faced image of Gaṇeśa which is assigned to about 500 A. D. A statue of elephant-headed Gaṇeśa, found

²³ Kane, *History of Dharmasāstra* I, pp. 183-4.

²⁴ We have already said (in footnote 6 above) that Vijñāneśvara wrongly breaks up the four names Mita, Saṁmita etc. into six. As 'śāla', 'Kaṭaṅkaṭa', 'Kūṣmāṇḍa' and 'Rājaputra' are given as distinct names in the *Gaṇeśa*-p. (I.46.12-13) and other late works, it seems that Vijñāneśvara's text of the verse 'mitaś ca saṁmitaś caiva' was adapted to a later tradition about the names of Vināyaka.

²⁵ *Yāj.* I. 271, 290 and 294.

²⁶ *Yāj.* I. 287-289.

²⁷ Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, p. 25 and plate No. 22 (c).

at Bhumāra, is attributed to the fifth century A. D.²⁸ Outside the Śaiva grotto-temple at Bādāmī there is a small image of elephant-faced Gaṇeśa which must have been executed before 700 A. D.²⁹ The images of this deity, as found in the cave-temples at Ellora, are all furnished with the elephant's head. In the Nidhanpur plate of Bhāskaravarman (middle of the seventh century) there is mention of Gaṇapati who must have had the elephant's head.³⁰ In the *Nārāyaṇopaniṣad*³¹ (Anuvāka 1) there is the Gaṇapati-gāyatrī "tatpuruṣāya vidmahe vakra-tuṇḍāya dhīmahi, tanno dantiḥ pracodayāt" in which Gaṇapati Vināyaka has been called 'vakra-tuṇḍa' and 'danti'. In his *Gāthā-saptasati* (NSP ed.) IV. 72 and V. 3 Hāla Sātavāhana refers to an image of Gaṇapati and the trunk of this deity. Daṇḍin mentions the 'elephant-faced god' (hastivaktro bhagavān) in his *Daśakumāra-carita*, Ucchvāsa III. In verse 2 of Ucchvāsa IV of his *Harṣa-carita* Bāṇabhaṭṭa speaks of a single large tusk of 'Gaṇādhipa'; and in Ucchvāsa III he associates 'Vināyaka' with obstacles and also indicates that this deity had the head of an elephant.³² The *Amara-koṣa* gives the following synonyms for 'vināyaka':—Vighnarāja, Dvaimātura, Gaṇādhipa, Ekadanta, Heramba, Lambodara and Gajānana. In his

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26 and Plate No. 3(b).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28 and Plate No. 8(b).

³⁰ *Epigraphia Indica* XII, p. 73.

* * * * *

gandharvavatī tasmād gaṇapatim iva dāna-varṣaṇam ajasram/
gaṇapatim aganīta-guṇa-gaṇam asūta kali-hānaye tanayam//
The word 'dāna' (meaning 'ichor'), as applied to Gaṇapati (the god), suggests that he has the head of an elephant.

³¹ According to J. N. Farquhar this Upaniṣad probably belongs to the period from 550 to 900 A.D. See Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, p. 188.

³² śikhara-nikhāta-kubja-kālāyasa-kaṇṭakena vainavena
viśākhikā-daṇḍena sarva-vidyā-siddhi-vighna-vināyak-āpan-
ayan-āṅkuśeneva satata-pārśvavartinā
virājamānaḥ.....bhairavācāryaḥ
dadarśa.—*Harṣa-carita*, Ucchvāsa III.

commentary on Varāhamihira's *Brhat-saṁhitā* 57.57 (P.785) Utpalabhaṭṭa quotes from 'Kāśyapa' a verse which runs as follows:—

eka-danṣṭro gaja-mukhaḥ caturbāhur vināyakaḥ/
lambodaraḥ sthūla-deho netra-traya-vibhūṣitaḥ//

In *Baudhāyana-gr̥hyasūtra* III.10³³ and *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* II. 5.83-90³⁴ the rite called 'deva-tarpana' includes the propitiation of Vighna, Vināyaka, Vīra, Sthūla (or 'Śūra', according to the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition of the *Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra*), Varada, Hastimukha, Vakratuṇḍa, Ekadanta, Lambodara, (Gaṇapati, according to the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition), the Vighna-pārśadas and the Vighna-pārśadiḥ. According to *Viṣṇudh.* III. 71.13-16 Vināyaka is elephant-headed (gaja-vaktra), four-armed (caturbhujā) and big-bellied (lambodara) wears a tiger-skin, has a serpent as his sacred thread, lacks the left tusk and holds a trident (Śūlaka) and a rosary of beads (akṣa-mālā) in his right hands and a pot of sweetmeats (modaka) and an axe in his left. *Bhav.* 1. 29 describes Vināyaka as *caturbhujā, trinetra, nāgayajñopavitāṅga, śaśāṅka-keṭa-sekhara, basti-mukha, eka-danṣṭra, dant-ākṣasūtra-parasu modaka-basta* and so on; and in *Bhav.* I. 30 he is called *vakra-tuṇḍa, gaja-danta, muṣala-pāśa-vajra-basta* etc. According to *Linga-p.* I 104-105 he is *gaja-vaktra* and *triśūla-pāśa-dhārin*. In the opening stanza of his *Mālatī-mādhava* Bhavabhūti describes 'Vināyaka' as possessed of the elephant's head. See also *Mahāvīra-carita* II.38 (heramba-danta-muṣa-lollikhit-aikā-bhitti vakṣo....me) and Māgha's *Śiṣupālavadha* I . 60 (na jātu vaināyakam ekam uddhṛtaṁ viṣāṇam adyāpi punaḥ prarohati). It is needless to multiply examples. Though in the above-mentioned Gaṇapati-Vināyaka is regarded as a widely worshipped deity capable of creating

³³⁻³⁴ These portions of the two works are of doubtful authenticity.

obstacles and yielding success³⁵, he is not given the position of a supreme god but is subordinated to Śiva. His elephant-head, which must have been added to him at a comparatively late date,³⁶ may be due either to the mediæval idea about the queer forms of Śiva's Gaṇas or to his identification with some popular deity conceived and worshipped for immunity from the havoc created by wild elephants.³⁷ But it is remarkable that in none of the above-mentioned sources there is any reference to Gaṇapati-Vināyaka's having a rat as his mount (vāhana) or to his reputation for wisdom. Some of the sculptures of Gaṇeśa found in and outside India, lack this animal; and of the Javanese statues there are very few which are furnished with this vāhana.³⁸

The position of Gaṇapati as a supreme deity, however, began to be recognised by a section of people even earlier than the seventh century A. D. We have already mentioned that in the *Nār. yaṇopaniṣad* there is the Gaṇapati-gāyatrī "tatpuruṣāya vidmahe vakra-tuṇḍāya dhīmahi etc." The

³⁵ According to *Linga-p.* (Jivānanda's ed.) I. 103.79 Vināyaka created obstacles to demons and yielded success to gods.

³⁶ The *Mānava-grhyasūtra*, the *Baijavāpa-grhya* and the *Mahābhārata* do not mention Gaṇapati's elephant-head. According to most of the stories about Gaṇapati's birth this deity originally lacked such a head.

³⁷ In the *Gaṇeśa-p.* I. 46. 48 and 72-73) Gaṇapati-Vināyaka is called 'ikṣu-cāpa-dhara', 'ikṣu-sāgara madhyastha', 'ikṣu-bhakṣaṇa-lālasa', 'ikṣu-cāp ātīreka-śrī' and 'ikṣu-cāpāni-sevita'. From these expressions it appears that Gaṇapati Vināyaka absorbed in himself some deity which was conceived and originally worshipped by the cultivators for protection of their fields of sugarcane from elephants. The names 'Gaṇapati' and 'Hasti-piśāciśa', given to Gaṇeśa in *Gaṇeśa-p.* (*Gaṇ.*) I. 46.21 and 119, tend to support this view.

It may be mentioned in this connection that in southern Bengal a deity called Dakṣiṇarai (दक्षिणराय—Lord of the South) or Dakṣiṇdar is still worshipped by the villagers as a preventive against the troubles created by the royal Bengal tigers of the Sundarbans. For description of the image of this deity, the method of its worship, and diverse accounts of its origin, see *JASB*, XI, 1915, pp. 175—177.

³⁸ Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, pp. 47-48 and 61.

Devī-p. (chaps. 112-114) looks upon Vināyaka as superior to Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva and others. The *Varada-tāpanīya*—(or *Gaṇapati-tāpanīya*) *upaniṣad*, which betrays Tantric influence and cannot, therefore, be dated earlier than the seventh century A.D.,³⁹ applies to Gaṇapati the terms *vināyaka*, *gaṇeśa*, *vighna-hartr*, *caturbhūja*, *gaja-rūpa-dhara*, *vakra-tuṇḍa* and *śivomā-tanaya*, and regards him not only as the lord of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others⁴⁰ but also as supreme Brahma. It knows at least fourteen Vināyakas⁴¹ belonging to Gaṇapati's entourage, and applies to Gaṇapati the *mantra* 'gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatiṁ' which, as we have already seen, is addressed to Bṛhaspati in the *Rgveda*. According to the *Gaṇapati-upaniṣad* (which forms a part of the *Atharvasīras-upaniṣad* of the Smārtas and is certainly not an early work), Gaṇapati is Śiva's son (śiva-suta) and is *eka-danta*, *caturbasta*, *pāsāṅkusadbārin*, *vighna-vināsin* and *mūṣaka-dhvaja*; he is *jñānamaya* and *viññānamaya*; and he is the source, the stay and the final goal of the universe and is identical with Parama Brahma. In the *Gaṇeśa-p.* Gaṇapati is called 'Bṛhaspati' and 'Brahmaṇaspati',⁴² and the *Rgvedic mantra* 'gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatiṁ' is applied to him.⁴³ It is probable that as Gaṇapati-Vināyaka, being a non-Vedic deity, has no Vedic verse addressed to him, his devotees of the Vedic fold applied the *mantra* 'gaṇānām tvā gaṇapatiṁ' to him and thereby connected him with the

³⁹ J. N. Farquhar is inclined to assign this Upaniṣad to the period ranging from 550 to 900 A. D. See Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, p. 202.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Varada-tāpanīya-upaniṣad* II. 3. brahma-viṣṇv-ādi-gaṇānām īśabhūtam ity āha tad gaṇeśa īti.

⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, I.2.4—...ṣaṭ-kone sumukhādayaḥ ṣaḍ-vināyakāḥ, vasudale vakratuṇḍādyasṭa-vināyakāḥ.

⁴² *Gan.* I. 46. 14b (kaviṇ kavīnām ṛṣabho brahmaṇyo brahmaṇas-patiḥ) and 105b (brahma brahmārcitapado brahmācārī bṛhaspatiḥ).

⁴³ *Gan.* I. 36. 19; 37-37 38. 18-19 and so on.

Rgveda.⁴⁴ It may be due to the application of this *mantra* that Gaṇapati came to be known as Bṛhaspati and attained fame as a god of learning and wisdom.

The application of the term *gaṇapati* to Indra in the *Rgveda* and to Rudra in the *Yajurveda* must have been the cause of Gaṇapati's having some of the characteristics of these two deities. Thus, in a large number of works Gaṇapati is described as carrying, like Indra, a goad (aṅkuṣa) a thunderbolt (vajra) and a lotus (padma, utpala) in his hands⁴⁵ and as wearing, like Rudra-Śiva, a tiger-skin and having a crescent moon on his head and a snake as his sacred thread.⁴⁶ In the *Varada-tāpanīya-upaniṣad*, *Gaṇeśa-p.* etc. the names 'Śiva' 'Paśupati' and 'Mahādeva' are applied to him.⁴⁷ Gaṇapati's noose (Pāśa), mentioned in some works,⁴⁸ shows that he had the characteristics of Varuṇa also. The *Devī-p.* (114. 2-4) states that before Vināyaka started for killing the demon Vighna, Śiva had given him his crescent moon, Brahmā his white girdle, the Sun a piece of coral, Viṣṇu his conch-shell⁴⁹ and bow, Indra his thunderbolt, Yama his staff

⁴⁴ Cf. *Gan.* 1. I. 14a -omkāra-rūpī bhagavān yo vedādaḥ pra-tiṣṭhitah. In *Gan.* 1.46.78 Gaṇeśa is called 'ṛg-yajuḥ-sāma-sambhūti' and in *Gan.* I. 61.43 he is called 'trayīmaya'.

According to *Gan.* I. 36-37 Gṛtsamada is said to have worshipped Gaṇeśa with the *Rgvedic mahāmantra* 'gaṇānāṃ tvā' in accordance with the instructions of his father. In *Gan.* I. 36. 19-20 this *Rgvedic mantra* is said to be superior to the Āgamic ones. For use of this *mantra* in Gaṇapati-worship see also *Gan.* I.38. 18ff., 51.35, 59.25, and so on.

⁴⁵ See *Matsya-p.* (*Vaṅga*. ed.)260.52-54 *Bhav.* I. 30.I *Devī-p.* 113.8 and 114.3; *Agri-p.* 50.26; *Gaṇapati-upaniṣad*; and so on.

For description of the image of Indra see *Matsya-p* 260.66-70. and *Viṣṇudb.* III.50.

⁴⁶ See *Bhav.* 1.29, *Viṣṇudb.* III. 71. 13-16, and so on.

As regards nature, Gaṇapati is akin more to Rudra-Śiva than to any other god.

⁴⁷ *Varada-tāpanīya-upaniṣad* I. I.5, and 2. 2; *Gan.* I. 46. 102.

⁴⁸ *Bhav.* I. 30.1; *Liṅga-p.* I. 105.9; *Gaṇapati-upaniṣad*; and so on.

⁴⁹ 'It is interesting to note here that in Indo-China there is an ancient statue of Gaṇeśa holding a conch-shell'.—Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, p.16 and plate No. 25 (c).

(daṇḍa), Varuṇa his noose, and so on. This shows how the different gods contributed to the growth of Gaṇeśa as a full-fledged deity. We have already mentioned that in the *Gaṇapati upaniṣad* Gaṇapati is described as 'mūṣaka-dhvaja'. According to the *Matsya-p.* he is 'ṛddhi-buddhi-yukta' and rides a rat.⁵⁰ In their lexicons Halāyudha, Hemacandra and Jātādhara call him *ākbu-ratba*, *ākbuga* and *mūṣikāṅka* respectively. These, and other references to Gaṇapati's rat, show that Gaṇapati's connection with this animal is one of the latest phases in the development of his character as a god. According to the *Gaṇeśa-p.* Gaṇapati had this *vāhana* in his last incarnation. But we do not know definitely how Gaṇapati came to have this animal as his mount. It is probable that this animal was connected with Gaṇapati because of its mischievous character.⁵¹ Or, it may be that either Gaṇapati came to be connected with agriculture and was consequently furnished with a rat as his *vāhana*, or some agricultural deity, riding a rat, was identified with him.⁵² The comparatively late age of the connection of the rat with Gaṇapati goes against the belief of some scholars 'that Gaṇeśa was originally a Dravidian deity worshipped by the aboriginal populations of India who were sun-worshippers, and that Gaṇeśa on his *vāhana*, the rat, symbolised a sun-god overcoming the animal, which in ancient mythology, was a symbol of the night'.

⁵⁰ *Matsya-p.* 260.54 (yuktam tu ṛddhi-buddhibhyām adhaṣṭān mūṣakānvitam) and 289.7 (.....mūṣakastham vināyakaṁ). The latter verse is quoted in Lakṣmidhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (Dana-kāṇḍa, p. 108), Aparārka's com. on the *Yāj.* (p. 343) and Vallālasena's *Dānasāgara* Ms. India office (fol. 77a).

⁵¹ Cf. *Gan.* II 134.6ff., wherein it is said that after being transformed into a rat by Vāmadeva's curse, krauñca, a Gandharva, began to do various kinds of mischief to sage Parāgara, and that Gajānana subdued it and made it his *vāhana*.

⁵² For Gaṇeśa as a god of harvest see *Indian Antiquary* XXXV, 1906, pp. 62-64.

From what has been said above it is evident that Gaṇapati passed through a number of stages before attaining the position of a full-fledged god, and that the sect of the Gāṇapatyas came into being at a comparatively late period. Tantric elements in the *Varada-tāpanīya-upaniṣad*, the *Gaṇapati-upaniṣad*, the *Mudgala-p.*, the *Gaṇeśa-p.*, and those portions of the *Bhaviṣya-p.*, *Agni-p.*, *Garuḍa-p.* etc. which describe the method of his worship, indicate that it was chiefly the Tantrics who took up the worship of Gaṇapati in right earnest and became incentive to the growth of the Gāṇapatya sect. Sculptural, epigraphic and literary evidences show that even the Jains⁵³ and the Tantric Buddhists⁵⁴ worshipped this deity. The popularity of this god among the Hindus as well as the Buddhists in and outside⁵⁵ India accounts for his inclusion among the 'five deities' (pañcāyatana) of the Smārtas.

It has already been said that although Gaṇapati was a highly popular deity, the sect of the Gāṇapatyas came into being at a comparatively late period. It is most probably for this reason that there is no early Purāṇic work dealing exclusively with the praise and worship of this god. The *Mudgala-p.* and the *Gaṇeśa-p.*, which have Tantric elements and record very late ideas about Gaṇapati, must have been written to infuse Gāṇapatyaism with Vedic ideas. This will be evident from an analysis of the latter work.

(to be continued.)

⁵³ See Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, p. 29 (for images of Gaṇeśa in Jain grotto-temples such as that at Chandor). The *Ācāra-dinakara* (composed in Samvat 1468 and published in the Kharataragaccha-grantha-mālā) describes the method of consecrating an image of Gaṇeśa even for the Jains.—See Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* II, p725.

⁵⁴ See Getty, *Gaṇeśa* pp. 8, 31, 36 and 37 ff.

⁵⁵ For information about the spread of Gaṇeśa-worship in Tibet, Mongolia, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Java, Bali, Borneo, Japan and Chinese Turkistan see Getty, *Gaṇeśa*, pp. 37ff., and Nagendranath Vasu, *Archaeological Survey of Mayurabhanja*, I, pp. xxii-xxiii.

MARRIAGE IN OLD AND MEDIEVAL BENGAL ACCORDING TO SMṚTI NIBANDHAS

By SURES CHANDRA BANERJI

THE principal Nibandhas of Bengal dealing with marriage are chronologically (1) the *Sambandha-viveka*¹ of Bhavadeva-bhaṭṭa (2) the *Sambandha-viveka*² of Śūla-pāṇi (3) the *Vivāha-tattvārṇava*³ of Śrī-nātha-ācārya-cūḍāmaṇi and (4) the *Udvāhatattva* of Raghunandana.

Works dealing with marriage.

The Bengal writers succeeding Raghunandana do not contribute substantially either to the ritual or to the legal aspect of marriage, their business having been more or less to explain the views of the great Smṛta in a popular way, thus rendering them accessible to the mass. Among the successors of Raghunandana to deal with marriage the most well-known perhaps is Gopāla Nyāya-pañcānana, author of the *Sambandha-nirṇaya*.⁴ In fact, Raghunandana marks the end of the constructive period of Smṛti writing in Bengal. The later writers devoted themselves almost exclusively to the preparation of epitomes of the well-known works of Raghunandana and also to the display of their capacities of defining the terms like Vivāha, etc. in various ways. The very names of works like *Udvāhavyavasthā*, *Udvāha-saṅkṣepa* indicate the nature of their contents. The colophon of one of these books very aptly describes the object of the author's writing it only for those who desire to have 'some' knowledge.

¹ There is a fragment of this MS. in the Dacca University collections.

² Ed. J. B. Choudhuri-Skt. Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā, 1941.

³ MS. No. 1484 belonging to the Vāṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣat, Calcutta.

⁴ Ed. S. C. Banerji, Poona Oriental Series, No. 85.

Again the works like *Vivāha-vādārtha*, *Vivāha-vicāra*, etc., are more or less scholastic treatises indulging in logical discussions on the proper implications of *Vivāha*. These discussions may have an academic value, but they throw little or no light on the social history of Bengal. The work named *Smṛti-sāgara* seems to be nothing but an attempt to preserve, in one place, the principal *Nibandhas* of Bengal dealing with marriage. The portion preserved in Dacca University is a copy of the *Udvāha-tattva* of Ragunandana. Among the post-Raghunandana writers we find also a tendency to present the rules of marriage of *Śūdras*. These works are mainly on procedure, such as the *Śūdra-Vivāha-paddhati* ascribed to one Paśupati. The *Udvāha-kaumudī* of Śrīkṛṣṇa (?) is much more than a mere work on logic and contains some rules of marriage as enjoined by the earlier writers like Raghunandana.

The well-known *Karmānuṣṭhāna-paddhati* (also called *Daśa-karma-paddhati*) of Bhavadeva-bhaṭṭa is professedly a work on the procedure of the ten *saṁskāras* and is of very little use beyond yielding a good deal of information on the ceremonial aspect of marriage as of other *saṁskāras* and also on the various Vedic incantations used in them. His *Sambandha-viveka* yet remains in manuscripts which again are sometimes of doubtful authorship and contain scanty information. The Manuscript noticed by H. P. Sastri⁵ is characterised as dealing with *Sapiṇḍa* relationship as bearing on marriage. The Ms. preserved in the Dacca University contains only three folio, and the contents which are sometimes unconnected seem to be, at best, a very brief summary of the original one. The *Ṣaṭ-Kriyā-Sāra-Dīpikā*, a comparatively less known work attributed to Gopāla Bhaṭṭa, the author of the well-known Vaiṣṇava work *Hari-Bhakti-Vilāsa*, is written on the lines of the *Karmā-nuṣṭhāna-paddhati* only with such modi-

⁵ See *Notices of SKT. MSS.*, MS. No. 399

fications as are especially applicable to the Vaiṣṇavas. Thus the book is intended only for the limited use of the Vaiṣṇava sect of the Hindu community. Hence, for the evolution of the marriage-laws and customs in Bengal we have to depend almost entirely on Śūlapāṇi, Śrīnātha and Raghunandana.

The *Udvāha-candrāloka*⁶, of the renowned scholar late Candra-Kānta Tarkālaṅkāra of Mymensingh, is a very recent work. Not even half a century has elapsed since its composition. It is an excellent treatise in the sense that, besides criticising some of the established rules of marriage, the author with profound learning and true courage suggests many new interpretations. Yet in spite of the scholastic achievements of the author his success in revolutionising the social ideas as inculcated by old writers of Bengal the chief of them being Raghunanadna, is doubtful. Hence, for our present purpose of a survey of the marriage rules taught by ancient Smṛti writers of Bengal, we may leave the *Udvāha-candrāloka* out of consideration.

The work entitled *Sambandha-cintāmaṇi* and attributed in the introductory verse to one Vācaspati who is styled Mahāmahopādhyāya and Vācaspati Miśra in the colophon, probably still remains in manuscripts. It is understood that in some parts of Assam, especially in Sylhet, this work even now exercises some influence over the local Hindu society. Some seem to be inclined to suppose the author to have been a Bengali. But the close resemblance of the author's name with that of Vācaspati Miśra, the renowned Smṛti writer of Mithilā, who also wrote a number of Smṛti works the names of which end with the word "cintāmaṇi", raises a great doubt regarding the suggested identity of the present author. Even if the *Sambandha-cintāmaṇi* be held to be a work of Bengal yet it hardly yields any more information

⁶ Pub. from Town Sherpur, Mymensingh, 1897.

than the *Udvāha-tattva* of Raghunandana so that we may leave this doubtful work out of consideration in making a survey of marriage rules prevailing in old and medieval Bengal.

Raghunandana is the first Bengali writer to attempt a critical explanation of the conception of Hindu marriage. By

Definition Vivāha.

a logical discussion of certain authoritative text and learned grammatical exposition of the word 'Dāna' in Manu's definition of Brāhma Vivāha⁷ he deduces that Vivāha is a certain mode of the bridegroom's accepting the bride so as to create Bhāryātva or wifehood in the latter⁸. This interpretation of the act of Vivāha is quite in keeping with the literal meaning of the term i. e. "taking (the girl) away in a special manner or for a special purpose", the special manner being the observance of various rites in marriage and the special purpose the creation of Bhāryātva. The definition of Vivāha given by Gopāla is less accurate as it does not expressly mention the creation of Bhāryātva as the consequence of Vivāha, which, according to him, means simply the acceptance by the bridegroom, of the bride who is offered by a competent person.⁹ This definition is apt to give rise to the anomaly that the bridegroom may accept the girl for purposes other than treating her as his wife. Indeed the imparting of Bhāryātva or of a definite legal and religious status to the girl is the sole object of the Aryan marriage.

An examination of the institution of marriage in its various aspects naturally leads us to a consideration of the

qualification of the parties to a marriage. Nothing definite has been laid down by Bengali writers with regard to the marriageable age of males. In his *Udvāha-tattva* Raghunandana,

Qualifications of the bridegroom.

⁷ Manu (N.S.p.), III. 27.

⁸ Cf. भार्यावसंपादकग्रहणं विवाहः—*Udvāha-tattva* (p.3) (Ed., Kṛṣṇacaraṇa Tarkalāṅkara) Calcutta, 1330 B.S.

⁹ Cf. पित्रादिकर्तृककन्योत्सर्गानन्तरं वरस्वीकारो विवाहः *Sambandha-nirṇaya*

like Śrinātha, cites a passage from Samvarta¹⁰ which indicates that one should marry after the period of studentship is over. This period being indefinite and varying in case of the members of the different castes we are not in a position to determine the exact age. Then again, for a long time this period has been reduced from years to days and sometimes even to hours, so that the opinion of the latest commentators regarding this particular subject becomes vaguer still. Marriage being the final saṁskāra in the life of a 'twice-born' (dvija) comes after Upanayana which usually takes place at the ages of eight, eleven and twelve respectively in the cases of Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas (cf. *Manu*. N. S. P. II. 36). Hence we can infer that these are at least the lowest limits of marriageable age among these classes while there can be no limit at all in the case of Śūdras who are not entitled to Upanayana. Thus it seems that marriage of minors was allowed in Bengal, and this conjecture is confirmed by the wide prevalence of early marriage even now-a-days not only in Bengal but also in India that necessitated the passing of the *Child Marriage Restraint Act* of 1929. Though there is no direct rule about the qualification of a bridegroom yet we can gather that the possession of good qualities has always been looked upon as an essential qualification in him, so much so that a girl even after attaining marriageable age must remain at her father's house till death rather than be married to a bridegroom devoid of good qualities¹¹. There is an incidental reference to the good family of the bridegroom, in the word "Utkṛṣṭāya" in Manu's verse¹² which Raghunandana quotes in support of the marriage of a girl before attaining marriageable age.

¹⁰ Cf. अतः परं समावृत्तः कुर्याद्धारपरिग्रहम्—*Udvāha-Tattva*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹¹ *Manu* (N.S.P.) IX. 89.

¹² *Ibid.* IX. 88.

Bengal seems to have been partial to the males in the matter of marriage. Mental and physical deformities such as idiocy, lunacy, impotency deafness, etc. Physical and mental defects. have nowhere been mentioned as the defects of a bridegroom. On the contrary, from certain passages cited by Raghunandana and some of his followers, notably, Gopāla, it is clear that men with all kinds of physical and mental defects were allowed to marry. The marriage of impotent persons has some meaning when he can beget children by appointing other persons. Jimūtavāhana in his *Dāyabhāga*¹³ tries to justify the marriage of a eunuch by referring to this practice. This vicarious mode of fulfilling one of the primary objects of marriage being obsolete in later times it is highly doubtful whether or not impotency is to be regarded as a disqualification for purposes of marriage. It may be supposed, however, that the practice was in vogue in Jimūtavāhana's time and the injunction of Parāśara,¹⁴ who is of the highest authority in Kali age, that a woman may take a second husband if the first one is impotent should be regarded as relating to impotency subsequent to marriage, and the second husband may be taken to mean the man who may be appointed to perform the duties of a husband. The *Bṛhannāradya*, quoted by only a few writers, may be quite a late work and as such its prohibition of the practice of begetting children by other persons may not apply to Jimūtavāhana's time. But the difficulty arises with Raghunandana who, on the one hand, follows this authority of the *Bṛhannāradya* and on the other seems to allow the marriage of impotent persons. The meaning of such a marriage is obscure.

¹³ *Dāyabhāga*, V 18 अस्ति च क्लीवादीनां दारपरिग्रहः।...क्लीवस्य पत्यामन्येन पुत्रोत्पादसंभवात् etc.

¹⁴ नष्टे मृते प्रव्रजिते क्लीवे च पतिते पतौ । पञ्चस्वापत्सु नारीणां पतिरन्यो विधीयते ॥ *Parāśara Smṛti*, Ed. Nageswar.

The marriage of a lunatic or of an idiot also appears to be an absurdity because they are unfit to perform the very ceremonies without the celebration of which a marriage cannot be said to have been performed.

A man having a wife is not debarred from taking another wife. In the *Udvāha-tattva* we find reference

Polygamy. to an interesting form of polygamy. A verse¹⁵, quoted from the *Gṛhastha-ratnā-*

kara, ordains that one who has got three wives, all of whom are living, must take a fourth wife; otherwise he will incur very grave sins. The same verse has been quoted by Gopāla. Though the reason behind the prohibition of having three wives is obscure, yet it is clear that according to Bengal writers polygamy was not a fault. It might be due to the superstition that the number "three" was particularly tabooed, because even to-day we find the belief that the journey of three Brāhmaṇas together is inauspicious and forebodes ill luck. The prevalence of unrestricted polygamy in Bengal after Jīmūtavāhana's times can well be inferred from the complete absence of any provision for *Ādhivedanika* or solatium to be paid to the first wife on the husband's taking a second wife, in the most authoritative Bengal Nibandhas following the *Dāya-bhāga*¹⁶. In Jīmūtavāhana's time polygamy is restricted by the condition that the husband has to pay a heavy sum to the first wife if he chooses to marry a second time. It may be that the Bengal writers, with the exception of Jīmūtavāhana, mostly flourishing after the regime of Vallāla Sena, were influenced by the Kulinism founded by that King and felt it a social necessity to give a legal sanction to unrestricted polygamy

¹⁵ त्रिविवाहं कृतं येन न करोति चतुर्थकम् । Cf. *Dharmādbikārī*, Bk I. p. 155.

—कुलानि पातयेत् सप्त भ्रूणहत्याव्रतं चरेत् ॥ *Udvāha-tattva*, op. cit. p. 66.

¹⁶ *Ādhivedanika* (solatium) has not been included in *strīdhana* by Raghunandana in his *Dāyatattva*.

because in the wake of the establishment of "Kulinism" sometimes for fear of degradation, and sometimes from a desire to elevate their position people were led to select Kulīna husbands for their daughters¹⁷ "with the result that the comparatively smaller number of the "privileged class" obtained a plurality of wives. Raghunandana, a Vandyaghāṭīya Brāhmaṇa, might have been himself a Kulīna and an unconscious supporter of polygamy so that he thought it reasonable to do away with all restrictions imposed on polygamy in the shape of solatium, etc. The mention of solatium in the *Dāyakrama-saṅgraha* of Śrīkrṣṇa does not conclusively prove that this restriction continued to be imposed even after Jimūtavāhana.

One whose elder brother is unmarried is considered incompetent to marry. He who violates this rule is called Parivettā and the offence is called Parivedana. This practice is condemned on pain of apostacy (pātitya) on the part not only of the bridegroom and the bride, but also of the superseded elder brother, the person offering the girl, and the priest conducting the marriage. This naturally necessitates the formulation of the rule that the elder and

One whose elder brother is unmarried whether competent to marry.

the younger brother cannot marry simultaneously, i. e., on the same day, or according to some, within the same year¹⁸. This rule applies only to brothers born of the same mother. Among the people outside the pale of the four recognised castes Jyeṣṭhatva or seniority is determined not by priority of birth but by the possession of superior virtues.

The younger brothers, however, do not incur any

¹⁷ *Marriage and Strīdhana*: Gooroodas Banerji, p. 45

¹⁸ एकोदरप्रसूतानामेकस्मिन्नेव वासरे। विवाहो नैव कर्तव्यो गर्गस्य वचनं तथा॥
—वासर इत्यत्र वत्सर इति ओड्देशीयाः पठन्ति व्यवहरन्ति च—*Udvāhatatva*, op. cit. p. 88.

sin by marrying before the elder brothers of the following description¹⁹:—

देशान्तरस्थक्लीवैकवृषणानसहोदरान् ।²⁰
 वेश्याभिसक्तपतितशूद्रनुत्यातिरोगिणः ॥²¹
 जडमूकान्धवधिरकुब्जवामनकुष्ठकान् ।²²
 अतिवृद्धानभार्यांश्च कृषिसक्ताभूपस्य च ॥²³
 धनवृद्धिप्रसक्तांश्च कामतः कारिणस्तथा ।²⁴
 कुलटोन्मत्तचौरांश्च परिविन्दन्न दुष्यति ॥²⁵

The younger brother, though attaining marriageable age, should wait at least three years for the unmarried elder brother who is engaged in banking business, royal service and cultivation, or is away in a foreign land. If the elder brother living abroad be unheard of the younger brother may marry after waiting only a year, and shall, on the elder brother's return, perform a quarter of the penances prescribed for the atonement of the sin of Parivedana. The rule of the three-year deference applies only to those cases where the elder brothers abroad do not devote themselves to the acquisition of learning, religious merits and wealth. In these three specific cases a waiting of twelve, ten, eight and six years is prescribed for the Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras respectively. Under normal circumstances the younger brother can never marry before the elder even with the latter's permission²⁶.

Among the elder brothers who can be superseded by the younger brothers in marriage Bhavaddevabhaṭṭa men-

¹⁹ Vide *Udvāha-tattva*, p. 92.

²⁰ Afflicted with a fatal or incurable disease.

²¹ One who cannot distinguish between what is right and what is wrong.

²² Averse to all activities.

²³ Those who are not allowed by the Śāstras to marry, eg. Vānaprastha.

²⁴ Those who act contrary to the rules enjoined by Śruti and Smṛti.

²⁵ Adopted son.

²⁶ विवाहस्त्वनुमत्यापि दोषाय—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 102

tions only the ascetic, the diseased, the brother living abroad, the impotent and the brother who has committed a great sin. Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha do not refer to the sin of parivedana.

The qualifications of the bride and the rules for selecting her are far more elaborate than those in case of the bridegroom. A Hindu marriage being more of a sacrament than a contract there is no objection to the marriage of a minor girl who is unfit to enter into any contract; on the contrary, her minority in most cases goes in her favour. So far as Bengal is concerned there is no hard and fast rule about the marriageable age of girls. The various authorities cited by Raghunandana, however, almost unanimously fix the eighth and the twelfth year as the lower and upper limits respectively of the marriageable age for girls. If this rule be violated and the girl reaches puberty at her father's house her parents along with her eldest brother will be doomed to perdition in the life hereafter. Even the man marrying such a girl out of lust shares the same fate with the additional penalty that for all practical purposes he will be treated as a Śūdra with whom even speaking will be prohibited. A custom cited from the *Mahābhārata* in this connection tends to imply that the staying of a girl at her father's house for more than twelve years of her age is not condemned if only her puberty is belated and she does not attain it there. All this seems to indicate that Raghunandana holds the attainment of puberty as the higher limit whatever the girl's actual age may be. Although so much has been said on the sinfulness of the girl's attaining the age of puberty at her father's house yet Raghunandana, after showing a careful consideration for the bride's future, supports Manu's opinion that a girl shall, on no account, be married to a bridegroom devoid of good qualities even though she may have to remain unmarried till her death owing to the

dearth of a desirable match. On the other hand, the lowest limit of eight years must not be mechanically observed if a bridegroom, desirable in all respects, be available. Hence, it is clear that despite positive rules to the contrary on purely religious grounds, Raghunandana, the practical Law-maker of Bengal, advocates late marriage and even non-marriage if it be necessary on grounds of expediency. None of the predecessors of Raghunandana in Bengal Smṛti bothers himself with the marriageable age of girls. They merely suggest that the bride should be younger than the bride-groom.

In selecting a bride one must avoid the seven kinds of girls designated as Paunarbhava²⁷ and also those that are older than the bridegroom. The girls of the following description are to be rejected for purposes of marriage:

1. Having a tawny complexion; 2. Having more limbs than usual; 3. Diseased; 4. Having excessive or no hairs on the body; 5. Garrulous; 6. Having as their names the names of a constellation, of a tree, of a river, of a mountain (?), of snakes and birds, or of serpents (?) or otherwise having fierce and base names.

The possession of such marks on palms and feet, however, as may forebode bad luck does not render a girl disqualified because Raghunandana points out that these defects produce bad results in this world and not hereafter as Pātitya etc. does. The marrying of such a girl does not cause Pātitya according to the Śāstras so that marriage confers on her the status of a wife.

It is interesting to note that none of Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha mentions any of the above disqualifications excepting disease. Among diseases are condemned only those that are incurable. This is a very practical interpretation of the word 'Arogiṇī' because it is very difficult, if not impossible,

²⁷ सप्तपौनर्भवाः कन्याः...कुलाधमाः। वाचा दत्ता मनोदत्ता कृतकौतुकमङ्गला ॥
उदकस्पर्शिता या च या च पाणिगृहीतिका। अग्निं परिगता या च पुनर्भूप्रभवा च या ॥
-*Udvāha-tatva*, p. 87

to secure a bride who will be absolutely free even from the petty diseases commonly found among many people.

Both Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha, on the authority of Yājñavalkya, enjoin that the bride should be charming²⁸. Śrīnātha does not stop merely by saying this, but explains the term Kāntā as follows—

बोदुर्मनश्चक्षुषोरानन्दकरीं, यस्यां मनश्चक्षुषोर्निर्वन्धस्तस्यां हृद्विरित्यापस्तम्बस्म-
रणात्²⁹ !

That is to say, she must be sufficiently charming so as to attract the bridegroom. The compound word 'Manas-cakṣuṣoḥ' shows that mere physical beauty is not to be sought in a bride, but that she must possess winning manners and a pleasing nature so that she may gratify not only the eyes of the bridegroom but also his mind.

The above disqualifications are not found in the incomplete work of Bhavadeva.

On the authority of Manu and Yājñavalkya Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha mention two other disqualifications of the bride, viz. brotherlessness and having an unknown father. The brotherless girl is condemned in apprehension of the 'Putrikāputratva'.³⁰ According to the interpretation of the *Mitākṣarā* "the term 'putrikāputra' is equally applicable to the son of an appointed daughter or to the daughter herself becoming, by special appointment, a son".³¹ These appointments were made for purposes of succession to the estate of a sonless man. It is not perhaps without any significance that Raghunandana is silent about both these two kinds of disqualification especially the former. That the father of the bride should not be unknown is implied by such rules as ordain the Savarṇa and Asagotra marriage of the twice born—the Savarṇatva and Asagotratva of a girl cannot, of course,

²⁸ अनन्यपूत्रिकां कान्तां etc. *Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā*, I. 3. 52.

²⁹ *Vivāha-tattvārṇava*, op. cit., Fol. 2b.

³⁰ भ्रातृमतीमिति गुप्तपुत्रिकाशङ्कानिरासार्थम् *Sambandha-viveka* of Śūlapāṇi.

³¹ *Hindu Law and Usage*—Mayne (10th Ed.), p. 113

be ascertained without a full knowledge about her father. Regarding the other disqualification it is quite possible that the system of Putrikāputra became obsolete in Raghunandana's times. That the system was fast dying out even in the days of Śūlapāṇi and perhaps of Śrīnātha also seems to be indicated by the fact that while the texts unequivocally condemned a brotherless girl they provided that even a brotherless girl might be married if there was no apprehension of *putrikāputratva* in her case³². The reference to the prohibition of a brotherless girl by Gopāla, a successor of Raghunandana, is rather puzzling but he does not adduce any evidence as to whether the system of putrikāputra or this prohibition was actually in vogue in his time, because he refers to this only by way of explaining the verse of Yājñavalkya referred to above³³.

The signs of a bride are divided by Śrīnātha into two classes, viz., Bāhya (external) and Ābhyantarīṇa (internal). Those mentioned above fall under the first class. The qualities such as intelligence, chastity, etc. are the internal signs and are, therefore, difficult to determine (Durvijñeyāni). Here, on the authority of Āśvalāyana, Śrīnātha lays down a very interesting, though crude, process of determining these internal virtues of a bride—a process not referred to by any one of the writers preceding and succeeding Śrīnātha. It is this. One has to gather soil from the following places:—(1) Fertile land, (2) Grazing field, (3) Altar (Vedikā), (4) Market place (Vikraya-sthāna), (5) Lake, (6) Barren soil (Īriṇa kṣetra), (7) Crossing of four roads (Catus-patha), and (8) Cremation ground. With each of these different kinds of

³² अभातृकापि पुत्रिकाशङ्काशुभ्या विवाह्यैव—*Sambandha-viveka of Śūlapāṇi* यदि केनापि प्रकारेण सा शङ्का निवर्तते तदाभातृकामपि परिणयेदित्युक्तं भवति—*Vivāha-tattvavāṇana*, Fol. 4a.

³³ N. C. Sen Gupta in his illuminating paper on "putrikā" ably shows that the institution became obsolete in India long before the time when the eminent Smṛti writers of Bengal flourished. This confirms our conjecture. See *J.R.A.S.B.*, Vol. IV, 1938, p. 149ff.

soil a ball is to be prepared and placed one after another. Then by suitable incantations these earthen balls are to be invoked in order to reveal the internal signs of the bride in question. She will be asked to take any one of these balls. The eight balls, when taken, prove respectively the following virtues and vices of the bride :—

(i) Possession of wealth and paddy, (ii) Possession of (domestic) beasts, (iii) Care of the (household) fire (Agni-suśrūṣā-para), (iv) Conscience, intelligence, popularity (Sarva-jana-para), (v)³⁴, (vi) Barrenness (Bandhyā), (vii) Unchastity, and (viii) Loss of husband.

Ordinarily a girl whose elder sister is unmarried is declared ineligible for marriage. A girl, married in violation of this rule, is called 'Agredidhisu' and her elder sister is styled as 'Didhisu'. Such a marriage is, however, allowed provided the marriage of the elder sister is delayed by her uncouth appearance. The Penalty prescribed for marrying the 'Didhisu' and the 'Agredidhisu' is somewhat peculiar and resembles, to some extent, the practice of specific performance in the law of contract. Besides performing the proper penance—'Kṛcchra' in the case of the husband of the 'Agredidhisu' and 'Kṛcchrātikṛcchra' in that of the husband of the Didhisu—both these persons shall have to exchange their wives mutually and shall be deprived of their conjugal rights which can never be restituted so that they will have to marry other girls. Here the Bengal school, represented by Raghunandana, differs substantially from the *Mitākṣarā* which, on Vasiṣṭha's authority, "requires each of the husbands to offer his wife to the other for the sake of form (to remove the slur) and then to use her again with his assent".³⁵

Girl whose elder sister is unmarried whether, fit to be married.

³⁴ This portion of the MS. of the *Vivāha-tatīvārṇava* is illegible

³⁵ *Hist. of Dharmaśāstra* : Kane, Vol. II, pt. I, p. 547.

The question of the maintenance of such wives, according to Bhavaddevabhaṭṭa, quoted by Raghunandana³⁶, is, however, not very clear. Should the husband of one wife maintain the wife of the other, or should they maintain their own wives? In the latter alternative there is little force in saying that the wives will be exchanged mutually, nor does that procedure inflict any punishment on the husbands beyond the fact that though they may marry a second time they must not be exempted from maintaining their first wives. In the first alternative again it smacks of indecency that the married wife of the one should put up with the other with whom she has practically no such relationship as may warrant her stay at his house. The reasonable interpretation seems to be that there will be no actual physical exchange of the wives which will be done only by mantras, and the husbands will have to maintain each other's wife. This procedure will inflict real punishment on a man who will be made to maintain a woman who is in no way related to him and as such no claim to his help. The practice of exchanging or transferring human beings from the possession of one to that of another is not unknown in the Hindu Śāstras. For example, in the ceremony of adoption the son of the natural father is killed by mantras, and by mantras again he is made to be born to the adoptive mother. Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha are silent about the question of the priority of the elder sister in marriage.

Ordinarily a man cannot marry a girl betrothed to another, and the father effecting such a marriage is to be punished like a thief. But this rule may be violated with impunity if the nominated bridegroom turns out to be of disreputable character and family, of the same Gotra, an apostate, impotent, attacked with a repugnant disease,

Girl betrothed to another man.

³⁶ परित्यक्ता च सा पोष्या भोजनाच्छादनेन च—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 103.

deceitfully showing himself off to be a desirable bridegroom and, in short, having any defect that may render him a disqualified bridegroom.

The rule of a single gift or rather of a single betrothal of the bride in normal circumstances is to be strictly observed in the five forms of marriage, viz.. (1) Brāhma, (2) Daiva, (3) Ārṣa, (4) Prājāpatya and (5) Gāndharva. But in the case of the remaining three forms, however, viz., (1) Āsura, (2) Rākṣasa and (3) Paisāca, this rule may be allowed to be violated if a bridegroom of superior qualifications be available.

The rule of a single betrothal shall not hold good if the person to whom a girl is affianced dies before marrying her. In such circumstances the father is entitled to marry her to any other person. Here Raghunandana refers also to the custom of the girl choosing at her will the younger brother of the person to whom she was betrothed. At this point Raghunandana expresses, in unequivocal terms, his opinion against widow-remarriage by saying that the rule of giving away the girl only once should be strictly observed after the ceremony of Pāṇigrahaṇa has already been completed. This implies the possibility of marrying the girl under special circumstances to any other person at any time between betrothal and Pāṇigrahaṇa.

If a person after paying bride's price (Śulka) and other things technically called Stridhana, meant for the girl who is betrothed to him, goes to a foreign land she may be married to another man after waiting a year for the former. If, however, there is any possibility of the former coming back a waiting of three years is enjoined before she can be given away to another man. This is possible because the actual giving away of the girl and not mere betrothal causes ownership of the bridegroom and before that the authority of the father over her does not cease so that he can use his discretion in marrying her to anybody else.

In case a girl is promised to be given to more than one man and all of them appear together for marriage the girl will be given away to the man to whom she was first affianced and others shall get back whatever they gave towards bride's price, etc. If, however, the first man comes after the marriage of the girl with any other man to whom she was subsequently promised the marriage cannot be void and the first man will get refund of the bride's price, etc. that might have been paid by him.

Thus we see that though ordinarily a girl, betrothed to one, cannot be married to another yet the contrary practice is allowed under special circumstances if it be necessary for the best interests of the girl concerned. None of the older writers discusses the question of the girl's betrothal.

The question of disqualification of brides, discussed above, relates to the absolute unfitness of girls for purposes of marriage. There are certain other disqualifications also which render a girl unfit to be married by particular persons.

On various authorities, e.g., Nārada, Āpastamba, Gotama, the Smṛti(?) etc., the Nibandhakāras of Bengal prohibit a man of the three twice-born classes from marrying a girl belonging to the same Gotra and pravara as his own. To understand this rule one must understand what gotra and pravara precisely mean.

By the term 'Gotra' is meant the first noteworthy Brāhmaṇa from whom a family traces its descent³⁷. The founders of gotras are, according to a verse cited by Raghunandana, eight in number. But this list seems to be merely illustrative and not exhaustive, because Raghunandana himself mentions additional Gotras e.g., Vātsya,

³⁷ वंशपरंपराप्रसिद्धमादिपुरुषब्राह्मणरूपं गोत्रम्—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 40.

Sāvarṇa etc. and in Bengal we actually find a lot of gotras not mentioned in the list.

‘Pravara’ implies the association of certain sages with a particular gotra so as to distinguish it from other gotras or from another gotra of the same name.³⁸ The same gotra may have different pravaras or different gotras may have the same pravara. Hence two persons are said to be of the same pravara when both of them have pravaras of exactly the same number and designation³⁹.

The Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are said to have no Gotra and Pravara of their own, but those of their priest. With the exception of Bhavadeva, who does not consider the Gotra and Pravara of non-brahmins, all the writers cite the authority of Āśvalāyana⁴⁰ in support of the above view. According to Śūlapāṇi⁴¹ and Śrīnātha⁴² the prohibition of marrying a girl of the same Gotra and Pravara applies only to the three twice-born classes, viz Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and not to Śūdras who are declared to have no gotra at all. Raghunandana, with the true insight and genius of an erudite scholar and a jurist, points out the anomaly that if there be no Gotra of Śūdras, it is meaningless to say, that, according to the Śāstras, they have a right to perform Śrāddha in which the mention of one’s Gotra is essential. Raghunandana displays a flash of originality in taking the particle च in the word वैश्यवच्छौचकल्पश्च in Manu’s verse V. 140 to imply that like Vaiśyas Śūdras have also the Gotra of the priest of their ancestors. Raghunandana reconciles his view with that of his predecessors by saying that the prohibition of

³⁸ प्रवरस्तु गोत्रप्रवर्तकस्य मुनेर्व्यावर्तको मुनिगणः—*ibid.* p. 40.

³⁹ संज्ञासंख्ययोरन्यूनानतिरिक्तत्वेन—*Ibid.* p. 48.

⁴⁰ “पौरोहित्यान् राजन्यविशां प्रवृणीत” (*Āśvalāyana Śraūta-sūtra*, Anandās-rama series, No 81, Poona, 1917, I 3. p. 13—quoted in the *Udvāha-tattva*)

⁴¹ असमानार्षगोत्रजामिति ब्राह्मणादिवर्णत्रयविषयम्—*Sambandha-viveka*.

⁴² असमानार्षगोत्रजामिति तु त्रैवर्णिकपरं शूद्रस्य गोत्रासंभवात् (*Vivāha-tattvavāya*)

marrying a girl of the same Gotra and Pravara does not apply to Śūdras not because they have no Gotra but because their Gotra is अतिदिष्टातिदिष्ट or substitution of substitution. The Gotra of Śūdras is such because once the Gotra of Brāhmaṇas is substituted in the case of Vaiśyas (and, of course, of Kṣatriyas) and the Gotra of the Vaiśyas again is re-substituted in the case of Śūdras. The above injunction of Āśvalāyana provides for the substitution of the Gotra of a Brāhmaṇa as in the case of Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, but not for the re-substitution of the Gotra of the latter as in the case of Śūdras.

Raghunandana's view that the non-Brahmins have no Gotra of their own is not very clear and is open to serious controversy. Golap Śāstri points out, and perhaps rightly, that "Viśvāmitra, who was a Kṣatriya by birth, and Vaśiṣṭha, who was not a pure Brāhmaṇa by birth, are admittedly founders of Gotras or ancestors of many founders of Gotras⁴³. "The same scholar argues thus—"this explanation (of non-Brahmins having no independent Gotra) cannot possibly be correct inasmuch as the Gotras of a non-Brahmin will then, from time to time, vary when a family of Guru becomes extinct and a new Guru of a different Gotra is selected. Besides, the office may devolve on the death of the Guru to his daughter's son whose Gotra must be different from that of the deceased and consequently the Gotra of the disciple may accordingly undergo a change". If the non-Brahmins be declared to have no independent gotra but only that of their Brāhmaṇa priests it becomes difficult to explain how some of the non-Brahmins of the present-day have such Gotras as Ālimyān, Maudgalya etc. which are not included in the traditional list of the Gotras of the Brahmins, which is as follows :—

जमदग्निर्भरद्वाजो विश्वामित्रात्रिगोतमाः ।

वशिष्ठकाश्यपागस्त्या मुनयो गोत्रकारिणः ।⁴⁴

⁴³ *Hindu—Law*, p. 68

⁴⁴ See *Udvāha-tatva*, p. 40

Girls related to a person within certain degrees of relationship, generally called prohibited degrees, cannot be married by him.

Prohibited degrees of relationship.

Raghunandana fully appreciated the confusing subtleties of the elaborate discussions on prohibited degrees of relationship in marriage and, therefore, after a thorough examination of the bewildering and apparently conflicting texts put his principal deductions in a nutshell (Saṅkṣepa). Briefly stated, the following relations have been declared by the commentators as ineligible for marriage⁴⁵ :—

Rule 1 (a) The female descendants, as far as the seventh degree, from the father and his six ancestors, namely, the grand-father, etc.

(b) The female descendants, as far as the seventh degree, from the father's bandhus and their six ancestors through whom those females are related.

(c) The female descendants, as far as the fifth degree, from the maternal grand-father and his four ancestors namely, the maternal great-grand-father, etc.

(d) The female descendants, as far as the fifth degree, from the mother's bandhus and their four ancestors through whom those females are related.

The father's bandhus or bāndhavas are⁴⁶ :—

1. Father's father's sister's son, 2. Father's mother's sister's son, 3. Father's mother's brother's son.

The mother's bandhus are:—

2. Mother's Mother's sister's son, 2. Mother's father's sister's son,

⁴⁵ Gooroodas Banerji: *Marriage and Stridhana*, p. 67

⁴⁶ S. V. Karandikar in his *Hindu Exogamy* (Bombay, 1929), pp. 203-4 erroneously supposes that no Smṛti writer anterior to Raghunandana ever contemplated to extend sapinda exogamy to the Pitr-bandhus and Mātṛ-bandhus. In this Raghunandana simply follows śūlāpāṇi and Śrinātha, his predecessors in the field.

3. Mother's mother's brother's son,
Rule II

A step-mother's brother's daughter and his daughter's daughter are also not to be married.

The above rules, however, have certain exceptions the chief of them being as follows:—

I. A girl who is removed by three Gotras from the original stock i.e., from the family of one's father, father's bandhu in the paternal line and from the family of maternal grand-father and mother's bandhu in the maternal line, can be taken in marriage though she is related within the seventh and the fifth degree as described above.

II. Certain authorities, notably Paithīnasi⁴⁷, prohibiting (as an alternative to the above rules) a man's marriage with the girls up to the fifth and the third degree on the paternal and maternal lines respectively have been construed by Śūlapāṇi to apply to the Āsura and the three other inferior forms of marriage (in the case of Brāhmaṇas?) and to all the forms of marriage in the case of Kṣatriyas⁴⁸ etc. In other words, Brāhmaṇas in the four disapproved forms of marriage, and Kṣatriyas in all the forms are allowed to marry within the prohibited degrees provided they do not marry within the fifth degree from father's side and third degree from mother's. Banerji⁴⁹ maintains that this view of Śūlapāṇi holds good when a "fit match is not otherwise procurable" but the original Mss. of Śūlapāṇi's work does not contain any such restriction on this rule. Furthermore, this rule does not apply to the marriage

⁴⁷ असमानार्थेयी कन्यां वरयेत्... त्रीन् मातृतः पञ्च पितृतो वा—*Udvāṭatīva*, p. 29

⁴⁸ त्रीन् पञ्चेति आसुरादिनिन्दितविवाहचतुष्टयविषयं क्षत्रियादिविषयं च—*Sambandh-viveka* of Śūlapāṇi.

⁴⁹ *Marriage and Stridhana op, cit*, p. 70.

of Kṣatriyas alone as held by Dr. Banerji but to the marriage of all the inferior classes beginning with Kṣatriyas as seems to be indicated by the word Kṣatriyādi in Śūlapāṇi's text.

Raghunandana, however, does not subscribe to this view but takes Paithīnasi's text to mean that the girls up to the fifth and third degrees are particularly prohibited as marriage within such degrees leads to greater sin⁵⁰ than marriage within the degrees beyond.

A verse from the *Matsyasūkta*, quoted in the *Udvāha-tattva*, prohibits a man from marrying the daughter of his disciple or of his initiator to Vedic studies.

Daughter of disci-
ple or of preceptor.

A man cannot marry a girl bearing his mother's nick or real name. If he does so through inadvertence he will have to desert his wife in addition to performing the penance called Cāndrāyaṇa. If, however, the fact of the girl's having such a name is discovered after betrothal her name will have to be changed by Brāhmaṇas at the permission of her father and then she will be eligible for marriage.

Girl having the
name of one's mo-
ther.

Though inter-caste marriage, or, at least Anuloma marriage was held valid by some of the *Dharmaśāstras* yet the Nibandhas of Bengal are unanimous in prohibiting it on various authorities of which the *Bṛhannāradya* deserves special mention⁵¹. References by Jīmūtavāhana and Raghunandana to Asavarṇa sons inheriting father's property cannot be held as positive proofs of the prevalence of intercaste marriage in those times. These are mentioned only by way of explaining certain authorities notably Yājñavalkya.

Inter-caste marriage.

⁵⁰ त्रीनित्याद्यधिकदोषार्थम्—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 30

⁵¹ द्विजानामसवर्णसु कन्यासुपयमस्तथा—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 49

After discussing and reconciling various divergent texts, chiefly those of Nārada, Viṣṇu, and Yājñavalkya Raghunandana deduces the following order of guardianship over a girl for purposes of marriage:—

1. Father, 2. Brother, 3. Paternal grand-father, 4. Sākulya i. e., somebody in the paternal line except those mentioned above, 5. Maternal grand-father, 6. Maternal uncle, 7. Mother, 8. Some male member in the maternal line except those mentioned above.

While Bhavadevabhaṭṭa omits from the list the maternal grandfather, maternal uncle and the last one. Śūlapāṇi and Śrīnātha do not give any rule about guardianship in marriage.

The great condition for persons to be fit for giving away a girl in marriage is that they must be free from the defects of insanity, apostacy, etc. In the absence of all the guardians mentioned above a girl is to be allowed to choose, as her own husband, a man having the requisite qualifications of marrying her⁵².

In this matter, as in many others the Bengal school as represented by its leading authorities, differs materially from the Mitākṣarā school which in pursuance of the authority of Yājñavalkya, gives no place to maternal relations in this particular matter.

We have discussed above the possible disqualifications of both the bridegroom and the bride. A question arises in this connection as to whether according

The above rules whether directory or obligatory. to the Nibandhakāras these invalidate a marriage once performed or whether these rules, or at least some of them, are merely directory. Let us, therefore, examine the effects of these disqualifications on marriage. Briefly

⁵² गम्यं त्वभावे दातृणां कन्या कुर्यात् स्वयंवरम्—*Udvāha-śāstra*, p. 122

speaking, the rules condemning disqualifications in brides and bridegrooms may be divided into three classes:—

(1) Those which are merely directory and can, therefore, be violated with impunity, (2) Those which, if violated, cause degradation of the husband, (3) Those which, if violated, render a marriage void.

All the prohibitory rules mentioned above save those with regard to Parivedana, Didhisu and Agredidhisu, the identity of Gotra, prohibited degrees of relationship and to a girl's bearing the name of one's mother, are merely directory. The violation of these directory rules was perhaps looked down upon by the orthodox section of the community but otherwise it inflicted no social or legal punishment on the person concerned.

A man marrying before his elder brother becomes fallen or degraded. Not only this. Such a marriage also causes degradation of the bride, the superseded elder brother, the person offering the bride, and also of the priest conducting the marriage.

It is doubtful whether identity of Gotras of the bridegroom and the bride renders a marriage void or causes degradation or both. From the authoritative texts quoted by Raghunandana in this connection we find that a person entering into such a marriage without any knowledge of the identity of Gotras shall forego his conjugal rights over the wife who will, however, be entitled to maintenance. If he be perfectly aware of Sagotratva before marriage the punishment is much heavier. He will then have to desert his wife, perform Cāndrāyana and then to maintain the wife. Again a verse of Āpastamba, quoted by Raghunandana, clearly puts forth that a man entering into such a marriage shall degrade from Brahmanism not only himself but also his issues.

Thus it seems that according to Raghunandana such a marriage can be avoided at the discretion of the hus-

band. By such a marriage he becomes degraded and if he does not choose to remain so he may remove the slur by deserting his wife and performing Cāndrāyaṇa.

A man marrying within the prohibited degrees becomes degraded along with his children and is to be regarded as a Śūdra. Such a marriage is not void. The prohibitory rule regarding the step-mother's brother's daughter and his daughter's daughter does not mention the consequences of its violation. From its similarity with the rules of prohibited degree it seems the violation of the former rule has the same consequences as that of the latter.

A man inadvertently marrying a girl bearing his mother's name is required to desert the wife and also to perform the penance of Cāndrāyaṇa. Here the marriage is void and the husband is not required to maintain the wife so deserted.

It seems extremely peculiar that though inter-caste marriage is vehemently opposed by the Nibandhakāras they are absolutely silent, in their treatises on marriage, about the exact consequences of such a union a fact from which one may almost feel tempted to deduce that the rule was merely directory. But the way in which it has been condemned and is condemned even to-day by the orthodox Hindus makes us believe that such a marriage resulted in degradation of the husband, if not in the avoidance of the marriage. It may well be that the punishment for the violation of this rule was only too well-known to be emphasised.

The marriage of the younger sister when the elder is unmarried is void except in certain special cases where such a marriage is allowed by the Śāstras, e.g., when the marriage of the elder is delayed by her uncouth appearance, etc. In such cases, as already shown, the husbands of the elder and younger sisters shall, after performing proper

Effect of marriage
of younger sister
when elder sister is
unmarried,

penance, mutually exchange their wives over whom they will have no conjugal rights and then they will take other wives. Even then they are not exempted from maintaining their first wives. The exception that the younger sister can be married away before the elder if the latter's marriage is delayed by her uncouth appearance is pointed out by Raghunandana for the first time because his renowned predecessor Bhavadeva does not mention any such exception and it appears that the rule was very strictly observed. Śūlapāṇi does not raise the topic at all. This exception at once shows the originality of Raghunandana as well as the changed ideas of a progressive society.

From the foregoing discussions it is clear that almost in every case where the wife is to be deserted, she is entitled to maintenance and in this sense a Hindu marriage can hardly be void. As a matter of fact some sort of relationship seems ever to subsist between the husband and the wife who is deserted. This is probably because a Hindu marriage is more than a mere contract it is also a sacrament; hence even though the contract may be irregular the marriage tie cannot be fully broken. The marriage of the Hindus is so indissoluble that, according to an authoritative text cited by Raghunandana, a woman can never be deprived of her widowhood even though sold off or deserted by the husband⁵³.


Thus Raghunandana distinctly sets forth his opinion against a complete severance of the relation between the husband and the wife. This idea has been dominating the Hindu mind ever since the dawn of Hindu civilisation. There have been rules for the desertion of the wife or degradation of the husband in a marriage contrary to Śāstric injunctions shaped according to the ever-changing

⁵³ न निष्क्रयविसर्गभ्यां मर्तुर्भायां विमुच्यते—*Udvāha-tattva*, p. 228.

social ideals but the wife has, in most cases, been allowed a maintenance. The rule for the wives' maintenance in those cases was perhaps made out of a sense of social justice; because in a Hindu marriage contract the girl being almost in all cases a minor has no hand at all as her father is the absolute master so that if a marriage turns out to be irregular thus necessitating her desertion she is not at all to blame. Therefore, it will be extremely unbecoming of the Hindus with a finished civilisation to leave her to her fate when she is deserted for no fault of her own.

Strictly speaking, divorce is not allowed by the Nibandhakāras even when the wife is to be deserted in the above cases.

Divoree not allowed.



SANSKRIT DRAMA IN A COMPARATIVE LIGHT

By K. C. PANDEY

Antiquity of dramatic art in India

DRAMATIC art was very highly developed in India long before Indian people came into close contact with Greeks, consequent on Alexander's invasion in 326 B.C. For, Pāṇini, whose date is generally accepted to be the 4th century B. C. refers to two works on Dramaturgy, one by Kṛśāsva and the other by Siāli in his famous work on grammar, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. These works are irrecoverably lost. We know them through references only. Therefore the view of some western scholars that the rise of Dramatic art in India was due to the Greek influence, is without any sound basis.

Textual Authorities

The authorities, on the basis of which I am writing, are (i) The *Nāṭya-sāstra* of Bharata, which belongs to the 6th century A. D. and (ii) The *Abhinava-Bhāratī* of Abhinavagupta of the 10th century A. D. Though there were written many other commentaries on the *Nāṭya-sāstra*, such as *Harṣa Vārtika* by King Harṣa Vardhana of Kannauj (7th century A. D.) and others by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Bhaṭṭa Udbhata, yet we know them only from references in Abhinavagupta's commentary.

What Does Sanskrit Drama Present ?

Bharata has written on drama from three points of view : (i) of a dramatist, (ii) of an actor and (iii) of stage-manager. In this paper I propose to present the point of view of dramatist only and shall confine myself to answering the question—

What does Sanskrit Drama present ?

I have chosen this topic because Aristotle in the course of his famous definition of tragedy refers to this aspect. Tragedy, according to him “is imitation of worthy or illustrious and perfect action”. Action or fable is the soul of tragedy. I shall discuss this part of the definition of tragedy after I shall have drawn a clear picture of what Sanskrit Drama presents.

Two Aspects of the object

The object that Sanskrit dramatist presents has two aspects (i) Rasa and (ii) Itivṛtta, fable or plot. They are related as soul and body. ‘Rasa’ is the soul. “Kāvyaṃ rasātmakam vākyam” and ‘Itivṛtta’ is the body of drama. “Itivṛttam hi kāvyasya śarīram parikīrtitam.” If we take the word “Rasa” not in the sense of a unity of situation, mimetic changes, transient emotions and the basic mental state Vibhāvānubhāvāvyaabhicārisamyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ, but in the sense of basic mental state (sthāyin) as Mammāṭa and others do. “Sthayībhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ” we may say that what the dramatist presents is nothing but a basic mental state manifesting or expressing itself in a series of actions in a number of situations, which logically leads to the realisation of one of recognised goals of human life Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. Dramatist presents a basic human tendency, a persisting state of mind, a basic emotion, which is aroused by a situation, in which the hero finds himself. It expresses itself not only in action but also in a variety of mimetic changes and transient emotions according as the situation varies. It persists till the attainment of the objective, howsoever the situation may change. No doubt psycho-physical responses vary as the situation changes. But all responses are dictated by the basic emotion. It is like an occasion from which varying transient emotions rise like waves—“Sthāyinyunmagna nirmagnāḥ kallolā iva vāridhau.” No change in the situation can up-root it. On the contrary,

the greater the change in the situation the stronger is the root that it takes in heart and mind. It colours the entire outlook of the person whose heart and mind it sways.

But let us confine our discussion to action and leave aside the emotive cause of it. Let us consider the body of Sanskrit Drama and eliminate its soul from our discussion. Because it is on this point that the conception of drama, as we find in Bharata and Abhinavagupta, bears marked similarity with the conception of Greek Drama, as presented by Aristotle in his Poetics.

Action and its Agent

The agent of the action, that a Sanskrit Drama presents, must be an ideal person. He should have nothing repulsive in the total make up of his personality. He should be beautiful in form, noble in birth, firm in determination and possessed of the qualities of forbearance and enthusiasm. Above all he should morally be so strong that under no circumstance he can be made to deviate from the path of virtue. Thus the object that a Sanskrit Drama presents is basic emotion of an ideal hero which expresses itself in a series of actions in a variety of situations.

Similarity with Aristotelian Conception of Tragic Action

The first part of Aristotle's definition according to Buckley's translation runs as follows:—

Tragedy is an imitation of worthy or illustrious and perfect action, possessing magnitude. We have defined action, that a Sanskrit dramatist presents in terms of Agent, the source and its essential nature. It is interesting to find that Aristotle also considers action under these very heads. His idea of the nature of tragic action, therefore, will become clear if we consider the following points: (i) what constitutes perfection of action, (ii) Sources of action and (iii) Agent or Hero.

In order to grasp fully the meaning of perfect action we have to recall to our minds, Aristotelian conception of *Soul*, the principle of life and therefore, the main spring of all actions.

According to Aristotle, there are four aspects of Soul : (i) Nutritive, (ii) Sensitive, (iii) Appetitive and (iv) rational or intellective. Each aspect is responsible for some kind of action or another. Of these, the first is thoroughly irrational. Second and third are partly rational and partly irrational, inasmuch as they submit to the control of reason but not necessarily always. The last is purely rational. The first is responsible for motion or activity of growth, procreation and decay, and represents plant soul. The second and third characterise the animal soul in so far as they are not under the direction of reason.

The tragic imitation has nothing to do with the action of these types because tragedy is not an imitation of action of plant or that of animal, and for that matter, not even of that which, though found in man, is essentially the characteristic action of plant or animal, in which the nutritive, sensitive and appetitive aspects of the soul do not submit to the command of reason. It is strictly confined to the action, which is characteristically human ; which is the result of long and continuous struggle between the two opposing forces, nutritive, sensitive and appetitive on one side and rational on the other, of victory of the latter over the former and of consequent submission of the first three to the last.

Tragic imitation has nothing to do with immoral and sinful action. Nor has it to do with accidental and isolated action that follows from equally accidental and isolated victory of the latter over the former and consequent unwilling and grudging submission on the part of the former to the dictates of the latter. On the contrary, it has to do with a series of action that is due to the habitual submission of

the irrational and partly rational aspects to the purely rational aspect of the soul, a series that leads to one end.

(i) *Perfect Action*

We have shown above that soul, according to Aristotle, is not all reason. It is made up of irrational as well as rational parts. Human soul is not only rational but also nutritive, sensitive and appetitive. Perfection in action, therefore, consists, not in the enslavement of the latter by the former, but in the harmonious working and perfect co-operation between the opposing forces. In order that the end of human life may be fully realised, the different parts of the soul must act in the right way; there should exist right relation between reason, feeling and desire. Hence the *perfect action*, which is the object of tragic imitation, is not the perfect action of reason as such, the contemplation of the pure ideas, in which intellectual efficiency or virtue, wisdom or insight consists; but the perfect action of the emotional aspect of soul, which consists in the rational attitude towards bodily appetites, fear, danger, anger, desire for economic good, fame and so on; in keeping the *mean* between two extremes. In short, perfect action is virtuous action, which springs from moral disposition or habit of will, voluntary action, consciously purposive action, freely chosen action, the action which is the realisation of the specific human nature, which makes manifest the essential nature of human being as such, which distinguishes man from every other creature and which consists not in mere bodily existence or sensuous feeling, the exercise of the vegetable and animal function, but in harmonious co-operation between the rational and the irrational aspects of soul.

(ii) *Sources of Action*

Tragedy is presentation of action. Every action presupposes an agent, by whom it is effected. The ques-

tion, therefore, is what is it in the agent that is responsible for the action that tragedy represents? The manners and sentiments are the main springs.

Manners are nothing but moral habits, which are formed by repeated efforts at the subordination and subjugation of the irrational parts of the soul to the rational in a variety of situations, in which the agent finds himself and is called upon to act. They constitute one of the main springs of action and are responsible for giving a certain quality to it.

Relative Position of Manners and Action

Manners give a certain character to the hero. But his actions are responsible for his happiness or misery. Therefore, tragedy which is a presentation of action, cannot exist without action. It may exist without manners. The end of tragedy is not the imitation of manners. It may *involve manners because of action*. The Action and fable are the end of tragedy. Such tragedies exist as are without manners. The manners are responsible for deliberate choice in regard to both word and action. Hence those speeches are without manners in which there is no evidence of choice of expression.

Sentiments

Sentiment in this context is discursive energy of reason, not expressed but in mind which is one of the main springs of action.

(iii) *Tragic Hero is A Better Man than we are*

According to Aristotle, men are of three kinds : 1. better, or 2. worse than we are and 3. like ourselves. Epic, such as that of Homer, imitates better men than we are. Tragedy and Comedy differ from each other because of the difference in their objects of imitation. The former imitates better and the latter worse men. The former is the presentation of the beautiful and the latter that of the ugly.

Thus, according to Aristotle, tragic action is a series of actions, which springs from moral habits and discursive energy of reason of the hero, who is a better man than we are.

This definition of action cannot apply to comic action, because comedy imitates worse men than we are. It cannot apply to tragedy either because such an action can never logically lead to tragic end. Hence Aristotle has slightly modified his definition of tragedy by introducing into it the element of error, as very essential. Let us now deal with it.

Tragic Error

Now the question that we have to answer is that if tragedy is representation of perfect action and, therefore, of perfect man how can there be anything in it such as can be responsible for excitation of pity? For, pity arises from the sight of suffering and how can a person, who is morally perfect, meet with what is pitiable. To represent such a man falling into adverse conditions from the prosperous, is impious but neither a subject of commiseration nor of terror.

To answer this question, Aristotle seems slightly to modify the definition of tragedy. He maintains that the hero of tragedy should neither be a worthy or morally perfect man, nor a depraved person, who falls from prosperity into adversity, but a character between the two, who neither excels in virtue and justice, nor is changed through vice and depravity from a state of great renown and prosperity into that of disrepute and adversity, but who experiences this change through some great error as does Oedipus, for example. What he actually means by this becomes clear if we fully understand his theory of error as discussed in his Ethics and apply it to the action and consequent fate of Oedipus.

Three Types of Action

There are three types of action : (i) Voluntary, (ii) not Voluntary and (iii) involuntary. Voluntary action is that, on account of which agent *is praised or blamed, according as it happens to be in accordance with the principle of virtue or otherwise*. Involuntary action on the other hand is that for which the agent is either excused or pitied. Involuntary action is divided into two kinds : (i) that which is done on compulsion and (ii) that which is done through ignorance.

(i) Action under compulsion

Compulsory action is that, which is wholly caused by what is external to the agent, when he does not contribute anything to it, when he is, as if it were, carried away by a storm of wind or dragged by some one of overwhelming power per force. There are, however, actions, to which though a man is forced by the external cause, yet the force is not so overwhelming as not to leave any room for choice to the agent. For instance, suppose a tyrant bids a person to do something, which is positively disgraceful and threatens to kill his nearest relations, parents and children, in case of refusal to carry out the behest. Or take another instance. A ship is over-taken by storm and to save the lives of the passengers and crew it is necessary to throw away the cargo. The question arises "Is the committal of the disgraceful deed, or throwing away of the cargo under the circumstances, voluntary or involuntary ? It is not a voluntary act in so far as it would not have been done but for the compulsion from outside, yielding to which is lesser evil than total indifference to it. But inspite of the compulsion there is still choice left to the agent. Such actions, therefore, are of mixed nature, partly voluntary and partly involuntary.

(ii) *Action through Ignorance*

The other kind of involuntary action is that which is done through ignorance, not of the principles, which determine the choice, nor of the universals, but of the particulars, agent, object, means, circumstances, end, deed and manner. An act done through ignorance of any of them is involuntary, provided the agent really feels sorry when he discovers the particulars in the ignorance of which the deed was done. Such acts are the ground of pity and pardon. For, they are really involuntary.

Thus when Aristotle talks of error as the cause of change of hero's condition from prosperous into adverse and holds it to be primarily responsible for the tragic emotion in the spectator, he means the ignorance of particulars of action. This will become clear if we apply what we have said in regard to action, done through ignorance, to the case of Oedipus.

The Facts, Oedipus was Ignorant of

Laius, king of Thebes, had been told at Delphi by the Oracle that a son would be born to him, who would slay him and Marry his wife. Therefore, when Iocasta, the queen, bore a son, the babe was given to a shepherd to be exposed on a mountain. This man, in pity, gave it to another shepherd, who took it to Corinth and there it was brought up as the son of king Polybus and was named Oedipus.

Years went by, once, at a feast, young Oedipus was taunted with not being the real son of Polybus. He went to ask the Oracle at Delphi and there he was told that it was his destiny to kill his father and to marry his mother. He, therefore, resolved never to go near Corinth again and took the road going towards the East. On the way he met Laius without knowing who he was. A quarrel occurred. Oedipus slew Laius and three of his followers. Only that she-

pherd, who had been asked to expose the child (Oedipus), escaped. Oedipus reached Thebes at a time when Thebes was being plagued by the Sphinx. He guessed the monster's riddle and the monster hurled himself from a rock. Oedipus was made the king of Thebes and married Iocasta.

After sixteen years a great calamity visited Thebes and the drama begins with Oedipus on the stage facing a crowd led by a priest.

We find that life of Oedipus in nothing but a series of errors. He kills his father and marries his own mother. But all this is done in ignorance of the particulars. While he is killing his father he is ignorant of the fact that the person, at whom he is aiming his blow, is his father. The same is true in the case of his marriage with his mother. The fact is that he fled from Corinth, where he was brought up as the son of the king of the land, for the simple reason that in case he lived there, there was a possibility of the prophesy of the Oracle at Delphi turning out to be true. He is a man of very strong character and strict moral principles. But he is ruled by destiny, which keeps him ignorant of the particulars. Thus Oedipus errs inasmuch as he is ignorant of the particulars, and his acts are involuntary, because he feels extremely sorry for them as soon as the particulars are revealed to him and suffers the doom from his own hands and therefore, arouses pity and fear. As such he is a fit hero for the tragedy.

We have so far been concerned with that part of Aristotle's definition of tragedy, which defines the nature of action that tragedy represents. The concluding part of Aristotle's definition of tragedy states the aim of tragic representation. To effect purification, or katharsis from emotions, such as pity and fear, through those very emotions, is the aim of tragedy.

There is a logical connection between the two parts. The former states the cause and the latter the effect, the tra-

gic experience. The one deals with the action, which is primarily to be persented by tragedy and the other states the effect which it aims at producing in the spectator. These two parts together deal with tragedy philosophically.

Logical Analysis of Tragic action

Having thus dealt with the tragedy metaphysically and ethically let us subject it now to logical analysis. The fact is that Aristotle himself, is concerned with the logical analysis of tragedy. We know that of the ten categories of Aristotle the first four are: (i) substance, (ii) quantity, (iii) relation and (iv) quality. In fact, it is only with these four that he deals at some length. The last six he passes over lightly.

We know that the subject of a proposition is, according to Aristotle, identical with his first category, the substance. The rest of the categories are simply answers to various possible questions in regard to the first. Having, therefore, represented tragedy to be a substance by putting it as a subject of a proposition, he proceeds to define it in terms of relation by speaking of it as an imitation of action.

Qualitative Analysis of Tragedy

The following are the six parts of Tragedy which give it its qualities:—

1. Ornament of the spectacle or scenery, 2. Diction, 3. Song, 4. Manner, 5. Sentiment, and 6. Action, fable or plot.

Quality of Tragic Action

Let us confine ourselves to action again. Magnitude should be the quality of action. It should be complete. It is only the completeness of action that can give it magnitude. For every action that is conceived as complete has well defined stages. They form a subject matter of discussion in the works on dramaturgy both in the west and the east. Bharata, for instance, admits five stages of action

similar to those admitted by Shakespearian critics. But Aristotle admits three only : (i) Beginning, (ii) Middle and (iii) End.

Beginning

Although in his Poetics, he deals with it only summarily and is content with saying that beginning is that which is *posterior to nothing but* from which something is expected to follow, we can get a clear idea of it if we turn our attention to his Ethics. The question, therefore, arises what is that element of action which is posterior to nothing ; what is the starting point of action ; at what point does the action begin ? The answer to this question will not be difficult if we remember that action, according to Aristotle, is not merely physical but psycho-physical. The physical action, the movement of the various parts of the body, necessary for the attainment of an end, is not independent but is always controlled and directed by the will, which chooses the means necessary for the realisation of the end. The first stage of action, as presented in tragedy, is therefore, constituted by what is involved in the choice, selection and fixing upon the means to the desired end.

If, for instance, we take the Oedipus of Sophocles, we find that the part of the drama from the time when Oedipus comes upon the stage and talks to the citizens who come to seek relief from the calamity, that has visited Thebes, to the arrival of prophet, who reveals Oedipus himself to be the murderer of the late king, the drama is concerned with the presentation of choice necessitated by the situation that had arisen after due deliberation about the particulars of action. In fact, he himself says :—

“I have wept full many tears, gone many ways in wandering of thought. And the sole remedy which well pondering I could find, this I have put into act.”

The Middle

We shall be able to get a clearer idea of what constitutes the middle of a complete action, if we have a clear notion of Aristotle's conception of fable or plot, which is the end of tragedy, because tragedy primarily aims at presenting action.

Fable or plot is nothing but combination of incidents. Incidents involve action because they are fruition of action. Plot is spoken of as the end of tragedy, because the presentation of one isolated, incomplete and imperfect action cannot make a tragedy. A series of actions complete in themselves but logically connected with one another, co-operating in the production of one ultimate end is necessary for tragedy. It has contents, through which it allures the souls of the spectator,. Just as different colours, thrown on canvas, without any design, are not attractive, so are not unconnected actions. Plot differs from actions only in regard to logical connection. It is the principal part of tragedy. It is the soul of tragedy.

Plot is of two kinds—(i) simple and (ii) complex. The one differs from the other inasmuch as the latter has complication and resolution while the former is without them. And further, while latter has revolution and discovery the former is without them.

Complication :—

All external circumstances and some of those that are internal frequently constitute complication. It is constituted by that part of the plot which extends from the beginning to that point from which change in the fortune of the hero begins. It consists of occurrences which stand in the way of fruition of hero's action. These occurrences shroud some particulars of action in darkness so that the end seems to recede farther and farther from the hero. They may be due to the fact that the means em-

ployed by the hero unexpectedly turn out to be most unsuited to the end, so that they create further difficulties and render the already rough path to the attainment of the objective rougher still. They embarrass rather than help the hero. In them the hero gets entangled in the course of his progress towards the destined end. Hence complication is also called entanglement.

If we take, for instance, Oedipus of Sophocles, we find that complication begins with the arrival of prophet, who was expected to reveal the name of the murderer of the late Thebian king. He, however, declares that Oedipus himself is the murderer. At such a declaration all feel generally surprised. And Oedipus is particularly surprised because it is against the fact of his personal experience no less than against the persistent rumour that the late king was killed by robbers. It shakes the faith of Oedipus to its very foundation in Oracle. It obscures the immediate issue and arouses the suspicion of Oedipus that Creon, his present wife's brother, is plotting against him to turn him out of Thebes in order to get the throne. It leads to the exchange of hot words between Oedipus and prophet and so on till a messenger comes from Corinth, where Oedipus was brought up as a prince and where-from he fled for fear of the possibility of his killing his supposed father and marrying his equally supposed mother.

Resolution or Disentanglement

Resolution or disentanglement is that part of tragedy which extends from the beginning of change in the hero's fortune to the end. We have said before, that error, the mistake about the particulars of action, is a very important fact in tragedy. Resolution, therefore, is concerned with the exposure of the error, with the removal of the shroud which conceals the particulars of action from the hero,

with the removal of doubt about the efficiency of the means employed, however surprising the complications brought about by them may be and with removal of doubt about the outcome of action, howsoever unwelcome it may be. The idea of resolution will become clear if we take that part of the plot of Oedipus, in which the two persons who knew the secret of the hero's birth and parentage come and reveal the secret, which they had kept to themselves so far and clear the mystery in which the birth of Oedipus was shrouded to the end, which is marked by the suicide by the queen and putting out of the eyes and infliction of banishment by the hero on himself.

Aristotle mentions two other parts of a complete action :— (1) Revolution, and (2) Discovery. The middle, according to Aristotle, is made up of all the four, mentioned above. It excludes only that part, which is concerned with the result of discovery and is therefore called end.

The five stages of action, admitted by Shakesperean critics, are nothing but an elaboration of the three mentioned by Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle himself had pointed the way out to it by dividing the middle into four parts.

Quantitative Analysis of Tragedy

The following four are the parts of tragedy according to quantity. Into these parts it is that the whole Tragedy is divided. They are common to all tragedies.

1. *Prologue*

Prologue is that part of tragedy which is prior to the entrance of the chorus. The function of the prologue is to convey information to the audience about the circumstances of the action, the situation from which the main action of the tragedy arises. It is a part of the dramatic technique. It is one of the means of conveying the necessary information about the unrepresentable part of the

plot. The point will become clear if we take the introductory part of "Agamemnon" for example. It may be summarised as follows :—

A watchman is seen on the tower, leaning on his elbow and gazing into the distance. He begins to talk to himself about the hardness of the task given to him. And while thus complaining, he discovers the beacon fire, a sign of victory of his master and so freedom from the task. He gets down and goes inside the palace to tell the news of the victory of his master. A noise of pleasure is heard and attracted by that noise, twelve elders of the Argos enter. The whole group was the Chorus.

Chorus represents a group of elders of the state. All its functions are classified under the following three heads :—

1. Chorus as spectators in the drama.
2. Chorus as spectators of the drama.
3. Chorus as a part of dramatic technique.

The following functions are put under the first head.

(a) Chorus serves the purpose of the crowd. The heroes of Greek tragedies are leaders of democratic states. We know what the importance of a crowd, particularly of elders, is in a democratic state. The hero therefore, was in occasional need of a crowd, such as the chorus represented. Hence chorus was natural in Greek tragedy.

(b) It serves as a body of people to whom the hero can express his thoughts and feelings. In modern drama as such it does not exist. We have soliloquy and confidant instead. The expression of thoughts and feelings is natural in human beings. Therefore, while Greek tragedians, influenced by the then existing form of the state, and the nature of the object to which the action was directed, felt it necessary to introduce the crowd in the form of chorus, the modern tragedian, being concerned with the action, the object, the end, of which is private and not public in its nature, finds

it better to introduce him thinking aloud to himself e.g. Shakespeare in his Hamlet. The other form which is occasionally felt necessary is *confidant*.

Under the second, chorus as spectator of the drama, comes the following function—

Chorus stand for the public in the theatre. The very impression that the dramatist wishes to leave in the minds of his audience, he outwardly embodies in words of a chorus. This enables us to know what was the nature of the experience, the ultimate effect of the whole tragic action on the minds of the audience, that the author intended to produce.

Chorus as a part of dramatic technique :—

The whole plot, which is the object of dramatic imitation, is divided into two parts (i) presentable and (ii) unrepresentable. The one is to be acted out on the stage. The other is to be informed about. The two are interdependent in the production of the idea of the whole plot. The audience is informed about the unrepresented by various means. One of such means is the chorus. In Agamemnon for instance, the Chorus, that enter after the prologue, dramatically convey the information about the necessary facts and incidents, which it is necessary for the audience to remember in order to be able to appreciate the drama, but which cannot be acted out on the stage.

The other two parts, which the quantitative analysis reveals are (i) Episode and (ii) Exode.

Presentable and Unpresentable in Greek Drama

The presentable is acted out by the characters of the piece. But the dramatic machinery is employed in conveying the information about the unrepresentable, the parts of the plot which are external to the drama (i) which either happened before the commencement of the dramatic action and therefore, which it is not possible for the audience to know or (ii) which happen afterwards and require to be previously foretold

and announced. (iii) It was also the fixed custom of the Greek drama that no deed of violence could be acted on the stage, though showing the effect of such deeds was permissible.

Three means employed for conveying the information about the distant and mmediate past were (i) Prologue, (ii) Chorus and (iii) Messenger. We have illustrated the first two in the preceding sections. The illustration of the third is the messenger in Oedipus.

The means of informing about the near or distant future are gods and prophets, who were credited by the Greeks with the power of knowing the future.

Unity in Greek Drama

The word "Unity" has two senses (i) oneness and (ii) completeness. We have discussed what, according to Aristotle, constitutes completeness of action in a preceding section dealing with the quantitative analysis of tragedy. We have, therefore, to discuss here only what constitutes oneness of action.

WHITEHEAD AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA OF ŚĀṆKARA

By P. NAGARAJA RAO

(Continued from Vol. V Pt. 3)

In a similar manner Hegel and Rāmānuja held the view that pure being is non-different from Non-being. Before entering on a dialectical discussion of this topic it would help us to note that the negative description of Brahman given in the Upaniṣads does not mean that it is a spurious infinite or a Negative infinite. 'It is the only Reality that gives reality to all other objects. It is the reality of the world'. In the words of S. Radhakrishnan 'the Absolute includes the finite. It is the whole. It is the self determining principle which manifests itself in all the determinations of the finite without losing its unity with itself.'⁴² To use the words of Whitehead. 'It stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things.' The Upaniṣads declare that it is the very supreme Reality. It also says 'that by knowing it we come to know everything. Śāṅkara in a very eloquent passage in the *Chāndogya* points out that Brahman is free from space, attributes, motion, fruition and difference, being in the highest sense and without a second, seems to the slow of mind no more than non-being.⁴³

Now let us see as to why Brahman cannot be described in positive terms. Why does the Advaitin unlike others take to a different path? Why should we describe Brahman in negative terms? We have so far seen that Śāṅkara on

⁴² S. Radhakrishnan *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXIV. no 4. July 1914. P. 450 'The *Vedānta Philosophy and the Doctrine of Māyā*.

⁴³ *Chāndogya*. VIII-I-I.

the strength of his spiritual experience and on the testimony of scripture has postulated one central consciousness called Brahman. By positing only one philosophical category he has adhered best to the principles of Occam's razor.

The fundamental difficulty in the way of giving a positive description of Brahman is that there is no other entity in terms of which Brahman can be described. All descriptions presuppose more than one thing at least. We have to describe Brahman in terms of Brahman alone. Such a method is possible only if Brahman is admitted to have parts. The Advaitin finds it difficult to admit distinctions of parts in Brahman. His Brahman is not a mechanical whole of parts, nor is it an organism dependent on the cooperation of several organs that constitute it. It is an impartite whole (akhaṇḍa). Further, there are innumerable logical difficulties in the admission of the whole and part relation. So Brahman cannot be described in terms of its parts. Even if it is admitted, we do not get at an adequate description of the whole in terms of the parts. Besides, we get only the description of a part, because another part is employed to describe it.

Secondly, Brahman is presupposed in all the descriptions. There is nothing apart from Brahman so we cannot describe that which is presupposed in all descriptions. The finite and the non-particular cannot be described.

Above all these difficulties, there is the logical fallacy of contradiction in all descriptions. If we examine the presuppositions and the general nature of descriptions and definitions we find that it involves two entities at least.

Further, we need to indicate the differentia of the objects described. To explain a thing is always to relate a thing to something other than itself that goes before or after it. We have to assume here the category of relation. Without the assumption of the category of relation, finite thought cannot perceive. What the related mode of thought cannot

give us is not knowledge. All descriptions and predications employed in our cognitive activities involve the relational mode of thought. To know a thing we have to posit three factors. The Advaita metaphysics has inveighed against these two categories and convicted them of contradictions.⁴⁴ Most of the logical categories such as substance-attribute-relation, causation etc. all presuppose difference and relation.

Śaṅkara has indicated in brief outline that the concept of relation⁴⁵ which is presupposed in most categories is unintelligible. Let us take up the category of relation. In the statement 'the leaf is green ; greenness is predicated about the leaf. Now the predicate greenness must be something other than the subject if it is to be significant.' If it is identical with the subject, it fails to serve its function as a predicate.

It gives no information about subject. It can as well be the subject itself for it is identical with it. If it is to bear some significance, it must be something other than the subject. If it is different from the subject, we need some other term to relate it with the subject. Is relation then, a term, or different from the terms it relates? If it is identical, there is no subject-attribute relation. If the relation is different from the terms it relates, then it needs another relation to relate it. If we admit the need of a link of relations it lands us in *infinite regress*. Infinite regress and contradiction stultify thought. So all relational

⁴⁴ Śrī-Harṣa, a post Śaṅkara Advaita dialectician in a manner similar to Bradley has examined all the logical categories and convicted them of contradictions in his work.—*Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya*. He declares that the logician's definitions of categories such as substance, attribute, relation, cause etc. are vitiated by one or other of the four fallacies. They are Atmāśraya (self dependence), Cakraka (arguing in circle), Anavasthā (infinite regress) and Anyonyāśraya (reciprocal dependence).

⁴⁵ Bradley—*Appearance and Reality*, Part I, Chapt. III.

knowledge or knowledge that is mediate is necessarily incomplete. But human discourse is not possible without the category of relation. Bradley clinches the issue when he says 'The conclusion to which I am brought is that a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise most necessary, but in the end most indefensible.'⁴⁶ Hence positive description in terms of finite categories is possible only about the world of things. Brahman cannot be described because the concept of description is unintelligible in respect of it. There is no knowing Brahman but there is only Being Brahman.

Bradley's metaphysics and his analysis come very near to Śāṅkara. There are no doubt differences in their tenets. Their technique seems to be the same. So the description of Brahman in logical terms is not possible. So in one sense, paradoxical as it may seem, Brahman is not Truth, when we mean by truth, a logical value. Bradley observes that 'there will be no truth which is entirely true.' All predication is unintelligible with reference to Brahman. 'If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is not; and if you predicate what is not different, you say nothing at all.'

Though no positive definition of Brahman is possible, still the Advaitin does not leave Brahman without descriptions. There are two classes of definitions employed by the Advaitin called *Svarūpa lakṣaṇa*⁴⁷ and *Taṭastha lakṣaṇa*.⁴⁸ Brahman is described as 'satyam, jñānam, anantam'. These attributes should not be taken to mean that they are qualifying Brahman. Brahman is knowledge

⁴⁶ Bradley *Appearance and Reality*, P. 28 (ninth impression 1930)

⁴⁷ Svarūpam sad vyāvartakaṁ svarūpa lakṣaṇam.

⁴⁸ Kādācitkatve sati vyāvartakaṁ taṭastha lakṣaṇam.

i.e., jñānam, Brahman is existence and Brahman is bliss. There is no difference between the substance and the attribute.

Another line of interpretation suggests that these three attributes secure to exclude Brahman from the three-fold characteristic of the world, unreality, inertness and finitude. Apart from this, svarūpa lakṣaṇa Brahman is defined per accidens (taṭastha lakṣaṇa).

The purpose of the scriptural statements is merely to indicate Brahman and not to describe it. They indicate Brahman by pointing to some of its accidents. A thing may be defined in two ways. We can describe it by stating its essential nature, we may indicate it by mentioning its accidental attributes which serve to distinguish it from other objects. Most scriptural passages with reference to Brahman follow the second method.

From our examination of Śaṅkara's position we come to the conclusion that Brahman is consciousness, infinitude and Bliss and the only reality. It is not inert (jada). It is not unreal (anṛta). It is not misery (duḥkha). Consciousness, bliss and infinitude constitute its being. It is devoid of internal differentiations and external relations. It is other than the finite objects. It is that which is constant in whatever is variable, hence it is different from them, as the string is from the flowers strung thereon.⁴⁹

The real is not related to anything else, because there is nothing besides it to relate it with. To limit the real is to finitise it. There is no object like it. It is single and indivisible. It is infinite and partless. It is not an object of knowledge but it is knowledge itself. When knowledge is objectified the knower and the known are separated. They are presented as two different things con-

⁴⁹ Vācaspati *Bhāmali* yeṣu vyāvartamāneṣu yad anuvartate tat tebhyo bhinnam, yathā kuṣumbhyaḥ sūtram.

nected by us. Such an explanation does not sustain the organic nature of judgment. If we assume that subject and object are two mutually separate entities we can never know the object, but only know about it.

In a closely argued article the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri has described the Advaita theory of judgment. He argues 'that judging activity being purposive, we should, in determining its purport, look to its end rather than its form; and the cognition of identity rather than characteristics, is both an actual and intelligible end.' He points out that 'the relation of predication takes place within a whole of which subject and predicate are components; the whole is above *this* relation, and to that extent is supra-relational.⁵⁰ 'It is the whole that guides and directs the twofold functioning of the judgment.' We have so far seen how Brahman is 'something which stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things, something which is real and yet waiting to be realised.' Brahman is immanent, all-pervasive and transcendent. Further, Brahman is the reality of the flux of immediate things.

Whitehead's conception of Creativity at the first glance looks like Śaṅkara's Brahman. But a detailed and a concentrated study of the nature of Creativity points out the differences. 'Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own.⁵¹ It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterised, because all characters are more special than itself. But Creativity is always found under conditions, and described as conditioned.'⁵² Creativity comes

⁵⁰ S. S. Suryanarayan Sastri—*Akhaṇḍārtha-Journal of Oriental Research*, Vol. XII Part IV.

⁵¹ *Process and Reality* P. 42.

⁵² *Ibid* P. 43.

into actuality only by virtue of its accidents. But for these accidents or principles of limitation it has no actuality. God is described as the first accident as well as the creature of Creativity. Despite its indeterminate and non-actual nature, Whitehead affirms that it is the unlimited, all pervading, undifferentiated causal matrix of the whole world. Creativity, when it is limited becomes the urge towards differentiations and unification for the purpose of individualising itself into Creatures. It is concerned 'with becoming the being and the relatedness of actual entities'. It is divested of the passive receptivity either of 'form' or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity. It is there before all creatures. It is not an entity but a general activity that underlies all things.

Whitehead's description of Creativity gives us not Śaṅkara's Brahman but a logical abstraction. First of all, the matrix is described as indeterminate and it is above all non-existent. It becomes a bare intellectual abstraction, an assumption which does not explain itself. Śaṅkara's Brahman is the real among the reals, (*satyasya satyam*). All other objects of the world are real because of it. Brahman is the reality of the world. It is not a bare abstraction but an infinite consciousness, that is, bliss and knowledge. Such an assumption enables one to explain the world of plurality as the modes of Brahman. What that principle of limitation is, and why it should be so, are not answered by him. He holds the view that God is the accident by virtue of which Creativity becomes actual and the process is started. The purely indeterminate Creativity is turned into determinate freedom by the principle of limitation. There is no reason given for this accident. Its irrationality is accepted. First of all, we have the difficulty of understanding what Whitehead means by the abstract concept, Creativity. It turns out to be nothing more than an hypothesis. Further, there is this difficulty about Whitehead's

God. God is represented as an accident of Creativity. He says that Creativity is actual in God. There is also the statement that God is the first creature of Creativity. One and the same principle cannot be the cause and effect at the same time.

Besides a process must have a purpose. A process without a purpose even though we grant its inception cannot give us an orderly world, or a pattern of interrelated events. At best we can have some kind of changing world for what we know it might be a chaos and not a cosmos. An orderly evolution working out a pattern and achieving a definite purpose giving rise to novel things like the one described by Whitehead is not possible without the assumption of a principle of consciousness. A bare and abstract Creativity and a metaphysical principle of accident called God cannot account for a patterned process.

If Reality is merely a logical abstraction, we cannot account for the world. In the words of Hegel a system which builds its tenets on abstractions is at best a 'metaphysical romance'. The conception of Reality as activity is not foreign to Indian thought. The *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhism has developed such a concept. A more easy and artistic conception is that of the Sāṅkhyas. They envisaged Reality as a process of *Prakṛti*. But they never represented its nature as purely indeterminate and non-existent. They affirmed the existence of *Prakṛti* and attributed the complex nature of threefold characteristics to it. By such a concrete hypothesis the *Sāṅkhya* was able to account logically for the evolutes of the world which have threefold characteristics. But Whitehead wants us to derive the entire world of objects from the high abstraction of Creativity which is not actual in itself.

The conception of Reality as dynamic is not without difficulties. Śāṅkara argues at great length against the *Mādhyamikas* as well as the *Sāṅkhyas*. The nerve of

the argument is that an ever changing entity cannot be perfect. Once we admit a perpetual change we will not be able to get any thing, which is unchanging. Memory and the recognition of the old will become impossible. Further, when Reality is represented as a process there is the question of the inception of the process. What is responsible for the process? Whitehead holds the view that it is an accident, which limits Creativity and thus we have the Process.

Categories like purpose, goal, process and pattern are intelligible only with reference to a consciousness or a personality. The word Creativity cannot do the function of a conscious spirit or a supreme Creator⁵³.

Śāṅkara's ontology and logic did not lead him to the positing of three entities—world of matter, souls and God. The concept of personality as the highest category can explain to a certain degree the creation of the world. But a bare logical abstraction cannot account for it. The positing of a bare abstract Creativity as the ultimate category leads to the high road of irrational assumption of an accident for it. No passage from it to the world of objects is possible. There is absolutely no rational and intellectual link between Creativity and the world. This hinter-land is the weakest link in Whitehead's thought. He dogmatizes here that there is a necessity for an accident, but does not tell us why it should be so. He no doubt secures a pattern for his system. The deduction from Creativity is aridly systematic, it is forced and artificial, for the most part ingenious. This artificially constructed concept which is undeviating in its abstractions is incongruent with Reality.

Śāṅkara describes Brahman in negative terms and we saw why he does so. His conception of Reality is not a bare abstraction or a mere intellectual hypothesis. It is an

⁵³ Śāṅkara's commentary on *Vedānta Sūtra* II, II, 1-10.

intuited Reality. We shall now examine the relation between Brahman and the world of Reality.

The nature of Brahman becomes very clear to us in our examination of the relation of the world of objects and Brahman. Śaṅkara's ontology does not permit him the positing of more than one entity. Some interpreters have taken their stand on Brahman and denied reality to the world and have branded it as illusory. They have treated the world as unreal and compared it to the illusory snake delusively perceived in the rope. They have described the world as of the nature of dreams and illusion. Such an interpretation reduces Advaita to solipsism which is not its real character.⁵⁴ Śaṅkara gives an epistemic status to the world. In his commentary on the *Vedānta sūtra* he refutes the Vijñāna-Vāda school of Buddhism which treats the world as a show and an illusion.⁵⁵ Śaṅkara defines the real as that which is not negated in all times. Brahman alone is real in this sense. The absolutely unreal is not cognised. It does not exist at all e. g., 'the barren woman's son' 'the sky lotus', 'the horns of a hare' etc. The world of objects is certainly not on the level of unreality. It is not like dream experience.

The world of waking life and empirical being is very different from illusory existence (*prātibhāsika sattā*). It is real and rooted in Brahman.⁵⁶ It is in the world of empirical beings that we strive to attain Advaita realisation. So the world of objects and souls is not unreal but belong to one order of existence. It is indeterminable in terms of the

⁵⁴ Post Śaṅkara thinkers interpret the master's doctrine and stress the negative element in his thought. They pay no heed to the realistic aspect of Śaṅkara's thought.

See. Dr. D. M. Dutta's article on the *Realistic aspects in Śaṅkara's philosophy* Proceedings of the first Indian Philosophical congress, 1925, P. 120-128.

⁵⁵ Śaṅkara on *Vedānta sūtras* II, II, 28-29.

⁵⁶ *san mūlāḥ somya imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ, Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, 8, 4.

real and the unreal exclusively. It is *sadasadbhyām anirvacanīyam*; positively described it is *sadasadātmaka*. Śaṅkara describes the world in his introduction to the commentary as the combination of the real and the unreal (*satyānṛte mithunikṛtya*). In another context Śaṅkara declares that 'those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state.'⁵⁷

We have seen so far that Śaṅkara is keen on distinguishing the world from Brahman on the one hand and from non-existence on the other. The author of *Vedānta sūtra* has declared that this world is non-different from Brahman.⁵⁸ Brahman is the cause of this world. But for him there will be no world.

If Brahman is declared as the cause of the world, we have to attribute personality to Brahman. Most of the theists of the world declare God to be the efficient cause and creator of the world. The Advaitin cannot and does not follow that line of thought. To admit that Brahman creates this world is to concede that the infinite subjects itself to the limitations of time and space. Such an acceptance convicts Brahman of contradictions. It is held to be partless and infinite and so it cannot get related to the finite. The infinite unconditioned Brahman cannot get related to finite world. Nor can it be maintained that the absolute manifests itself in and through the finite. That would mean that the Absolute is not independent but relative. It is not finite for its self-expression. Further, Brahman being self-luminous, it is always manifest. It always abides in its nature. Manifestation has no meaning

⁵⁷ Śaṅkara's commentary on *Vedānt sūtra* II, 11, 29. *naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambhādikam kasyāmcidapyavasthāyām bādhyate*. 2, 2, 29. See also *Vedānta sūtra*, II, 1, 16.

⁵⁸ *Vedānta sūtra* II, 1, 14.

for it.⁵⁹ There is another doctrine that God transforms himself as the world. It is called *pariṇāma vāda*. This doctrine too is not free from defects. Does Brahman transform his entire self, or a part of his self? If he transforms his entire self, he has to share the thrills and anguishes of the objects and men in the process of the transformation. Besides, he will be only an immanent God and will have no transcendental existence.

Further, we have the question whether it is the whole of God that is transformed or only a part. If it is the whole, God gets lost in creation, and Advaita would be a variety of Pantheism. If it be contended that only a part of Brahman is transformed, we need to admit the part and whole relation in Brahman. Such an admission militates against the impartite nature of Brahman. Further, as one of the commentators of Śaṅkara points out, to keep one part of God pure and another part for creation is a like taking one half of a fowl for cooking and the other for laying eggs.⁶⁰

So Śaṅkara steers clear of the two doctrines, creation and transformation and takes to a third type of explanation. He calls his doctrine *Vivartavāda*. It holds that Brahman appears as the world. The reality of the world is Brahman. It is non-different from Brahman but still it appears as its effect. The world is the consequent and Brahman is the ground. So the *Vedānta-sūtra* declares that the world is non-other than its cause Brahman (ananya). Vācaspati, the commentator of Śaṅkara, explains the implications of the statement clearly. He declares that non-difference from Brahman does not mean identity but the denial of

⁵⁹ Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* P. 9. defines self-luminosity as follows—*avedyatve satyaparokṣa vyvahārayogyatā*.

⁶⁰ Anandagiri on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Vedānta sūtra* 1, 2, 8. *na hi Kukuṭāder ekadeśo bhogāya pacyate ekadeśastu prasavāya kalpyate virodhāt*.

difference.⁶¹ The effect is non-other than the cause, but it is not identical with the cause. The world is the effect and in that capacity it shares with the cause the negation of unreality. As effect it differs from the cause, because it falls short of Reality. Brahman alone is the sole reality and it is non-dependent and self-explanatory. The world cannot be taken as eternal and constant ; if it were so it would not be an effect. It would be self-explanatory; it is not so.

Neither can we treat the world as unreal. If it is unreal it would have nothing in common with Brahman which is real. If it were unreal it cannot be the product of the real. The relation between Brahman and the world is unique. It is an one-sided relation. Brahman is in no way dependent on the world, but the world is dependent on Brahman. The effect has no existence apart from the cause, but the cause is not influenced by the effect.

Śaṅkara distinguishes two kinds of casuality one in which the cause is itself transformed in producing the effect, and the other in which the cause without itself undergoing any change, produces the effect.⁶² Śaṅkara takes up the second view of causality. The traditional illustrations refer to the one sided dependence, and do not mean that the universe is illusory. The world is said to depend on Brahman as the appearance of the snake depends on the rope or that of a silver on a shell. 'The point of these illustrations as Radhakrishnan puts it 'is to affirm that the production and cessation of the appearances makes no difference to the reality of which they are reflections.'

The Upaniṣads too declare that Brahman is the Reality sustaining the universe and its workings. The regularity and

⁶¹ Vācaspati-Bhāmatī II, 1. 14.

na khalv ananyatvam ity abhedam brūmah, kim tu bhedam vyāse-dhāmah. Further it is commented that what is sought to be established is not identity but the denial of the existence of a reality apart from the cause.

⁶² They are called *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*.

the moral order, *ṛta*, that exists in this world is due to Brahman. Yajñavalkya after a long negative description of Brahman tells Gārgi 'Verily, O Gārgi at the command of that imperishable the sun and the moon stand apart, Verily, O Gārgi, at the command of that imperishable the earth and the sky stand apart. . . . Verily, O Gārgi, if one performs sacrifices and worships and undergoes austerity in this world for many thousands of years, but without knowing that imperishable, limited indeed is that (work) of his. Verily, O Gārgi, he who departs from this world without knowing that imperishable is pitiable⁶³. . . . That imperishable is the unseen, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the ununderstood Understander⁶⁴. . . the *Taittirīya* expresses the truth in a poetic language 'out of fear of Him the sun rises, through fear of Him, Agni, Indra and Death speed.'⁶⁵ 'Puṣpadanta's verse in praise of the Lord brings out the truth.⁶⁶ 'O, Lord 'thou art the sun, moon, air, fire, water, sky and earth, I know not anything that is, which you are not.' The *Gitā* points out 'that the splendour which is in the Sun and which illumines the whole universe, that which is in the moon and which is like-wise in the fire—that is mine. (Lords)'.⁶⁷

We have seen so far that the world or the universe is not as real as Brahman, because it is limited and admits of subject and object relations. But we have also to note that it is not unreal or *tuccha* or *asat* as some make it out.⁶⁸ Such

⁶³ *Bṛhadāranyaka* 3, 8, 9.

⁶⁴ *Ibid* 3, 8, 11.

⁶⁵ *Taittirīya* II, 8.

⁶⁶ *Mahimnāṣṭotram*. V. 26.

⁶⁷ *Gitā* XV v. 12.

⁶⁸ Vidyāranya *Pañcadaśī* VI, 130 'that the man in the street (*laukika*) regards the world of *māyā* to be real (*vāstavi*). He who is learned in scripture regards it as unreal (*tuccha*) and the metaphysician regards it as indeterminable (*anirvacaniya*).

'*tucchā'nirvacaniyā ca vāstavi ce'ty asawtridhā, jñeyā māyā ca tribhirbodhaiḥ śrauta-yauktika-laukikaiḥ*'

a view goes against the very injunctions of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads exhort us to transcend ignorance and realise the self in this very world of space and time. 'If one fails to attempt to realise Brahman in this life he stands to a very great loss'⁶⁹ declares the Kena. Our laudable attempt to realise ourselves through modes of life, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nidhidhyāsana* (instruction, reflection and contemplation) would lose all the value if the world is entirely unreal. If the universe is declared unreal, our ethical efforts like love, heroism, sacrifice, etc., will be bereft of their significance, and stand on no higher level than he encounters of Don quixote with wind mill. An entirely unreal universe cannot exhibit the rule of law, mechanical and moral, that we find in this world. The rigidity of the causal principle that obtains in the universe is possible because of the reality of Brahman at the back of it.⁷⁰

There cannot be such an impassable gulf between Reality and existence. We should not asunder them apart. Interests of Philosophic unity require of us to bridge it. The late Professor Suryanarayana Sastri writes that 'from the empirical to the real, from appearance to the absolute, a passage is either possible or it is not. If not, the absolutist philosophy is an irrelevant night-mare. If on the contrary the passage is possible, there can be no radical discontinuity between the two. The appearance is neither entirely an appearance nor has it a distinct Reality in a fantastic realm of its own. It is real; but its reality derives from and is reducible to the Absolute.'⁷¹ The traditional view of the distinction between the two realms, the transcendental and

⁶⁹ Kena II 5.

⁷⁰ See. S. Suryanarayana sastri *Advaita, causality and Human freedom. The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XVI 1940.

⁷¹ S. Suryanarayana sastri *An advaita plea for continuity. The journal of Madras University Vol. X no. I.*

the empirical, have been carried too far. In fact, there are no two exclusive, discrete and diverse realms. The empirical is only a semblance of the transcendental. The whole is present in the part informing it and giving it, reality. 'Reality and existence are not to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries. Nothing on earth is utterly perfect or utterly without perfection. Those who have the vision of perfection strive continually to increase the perfection and diminish the imperfection'.⁷²

Śaṅkara points out that 'the whole multiplicity of creatures existing under name and form, and in so far as it has supreme being itself for its essence is true; if regarded as self-dependent, it is untrue'.⁷³ From these considerations, it follows that the world is not a mere illusion and show. 'It is real not being ultimate but being a form, an expression of the ultimate.' In the words of Radhakrishnan 'the world is not so much negated as reinterpreted'. 'Unreal the world is, illusory it is not'.

The Advaita view of cause merits a detailed consideration. It is only when we understand what the advaitin means by cause we can know the relation between Brahman and the world. The concept of cause involves the notion of relation. The cause and effect are related to each other. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and Bauddha schools hold the view that the effect is something new and different from the cause. They say that the effect comes into being *de novo*. They argue that if it were not so the expression that the cause produces the effect will have no meaning.

If the cause were not different from the effect, and if the effect was already in the cause, then there is no need for the operation or the instrumental cause. On that view we

⁷² S. Radhakrishnan *Eastern Religions and Western thought*. P. 31.

⁷³ Śaṅkara on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI, 3, 2, Sarvam ca nāmarūpādi vikārajātam sadātmanā eva satyam, svatastu aṅgtaṁ.

find no use for the potter or his instruments because the pot is already in the clay.

For such reasons the cause is held to be different from the effect. The Sāṅkhya system criticises the Nyāya view and many an Advaitin expresses himself in sympathy with the Sāṅkhya criticism. The Sāṅkhya criticism paves the way for the Advaitin.⁷⁴ If the effect is held to be something new and as not contained already in the cause then we have the contingency of something being produced out of nothing. If every effect is something new and not connected with its cause anything can produce anything; a position contrary to and falsified by human experience.

The Sāṅkhyas hold the view that the effect is prefigured in the cause. It is found in the cause in a potential form. Cause only manifests the effect. Causal operation is of the nature of an activity. It transforms what is potential into the form of the effect. The effect is not something new. It is because of this we see men seeking appropriate causes for appropriate effects. Not even a thousand artists can turn blue into yellow.⁷⁵ Nor can we extract oil out of sands. It is seen that one who wishes to produce a particular effect seeks an appropriate cause e. g., one who wants curds seeks milk and not water.

If the effect is considered as non-existent, there is the doubt as to how a non-existent effect has connection with an existent cause. The effect is either different from the cause or is not. If it is not different, then there is no meaning in calling it a cause. If it is different, it can only be present

⁷⁴ The Sāṅkhya theory of transformation is the spring board for the Advaitin's theory.

Sarvajñātman *Saṅkṣepa-sāṅkhya*. II. 61.

Vivarta vādasya hi pūrtiva bhūmihī Vedānta vāde parināma vādah.

⁷⁵ Īśvara Kṛṣṇa *Sāṅkhya kārīkā*. v. 9.

This doctrine is called *Satkārya-vāda*.

in a non-manifest form in the cause. The effect is not contained in the cause. The Advaitin does not rest satisfied here; he finds that the Sāṅkhya is insufficiently logical. He directs his attack on the Sāṅkhya. Granting for a moment that causation is manifestation, we have the question, is this manifestation existent or not? If it is existent, then the causal operation of the manifestation is superfluous. If it is not existent, then the manifestation itself will require another cause for it. This lands us in *infinite redress*.

The Advaitin concludes that cause and effect should not be treated as distinct entities. That way we cannot explain the intelligibility of the concept. So Śaṅkara treats cause and effect as really identical, now appearing as cause and now as effect. We must deny their distinctness and treat them as the appearances of Brahman. The non-distinctness is asserted in respect of the relation between Brahman and the world. 'The causal relationship is to be understood as the relation between the substrate and the super-imposed, *i.e.*, the rope and the snake: But for the rope there would be no snake delusion. The snake delusion does not affect the rope in any way. The effect is nothing other than the cause though it appears to be different. But the Advaitin admits the efficacy of the causal concept in the world and holds that it is unintelligible only in respect of Brahman. The late Prof. S. Suryanarayana Sastry has clinched the issue in the statement that 'causal rigidity in the empirical world is consistent with the denial of causality in the transcendental world.' If there is not causal rigidity and moral necessity in the world our endeavour for self-realisation here will prove of no avail. So it does obtain in the world of Plurality.

The logical requirement of the school of Monistic idealism has to adopt this double strand of explanation but not the postulation of two entities. There is no real dualism between Brahman and the world or between substance

and modes, or between the Noumenon and the phenomenon. They all do not belong to the same order of Reality; one of them is the truth of the other in Hegel's language.

Such in short, is the line of criticism adopted by Śaṅkara. He just passes in review the different conceptions of cause and criticises them bringing out their varying fullness and worth. The lower conception finds its fulfilment in the higher. It is a progressive discovery of truth and the method of criticism is immanent.⁷⁶

The advaitin's conception of cause and effect in respect of Brahman is peculiar. Traditional exponents of Advaita hold that the one sided causal relation described by Śaṅkara i.e., the *Vivarta-vāda* is only found in delusive cognitions. *Vivarta-vāda* holds the view that the cause is in no way affected by the effect, whereas the effect has no reality apart from the cause. This type of one sided relation of transformation is found only in delusions. So some of the orthodox exponents of Śaṅkara hold the view that Śaṅkara's distinct genius and unique insight is displayed in the distinction he effects between the ordinary doctrine of transformation and his own doctrine of illusion. Following this line of thought they hold that world is unreal. There are a few passages where Śaṅkara asserts this view boldly. Sometimes he does so even setting at naught the authority of the *Vedānta-sūtra*.

A certain school of Advaita thinkers holds the view that the world is unreal, and that Brahman can be known only by negating the world. The relation between Brahman and the world on their account is the relation between ignorance and knowledge. It is a relation of contrariety. Both cannot be true; if one is true the other is false. They represent Reality and existence as antithetical principles. The nerve

⁷⁶ See Śaṅkara on *Vedānta sūtra* II. 1. 14.

of their argument is as follows. Brahman cannot be known by any direct *pramāṇa*, except through the appearance. The appearance is the world. This appearance has to be negated to know Brahman. By annulling it we know Brahman. If this were not so, says the orthodox interpreter, Śaṅkara would not have started with a dissertation on superimposition instead of a description of Brahman. They hold that the significance of the *adhyāsa bhāṣya* is that Śaṅkara sets a great deal by the method of negation.

A later day Advaita thinker Vidyāranya holds the view that the objects of the world have five aspects. They are—(1)⁷⁷ their existence, (2) their manifestation, (3) their lovability, (4) their name and (5) form. Of these the last two are related to the realm of unreality and the first three are of the nature of Brahman itself.

Now we have to see as to why and what makes Brahman appear as the world of Reality. The problem of creation is a very difficult problem. No completely satisfactory answer to it is possible. Hindu thought suggests many theories. Some hold the view that creation is due to the wondrous power of God, some regard it as a dream and an illusion. Some others assign it to the sweet desire of God. Yet others hold that it is due to God's desire to manifest all beings. Some hold it to be for the enjoyment and diversion of the Lord.⁷⁸

The Advaitin does not subscribe to any of these views. He says, the world is the expression of Brahman. It is a process of self-determination. This principle of self determination is called *māyā* or nescience. On the ontological side *māyā* is represented 'as the beginningless positive substance capable of being destroyed by Brahman realisation'.

⁷⁷ Vidyāranya *Dig-dṛṣya viveka* 20. *astibhāti priyam rūpam nāma cetyamśa pañcakam ādya-trayam brahma-rūpam jagad rūpam tato dvayam.*

⁷⁸ Gaudapāda's *kārika* Chapt. I. v. 7 to 9.

Māyā is the principal category with the help of which Śaṅkara accounts for the world of diversification. It is represented as a beginningless entity which is responsible for the world of diversity.⁷⁹ When Brahman is conditioned by Māyā we have the world of objects and souls. Māyā is of the nature of ignorance. It cannot belong to inert objects. It is an attribute of consciousness. It is described as a quality characterising conscious entities. It must have a locus. The individual soul is the locus of māyā. Besides a locus, Māyā being the nature of ignorance, requires a content (viśaya). Its content is Brahman. The soul is the locus and it is ignorant of Brahman.

Here it may be asked, how can we have the jīvas (souls) prior to the functioning of Māyā. For Māyā to function we need a locus and a content. Thus there is the defect of reciprocal dependence in respect of Māyā. We do not have souls prior to the functioning of Māyā, and we cannot have Māyā without the souls, for its locus. The resourceful advaitin posits the beginningless nature to Māyā.⁸⁰

Māyā besides being beginningless is positive also. It has two powers, it suppresses Brahman and shows up in its place the world of names and forms (nāma-rūpa prapañca). These two functions are called *āvarana* and *vikṣepa* respectively. It is because of these two functions we have the appearance of the world in Brahman. Unless it were a positive substance we cannot invest it with powers to create entities in place of Brahman.

Advaita logic holds the view that (difference) (bheda) is due to the functioning of Māyā. Difference as a category

⁷⁹ Author's paper: *The Implications of the doctrine of Māyā*, *Prabuddha Bharat*, April, 1944.

⁸⁰ The Advaitin holds six things as beginningless, they are Jīva, Īvara, Viśuddha cit, the difference between Īvara and jīva, avidyā, the connection between avidyā and soul—see Acyuta Kṛṣṇānanda's commentary of *Siddhāntaleśa saṅgraha* (Kumkonam edition) P. 305.

of thought is said to obtain in the world of appearance. It is not considered basic; Identity is considered basic. The category of difference is criticised at great length. The summary of the arguments divested of its dialectics is as follows; difference is a relation, it presupposes two terms; it needs a locus as well as the thing from which it is differentiated. In the language of the Indian logician difference depends on an *anyuyogī* and a *pratiyogī*; because it is of the nature of a relation. We cannot have a relation without two terms.⁸¹

Now the question is 'Is difference the nature of the thing (svarūpa) or is it an attribute? If it were to be the nature of the thing itself, it will break itself into a number of things, because difference is its very nature.

The function of difference is splitting up things. This process will go on endlessly and would not even rest with the primal atom.

If we consider difference not as the nature of the thing but as the attribute of the relata, even then we are not free from defects. Then there is the question, is the attribute different from its substrate or is it of its very nature? If the attribute is different from the substrate we have three units, the substrate, the difference which is its attribute, and the difference of the attribute from the substrate. Once we start on the circle; it lands us in *infinite regress*.⁸²

The dialectic leads us to the conclusion that identity is more fundamental than difference and that difference is derivative. Further, difference presupposes identity, and identity does not presuppose difference.

The school of thought that upholds the doctrine of 'identity-in-difference' remarks that identity too presupposes

⁸¹ Vācaspati, the commentator of Śaṅkara, bases his discussion of the dialectics of difference on Maṇḍana's *Brahmīsiddhi*.


⁸² S.S. Suryanarayana sastri's *Bhāmātī* (catuṣsūtri) edited with an English translation. see the introduction, PP.XVII—XIX also See PP. 174-179.

difference, because without difference identity has no meaning.

This argument would have some force if the Advaitin interprets the term identity to mean 'negation of difference'. It is not negation of difference (bhedaabhāva). It means the svarūpa ie; the *tādātmya*, the very nature of Brahman. So the criticism is pointless. It remains now for the Advaitin to point out that identity is basic and primary and it alone can claim ultimate validity.

The doctrine of Māyā is central to Advaita. So far we have seen that it is a positive, beginningless, entity responsible for the suppression of Brahman and the showing up of the world of difference in its place. Māyā has its jurisdiction over all the things in this world except Brahman. It is because of this, Māyā is sometimes referred to as the material cause of the world. Śaṅkara discusses the nature of Māyā in his celebrated introduction to the commentary on the *Vedānta sūtra*. There he points out that 'the entire world of social, scriptural and (śāstraic) discourse presuppose the doctrine of māyā. He boldly proclaims that finite knowledge and the concept of the instruments of knowledge all presuppose the doctrine of Māyā. It comes to saying that Māyā is presupposed in all our activities. Further, it is indicated that Māyā is necessary for the very possibility of finite knowledge. Thus the doctrine is derived from the experience of men. Māyā in the words of Swami Vivekananda, 'is a simple statement of facts; it is what we are and what is around us'. There is a persistent confusion in human life between the inert object and the ātman.

(To be continued.)



GAUDAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ

By JNANENDRA LAL MAJUMDAR

(ALĀTAŚĀNTI)

(Continued from Vol. V. Pt. 3. P 226)

VIII. (a)—*Vijñāna is imageless.*

अस्पन्दमानमलात्मनाभासमजं यथा ।

अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमजं तथा ॥४८॥

Translation—(48) Just as an unmoving fire-brand is imageless and unborn, so is unmoving Vijñāna imageless and unborn.

Awakening of Faith. p. 79—"When the Ālayavijñāna is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra VII.—"The state of imagelessness which is in compliance with the awakening of mind itself, is not affected by such changes as arising, abiding and destruction."

Ibid. Sagathakam 257.—"By passing on to Mind only, he passes on to the state of imagelessness; when he establishes himself in the state of imagelessness, he sees not (even) the Mahāyāna."

Ibid. Sagathakam 369.—"In the state of imagelessness, there is no reality, no Parikalpita, no Paratantra, no five Dharmas, no two-fold mind."

Exposition :—

Unborn, because causation is impossible. It is a false appearance like an image or shadow. There is the truth behind it which is the Light of Vijñāna or Citta of which it is the image, and which is calm and non-dual. Now, if we analyse the character of an image, we find that it is no doubt a false appearance, but this false appearance has the appearance

of being a second to the real thing which is seen separately and there is also a medium in which it appears. Thus in the face of the separate appearance of the image and of the medium, the thing itself cannot be called non-dual and the image also cannot be called unborn. Similarly, the world is perceived separately from Vijñāna and there is the perceiver by or in whom it is perceived. This discrimination surely vitiates the non-duality of Vijñāna, and the characteristic marks of perceiver and perceived falsify the idea of non-birth of the world.

In reply we have to say that the point of our comparison of the world with an image is only the unreality of both. We never mean to say that the world is, in all respects, what an image is. That would be identity and not comparison. But you may ask where is the example of an image-like false appearance, diversified in character, which is not perceived as a separate object from the reality of which it is like an image? I shall tell you. It is the optic illusion presented by a moving fire-brand. When the fire-brand moves, we see lines, curves and various other forms of light which are mere false appearances, images, as it were, of the fire-brand. When it ceases moving, the images disappear and nothing of the kind emanates from it. Again, when it moves, the images do not appear from a different source and as they are unrealities they cannot also be said to issue from it, and when it ceases moving, they do not go somewhere else and cannot also be said to have entered into it. Moreover, so long as the images are seen the fire-brand is not seen in its true form, and yet it is the fire-brand that is really seen when the images are seen. In short, the images are what are seen of the fire-brand when it is in motion.

It is the same with Vijñāna which being in motion, there appear the diversities of subject and object, perception and perceiver, which remain in view, covering the view of the

reality, only so long as it continues moving, but the moment it ceases moving, they disappear no one knows where as they appeared from no one knows where. They are what are seen of the Light of Vijñāna when it is in motion. Being really nothing and yet appearing as something they are always inscrutable as has been said before. No question of causation can arise here. *Thus the world is unborn and vijñāna is non-dual and discrimination is false.*

अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः।
 न ततोऽन्यत्र निष्पन्नालातं प्रविशन्ति ते ॥४९॥
 न निर्गता अलातात्ते द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः।
 विज्ञानेऽपि तथैव स्थुराभासस्याविशेषतः ॥५०॥
 विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः।
 न ततोऽन्यत्र निष्पन्दाज्ञ विज्ञानं विशन्ति ते ॥५१॥

Translation—(49) When the fire-brand moves the images are not from anywhere else. When the fire-brand ceases moving, they are not anywhere else, neither do they enter into it.

Translation—(50) As nothingness is their character, they do not come out of the fire-brand. It should be the same with Vijñāna also, for the image (here) is not different in character (from the image in the case of a moving fire-brand).

Translation—(51) When Vijñāna moves the images are not from anywhere else. When Vijñāna ceases moving, they are not anywhere else, neither do they enter into it.

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद् द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः।
 कार्यकारणताभावाद् यतोऽञ्जित्याः सदैव ते ॥५२॥
 द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुः स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि।
 द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावा वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥५३॥

Translation—(52) As nothingness (absence of substance) is their character, they do not come out of Vijñāna

for which reason they are always inscrutable, being non-existent as effects and no causal relation prevailing.

Translation—(53) A thing may be the cause of a thing and a nothing the cause of a nothing of course. (But) the dharmas (*i.e.*, the grasped and the grasping) cannot be proved to have the character of a thing or the character of a nothing.

एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चित्तं वापि न धर्मजम् ।

एवं हेतुफलाज्जातिं प्रविशन्ति सनीषिणः ॥५४॥

Translation—(54) Thus the dharmas are not born of the Mind, nor is the Mind born of the dharmas. In this way the wise comprehend (*lit.* enter into) the non-birth of cause and effect.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 561—“When the world is regarded as like Māyā and a dream, exempt from cause and condition, and eternally causeless, there is no rising of imagination.”

VIII. *Attachment is the cause and Māyā-like the nature of the birth of things.*

यावद्धेतुफलावेवास्तावद्धेतुफलोद्भवः ।

क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोद्भवः ॥५५॥

Translation—(55) As long as there is attachment to cause and effect, so long there is the arising of cause and effect. When the attachment to cause and effect vanishes, there is no arising of cause and effect.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, LI—“Mahamati, it is like the city of the Gandharvas which the unwitted take for a real city, though it is not so in fact. The city appears in assence owing to their attachment to the memory of a city preserved in seed from beginningless time.”

Awakening of Faith, p. 56—“All things, on account of our confused *smṛti*, appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused *smṛti*, the

signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world (of individual and isolated) objects."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, IX—"It is for the sake of the simple-minded that the Citta is said to be evolving as regards form. There is no such evolving in the Citta itself, which is beyond comprehension."

यवद्धेतुफलावेशः संसारस्तावदायतः ।

क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे संसारं न प्रपद्यते ॥५६॥

Translation—(56) As long as there is attachment to cause and effect, so long *samsāra* (birth-and-death) is spread. When attachment to cause and effect vanishes, *samsāra* is not attained.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXIII—"The Blessed One said—What is meant by a worldly object of enjoyment, Mahamati? It means that which can be touched, attracted by, wiped off, handled and tasted ; it is that which makes one get attached to an external world, enter into a delusion on account of a wrong view, and appear again in the Skandhas where, owing to the procreative force of desire, there arise all kinds of disaster such as birth, age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair etc."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXVIII—"Further, Mahamati, there are three attachments deep-seated in the minds of the ignorant and simple-minded. They are greed, anger and folly ; and thus there is desire which is procreative and is accompanied by joy and greed ; closely attached to this there takes place a succession of births in the paths When one is cut off from this attachment, no signs will be seen indicative of attachment or of non-attachment."

Exposition :—

(55-56) But you chuckle and say that in going to illustrate the non-duality of Vijñāna, we have stultified our idea of its calmness and thus our contention that the world

is unborn falls through, for activity is merely an effort to produce an effect, no matter whether the effect is real or fanciful. As the movement of a fire-brand produces an effect, so the movement of Vijñāna produces an effect which is the world, and thus there is causation. In defending ourselves against this charge, we have simply to draw your attention to the fact that the movement of the Vijñāna is merely relative, the movement of our attachment to causation being imputed to it as is the movement of a carriage imputed to the surrounding landscape. So long as our attachment to causation will operate, the Vijñāna will be hidden from our view (verse 82) and the world of causation will appear in its place, spreading the saṃsāra of birth and death. The moment our attachment to causation will cease to operate, the world and saṃsāra will disappear. It is like a transparent wheel rapidly revolving between a stationary fire-brand and an observer's eye and producing the same effect as is produced by a fire-brand itself revolving. When the wheel stops there is nothing but the stationary fire-brand. So the Buddha said, "When a (psychological) revulsion takes place in the Yogins (by the transcendence) of the Citta, Manas and Vijñāna, they cast off the (dualistic) discrimination of grasped and grasping in what is seen of Citta itself, and entering the Tathagatagarbha attain the realisation of noble wisdom; and in this there is no thought of existence or non-existence" (L. *Sūtra*, XXXV.) Non-brith, therefore is the truth.

VIII. (a) *Refutation of Nihilism and Eternalism*

संवृत्या जायते सर्वं शाश्वतं नास्ति तेन वै ।

सद्भावेन ह्यजं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नास्ति वै ॥५७॥

Translation—(57) Everything in its *saṃvṛti* (conventional) aspect is born, hence there is no eternity. Everything in its *sat* (paramārtha, ultimate reality) aspect is unborn, hence there is no annihilation.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LV—"Conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*) and ultimate truth (*paramārtha*)—if there be a third, non-entity is its cause; the false imagination belongs to the conventional; when it is cut asunder, there is the realm of the wise."

Ibid, *Sagathakam* 429—"According to conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*) things are, but not in the highest truth; to be confused in things not having self-nature—this belongs to conventional truth."

Ibid, *Sagathakam* 529—"When the *Parikalpita* is thoroughly understood (as to its nature), the *Paratantra* is not born; when the *Paratantra*, is understood, the *Parikalpita* becomes Suchness (*Tathatā*)."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXIII—"Eternalism rises from embracing a doctrine of no-causation, while nihilism rises from believing in the annihilation of causal conditions and in the non-existence of a cause."

Ibid, *Sagathakam* 869—"Others who are not wise abide in nihilism because of their negation of causation and reality."

Laṅkāvatāra, Sūtra, LXXXV—"When it is understood that the objective world is nothing but what is seen of the Mind itself this is emancipation, *Mahamati*, and not annihilation."

Exposition:—

(57) Of course, things are born to our worldly vision before which the wheel of attachment is revolving. It is *saṃvṛti* or conventional truth which is really another name for untruth. In *Paramārtha* or ultimate truth nothing is born. Such a birth of the world disproves the common notion of its eternality. But it must also be kept in mind that it is not absolutely nihil, for, on the one hand it is the result of attachment to causation which is in operation, and

on the other, in particular, it is what is seen of the true light of Citta or Vijñāna.

“I always preach emptiness which is beyond eternalism and nihilism,” said the Buddha.

धर्मा य इति जायन्ते जायन्ते ते न तत्त्वतः ।
जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ॥५८॥
यथा मायये मयाद्बीजाज्जायते तन्मयोऽङ्कुरः ।
नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्वर्मेषु योजना ॥५९॥

Translation—(58) The dharmas which appear to be born, are not born in truth (i. e., in reality). Their birth is like Māyā and that Māyā is non-existent.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XLIV.—“All things have the nature of Maya all things are like Maya because they are unreal and like a lightning flash which is seen as quickly disappearing.”

Ibid, Sagathakam 30—“As Maya is manifested depending on grass, wood and brick, though Maya itself is non-existent, so are all things essentially (mere appearances).”

Translation—(59) Just as from a seed created by Māyā, a seedling of the same nature is born and it is neither eternal nor annihilated, even so the dharmas should be considered.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XII.—As nothing is existent, “in reference to what should we talk of non-existence?”

C. *Nirabhilāpya—Śūnyatā*—Emptiness of Unpredicability

(B) *The falsity of Nāma (name)*

नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु शाश्वताशाश्वताभिधा ।
यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते विवेकस्तत्र नोच्यते ॥६०॥

Translation—(60) No such term as eternal or non-eternal applies to the dharmas which are all unborn. Where

expressions do not obtain, no distinction can be expressed (i. e. no distinguishing terms can be used for what are unpredicable).

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXVII—"Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredicable? It is that the nature of the false imagination is not expressible, hence the emptiness of all things in the sense of their unpredicability. Thus one speaks of the emptiness of unpredicability."

Awakening of Faith, p. 56—"Therefore all things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be expressed in any form of language."

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXVII—"I always preach emptiness which is beyond eternalism and nihilism."

Exposition :—

(58 to 60) Hence the world cannot be characterised as either existent or non-existent. No characteristic mark of existence or of non-existence appertains to it. How then do you characterise its appearance? Whatever appears must either exist, as a reality, or not exist, as a phantom, a flower in the sky. No, we say, there is another form of appearance in which things can be used as realities, although they are not so. This happens in the case of magically created objects, things having the nature of Māyā or illusion, which itself has no reality. Like a Māyika seedling born of a Māyika seed, the world is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indescribable and so no distinctive characteristic mark can be attributed to it.

Thus is established Nirabhilāpya-Śūnyatā—the emptiness of unpredicability—as stated by the Buddha. Hereby is also established the falsity of the dharma Nāma (name).

(R) *The falsity of Vikalpa (Discrimination)*

यथा स्वप्ने द्रव्याभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ।

तथा जाग्रद्द्रव्याभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ॥६१॥

Translation—(61) As in a dream the mind moves through (or, by) *Māyā* (to appear) as a two-fold image, so in the waking state the Mind moves through *Māyā* to appear as a two-fold image (viz. the grasping and the grasped).

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Sagathakam 213—“ Depending upon the Mind, there appears (within) a mind and without a world of individual objects (*rūpiṇaḥ*); this and no other is an external world which is imagined by the ignorant.”

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. LXIV—“ According to the Blessed One, depending on and attaching to the dualism of being and non-being, there evolve views characteristic of wrong discrimination as when the magician produces varieties of people that are not at all real and complete objects.”

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं चित्तं स्वप्ने न संशयः ।

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रन्न संशयः ॥६२॥

स्वप्नदृक् प्रचरन् स्वप्ने दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।

अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वापि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥६३॥

स्वप्नदृक् चित्तदृश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।

तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं स्वप्नदृक्चित्तमिष्यते ॥६४॥

चरन् जागरिते जाग्रद् दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।

अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वापि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥६५॥

जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणियास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।

तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रदचित्तमिष्यते ॥६६॥

Translation—(62) In a dream the Mind is doubtless the non-dual (reality) as well as the two-fold image. Similarly, in the waking state (it is) doubtless the non-dual (reality) as well as the two-fold image.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. VII—“Body, property and abode are objectifications of the *Ālayavijñāna* which is in itself above (the dualism of) subject and object.”

Ibid. LV—“ As to the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it; so is the nature of the false imagination.”

Translation—(63-64) Moving in a dream a dreamer constantly sees egg-born, heat-born and other jīvas (living beings) also (besides non-living things) lying in the ten directions. These (jīvas) who are sights of the Mind of the dreamer do not exist separately (i. e., are not different) from it (the Mind). Similarly, this Mind of the dreamer is considered to be what is their sight. (That is, there is only the Mind which appears both as the seer and the seen).

Translation—(65-66) Moving in the waking state a waking person constantly sees egg-born, heat-born and other jīvas also lying in the ten directions. These (jīvas) who are sights of the Mind of the waking person do not exist separately (i. e. are not different) from it (the Mind). Similarly, the Mind of the waking person is considered to be what is their sight.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LIII—“ The Manas is evolved along with the notion of an ego and its belongings, to which it clings and on which it reflects. It has no body of its own, nor its own marks ; the Ālayavijñāna is its cause and support. Because the world which is the Mind itself is imagined real and attached to as such, the whole psychic system evolves mutually conditioning.”

D. *Lakṣaṇa-sūnyatā*—Emptiness of individual marks

उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते किं तदस्तीति नोच्यते ।

लक्षणाज्ञान्यमुभयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्यते ॥६७॥

Translation—(67) (Thus)as both of them (i. e., the Mind and the jīva both appearing as the seer and the seen) are mutual sights, of which may it be said. “It is”? It is in this direction (i.e., the doctrine of the Buddhas) that both (i. e., the two-fold image, the see and the seen) are recognised to be empty of individual marks (*Lakṣaṇa-Sūnyam*).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XXVII.—“Mahamati, what is the emptiness of individual marks? It is that all things have no (such distinguishing) marks of individuality and generality. In consideration of mutuality and accumulation (things are considered to be realities), but when they are further investigated and analysed, Mahamati, they are non-existent, and not predicable with individuality and generality; and because thus no such ideas as self, other or both, hold good, Mahamati, the individual marks no longer obtain. So it is said that all things are empty as to their self-nature.”

Ibid. XXVII.—“This (teaching of) emptiness, no-birth, non-duality and no self-nature is found in all the sutras of all the Buddhas, and this doctrine is recognised in everyone of them.”

Exposition :—

(61 to 67) Having thus disposed of the doubts raised against the non-duality and calmness of the Light of Vijñāna or Citta, the true aspect of which we fail to realise on account of our attachment to the idea of causation and an image-like false aspect of which is all that we see of it as the world of subject and object, we return to the conclusion arrived at before that the waking state and the dreaming state are alike in nature and that all perceptions in both the states have the same value of fictitiousness measured in the scale of truth. It is the magic of Māyā, which though itself non-existent raises the vision of the existence of the duality of subject and object of which the world is composed where there really exists the non-dual self of Citta, and it is the same in both the waking state and the dreaming state. The virtual non-existence of the apparent existence of subject and object or the perceiver and the perceived, is clinched by the fact of their mutual dependence—Citta as perceiver sees itself as perceived jīvas or beings and these perceived jīvas as perceivers see Citta as their perceived. And this is the case

whether we are awake or dreaming. Hence neither the subject nor the object has any real distinction as such.

In this way beginning from an analysis of a dream, we have seen what we generally consider as the characteristic marks distinguishing the subject and the object of common usage in the world are really fictitious. Utility, extension in time and space, and persistence in perception, and even the discrimination of subject and object, all are false.

Thus is proved *Lakṣaṇa-sūnyatā*—the emptiness of characteristic marks. And the falsity of *Vikalpa* (discrimination) is also established.

यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥६८॥

यथा मायामयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥६९॥

यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥७०॥

Translation—(68-70) Just as a dream-made *jīva* (living person) is born and also dies, so all those *jīvas* come to be (appear) and also cease to be (disappear). Just as a *Māyā* (magic) made *jīva* is born and also dies, so do all those *jīvas* come to be and also cease to be. Just as an art-made *jīva* is born and also dies, so do all those *jīvas* come to be and also cease to be.

IX. Conclusion :—

In ultimate truth nothing is born

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।

एतत् तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चिन्न जायते ॥७१॥

Translation—(71) Never is a *jīva* born, his existence is not. This is that highest truth where nothing is born.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Sagathakam 228—“Seeing the world as like *Māyā* and a dream one abides with the truth; the

truth indeed is free from individual marks, removed from speculative reasoning."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. XXXIV—"In all things there is no self-nature; they are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality; (even) Nirvāṇa is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything enter into Nirvāṇa."

Exposition :—

(68 to 71) Nevertheless you take up the position that you cannot shake off the idea of your birth and death which is hammered deep in your every moment of your life. We too do not say that you can, for it is nothing but madness to ask one to give denial to a fact of which one is cognisant. Difficulty, however, arises on the question of the interpretation of the fact. There is undoubtedly a fact in your experience which you call birth and death, and standing on this fact you are persistent that you are not unborn. We too do not deny this fact, but what we want to impress on your mind is another fact which is that with the fact of birth and death you associate ideas which are wrong. These are the ideas of the existence of an ego or self-nature and the idea of the existence of characteristic marks. By non-birth we mean the non-existence of Emptiness of an ego or self-nature and that of characteristic marks, and not that beings or individuals do not appear and disappear. This we have explained before in connection with verses 24-25. They do appear and disappear, and we may even say that they are born and die, but in the sense in which a being is born in a dream, in Māyā or even as an artificial automaton.

This is that ultimate truth where nothing is born, possessed of a self-nature or individual characteristic marks.

चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद्द्वयम् ।

चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥७२॥

Transiation—(72) It is when the Mind is set in motion that there is this duality bearing the semblance of grasped (things) and grasping (persons). The Mind, (however), is eternally (or, eternal and) objectless and is hence called touchless.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LIII—“Like the waves of the ocean, Mahamati, the world which is the Mind-manifested, is stirred up by the wind of objectivity, it evolves and dissolves.” (See also the first quotation below verse 61.)

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 100—“Mind is grasped by mind, it is not a something produced by a cause; Mind is by nature pure, memory has no existence in (Mind which is like) the sky.”

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. IX—“It is for the sake of the simple-minded that the Citta is said to be evolving as regards form. There is no such evolving in the Citta itself which is beyond comprehension.”

Exposition :—

(72) As we have explained before in connection with verse 47 and after, the duality which appears as the subject and the object is nothing but what is seen of Citta or Vijñāna, when our attachment to the idea of duality sets it in relative motion and hides its true aspect from our view. The Citta itself is free from all touch with the duality and is hence called touchless. It is the ultimate truth.

IX. (a) *The test of the three forms of existence*

योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ ।

परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यान्नास्ति परमार्थतः ॥७३॥

अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नाप्यजः ।

परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्त्या संवृत्या जायते तु सः ॥७४॥

Translation—(73-74) One (i. e., a person) who exists in *Kalpita* (false-imagined) *samvṛti* (convention or usage) does not exist in *Paramārtha* (highest truth or reality).

Should one exist in the *Paratantra* (relative) aspect of *samvṛti*, (then also) one does not exist in *Paramārtha*. In *Kalpita samvṛti* one is unborn, in *Paramārtha* such a one is not even unborn. Determined in the *Paratantra* aspect of *samvṛti* one is however born.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LV—"False-imagined existence is not, but from the relativity point of view it is, assertion and refutation are destroyed when one is freed from the imagination.

"If the relativity-aspect of existence is, while the imagination is not, this means that there is a being apart from being and that a being is born of a non-being.

"Depending on the false imagination there obtains the relativity-aspect of existence; from the conjunction of form (*nimitta*) and name there rises false imagination."

Ibid. Sagathakam 527—"The Parikalpita and the Paratantra are mutually dependent and are not to be differentiated; thus with matter and impermanency, they are mutually conditioning."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LXIV—"The signs of existence and non-existence are falsely imagined and go on so imagined; (in fact, existence itself is) devoid of discrimination."

Ibid. XXXI.—"It is because of worldly usage that things are talked of as existing."

Exposition :—

(73-74) So far in our discourse regarding birth and causation we have been concerned mainly with Paratantra or relative existence, that is, existence of things which are Paratantra or mutually dependent. But there are two other kinds of existence to which also we have referred. The one is Kalpita or Parikalpita existence which is pure imagination in the ordinary sense of the term, as, for example, the

existence of a flower in the sky or a mirage which have no objective existence even in the worldly sense. And the other is paramārtha existence, the absolute existence (called Pariniṣpanna or absolute in the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*).

Now, if we apply the test of these three forms of existence to our experiences, we see that from the stand-point of Paramārtha the things which are Kalpita or even Paratantra in worldly usage are non-existent. But there is this difference between a Kalpita thing and a Paratantra thing that the former being unborn even in worldly usage there is nothing in it which can be said to be unborn from the Paramārtha stand-point, while the latter, though non-existent from the Paramārtha standpoint, is born or appears as a reality from the standpoint of worldly usage. So the Buddha taught, "It is because of worldly usage that things are talked of as existing." (L. *Sūtra* XXXI).

(8) *Samvid-jñāna* (Right Knowledge)

X. *Non-attachment is the cause of Nirvāṇa which is the realisation of non-birth and the touchless self*

अभूताभिनवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।

द्वयाभावं स बुद्धवैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ॥७५॥

Translation—(75) There is (only) attachment to non-existents (to account for the sense of birth), the duality (of grasped and grasping) does not exist there. Understanding thus the non-existence of duality one is freed from *nimitta* (form, appearance, object) and is not born.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXXIX.—"Further, Mahamati, there are two kinds of characteristic signs (lakṣaṇa) of self-nature. They are the attachment to words as having self-nature and the attachment to objects as having self-nature. The attachment to words as having self-nature takes place owing to one's clinging to the habit-energy of words and false imaginings since beginningless time. And the attachment

to objects as having self-nature takes place from not knowing that the external world is no more than Self-Mind."

Ibid, LI—"Mahamati, the Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas are to know this that the primary elements have never come into existence, and that, Mahamati, these elements are unborn. Thus understood, there is nothing in the world what is but discriminated (by our imagination)."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 213—"The mind being influenced by habit-energy, there rises a something resembling real existence (bhāvābhāsa); as the ignorant do not understand, it is said that there is the birth (of realities)."

Exposition:—

(75) But still the fact remains that this birth or appearance, whatever we may choose to call it and however false it may be in reality, is the cause of our sense of worldly existence which brings with it innumerable sufferings, and that what we really want is to get rid of them and not to be merely enlightened about the reality or unreality of birth. In short, how to get rid of birth which brings in its trail all the miseries of existence? Now, if we want to get rid of birth we have merely to get rid of its cause. What is the cause of birth? Before answering this question, we have first to consider what birth itself is. Birth is a condition the fulfilment of which presents a world of subjects and objects to our vision. But why should this condition arise at all, presenting a world of subjects and objects to our vision? It is simply because we want to have it so presented, for nothing comes to happen which does not serve a purpose. But why do we want to have it presented to us? It is because we have a foolish attachment to it. Why are we attached to it? Because we are ignorant of the truth that it is a mere nothing, a phantom that has not a shred

of existence in it as it appears to us. But why are we so ignorant? Because we are and feel it. This is no answer to the question, you will say. You are right, but you should consider that if the cause of ignorance could be explained that would be true knowledge the business of which is not to point out a cause of ignorance but to destroy it, and that the soul of ignorance is the absence of this knowledge.

Thus we see that because we are ignorant of the truth of the non-existence of the world of subject and object, we have an attachment to it and want to have it presented to us, and so it comes to us which means that we are born.

Hence, we see that the cause of birth is our ignorant attachment to the world of subject and object which however is really non-existent. Remove the cause and there is no birth. But how to remove it? Remove it by laying the axe at its root, by understanding that the duality of subject and object is non-existent, for you cannot possibly get attached to what you understand to be nothing, empty of self-substance. You may see it as one sees a mirage, but knowing it to be a mirage you do not run for it. Thus you are saved from birth, for you have attained Right knowledge.

In four sections this verse beautifully sets forth the grounds of saṃsāra and emancipation from it—attachment to duality, non-existence of duality, realisation of the non-existence of duality, and, cessation of saṃsāra. It is indirectly a statement of the *Four Noble Truths* taught by the Buddha, namely, sorrow, cause of sorrow, destruction of sorrow and means of destroying sorrow. It explains the *Chain of Origination* from ignorance devised by him for the guidance of the ignorant masses who are frightened by the idea of non-birth. It reveals the supreme importance of the teaching of emptiness.

It should be pointed out here that it is because the duality of subject and object is the cause of birth, they (subject and object) are called nimitta which literally means cause.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LV.—"When well pondered with intelligence (buddhi), there is neither relativity nor false imagination ; where perfect knowledge is, there is nothing (dualistically) existent ; for how with intelligence can discrimination take place?"

(See also quotations under verse 55).

यदा न लभते हेतून्तत्तमाधममध्यमान् ।

तदा न जायते चित्तं हेत्वाभावे फलं कुतः ॥७६॥

Translation—(76) When one does not get the causes, good, bad and indifferent, then the Mind is not born, for whence can there be an effect in the absence of a cause ?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra Sagathakam 416—"Habit-energy as cause is one, but as far as form (lakṣaṇa) goes it is triple ; this is the way in which a picture of one colour appears variously on the wall."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. XLV.—"Mahamati, the philosophers who are the gathering of the deluded, foster the notion of deriving the birth of all things from that of being and non-being and fail to regard it as caused by the attachment to the multitudinousness which rises from the discrimination (of the Mind) itself in this light the term 'Unborn' is to be understood."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 239—"When the Manovijñāna is turned over (vyavṛitta) the Citta frees itself from turbidity ; by understanding (the nature of) all things, the Mind (Citta) becomes Buddha, I say."

Ibid. XXXVIII.—"When the self-nature and the habit-energy of all the vijñānas, including the Alaya, Manas and Manovijñāna, from which issues the habit-energy of

wrong speculations—when all these go through a revulsion (paravritti), I and all the Buddhas declare that there is Nirvana, and the way and self-nature of this Nirvana is emptiness, which is a state of reality.”

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य ह्यनुत्पत्तिः समाद्वया ।

अजातस्यैव सर्वस्य चित्तदृश्यं हि तद् यतः ॥७७॥

Translation—(77) The *sama* (homogeneous, equable), non-dual non-rising of the Mind, free from *nimitta* (appearance, form, object) is also (the non-rising) of the unborn all, for it is but Mind-sight (the Mind as it is seen).

Awakening of Faith. p. 78—“When the mind (Alaya-vijnana) is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted the multiplicity of things disappears.”

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 561—“When the world is regarded as like Maya and a dream, exempt from cause and condition, and eternally causeless, there is no rising of imagination”

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, XLIII—“Thus, Mahamati, this error being discriminated by the wise turns into Tathatā (Suchness) with them, by virtue of a revulsion which takes place in them concerning the Citta, Manas, Manovijnana, false-reasoning, habit-energy, the (three) svabhavas and the (five) Dharmas. Thus, Mahamati, there is this statement that Tathata is Mind emancipated.”

(E) *Tathatā* (Suchness)

बुद्धवानिमित्तां सत्यां हेतुं पृथगनाप्नुवन् ।

वीतशोकं तथाकाममद्वयं पदमश्नुते ॥७८॥

Translation—(78) Understanding the true fact of the absence of *nimitta* (form, object) (and) not getting a *hetu* (cause) separately, one tastes of the state which is past all grief, and desireless, (and) fearless.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Sagathakam 421—"To be undefiled in inner realisation, to be released from cause and form (hetu-lakshana), to attain the eighth stage and the Buddha-stage—this is the essence of Tathagatahood."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. XXXV—" (The Buddhist doctrine is this). Mahamati, when a (psychological) revulsion takes place in the Yogins (by the transcendence) of the Citta, Manas and Vijñana, they cast off the dualistic discrimination of grasped and grasping in what is seen of the Mind itself, and entering the Tathagatagarbha attain the realisation of noble wisdom ; and in this there is no thought of existence or non-existence."

Ibid. LXXX—"Mahamati, in the eighth stage, the Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas, Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas cease cherishing discriminative ideas that arise from Citta, Manas and Manovijñana Mahamati, at the eighth stage there is Nirvana for the Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas."

Ibid. VI—"Mahamati, my teaching consists in the cessation of sufferings arising from the discrimination of the triple world, in the cessation of ignorance, desire, deed and causality, and in the recognition that an objective world, like a vision, is the manifestation of Mind itself." (*See also quotations under verse 57*)

Exposition:—

(76 to 78) Now who is he that is thus saved from birth? He is the jīva or person who feels his birth, the subject himself. If so, it comes to this that the subject who is non-existent has an ignorant attachment to himself and the world of non-existent objects and so has a feeling of birth which also is non-existent. Does it not amount to nihilism, non-existence of everything? If it be said that nevertheless there is the feeling of birth which is undeniable, then it comes to eternalism, for if emptiness

which is eternal can feel birth, then there is nothing which can remove that feeling . If it be said that it is removed when the non-existent subject and object, which appear as having Paratantra or mutually dependent existence, are understood by the non-existent subject as really non-existent on that ground, then why should not the condition of mutual dependence, which is here Paratantra and not Parikalpita in emptiness, appear again and make emancipation temporary? In reply we have first of all to point out that there is no essential difference between Paratantra and Parikalpita, the only difference between them being that while the Parikalpita is understood to be Parikalpita by worldly knowledge, the Paratantra is understood to be Parikalpita by True knowledge, by the knowledge of the non-existence of the world. The Paratantra is merely a more firmly rooted plant in our imagination than the Parikalpita. Therefore the Buddha taught, "The Paratantra and the Parikalpita are mutually dependent and are not to be differentiated" (Sagathakam 527). When one truly realises that the world is not existent though appearing as existent, then one feels that it is no more than a flower in the sky, that is, the Paratantra turns into Parikalpita. The world then for ever loses all its capacity to appear as a reality and there is permanent emancipation. Why? You would question again. If emptiness which is nothing can be perceived as something even as Parikalpita, what is there to remove that perception for ever? Here we would draw your attention to the fact that in the perception of a flower in the sky there are two factors to be considered, namely, the flower and the sky,. The flower is emptiness and the sky is reality. When the emptiness of the flower is realised, the reality of the sky is realised at the same time—the two come together. It is even so with the perception of the world, and this we have said before in verse 28—the perception of the birth of the world is like the percep-

tion of foot-prints in the sky. Now, when the error is understood what becomes of the flower that was perceived? Considered from one standpoint, it vanishes—it was emptiness, appeared somehow as a reality and now disappears as emptiness, that is all. But considered from another point of view which is more comprehensive, it was really the sky which, through an inscrutable error appeared as a flower; where there was nothing but the sky, a flower was seen. When the error is detected the flower turns into its real self, the sky. Similarly, it is the true Light of Citta, which through an inscrutable error, appears as the false light constituting the subject. When the subject detects the error, he turns into his self, the Citta, and with him goes the world of his perception. Hence the Fully-enlightened One said, “When the Parikapita is thoroughly understood (as to its nature) the Paratantra is not born; when the Paratantra is understood, the Parikalpita becomes Suchness” (Sagathakam 529). Thus it is not nihilism when we speak of one’s being saved from birth. “When it is understood” said the Buddha, “that the objective world is nothing but what is seen of Citta itself.....this is emancipation, Mahamati, and not annihilation.”

It is not also eternalism. For, the birth of Citta as subject is a mere fiction, and when every shred of the attachment which generated the fiction disappears the fiction also disappears for ever. The truth is that Citta is eternally free from the nimitta of subject and object and so the question of birth does not at all arise about it in any shape, and the eternal non-birth of Citta as subject indicates also that of the visible world which is nothing but Citta as it appears to worldly vision. The sky was never born as a flower, nor was the flower ever born as such, for it was nothing but the sky as it appeared to a perverted vision.

In this way, understanding the true non-existence of nimitta and seeing that attachment has also no existence

of its own, the jīva or subject attains Citta-hood where there is no suffering, no hankering, no fearing.

Thus is established the truth of Suchness.

E. *Pracarita-Śūnyatā*—Emptiness of work (done by a jīva).

अभूताभिनिवेशाद्दि सदृशे तत् प्रवर्तते ।

वस्त्वभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निःसङ्गं विनिवर्तते ॥७९॥

Translation—(79) It is owing to one's attachment to the non-existent (cause and form) that it (i. e., this tranquil state) becomes active accordingly (producing sufferings, craving and fear). But understanding the non-existence of things one realises touchless inactivity.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. XXVII—"Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness of work? It is that the *Skandhas* are devoid of an ego and its belongings, and go on functioning when there is a mutual conjunction of cause and effect. Thus one speaks of the emptiness of work."

Ibid. LXI—"From the night of the Enlightenment till the night of the Parinirvana, the Tathagata has not in the mean time uttered even a word, nor will he ever utter; for not speaking is the Buddha's speaking."

This is explained in *Lankāvatāra Sūtra. LXXXIX*, in the following manner :—

"The Tathagata points out the Dharma without deliberation, without contemplation, and by means of such words as are original and independent. Because of his right thinking and because of his unfailing memory, he neither deliberates nor contemplates."

Ibid. LXVI—"The Tathagata's Jnana is pure, (resting) in quietude in the most excellent patience (or recognition of truth); it is productive of excellent sense and is devoid of purposiveness (*samudacara-varjitam*)."

F. *Apracarita-Śūnyatā*—Emptiness of no-work (in Nirvāṇa)

निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्चला हि तदा स्थितिः ।

विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्साम्ययमजमद्वयम् ॥८०॥

Translation—(80) cf. 93. Then, for certain, one who is inactive and remains inactive is established in the position which is (the position) of no-work. It is the realm of the buddhas (wise). It is *sāmya* (*samatā*, sameness) which is unborn and non-dual.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. XXVII—“Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness of no-work? It is that the Skandhas are Nirvana itself and there is no work doing in them from the beginning. Therefore, one speaks of the emptiness of no-work.”

Ibid. LXXVII—“When it is understood that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind itself, discrimination no more rises, and one is thus established in his own abode which is the realm of no-work. The ignorant work and discriminate, but not the wise.”

Exposition :—

(79-80) It is this calm Citta-hood which is revealed to our mundane vision in false character as the duality of subject and object variously shaped according to the multifarious character of attachment which is its cause. The question now arises, does not the jīva who has realised the falsity of the creation and attained Cittahood continue to see the vision of the world? The answer is, it does not matter whether he does or does not, for having understood the non-existence of things he loses all touch with them and becomes quiescent. He has desisted from activity and will never again be active. It is this quiescence alone which belongs to the Buddhas or wise men and not the non-existence of the world. Is not this quiescence also non-existent? No, it is the self of the reality, the unborn, non-dual *sāmya* or sameness.

Thus are established Pracarita-sūnyatā—Emptiness of of work and Apracarita-sūnyatā—Emptiness of no-work.

XI. *The Self is Dharmadhātu which is self luminous but obscured by attachment to ideas of existence, non-existence, and so forth.*

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् ।

सकृद् विभातो ह्येवैष धर्मधातुः स्वभावतः¹ ॥८१॥

Translation—(81) The birthless, sleepless, dreamless (sāmya) becomes perfectly illumined by itself (that is, becomes thoroughly revealed by its own light). For, this Dharmadhātu is, by its self-nature, eternally luminous. (Dharmadhātu means Dharma-material, that is, the Dharma which is the material composing the other Dharmas.)

Awakening of Faith. pp. 61-62—“Enlightenment is the highest quality of the Mind ; it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of subjectivity (smṛti). As it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of subjectivity, it is like unto space (akasa), penetrating everywhere, as Dharmadhātu (the unity of all). That is to say, it is the universal Dharmakaya of all Tathagatas.”

Ibid. pp. 55-56—“What is meant by the soul as Bhutatathata is the Dharmadhātu (the oneness of the totality of things) the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the Doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreate and eternal.”

Ibid. p. 57—“In the essence of Bhutatathata, there is neither anything which has to be excluded, nor anything which has to be added.”

Ibid. p. 74—“Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity abiding in Nirvana.”

Exposition :—

(81) The question still arises, is this quiescence of Cittahood, perceived or not? If it is not perceived,

1. The current reading धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः is evidently due to the commentator's not knowing the Mahāyāna term—‘धर्मधातु’.

it is not revealed and cannot be said to exist. If it is perceived, it is a non-reality as an object. The answer is, it is the Light itself, self-revealed, unconditioned, invariable—It is eternally revealed by its own nature, this Dharmadhātu, i.e., the Dharma which is the material composing all Dharmas, the ultimate reality of all Dharmas. As the true Light its name is Vijñāna or Citta and as the true Existence its name is Dharmadhātu. It is the Light of the highest knowledge not dependent on any inferior light for its revelation. Bhūtatathatā (Suchness of existents), or, simply Tathata (Suchness) is another designation for Citta or Dharmadhātu, for all existents are unified here.

सुखमाद्रियते नित्यं दुःखं विव्रियते सदा ।

यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहेण भगवानसौ ॥८२॥

Translation—(82) This Bhagavān (possessor of infinite merits) (Dharmadhātu) is always easily obscured by attachment to any and every Dharma, (i.e., the other Dharmas, form, name and discrimination), and always with difficulty freed from the obscurations (āvaraṇa).

Awakening of Faith. p. 82—“The defiled vijñana is called Klesavarana (affectional hindrance), because it obscures the fundamental wisdom of Bhūtatathata. Avidya is called Jneyāvarana (intellectual hindrance), because it obscures the spontaneous exercise of wisdom from which evolve all modes of activity in the world.”

In the translation of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* these hindrances are called passion-hindrance and knowledge-hindrance respectively. (See quotation below verse 97).

Exposition :—

(82) The wealth of knowledge, the richness of creation and the infinitude of capacity are all here. He is the Bhagavān, the omniscient, omnipresent, all-powerful Lord, the Eternal-unthinkable. “My highest reality,” said the Buddha, “is the Eternal-unthinkable since it conforms to the idea of a

cause and is beyond existence and non-existence. Because it is the exalted state of self-realisation, it has its character ; because it is the cause as the highest reality it has its causation ; because it has nothing to do with existence and non-existence it is no doer ; because it is to be classed under the same head as space, Nirvāṇa and cessation it is eternal The Eternal-unthinkable of the Tathāgatas is thatness realisable by noble wisdom within themselves." (L. *Sūtra*, XVII) "(Adoration) to the Dharma," writes Aśvaghoṣa, "whose essence and attributes are like the ocean, revealing to us the principle of anatma and forming the storage of infinite merits."

Now, if there is the infinite principle of Light, eternally resplendent, why do we miss it ? We miss it because there is the hindrance of attachment to the other Dharmas. From the standpoint of the Light itself, there is, as we have seen before, no question of its missing us, because we have no existence in it or to it. It is from our standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of the jīva who is non-existent and has yet an inscrutable worldly existence, that it is said that the Light is hidden from our view by attachment to the world of form, name and discrimination. This has been fully explained before. The hindrance operates in two shapes. It first appears in the shape of Avidyā or ignorance by which the true Light is obscured and the egolessness or non-existence of self-nature of everything in the world is not perceived. Avidyā is called Jñeyāvaraṇa as it signifies absence of Vidyā or Jñāna, the true knowledge of the Jñeya Dharmadhātu. Then it appears in the shape of Kleśāvaraṇa or passion-hindrance when the world is perceived and considered as existent, non-existent and so forth.

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्ति नास्तीति वा पुनः ।

चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥८३॥

Translation—(83) It exists, it does not exist, it exists and does not exist (at the same time), or, again, not that it

exists and does not exist (at the same time) with (these ideas of) impermanence, permanence, bothness and nothingness (not-bothness) an ignorant person forsooth obscures it (i.e., the Dharmadhātu).

Awakening of Faith. p. 59—"Bhūtatathatā is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence."

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. L—"What is meant by (being devoid of) the four propositions? It means to be devoid of oneness and otherness, bothness and not-bothness, being and not-being, eternity and non-eternity. These are called the four propositions. Mahamati, train yourself to examine carefully all things as regards these four propositions."

Exposition :—

(83) When the world is thus erroneously viewed by the ignorant, the true Light is thereby obscured. What are the erroneous views held by the ignorant about the world? They all hinge on the worldly perception of existence and non-existence, and can be classified under four heads, namely the view that a thing "exists," as bull's horn; the view that something "does not exist", as a hare's horn; the view that something "exists and does not exist" at the same time, when we think that a thing is eternal in the alternate forms of cause and effect so that when it is existent as the effect it is at the same time non-existent as the cause and vice versa; and the view that a thing is "not (such) that it exists and does not exist" at the same time, so that when it does not exist it becomes nihil, absolutely nothing. All things in their essential nature are nothing but Dharmadhātu. But instead of seeing them as the Dharmadhātu, ignorant people impute these characteristics to them from which the Dharmadhātu is absolutely free. Had they been real characteristics of things, they would surely have been

characteristics of the Dharmadhātu of which the things are composed. Or, had they been characteristics of the Dharmadhātu they would surely have been real characteristics of things. But things have not these characteristics, neither has the Dharmadhātu these characteristics, so that from neither standpoint can these characteristics be called real. It has been shown before (verse 58) that the birth of a thing is like *Māyā*, so that to say that it "exists" as a particular born thing does not indicate any real existence of this nature and when there is no real existence of this nature it is meaningless to say that something "does not exist" as a particular born thing. It has also been shown (verse 57) that the views of eternalism and nihilism are both wrong, because things as they are born are not eternal and things in their essential nature can never be nihil. Gauḍapāda has aptly said that these views are tantamount to ideas of impermanence, permanence, bothness and nothingness (not-bothness) of things, for worldly existence is impermanent and worldly non-existence is permanent, i.e., what appears disappears but what disappears never reappears, and in eternalism as cause and effect there are both the ideas of permanence and impermanence, and nihilism is nothingness. These four propositions are really the one proposition of existence and non-existence viewed from different standpoints, for all dichotomies depend on it. If this is proved to be false, every idea involving a dichotomy will fall through. The great Buddha examines it in the following masterly way : "Said the Blessed one: Mahamati, there are some philosophers who are addicted to negativism, according to, whose philosophical view the non-existence of the hare's horn is ascertained by means of the discriminating intellect which affirms that the self-nature of things ceases to exist with the destruction of their causes; and they say that all things are non-existent just like the hare's horns. Again, Mahamati, there are others who seeing distinctions existing in things

as regards the elements, qualities, atoms, substances, formations and positions, and, attached to the notion that the hare's horns are non-existent, assert that the bull has horns. Mahamati, body, property and abode have their existence only when measured in discrimination. The hare's horns neither are nor are not; no discrimination is to be made about them. So it is, Mahamati, with all things, of which neither being nor non-being can be predicated. Have no discrimination about them. Again, Mahamati, those who have gone beyond being and non-being, no more cherish the thought that the hare has no horns; for they never think that the hare has no horns because of mutual reference, nor do they think that the bull has horns because no ultimate substance is to be obtained however minutely the analysis of the horns may go on even to the subtlest particles known as atom; (that is), the state in which noble wisdom is realised is beyond being and non-being the non-existence of the horns has no reference to the non-rising of discrimination. Why is it not so? Because there is discrimination owing to the idea of horns Because of this dependence of discrimination upon the idea of the horns, and because of this relationship of dependence and apart from the anyananya relationship, one talks of the non-existence of the hare's horns, surely not because of the reference (to the horns of the bull) However minutely the atoms are analysed no horn (substance) is obtainable; the notion of the horns itself is not available when thus reasoned. As neither of them (that is, the bull's nor hare's) are existent, in reference to what should we talk of non-existence? The dualism of being and non-being as held by the philosophers does not obtain as we see in the reasoning of horns" (*L. Sūtra*. XII).

In short, the Vijñāna, Citta or Dharmadhātu is the Light and the Existence without any touch of subjectivity and objectivity.

[To be continued

SHORT NOTES

RAGHUPATI UPADHYAYA

By DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

AMONG a large number of scholars of Mithila, whose names have long fallen into oblivion, the name of Ragupati Upādhyāya, who was at one time the premier scholar of that glorious land of light and culture, has been rescued and we shall briefly refer to his works and his date of activity.

Raghupati was the son of the famous Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar Rucidatta, who was a most distinguished pupil of Jayadeva *alias* Pakṣadhara Miśra. Rucidatta was the most popular Navyanyāya scholar in Madras (Mithilā ?), where a separate school of Navyanyāya, inspired by his monumental commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, survived for a long time (*vide Tanjore Cat.*, pp. 4577-4602). As a pupil of Pakṣadhara his date is roughly about 1500 A. D. Raghupati read with his own father and wrote several works, of which the following three were examined by us.

(1) *Śabdamaṇiparikṣā* i. e. a commentary on the last part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. An old complete copy of this book is preserved in the *Sarasvatī Bhavana*, Benares. We reproduce the colophon found at the end (fol. 171a):—

इति महामहोपाध्याय श्रीरुचिदत्तात्मज महामहोपाध्याय श्रीरघुपति
विरचिता शब्दमणिपरीक्षा समाप्ता । शुभमस्तु संवत् १६४४ समये आषाढ वदि
एकादशी बुधे लिखितं चेति—संख्या ४५६४ ।

The date of the copy works out quite regularly to be June 21, 1587 A. D. when the 11th tithi of the dark half of the month coincided with a Wednesday. It is the oldest copy of Raghupati's work and was probably written in the life time of the author.

(2) *Anumāna* part of the same work, preserved in the same library, complete in 109 folios. It concludes with the following verse, a glowing tribute to his father's achievement:—

व्याख्यास्ति गौतम-कणादमतप्रसंगे, सर्वत्र (सान्तर-?) गुरोर्गुणवत्यथापि ।

तद्गूढभावपरिशीलनकुण्ठबुद्धे-भूयान्मुदे रघुपतेरयमुक्तिवन्धः ॥

It can be easily surmised that Raghupati must have written a commentary on the *Pratyakṣa* part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, but as far as we are aware, no copy of this part has yet been discovered.

(3) *Śabdālokarahasya*, a commentary on the last part of Pakṣadhara's *Āloka*, also preserved in the same library (Hall: *Contributions*, p. 40 etc.). Complete in 166 folios.

Besides the above three works we traced and examined a fragment of Raghupati's *Āloka-sāra* preserved in the B. O. R. I., Poona (Ms. No. 132 of A. 1883-84, foll. 1-50, 76-133). It goes to the *Avayava* portion of the *Anumāna* part. It begins:—श्रीजगदम्बायै नमः

श्रीमन्नुसिंहचरणौ प्रणिपत्य मूर्ध्ना, ज्ञात्वा गुरुपमगुरोरनुमानखंडे ।

आलोकसारमपसादितदोषजातं प्रीत्यै सतां रघुपतिः प्रकटीकरोति ॥

There cannot be any doubt that Raghupati must have commented also on the *Pratyakṣāloka*, which, however, remains yet to be discovered.

As a son of Rucidatta, Raghupati's date can be safely fixed about 1550 A. D. He was still living in 1583 A. D., as he is said to have given assent to a '*Nirṇayapatra*' at Benares. According to Cītebhaṭṭa-*Prakarana* by R. S. Pimpūtākāra (Bombay, 1926, pp. 76-7), there was an assembly at the Mukti-maṇḍapa of Benares concerning a class of Brāhmaṇas named 'Devarṣi' in the Saka year 1505 being a Subhānu year under the Southern system of Vṛhaspati cycle. Among those present were (1) Bhāvaye Gaṇeśa Dikṣita, the leader of Cīpolne Brāhmaṇas, (2) Bakhle Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, Kahnāde leader, (3) Seṣa Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Pandita of Mahārāṣṭra, (4) Gopi Bhaṭṭa

of Gujrat, (5) Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya of Gauḍa and (6) Raghupati Upādhyāya of Tirhut. Raghupati must have settled then at Benares in his old age. This date of Raghupati, the second and third quarters of the 16th century A. D., is confirmed by the fact that he referred to Siromani respectfully by name in the *Ālokaśāra* and was probably the first scholar of Mithila to do so. The passage is cited below:—

स चेति । (Anumānāloka, fol. 67a—“स च व्यतिरेकशब्दस्य विपक्षव्यावृत्तिपरत्वे संगच्छते न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिपरत्वं इति ध्येयम्”) पञ्चरूपसंपत्तेर्गमकत्वप्रवादे विपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वमेव गते न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरिति मूलयुक्तिरनुसंधेया । शिरोमणयोपि अनुमर्थं संवदन्ति, परन्तु भंग्यन्तरेण । तथाहि, व्यतिरेकः विपक्षे हेतोरभावः । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ साध्याभाव-हेत्वभावयोर्यौ व्यतिरेकौ । साध्यहेतू तयोर्व्याप्ताविति (*Anumāna-Dīdhiṭi*, Jāgadiśī, p. 820) व्याख्यानेस्य स एवार्थ इति ॥ (fol. 100a: at the end of the chapter on Kevalānvayī). Five devotional verses of a vaiṣṇava poet Raghupati Upādhyāya are cited in the *Padyavali* of Rupa Gosvāmin. He may be identical with the present author. (*Padyavali*, vv. 82, 87, 97, 125 and 302)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE SANSKRIT MANUSCRIPTS
IN THE GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL MANUSCRIPTS
LIBRARY, MADRAS, By A. Sankaran, M. A., Ph. D.
and S. M. Fazlullah, M.A., L.T., Vol. XXX Sup-
plemental, 1947, pp. xxviii+10,769—10,966. Price
Rs. 7-10-0.

The Volume under notice contains a descriptive Catalogue of 230 manuscripts of different branches of Sanskrit literature. A few of the more important and rare works, described in this volume are :

(1) *Bhāradwāja-Sikṣā* with the commentary of Lakṣamana. (2) *Gītāvivṛtiḥ* by Śrī Vidyādhirāja-Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. It is a commentary on the *Gītā* according to the dualistic Philosophy. (3) *Mahāvākyaṛtha-vivṛtiḥ—Tattvaprabodhinī*. It is a commentary on the *Mahāvākyaṛtha* of the *Adi-Śankarācārya*, by Cidānanda Brahmāśrama Swāmi. (4) *Bālabodhinī* by Śankarācārya. This is an independent work on the Advaita School. Discription given about the Mss. is very scanty and sometimes nil. So it is impossible to make out any new information from this. It is desirable to quote some more matter from the Mss.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MUḌRĀ-RAKṢASA. By
Dr. G. V. Devasthali, M. A., Ph. D. Published by
Shri Keshav Bhikaji Dhawale, Shri Samarth Sadan,
Benham Hall Lane, Bombay 4. 1948 pp. IV + 174.

The book under review is meant as an introduction to the Study of Viśākhadatta and his well-known drama—*Mudrā-Rākṣasa*. It has been written mainly for the Study

of University Students. In eleven chapters the author deals with the Author, the Plot, A critical appreciation, characters, Sources, Viṣākhadatta as a Dramatist, and Society as depicted in the *Mudrā-Rākṣasa*. He has in a way tried to make the book very useful and comprehensive. He has supported every statement of his either from the text or from some external authority.

The book has been very well written with a wider outlook. Dr. Devasthali has shown his critical judgment in dealing with every aspect of the problems. He has utilised all the material available on the subject in a befitting manner. His approach is scholarly and is based on a critical study of the text. The book is very useful and I wish that such hand-books should be published on all our old authors. Dr. Devasthali deserves our congratulation and encouragement. The printing and get up of the book are also quite good.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA. By
Tiru G. Subramania Pillai, M. A., L.L. B., Annamalai
University. Published by the University, Annamalai
Nagar. Pages xii+145.

The book under review contains a series of lectures delivered in the Universities of Benares and Allahabad under the auspices of the Annamalai University as the Sri Arulnandi Śivāchārya Swamigal Sivajuāna Siddhiār Lectureship. In five chapters the author gives us in brief an Introduction and History of Śaiva Siddhānta, its metaphysics, Atma Darśana, the Doctrine of the Divine Guru, and Śivaprakasam. The author has supported his statements with quotations from Tamil works. In a way it is a hand-book of Tamil religion as the propounders of this school believe that the roots of saivism are embedded in the ancient classical lore of the Tamils, the Sangam Literature. Śaiva Siddhānta claims to give an Advaitic interpretation of God and the Universe. But it is clear from their texts that it is not an orthodox system.

In this small book the author has tried to give the essential features of the Śaiva Siddhānta. It is a well written book. It is hoped that those interested in the subject will be benefitted by it.

PRĀCĪNA BHĀRATĪYA ŚĀSANA-PADDHATĪ. By Dr. A. S. Altekar, M. A., L.L.B., D. Litt., Benares Hindu University. Published by Bharati Bhandar, Leader Press, Allahabad. Bhārata Darpana Granthamālā Series No 1. 1948 pp. 5 + 275. Price Rs. 5-0-0.

Dr. Altekar is a well known scholar of Ancient Indian History. He has contributed several original articles and has also written several books. The book under review is the first of its kind in Hindi. The book is divided into fourteen chapters. The author has examined almost all the views advanced from time to time on various problems of Ancient Indian History and has given better interpretations in several cases. One may not agree with all his conclusions, but that does not minimise the importance of the book. It is written in lucid and interesting language. The book is fully documented and is meant for being treated as an authoritative text in Hindi. It can easily be recommended to our students. The publisher deserves our hearty congratulations for having published such a fine book in Hindi.

ANANDARANGA VIJAYA CAMPU OF Śrīnivāsa Kavi, edited by Dr. V. Raghavan, M. A., Ph. D., Published by Palaniappa Brothers, Teppakkulam, Tiruchhirapalli 1948. pp. xv + 199. Price Rs. 4.

The book under review is a historical Kāvya written by Anandaranga Pillai, the head clerk of Duplex. From the records preserved, we learn a good deal about the life history of this poet. The Campu is not merely a fine specimen

of the composition of our poet but it also abounds in historical references of the time. From its pages we learn that Cennakeśavapura or Cennapaṭṭana is the name of Madras.

It is a well written Kāvya. The merits of a good Kāvya are easily found in the description of the ṛtus. The style is simple and fluent. One can easily follow the language and the sense. Of course, here and there we find the artificiality of a kāvya as well. We are very thankful to Dr. V. Raghavan of the Madras University for having edited this interesting Kāvya.

BHARATIYA SIKKE. By Shri Basudeva Upadhyaya, M.A.
Published by Bharti Bhandar, Leader Press, Allahabad
1948 pages 14+259. Price Rs. 5.

The authorities of the Bharati Bhandar deserve our congratulations for having started a very useful series under the name of *Bharat Darpana-Granthamala*. The book under review is the second publication of this series. This is just the time when we should try to publish our own authentic researches in Indology after having scientifically examined all the available material from Indian stand point. The ancient period of Indian History needs much more investigation and researches. Archaeological finds including coins are of immense value in this respect.

It is indeed a matter of great satisfaction that attention of Indian scholars has been drawn towards this just after our gaining independence. The book under review is a faithful attempt in this direction. The author has quite successfully collected the results of previous writers on the study of coins and has placed before the scholarly world his own views thereon in Hindi. It is the first contribution of its kind. We learn from this all about the importance of coins in the reconstruction of our history in several aspects.

The book is divided into fifteen chapters. The author has dealt with the history of coinage from the earliest period up to the days of the East India Company in chronological order. He has also referred to from time to time, the conditions of the country. The comparative study of the coins of different periods is very informative and useful. In brief, the author has tried to make the book quite comprehensive. He deserves congratulations for his successful attempt to make a substantial contribution to Hindi.

A HISTORY OF SANSKRIT LITERATURE. Classical Period.
Vol. I. By Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, C.I.E., M.A.,
PH.D., D.LITT. and Dr. S. K. De, M.A., D.LITT.,
Published by the University of Calcutta, 1947. Pages
cxxxix + 833. Price Rs. 25.

The volume under review is a fresh attempt to write an exhaustive history of Sanskrit Literature. Dr. S. N. Das Gupta is the General Editor and has contributed to this volume Preface, Introduction, History of Alankāra Literature, and Editor's Notes. Dr. S. K. De has contributed the history of Kāvya Literature.

In the Introduction the author deals with the development and growth of Sanskrit poetry from the earliest time. He discusses special features of Kāvya, concept of drama, Aesthetic Emotion, Transcendent object of literary art etc. to a great length. In the second section of the Introduction, the author deals with the social background of Literature. Along with this he also treats of the types of literature, types of Drama, Dramatic art, place of love in literature etc. The treatment of the various important problems in this section appears to be not so synthetic. Students will feel confused at times while reading this

Introduction. Thoughts are scattered and not connected in any way.

The second book deals with the History of Kāvya literature. This book has been comparatively very well written. In chapter I we have origins and characteristics, the second chapter covers from Aśvaghoṣa to Kālidāsa, the third chapter is exclusively devoted to Kālidāsa, the fourth and the fifth deal with the successors of Kālidāsa in poetry, prose and drama. Chapters sixth and seventh are devoted to the later decadent Boetry, Prose and Drama. The author has tried to be exhaustive and comprehensive in his treatment of the subjects. He has collected all the material available and has critically discussed the various aspects of Kāvya. He has dealt with a few selected poets quite thoroughly and has given his own independent view on several important issues.

Book III is devoted to the History of Alankāra literature. The author has discussed the origin and development of Alankāra from the earliest time to the time of Panditarāja and has also mentioned the names and works of some of the less important authors of recent times. But in no way the treatment can claim to be exhaustive; there is yet much scope for addition and critical treatment.

Book IV contains Editor's Notes. The writer has taken some thirtyfive poets and their works and has given their chronological references. Besides, he has also discussed in brief various aspects of their poetry, prose, characterisation, dramatic art etc. These notes are not exhaustive and could have been easily included in the treatment of respective poets and their works.

We, however, heartily welcome this addition to our literature from the pen of experienced Indian scholars. No doubt, it is a very hard and searching task. But we hope that the contributors will take the trouble to make the work a

real and original contribution to the literature written from Indian outlook and after a careful study of the authors and their works in origin. We no more like the western outlook in the interpretation of our thoughts. In fact, western scholars cannot 'correctly deal with our thoughts. Even a single volume is so costly that no individual student can purchase it, but we hope all the Institutions and Libraries will encourage this publication by purchasing one or more copies of the book.

EARLY HISTORY OF INDIA (Second and Revised Edition).

By Nagendra Nath Ghosh, M.A., Allahabad University, 1948 pp. xx + 430. Price Rs. 12.

The book under review is a revised edition of the work. Prof. Ghosh has collected almost all the new materials found in course of these ten years and has incorporated them in this edition. The work has been prepared mainly for the use of students. There is sufficient proof in the body of the book to show the originality of the writer. In order to help the students five maps have been given. It is a matter of great satisfaction to see that fresh efforts are made to write an authentic history of Ancient India, but there is yet much to be done. It needs much more investigation with critical Indian outlook into the literary and other evidences from original sources. We cannot altogether neglect our Purāṇas. It is also very necessary to fix the chronology of these sources which is possible only by careful study of the original texts. Prof. Ghosh has tried to make use of some of these sources, but it is not sufficient.

It is however, a matter of great pity to find Prof. Ghosh making such statements, without making himself fully acquainted with the correct interpretation of Hindu scriptures, as "The wrong began when the division

became hereditary on account of the selfishness of the priestly class who gave a fantastic and supernatural explanation of their origin..” (p. 42) and similar other peculiar views on pages 42-43. Again, the author is not correct when he says—“(The philosophy of Buddhism) does not formally deny the existence of God” (p. 54), (vide-*Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Pañjikā* on it, pp. 549-559) “The Nirvāṇa of the former (Buddhist) is escape from existence” (p. 60) and so on. It will not be out of place to point out here that the temple of Viśwanatha was never destroyed by ‘Aurangzeb, though our historians think it to be so (vide-*Critical Bibliography of Mīmāṃsā* by Dr. Umesha Mishra, p. 54)

Thus there are several statements which need further investigations. In spite of these short-comings the book is quite helpful to our students and Prof. Ghosh deserves congratulation for such a useful book.

ORISSA. By L. N. Sahu; Servants of India Society, Cuttuck, 1949. Pages 60; Price Re. 1.

It will be a mistake to take this brochure of sixty pages as a scientifically enumerated story of Utkala—her kings and her civilization. It is on the other hand, an ill-made collection of other people’s opinions on the kings of Orissa, the religious sects that are prevalent there and on the reason and nature of the erotic scenes which are inscribed in most of the temples there.

Among the kings, Shri Sahu emphasises the glory of the Sailendra dynasty though without adducing much evidence he concludes that “the Sailodbhava dynasty is the same as the Sailendra dynasty” (p. 11). The information that he gives about such other dynasties as the Bhauma and the Ganga appear to be too confused and ill-assorted.


Among the religious sects of Orissa, Shri Sahu gives much space to Alekhism and says that the philosophy of

its chief exponent Mahima Gosain was "Hindu-like but yet in many respects un-Hindu" (p. 24). It is interesting that with his Advaitism, his cult had been able to attract the untouchables. It is possible that, as Shri Sahu vaguely suggests, there was some indirect influence of Islam on them; it may be to that extent more democratic, than many other sects.

The last few pages of the brochure contain the reprinting of Shri Upadhyaya's paper on the Erotic Scenes in the temples of Orissa, which have for long baffled several scholars who had been putting forward different views. The prevalence of the Vajrayanists, as Shri Upadhyaya suggests, may be only one of the reasons and the source of the cult of nudity can perhaps be traced from earlier records.

It would have been much better if Shri Sahu had given us a more reasoned and well-connected account of Orissa instead of the padded-up brochure he has given us. The book may be to many misleading.

AMAR MUKERJI.



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